USA
Source: www.highnorthnews.com

The Brazilian government has submitted the proposal to sign the Svalbard Treaty to the National Congress, which is now under consideration.

According to Jefferson Cardia Simões, Director of the Polar and Climate Center at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), whom I spoke with during the Arctic Circle Assembly 2025 in Rejkjavik (16-18 October), “there is no reason for the agreement not to pass, there is no cost to it”.
If approved, Brazil will become the last BRICS country to join the Svalbard Treaty, extending the bloc’s legal footprint all the way to the High North. Brazil’s entering Svalbard inevitably raises the question of alignment or, as Arne Holm put it, “another BRICS in the wall.”

Research is not explicitly mentioned among the activities covered by the Svalbard Treaty; however, Norwegian authorities have in practice facilitated international research and education on the archipelago, creating the conditions for today’s diverse scientific community.

Yet political trust in the post-Ukraine invasion era has fractured, and Brazil is stepping into that gap.
In the post-2022 Arctic, the question is not who you are but who you are with. Threat perception has shifted, and the term “like-minded states” is emphasized more than ever.

Brazil positions itself as a gatekeeper of its own partnerships

Professor Simões explained that Brazil has been in communication with Russia regarding a possible joint scientific station on Svalbard: “We are open to cooperation, but what matters if someone offers it”.

Rather than seeking entry into a Western-defined framework, Brazil positions itself as a gatekeeper of its own partnerships.

Cooperation becomes performative; a way of signaling diplomatic autonomy and claiming legitimacy in an international order where moral hierarchies have blurred and the lines between good and bad partners are no longer fixed.

This actually fits President Lula da Silva’s broader foreign-policy posture that a deliberate balancing act that favors pragmatic autonomy over ideological alignment.

For Brazil, joining the Svalbard Treaty is more than a legal act, it is an entry point into Arctic dialogue. Svalbard offers one of the rare platforms through which non-Arctic or geographically distant states can engage directly with Arctic under a legitimate international framework.

Another BRICS in the Wall – Or How Walls Are Replacing Cooperation in the Arctic

In that sense, the archipelago functions as a diplomatic crossroads between presence and participation.

BRICS, But Not BRICS-as-Usual

The BRICS are not present in Svalbard as BRICS. They do not act as a coordinated bloc, nor do they pursue a shared Arctic strategy.

Rather, they perform separate actions; China as an established polar power, India as a cautious multilateralist, Brazil as a newcomer seeking legitimacy through cooperation.

This dispersion exemplifies what could be called post-Western multilateralism that the Western states are no longer alone in setting the rules of multilateral cooperation and new actors are also co-constructing the narratives(s) of the Arctic. 

Two years ago, Russia floated the idea of establishing a science center in Pyramiden with its BRICS partners.

China already operates the Yellow River Station in Ny-Ålesund

Yet, little has materialized from that proposal. Indian representatives made it clear that India has had no talks with Russia on scientific cooperation in Svalbard as they are already conducting research there.

China, for its part, already operates the Yellow River Station in Ny-Ålesund. Brazil, by contrast, as a BRICS member, is currently discussing such cooperation with Russia.

Its motivation is both practical and symbolic; to begin conducting Arctic research and, through that, to enter the Arctic arena.

From a normative (increasingly a suspicious term, though) perspective, perhaps naively, cooperation can mean something quite different for actors outside the established circles.

Rather than treating every gesture as a move in a geopolitical game, one might read cooperation as an act of survival, an effort to persist in a world that seldom makes room for difference.
Also read (the text continues)

The Evolving Concept of Arctic Exceptionalism: From Isolation to Geopolitical Leverage

For some, cooperation is not a geopolitical maneuver, but a way to remain visible and to exercise the rights that international law already grants them.

Cooperation as a Choice to Know the Other

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, EU’s and USA’s relations with Moscow have reached their lowest point since the end of the Cold War, shaping how every act of alignment is interpreted.

Even if the system is called “multipolar”, in today’s fractured world, the zeitgeist pushes states toward bipolarity; one is either with so-called West or with Russia-China axis. Global debate has increasingly revolved around the hype word like-mindedness.

But perhaps it is time to look at cooperation from a diagonal angle; how can non-Arctic and non-Arctic-Council observers develop integration in the region?

Such a perspective could help Arctic states recalibrate their own strategies, but also Arctic venues and gatherings need to open space for those developing their Arctic interests.

Brazil or Turkey cooperating through Russia in Svalbard

The question is not only how those non-Arctics engage with Arctic ones but how they might cooperate among themselves within the Arctic and what such cooperation could evolve into.
Considering, for instance, the possibility of Brazil or Turkey cooperating through Russia in Svalbard rather than in the established research hub of Ny-Ålesund; a shift that would carry clear political symbolism as well as scientific value.

This might make Oslo’s job more difficult in the archipelago and strengthen alternative alignments. This is where science diplomacy becomes pivotal.

Today, scientific cooperation is not peripheral, it is constitutive of Arctic politics and of how legitimacy is performed. Science diplomacy remains one of the most debated instruments for reshaping relations with Russia, yet it has also become a source of disruption in Svalbard politics.

Under the Treaty, Norway cannot refuse new signatories and drafted in 1920, the Treaty could not have anticipated how central science would become to Arctic governance. 

About BRICS

The BRICS is a group formed by 11 countries: Brasil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Iran.

It serves as a political and diplomatic coordination forum for countries from the Global South and for coordination in the most diverse areas.

Source: BRICS
To prevent science diplomacy from being demonized by association, it may be more useful to rethink alignment, to practice selective, situational cooperation rather than exclusion. Cooperation is a choice.

It is a choice to know the other, to keep the unfamiliar close rather than remain surrounded by the same, by the self.

That is why greater inclusivity matters. To preserve the spirit of what was once called “exceptional” Arctic governance needs to become less geo-epistemologically Euro-centric and less focused on formal observer status within the Arctic Council or membership in the Svalbard Treaty.
The challenge, and opportunity, lies in engaging states that are not yet part of Arctic institutions but have developing research agendas, so that their participation comes through dialogue, not surprise.
In the end, what matters is not how many Arctic strategies are written in Berlin or London, but how many new voices are allowed to enter the room. The stability of the Arctic will depend not only on those who have long spoken for the region, but also on those who seek to speak with it.

China
Source: www.chinadaily.com.cn

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa expressed the commitment to strengthen a multilateral system that upholds peaceful resolution of conflicts through dialogue during their separate bilateral meetings in Jakarta this week.

Lula, whose country serves as the BRICS chair for 2025, visited Indonesia from Wednesday to Friday. Ramaphosa arrived in Jakarta on Wednesday for a two-day visit.

The three presidents discussed key issues, including the relevance of groups such as BRICS, the Global South and the G20.

Brazil in 2009 joined the BRICS, while South Africa also became a member in 2010. Early this year, Indonesia was formally admitted into BRICS as its newest full member.

Prabowo said Indonesia and Brazil share a similar position as emerging economic powers in the Global South and also hold similar views on multilateral issues.

Lula pointed to South-South cooperation that is based on "dialogue and mutual respect". On Friday, Lula met with ASEAN Secretary General Kao Kim Hourn in Jakarta, sharing ideas on ASEAN-Brazil cooperation in areas such as sustainable development, trade and investment.

Ramaphosa said in his press statement with Prabowo on Wednesday that they had discussed global issues related to BRICS, the G20, and the Non-Aligned Movement and others.

"We affirmed the need to strengthen the multilateral system to enhance the peaceful resolution of conflict through dialogue," the South African leader said.

Strengthening BRICS

The visits of Lula and Ramaphosa to Jakarta would help strengthen BRICS, observers said.
Shofwan Al Banna, an international relations professor at Universitas Indonesia, said the BRICS has now become an important platform, introducing a new form of cooperation beyond the current West-dominated international structures.

Shofwan said bilateral and interregional cooperation beyond the BRICS, such as ASEAN and other regional organizations, is also important in the current situation.

Johanes Herlijanto, a lecturer at Universitas Pelita Harapan, said BRICS does not aim to substitute for existing multilateral cooperation organizations, but to serve as an "additional" platform for gaining new opportunities.

"As such, the challenge for Indonesia is how to take advantage of its presence in BRICS without reducing the benefits it gets from being part of various other groups," Herlijanto said on Friday.
The writer is a freelance journalist for China Daily.

Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org

Assessing the potential of the BRICS partnership circle

The creation of the BRICS partnership circle in 2023-2024 notably expanded the outreach of the bloc, with dozens of emerging economies expressing their intention to join the BRICS+ platform. As a result, the BRICS+ bloc now includes 10 core members plus Saudi Arabia as an invited country and 10 BRICS partners, namely Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Uganda and Nigeria. In effect the BRICS now has two groups of countries, with the partnership circle participating in the key meetings of the BRICS+ bloc, including the BRICS annual summits. But rather than the BRICS partnership belt serving merely as a BRICS engagement group for a widening circle of developing economies, there may be a case for transforming this circle of friends into an active engine of BRICS economic cooperation. By endowing the partnership circle with the latitude to launch coordination initiatives and pursue economic/trade alliances, the BRICS may thus create an additional development track that supports the efforts of the core economies in devising, launching and scaling new economic policy initiatives.

One of the key features in the current composition of the BRICS partnership circle is the presence of the core BRICS economies’ regional partners – as is the case with Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand with respect to Indonesia (core member) in ASEAN or Belarus and Kazakhstan with regard to Russia (core member) in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Uzbekistan is a member of the Eurasian Development Bank along with the members of the EAEU, while Nigeria and Uganda are partners with their African core BRICS economies in the AfCFTA. Accordingly, the BRICS partnership belt may with time work together with the BRICS core in exploring the modalities of creating a circle of partnership among the respective regional integration arrangements and regional development institutions where core BRICS and BRICS partner economies are members.

Developing a network of trade alliances within the partnership circle and building the trade connections between this circle and the core BRICS economies should become the key focus of the broader BRICS+ in the near term, given the protectionist pressure exerted on BRICS in 2025. Indeed, our very first essay that introduced the concepts of BRICS+ and BRICS++ called for the creation of a BRICS partnership circle predicated on trade alliances and FTA agreements[1]. The presence of such economies with a diversified network of FTAs as Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam that form part of ASEAN as one of the world’s leading blocs in advancing economic openness, creates opportunities to use the partnership circle as an additional engine in boosting trade and investment cooperation across the BRICS+ platform.

Another possible area of cooperation in the partnership belt may be the creation of a “BRICS partnership Troika” that could represent the expanded BRICS+ along with core members in outreach meetings as well as in global organizations and forums. With the partnership circle likely further expanding in the coming years, a Troika format could present BRICS+ with a relatively parsimonious format of representation in external discussions – both at the level of the core as well as the partnership belt. Creating a “BRICS partnership Troika” would also add dynamism within the partnership belt itself, with each of the members obtaining the opportunity to devise BRICS+ priorities and actively cooperate with their Troika partners in testing new formats and mechanisms that may be taken up jointly with the core BRICS members. The BRICS core members could also weigh the merits of a creating a “hybrid Troika” format in which the core BRICS Troika is supplemented by a rotating presidency from the partnership circle. 

The BRICS+ group may also explore the possibilities of creating preferential treatment regimes for the partnership circle members in the economic sphere, which could incentivize other emerging markets to join the BRICS group of friends and may include the following:

• Fast-track to NDB membership
• Membership and access to the resources of the BRICS CRA (once it is revamped to become fully operational)
• Fast-track to FTAs within the BRICS+ network
• Fast-track to concluding Digital Economic Agreements (DEAs)
• Fast-track to agreements in the sphere of financial market integration

The pursuit of DEAs within the partnership belt may be particularly promising, given the presence of heavyweights such as Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam from ASEAN that is itself one of the most active regional integration blocs in advancing digital economic cooperation in the world economy. Another reason why this may be important for the partnership belt is the notable presence of landlocked economies such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Uganda and Bolivia in the group that account for half of total membership. Some of these economies are unique in terms of their remoteness from coastal infrastructure, with Kazakhstan being the largest landlocked economy in the world, Uzbekistan being uniquely doubly-landlocked (surrounded by landlocked economies) and Belarus being the largest landlocked economy in Europe. Such countries are in particular need of connectivity projects – hence the need for the fast-track to join the NDB Bank; and they greatly benefit from digital economic development and trade as a way to deal with the “gravity of distance” – something that is advanced via digital economic agreements.

A separate track within BRICS+ to address the needs of developing landlocked economies may be coordinated by the five landlocked BRICS partners with Ethiopia that is a member of the BRICS core and the most populous landlocked economy in the world. One of the possible focus areas for this track could be to expedite and facilitate the accession of BRICS+ LLCs to the WTO as well as to support their economic modernization through BRICS+ joint efforts in international forums and organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank. Another possible area of cooperation is the role that the BRICS+ LLCs can play in working together with the regional development institutions (RDBs and RFAs) of the Global South as well as with global organizations such as the NDB and the World Bank in developing a targeted portfolio of projects supporting transportation connectivity and digital development in LLDCs. Advancing the UN’s Awaza Program of Action for LLDCs in key BRICS forums, including the BRICS+ summits and the BRICS Summit Decalarations, may also become an important connection between core BRICS economies and their partners.

Overall, empowering the partnership circle to become a platform for launching new formats of economic cooperation, with a focus on pragmatic measures targeting networks of trade accords and investment project portfolios could serve to revitalize the development of the BRICS+ bloc. It would widen the array of development tracks and provide optionality/back-up options in cases when the BRICS core may be encountering a slowdown in decision-making or an outright stalemate. From the point of view of business theory, the partnership circle is a key asset of the BRICS+ platform, whose return on assets (ROA) could be enhanced by enabling this sub-group in BRICS+ to become a source of new development impulses and policy initiatives. Exploring the possibilities that the partnership circle could deliver through the prism of such business models as VRIO[2] and the Resource-Based View (RBV)[3] may enable the BRICS+ to move away from a static view of assets (“what we have”) to a dynamic/capability-based approach (“what we can do with what we have”)[4]. Further expansion in the membership within the BRICS partnership circle could be guided in part by such considerations of greater efficiency and the potential increments to the wider BRICS+ trade and investment cooperation that new members could deliver.

[1] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/re-thinking-the-brics-on-the-concepts-of-brics-and-brics/
[2] Valuable, rare, inimitable, and organized-to-capture (VRIO) resources and capabilities.
[3] A RBV of the firm focusses the company on conducting an internal audit of all its assets—not just physical ones, but also intangibles like new ideas, new initiatives, brand reputation, patents, etc.
[4] Such an analysis through the prism of business theory of maximizing the return on the asset portfolio of the BRICS+ platform is also relevant for the BRICS core. It could also be applied to other integration blocs and platforms such as the SCO and its partnership circle within the SCO+ format.

Yaroslav Lissovolik, Founder, BRICS+ Analytics

Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org

The RICs realm: from regionalism to globalism

The idea of an alliance of Russia, India and China (RICs) has served as a crucial catalyst to the creation of the BRICS bloc and the reinvigoration of regional cooperation in Eurasia. This vision of cooperation among the three non-Western Eurasian powers is currently going through a period of renaissance on the back of the thawing of bilateral ties between China and India. While the geopolitical importance of this Eurasian triad has been widely acknowledged in terms of its role in boosting South-South cooperation, it may also be expedient to explore the economic possibilities that are opened by the formation and the strengthening of this alliance. In our view the RICs could serve as a key connectivity mechanism between the regional integration projects in Eurasia, which in turn opens the prospects for a more global role that this Eurasian Troika may play in the world economy.

At the regional level, the RICs is well placed to serve as the core of the Greater Eurasia platform that may bring together not only the main developing economies of the region, but also its key regional integration blocs. In building the circle of regional integration blocs from Eurasia, the RICs can advance their respective regional arrangements – the Eurasian Economic Union (Russia), SAARC/BIMSTEC (India), SCO (China). The two key Eurasian regional blocs that could complement this troika of regional arrangements are ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – indeed one of the formats pursued in the context of the Greater Eurasian Partnership is the SCO-EAEU-ASEAN platform. The resulting five-member circle of Eurasian regional blocs may be referred to as SAGES[1] (SCO, ASEAN, GCC, EAEU, SAARC) and may serve as the backbone for the evolving Greater Eurasia project. Forming this Eurasian circle of regional integration arrangements may be facilitated by the recent strengthening of ASEAN and GCC ties with China in the context of this year’s China-ASEAN-GCC meeting[2]. 

Within the BRICS framework, the RICs could serve as a key connectivity mechanism between BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Indeed, apart from the SCO-EAEU-ASEAN track of cooperation in Eurasia, another trajectory in the Eurasian “integration of integrations” roadmap is the SCO-EAEU-BRICS formation. The latter format in turn opens the possibility of building a wider network of regional integration arrangements on the basis of a BEAMS/BEAMS+ framework (BIMSTEC, EAEU, AfCFTA, Mercosur, SCO)[3].

At the global level, the RICs could advance greater connectivity between the regional integration blocs in forums such as the G20. One possible format in this respect is the regional 20 (R20) to be advanced via creating a G20 engagement group that would in turn represent the first global platform for regional integration blocs[4]. Each of the RICs could initiate and then advance the R20 agenda during their respective G20 presidencies, with RICs partners from the Global South within the G20 providing support in building sufficient momentum for such an arrangement to become entrenched. 

Apart from the theme of creating a platform for regional integration blocs, the RICs stand to play a crucial role in the transportation/logistical connectivity in Eurasia. In view of their territorial scale, the RICs account for the bulk of intra-continental connectivity pathways, which makes them key drivers in the creation of Eurasia’s North-South and East-West connectivity corridors. The RICs would also be critical in co-integrating and reconciling the North-South and the East-West axis of connectivity efforts, making sure that such tracks are complementary and mutually reinforcing.
Furthermore, the RICs also share borders with the bulk of Asia’s landlocked countries (Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Nepal), which raises the importance of providing support to such economies at the level of global organizations and international forums. All three members of the RICs troika enjoy extended coastal access, are positioned in different parts of Eurasia – Russia in North/Northeast Eurasia, China in East/Southeast Eurasia and India in South Asia – and serve as crucial connectivity gateways for the in-between inland territories that depend on access to trade routes and coastal infrastructure. 

Apart from Eurasia, a similar intriguing geo-economic pattern is observed in other two major regions of the Global South, namely in Africa and in South America, where the three largest coastal economies are positioned in different parts of their continents surrounding the respective continental heartlands. In Africa, the largest continental economies by GDP in PPP terms – South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria – are positioned in different parts of the continent (South Africa, North Africa and West Africa respectively) and may serve as crucial connectivity gateways for Africa’s inland regions and landlocked economies such as Botswana, Niger and Chad. The picture is similar in South America with the largest coastal economies of Brazil, Argentina and Colombia providing logistical connectivity to landlocked economies such as Paraguay and Bolivia. Accordingly, at the level of BRICS+/Global South, the RICs could lead the formation of a Tri-continental Troika mechanism that brings together the Troikas of the largest economies from Eurasia, Africa and South America[5]. The key focus of such a Troika mechanism would be the coordination of efforts in regional economic integration across the developing world and the support to be provided to the inland/landlocked economies of the Global South. 

In the end, the RICs format may well transcend the limits of a regional integration effort in Eurasia. The assembly of Eurasia’s blocs of economic cooperation hinges crucially on the coordinated efforts of the region’s largest counterparts, but the real task in re-building global economic governance and in advancing greater South-South trade and economic cooperation is even more massive in scale. Apart from the coordination challenges of promoting economic cooperation among the regional integration projects of the developing world there is of course also the future of the global financial system that needs greater optionality in the form of more national currencies and payment systems coming from the emerging market space. The RICs may be the critical link and the key engine of this global economic transformation that enables the economic potential of Eurasia and the Global South to be finally realized.

[1] https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/comments/the-assembly-lines-of-grand-eurasia/
[2] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/asean-gcc-china-troika-to-boost-south-south-trade/
[3] https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/employing-new-construction-tools-beams/
[4] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/connecting-g20-with-the-rest-of-the-world/
[5] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/alternative-perspectives-on-em/ ; Note: all nine economies are either BRICS core members, BRICS partners (Nigeria), invited countries (Argentina), BRICS NDB members (Colombia)

Yaroslav Lissovolik, Founder, BRICS+ Analytics

India
Source: www.orfonline.org

Through coordinated maritime and urban initiatives, BRICS is positioning itself as a central force in shaping global logistics, innovation, and coastal development

This is part of the essay series: Sagarmanthan Edit 2025.

BRICS countries are increasingly aligning their efforts in maritime development, recognising the strategic importance of logistics, city infrastructure, research, and industrial collaboration. By expanding container transportation within the bloc, they are creating more efficient and flexible supply chains, enhancing trade, reducing costs, and supporting the growth of national economies. Accelerating transport and logistics projects is therefore critical to deepening connectivity among member states and unlocking new trade routes.

Beyond logistics, BRICS is advancing scientific and technological cooperation in the ocean and polar sectors through joint initiatives involving governments, universities, research institutions, and industries. The 6th Meeting of the BRICS Working Group on Ocean and Polar Science and Technology, hosted by Russia in Murmansk in 2024, brought together over 50 scientists to discuss ocean resource development, coastal zone management, and climate impacts. With emerging research areas such as the Red Sea, Caspian Sea, and Persian Gulf, these collaborations aim to generate new knowledge, develop advanced technologies, train human capital, and promote joint marine expeditions to strengthen collective capabilities.

Beyond logistics, BRICS is advancing scientific and technological cooperation in the ocean and polar sectors through joint initiatives involving governments, universities, research institutions, and industries.

These initiatives also lead to the strengthening of cooperation between maritime development and urban growth. Ports and coastal cities are emerging as hubs of innovation, infrastructure investment, and industrial activity, shaping the future of urban-maritime integration. With a large concentration of “blue cities”, BRICS is uniquely positioned to leverage its maritime–urban advantage. By fostering collaboration among governments, city authorities, industries, and research institutions, member states can advance sustainable coastal development, modernise port–city infrastructure, and enhance urban resilience to climate impacts.

The expansion of BRICS in January 2024 into BRICS Plus, welcoming Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Ethiopia, further broadens the bloc’s geographic and scientific scope, reinforcing its role as a key actor in global maritime logistics, urban connectivity, blue economy research, and sustainable development.

Importance of Maritime Logistics for BRICS and Associated Challenges

Maritime logistics is central to BRICS cooperation, with port infrastructure, multimodal corridors, and digital technologies enhancing trade connectivity and global competitiveness. Efficient logistics support economic growth, regional integration, and resilient supply chains. Well-connected port cities serve as vital hubs linking economies and enabling smoother flows of goods and services.
However, several challenges hinder the full potential of BRICS maritime connectivity. According to the Subgroup on Transport and Logistics of the BRICS Business Council, key barriers include:
 

• A need to expand and modernise the BRICS countries’ maritime fleets, including icebreaking vessels.
• The requirement to improve legal frameworks for international transportation and reduce bureaucratic obstacles.
• Ensuring secure international payments and removing associated transactional barriers.
• Limited information exchange, digital restrictions, and a lack of standardised data sharing mechanisms.
• Underdeveloped maritime insurance systems constrain risk management and investment in shipping operations.

Addressing these challenges will be critical for enhancing intra-BRICS connectivity, creating more resilient supply chains, and enabling port cities to serve as engines of regional trade and economic growth.

Urban and Regional Connectivity: Linking Cities, Ports, and Trade Hubs

At the city level, initiatives such as the Vladivostok–Chennai corridor demonstrate how maritime connectivity between ports can transform regional economies, strengthen urban trade hubs, and create models for similar cooperation among other BRICS cities. By linking urban centres through faster and more reliable shipping routes, member states can promote industrial growth, enhance local port infrastructure, and boost employment opportunities along coastal regions.

The Eastern Sea Corridor, linking the Russian port of Vladivostok and the Indian port of Chennai, has commenced operations, marking a significant step in strengthening maritime connectivity between Russia and India. This corridor reduces cargo delivery time from 40 days via the traditional Suez Canal route to just 24 days, enhancing trade efficiency and fostering closer economic ties.
The expansion of BRICS in January 2024 into BRICS Plus, welcoming Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Ethiopia, further broadens the bloc’s geographic and scientific scope, reinforcing its role as a key actor in global maritime logistics, urban connectivity, blue economy research, and sustainable development.

A key milestone in this collaboration was Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Vladivostok in 2019 for the Eastern Economic Forum, marked a renewed strategic interest in the Russian Far East by India. Following the summit, several agreements were signed, including a Memorandum of Intent to develop a dedicated maritime corridor between Vladivostok and Chennai. The corridor spans approximately 10,458 kilometres, passing through the Sea of Japan, East China Sea, South China Sea, the Malacca Strait, and the Bay of Bengal, offering a faster and more reliable trade route that strengthens regional connectivity and supports the growth of bilateral commerce.

Advantages of the Eastern Maritime Corridor (EMC)

The Eastern Maritime Corridor (EMC) offers multiple strategic and economic advantages for India-Russia trade and regional development:

• Shortened Distance: The corridor is approximately 45 percent shorter than the traditional Suez Canal route, reducing travel time, lowering transportation costs, and enhancing the competitiveness of Indian exports to Russia.

• Mumbai – Saint Petersburg via Suez Canal: 16,066 km
• Chennai – Vladivostok via EMC: 10,458 km

• Port Infrastructure and Regional Development: The EMC has strengthened cargo handling at smaller ports such as Dhamra, Gangavaram, and Krishnapatnam. Chennai Port is evolving into a container collection hub for India’s East Coast, supporting regional trade and logistics networks.
• Broader Economic Impact: By opening new export markets in Russia and Northeast Asia, the EMC stimulates industrial growth in East Coast states such as Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Odisha. It also creates employment opportunities through port development and related industries. Faster and more reliable logistics flows will directly benefit retail supply chains, reducing delivery timelines and inventory costs. This efficiency aligns with the demands of e-commerce and consumer-driven markets, making the corridor vital for the future of retail trade.

In 2024, Russia’s Deputy Minister for the Development of the Far East and the Arctic, Anatoly Bobrakov, visited Chennai on 25 January for the India-Russia Workshop on Operationalisation of the EMC, organised by the Chennai Port Authority. The seminar brought together over 100 participants from Indian companies and government bodies. Sarbananda Sonowal, India’s Minister of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, highlighted that the EMC’s reduction of 5,608 km compared to the Suez route will “significantly reduce logistics costs and boost efficiency in cargo transportation between the two countries,” which will also strengthen the role of port cities as hubs of trade and urban development.

India-Russia Maritime and Urban Collaboration: Shaping Future Blue Cities

Cooperation between India and Russia in maritime development and urban connectivity is strengthening economic, logistical, and strategic ties while deepening BRICS integration into global trade networks. This collaboration spans Arctic initiatives, port infrastructure, and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). The launch of the Mumbai–Vladivostok container service in 2024 and the projected rise in bilateral maritime trade to $50 billion by 2030 underscores the scale of this partnership.

At the city level, initiatives such as the Vladivostok-Chennai corridor illustrate how maritime centres can evolve beyond traditional ports into hubs of trade, technology, and digital connectivity. By linking urban nodes through shipping routes and multimodal infrastructure, these projects stimulate regional growth, industrial development, and employment, demonstrating the transformative potential of BRICS cooperation.

With global trade increasingly shaped by e-commerce, just-in-time supply chains, and evolving consumer expectations, multimodal port cities and integrated logistics systems are becoming critical policy priorities. The integration of shipping, rail, road, and digital infrastructure enhances the efficiency, flexibility, and resilience of supply chains, ensuring competitiveness in the digital retail era. For India and Russia, prioritising investments in such ecosystems is not only a matter of improving connectivity, but also of positioning their maritime cities as strategic hubs within global value chains capable of delivering speed, reliability, and innovation to international markets.

Maritime cities within BRICS must become engines of growth and dynamism, driving prosperity for their hinterlands and shaping the blue cities of the future.

Moreover, the transformation of maritime cities in the Global South, with their vast coastlines and growing urban populations, will be central to the future of global trade. For BRICS, which encompasses some of the world’s most dynamic coastal and port-based economies, this shift underscores the need for collaborative innovation, targeted investments, progressive policies, and the development of human capital to support emerging service sectors. Maritime cities within BRICS must become engines of growth and dynamism, driving prosperity for their hinterlands and shaping the blue cities of the future.

UK
Source: https://bioengineer.org/ais-influence-on-trade-insights-from-turkey-and-brics/

In recent years, the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into various sectors has transformed industries worldwide, presenting both challenges and opportunities. In his groundbreaking study, Çüneyt examines the sectoral impact of AI on international trade, focusing specifically on Turkey and the BRICS economies, which include Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. This comprehensive analysis sheds light on how AI is reshaping trade dynamics, competitiveness, and economic strategies within these emerging markets.

As global trade patterns evolve due to technological advancements, the research reveals that artificial intelligence is not merely a technological tool but a significant driver of economic transformation. It emphasizes the growing importance of AI in enhancing productivity and efficiency across several sectors, from manufacturing to agriculture and services. By leveraging AI technologies, countries can optimize their supply chains, predict market trends, and ultimately increase their export competitiveness, thus leading to a more strategic engagement in international trade.

One of the key findings of this research is the disparity in AI adoption rates among different sectors within Turkey and the BRICS nations. In Turkey, for instance, the manufacturing sector stands out as the primary beneficiary of AI integration, with firms utilizing advanced algorithms for process optimization and predictive maintenance. This not only improves production efficiency but also minimizes costs, allowing Turkish manufacturers to compete more effectively in global markets. Conversely, sectors such as agriculture are identified as lagging in AI adoption, highlighting the need for targeted policies to bridge this gap.

The BRICS economies present a diverse landscape regarding AI impact on trade. In China, state-backed initiatives and substantial investments in AI research have propelled the nation to the forefront of technological innovation. Chinese companies are encountering unprecedented gains in manufacturing and e-commerce, significantly affecting their trade balances. The study underscores how such advancements can reshape trade relationships and create competitive advantages, as China continues to challenge traditional powerhouses in the global market.

In India, the emergence of AI-driven startups is transforming its services sector, particularly in information technology and business process outsourcing. As Indian firms harness AI to enhance service delivery and reduce operational costs, they are starting to attract more significant international investment. This growth trajectory indicates a potential shift in India’s trade profile, from being a service-oriented economy to a technology-driven powerhouse, which could substantially alter its interactions in the global trade arena.

The research highlights that while AI presents a host of opportunities for economic growth, it also raises critical questions regarding workforce displacement and the need for reskilling. The automation of tasks traditionally performed by humans can lead to job losses in sectors like manufacturing and agriculture. Policymakers are urged to consider these dynamics when devising strategies aimed at maximizing the benefits of AI, while also protecting vulnerable segments of the labor force.
Moreover, the study reveals that cross-border collaborations in AI development can significantly enhance international trade prospects. Countries that prioritize partnerships in AI research and development can create synergies that facilitate knowledge transfer and innovation. This cooperation could be particularly advantageous for smaller economies that may lack the resources to compete directly with larger markets. By fostering international alliances, these nations can cultivate a more robust presence in the global trade landscape.

Cybersecurity concerns also emerge as a significant theme in the context of AI and international trade. The study points out that as AI systems become more integrated into trade operations, the risks of cyberattacks increase correspondingly. Countries must prioritize enhancing their cybersecurity frameworks to protect critical trade infrastructures from potential threats. Such vigilance is essential to maintain trust and reliability in AI-powered trade systems, ensuring that the benefits of automation do not come at the cost of security and stability.

As the research progresses, it highlights the necessity for regulatory frameworks to govern the use of AI in international trade. Countries are urged to develop comprehensive policies that address ethical considerations, data privacy, and the need for transparency in AI algorithms. Adopting robust regulations not only ensures fairness in trade practices but also promotes a level playing field for all participants in the international market, facilitating trust and confidence in technological advancements.

The findings underline that nations must adopt a strategic approach to integrating AI into their economic frameworks. Countries like Turkey and the BRICS economies have the potential to significantly influence global trade dynamics by embracing AI technologies. However, this requires a coordinated effort involving government, industries, and educational institutions to foster innovation, provide necessary resources for research, and develop a skilled workforce prepared for the future.
The research calls attention to the role of tech giants in shaping international trade policies. Major corporations at the forefront of AI development have the power to influence how different nations navigate the global economy. By engaging in conversations about the ethical use of AI and its implications for trade, these companies can help foster an environment that balances profit motives with social responsibility.

In conclusion, Çüneyt’s findings present a nuanced view of the sectoral impacts of AI on international trade. The study illuminates how AI can be a potent catalyst for economic growth and competitiveness, particularly in Turkey and the BRICS economies, while also addressing the multifaceted challenges that accompany its integration. Policymakers, business leaders, and educators must work collaboratively to harness the potential of AI, ensuring that its benefits are widely distributed across society and that the transition towards a tech-driven economy is managed responsibly.

In a world increasingly defined by technological advancements, understanding the intersection of AI and international trade will be crucial for all stakeholders involved. The insights drawn from this research can serve as a foundation for future initiatives aimed at leveraging AI for sustainable and inclusive economic development across borders.

Subject of Research: The impact of artificial intelligence on international trade in Turkey and BRICS economies

Article Title: Sectoral analysis of the impact of artificial intelligence on international trade in Turkey and the BRICS economies

Article References:

Cüneyt, Ç. Sectoral analysis of the impact of artificial intelligence on international trade in Turkey and the BRICS economies.
Discov Artif Intell 5, 275 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1007/s44163-025-00575-4
Image Credits: AI Generated
DOI: 10.1007/s44163-025-00575-4

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, International Trade, Turkey, BRICS Economies, Economic Development, Cybersecurity, Workforce Reskilling, Policy Frameworks, Global Market Dynamics.
Tags: AI in international tradeAI integration in manufacturing industryAI-driven supply chain optimizationBRICS economies and artificial intelligencechallenges of AI adoption in tradeeconomic strategies influenced by AIexport competitiveness in emerging marketspredictive analytics in agricultureproductivity enhancement with AI technologiessectoral impact of AI on tradetechnological advancements in global tradeTurkey’s economic transformation through AI

UK
Source: www.cryptopolitan.com

In this post:

• China’s CIPS payment system now operates in 185 countries, enabling yuan-based trade outside the dollar.
• 52 trillion yuan in transactions were settled through CIPS in 2023, covering 58% of China’s cross-border flows.
• BRICS launched a yuan-pegged stablecoin and plans rupee bonds to expand use of local currencies.

The BRICS-linked Cross-Border Interbank Payments System (CIPS) has expanded across 185 countries, allowing international payments in Chinese yuan without using the U.S. dollar, according to data from the New Development Bank (NDB).

CIPS was launched by China and managed by its central bank as “a real alternative for global trade settlements.”
At the Shanghai Oil and Gas Exchange, liquefied natural gas contracts are now priced for and paid in yuan. Same thing with soybeans from the Shenzhen Qianhai Joint Trading Center.

China has allegedly already signed 40 settlement agreements with other countries, with total settlements through CIPS hitting 52 trillion yuan earlier this year, equal to 58% of China’s total cross-border transactions, a figure that tops the dollar in some measures.

Trade between China and Russia has been settled in local currencies for three straight years, covering 95% of their total trade volume. Still, not every country has joined the yuan system.

Europe, North America, and Australia have kept their distance, while developing economies in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe are using CIPS more frequently, especially for Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) loan repayments.
China expands yuan use through CIPS and new stablecoin

Meanwhile, US president Donald Trump has rejected neoliberal globalization, saying it will restore American dominance. His policies have isolated Washington’s allies and left the European Union struggling.

Global tensions have grown with the Ukraine war and economic pressure between China and the U.S., creating instability not seen in decades.

At the United Nations General Assembly on September 27, BRICS foreign ministers issued a joint statement denouncing U.S. tariffs, calling them a “proliferation of trade-restrictive actions.” Brazilian President Lula da Silva called Washington’s import taxes “tariff blackmail” and urged BRICS nations to close ranks.

Around the same time, China announced a yuan-pegged stablecoin called AxCNH at the 10th Belt and Road Summit, intended for cross-border settlements linked to infrastructure projects.

The stablecoin launched in Kazakhstan, showing Beijing’s push to take the yuan international and challenge the dollar’s global dominance.

Meanwhile, the NDB is diversifying its financing. Since 2015, the NDB has issued loans in yuan and rand. It now plans to roll out rupee-denominated bonds by 2026, targeting between $300 million and $500 million in three- to five-year tranches.

This fits the bloc’s larger plan to reduce dependence on the dollar and rely on member-state currencies instead.
Trump escalates rhetoric against BRICS

President Trump has repeatedly criticized the bloc. In a Truth Social post in July, he said:

“When I heard about this group from BRICS, six countries, basically, I hit them very, very hard. And if they ever really form in a meaningful way, it will end very quickly. We can never let anyone play games with us.”

Trump pledged to protect the dollar’s reserve-currency status and said he would never allow a U.S. central bank digital currency. On July 6, he announced 100% tariffs against any country adopting what he called the “Anti-American policies” of BRICS.

BRICS officials have denied that the group is anti-U.S. Brazil, under Lula’s leadership, dropped its earlier plan for a shared BRICS currency but moved forward with BRICS Pay, a cross-border settlement platform designed for local-currency trade among members.

The bloc also expanded in 2024, adding Iran and Indonesia, and has continued meeting under its multilateral framework.

During the BRICS summit in Brazil, leaders issued indirect criticism of U.S. military and trade policies, reinforcing their intention to build independent payment and financial systems outside Western control.
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UK
Source: aircargoweek.com

• BRICS expansion is shifting global trade, with South–South corridors and emerging markets like India drawing cargo flows away from traditional US and European hubs.
• Currency diversification among BRICS nations adds complexity for logistics, requiring shippers to manage contracts, payments, and hedging in multiple currencies beyond the US dollar.
• Infrastructure investments in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East are redirecting supply chains, challenging US influence and forcing carriers to adapt to new trade routes.

The steady enlargement of BRICS, from its original five members to a broader coalition that now includes resource-rich and strategically important economies, has sparked renewed debate about whether the United States is losing its long-standing dominance in global trade and finance. For decades, the US dollar, American consumer demand, and US-centric supply chains have shaped the way freight moves around the world. Today, that position looks less secure. Shifting trade corridors, currency diversification, and new infrastructure investments are challenging Washington’s leverage, forcing logistics and shipping companies to adapt.

Shifting trade corridors

The expansion of BRICS has accelerated the reorientation of global shipping flows. With countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt aligning with the bloc, oil, gas, and other bulk commodities are increasingly routed through South-South corridors rather than via traditional US and European hubs. Containerised freight is also shifting. The rise of India as both a manufacturing alternative to China and a major consumption market is drawing in cargo flows from Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.

For freight forwarders and carriers, this means adjusting network strategies. Routes that once depended heavily on eastbound trans-Pacific and westbound trans-Atlantic volumes are now being complemented or even supplanted by stronger Asia–Middle East–Africa linkages. In practical terms, ships and aircraft are being deployed along corridors that barely registered on logistics dashboards a decade ago. The US remains a powerful destination, but its relative gravitational pull is waning.

Currency diversification

Just as significant as trade flows is the gradual erosion of the dollar’s supremacy in global commerce. BRICS nations are increasingly experimenting with local-currency settlements, bilateral swap agreements, and payment systems that bypass the dollar. While the dollar remains deeply entrenched in trade finance, these developments are more than symbolic.

For logistics operators, currency diversification introduces a new layer of complexity. Freight contracts, customs payments, and insurance policies have long been standardised around US dollars. A move toward yuan, rupees, or even basket-based currencies adds volatility to invoicing and requires more sophisticated hedging. Multinational shippers will need to navigate a patchwork of settlement regimes, often within the same supply chain.

Although this trend will take years to mature, it underscores the broader point: the US cannot assume it will remain the default financial anchor of global trade forever.

Infrastructure investment tilting East and South

Another sign of shifting power lies in infrastructure. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, now reinforced by India’s expanding regional ambitions, is reshaping the physical backbone of global logistics. Billions are being poured into ports, rail lines, and logistics parks across Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. These investments not only upgrade capacity but also redirect trade corridors.
For example, African mineral exports that once traveled through European ports are increasingly shipped via Chinese- or Gulf-financed terminals. Latin American agricultural cargoes are finding new routes into Asia without transiting North American hubs. For US carriers and forwarders, the implication is clear: supply chains are being anchored around nodes where US influence is limited.

Looking Ahead

The expansion of BRICS is not just a geopolitical development; it is a logistics story. Cargo flows, payment systems, and trade infrastructure are the arteries of global commerce. As these arteries are redirected, the centre of economic gravity moves with them.

For the US, the challenge is not to prevent this rebalancing, it is already well underway, but to adapt intelligently. That means engaging in infrastructure investment abroad, securing trade agreements with emerging economies, and ensuring that US carriers and logistics firms remain competitive in new corridors. The United States may not dominate global trade in the way it once did, but with strategic adaptation, it can remain a vital player in a more complex, interconnected system.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Question: You and Nikita Mikhalkov go back a long way. When did you first meet and how long have you been friends?

Sergey Lavrov: I can’t say exactly when we first met. Both of us happened to be at a social gathering with mutual friends. We sang songs. I remember the Kuban Cossack Choir was there. Nikita Mikhalkov sang and demonstrated a Cossack initiation ritual where a shot glass is placed on a saber followed by a rather complex routine.
We knew about each other’s existence before, and we hit it off right away when we met in person. We connected instantly. He has a good sense of humour and a good sense of the country and the people. These aren’t empty words. These qualities come through even in a friendly conversation. They can’t be hidden.

Question: You’ve been friends for a long time now. When you spend that much time with someone, you tend to think that you know everything about them. Has Nikita Mikhalkov ever revealed a side of himself that surprised you?

Sergey Lavrov: I don’t think you can say that anyone can know everything about another person, unless, of course, they’re siblings or husband and wife. Unfortunately, we don’t talk to each other very often (I mean face to face), but we regularly talk by phone to discuss our diplomatic work and the public and educational activities that Mikhalkov is involved in.
We share concerns about matters of justice in our country and internationally. We approach these issues from the perspective of what diplomacy can do about it, such as ensuring we are treated in the international arena with the respect we deserve, securing the most favourable environment for our country’s development, addressing socioeconomic issues, and improving our people’s living standards. Mikhalkov approaches these same issues as top priorities leveraging art and journalism as his methods and tools. We often exchange opinions about what he saw in our ministry’s public moves, and what I saw in what he does, primarily as the host of the BesogonTV programme and a theatre figure as well.

Question: Do you watch BesogonTV?

Sergey Lavrov: I do, and I enjoy it a lot. I always share my emotions and impressions with him. This programme is on target. The genre created by Mikhalkov is perfectly suited to the current moment. It’s forthright with just the right amount of humour, occasionally sarcasm. These feelings and emotions multiplied by his artistic skills drive the message home. Nikita Mikhalkov does this at a high intellectual level, and these messages reach all our citizens - not just the ones engaged in intellectual work, but also those who live in our country and see what’s going on within and beyond its borders. It takes a great talent to accomplish his.

Question: When Nikita Mikhalkov raises his glass at the end of the programme, it feels like a homely conversation with good friends.

Sergey Lavrov: It’s a true find. However, he doesn’t do it just to be creative. It’s a genuine desire to use this Russian tradition to bring Victory closer. We are somewhat superstitious. We believe in signs. I completely agree with him in this regard.

Question: What are your favourite films by Nikita Mikhalkov?

Sergey Lavrov: I like many of his films. Of course, I like the films in which he played a charismatic personality, like A Friend among Foes and A Foe among Friends. I like The Barber of Siberia. I also like the theatrical play 12, as well as his bit part in A Railway Station for Two. He is always himself, yet a different personality each time. This ability to impersonate different characters is a great gift.

Question: When you discuss culture and cinema rather than politics, are you talking about what’s happening in Russia or about the processes unfolding in the West?

Sergey Lavrov: It’s both. These developments are interconnected and the correlations range from positive to negative.

External factors play a part in ensuring the best interests of our people, their well-being, sustainable socioeconomic development, and proper defence capability. Nikita Mikhalkov and I discussed this and shared our impressions. There were external factors at play after the Soviet Union became history. There was euphoria. We thought we then shared “universal values” and had “no enemies.” The Russian President said addressing Congress, “God bless the people of the United States of America.” There was humanitarian aid. Documents were signed within the OSCE framework stating that everyone is equal, security is one for everyone, and in general, we share a common destiny.

When it became clear that we would uphold our dignity based on our national interests and did not want to be “friends” with the West at the expense of forgetting about the Russian people in Crimea, Donbass, and Novorossiya (after many years of honest attempts to do so), all the agreements that the West “sponsored” in this regard (including with us), seeking respect for the rights of these people, did not prevent it from driving a hard bargain turning Ukraine into an anti-Russia, a kind of a land-based aircraft carrier for creating constant threats to the Russian Federation. You know what happened next: a coup that flew in the face of the agreements to strengthen national accord, and the Minsk agreements, which no one was going to act upon followed by our attempts to convince our Western “partners” to sign security guarantees for Ukraine and themselves, as well as for the Russian Federation in order to make things unambiguously clear for everyone.

When we were forced to launch a special military operation, it turned out that the West had taken advantage of our foreign relations to hinder our development. They said, “Here are some basic technologies for you,” and you give us petroleum, gas, titanium, and aluminium, and we’ll provide you with everything else. It turned out we were dependent on them. Nikita Mikhalkov spoke about this more than once in his Besogon programme.

The decision made by President Putin to ensure guaranteed technological and economic sovereignty in the defence industry played a significant role in the self-sufficiency that we enjoy today. True, it took some effort on our part. The process may be unfolding not as fast as we want, but it is underway.

We see eye to eye on these matters. From now on and forever... We should have never trusted the West. History taught us this starting with the Tsarist times, then during the Soviet era. Especially in the final years of the Soviet Union, the West put out lots of “lures” for us. In areas that are critical to survival of the state (security, technology, and food), we must be self-sufficient or seek partners that are not infected with the Western “disease” of living at the expense of others and coercing everyone into obeying them. We have such partners in the SCO and BRICS. Mikhalkov also promotes the topic of new global alliances in his Besogon programme and covers every topic that resonates with me as an individual, a diplomat, and a foreign minister.

An hour-long programme without commercials is rare. He insisted on having it that way which was the right thing to do.

Question: In Vladivostok, he and I discussed cultural cooperation within the BRICS and SCO frameworks, and the new awards around the world, because we understand that just like other awards, the Oscars have been politicised to become a “friend or foe” marker.

Sergey Lavrov: We have the Diamond Butterfly film award. Concurrently, we’re promoting song associations within the BRICS Plus and the SCO Plus frameworks. There’s also the Intervision contest, which, I’m confident, Nikita Mikhalkov will support. This is important. They tell us we’re fencing ourselves off. That’s not true. If things were fair, sports and art would be above and beyond politics. However, they ban international tours by our great musicians and opera singers simply because they’re from the Russian Federation. As the saying goes, every cloud has a silver lining.

In addition to us not abandoning our compatriots in Ukraine to the future determined by the West, we also came to realise the value of everything the West was offering us and what kind of a “reliable” partner it is. So, both Besogon and our ministry are defending Russian identity not in the context of autarky, but as self-respect and a sense of dignity.
We are ready and willing to cooperate with anyone who will do so on the basis of equality and mutual respect, not through diktat. However, telling us, “Okay, we will invite you here,” or “You can raise your flag here, but your anthem won’t be played here,” is humiliating. But I still understand the athletes who go there and win. They carry themselves with dignity. It’s not their fault.

A new world is in the process of being created against all odds. This is an entire era in and of itself. Besogon promotes the understanding that creating a just world overnight is not a realistic approach. This is an era that takes sustained effort, a battle in every sense of the word to ensure that the world exists in a form agreed upon in the UN Charter.
I was involved with the UN for many years. All the principles enshrined in the UN Charter starting with the principle of the sovereign equality of states, large and small, and respect for all languages ​​and religions remain absolutely relevant today. This is what the Ukrainian junta has trampled upon by outlawing the Russian language, a language that Nikita Mikhalkov defends in his programmes, finding arguments from the perspective of art and its influence on the people’s minds and hearts.

There’s not a single country in the world other than Ukraine that has banned a language. Not just any language, but an official UN language. Laws to that effect have been passed. Media publications and theatrical performances in Russian are not allowed. Books were thrown out of libraries, just like they did in Nazi Germany. The only difference is books were burned in Nazi Germany. However, the Ukrainians are quite thrifty people, so they turned them in for recycling and got paid for that. The canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church was banned as well.

The ideals that are most relevant to us in relation to the developments Ukraine have always been at the core of Besogon’s philosophy. We speak a common language in this regard.

Question: How important is Nikita Mikhalkov for the country and the art, perhaps even the world art?

Sergey Lavrov: Nikita Mikhalkov is an outstanding figure of our theatre and cinema who advances culture in all spheres of our lives.

Besogon is an innovative genre. I’m not sure how best to describe it, but it is definitely a genre with political content that conveys the author’s assessments. Not everyone agrees with them completely, but he does a good job driving them home. He makes his point clear. His sharp eye highlights the facts and events in our lives that many would overlook, just as they would overlook the troubling processes within these facts and events.
He has the unique gift of turning artistic insight into political and social analysis.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Global Dance Overture project held in China

The Global Dance Overture international cultural and educational project in the BRICS countries will be held in China on October 29-31 within the framework of the Russia and China Years of Culture (2024-2025).

This initiative is being implemented with support from the foreign and culture ministries of Russia to expand and strengthen friendly ties between BRICS countries and partner states, as well as create an international choreographic community based on the BRICS Folk Dance Culture Alliance. It was established in 2024 following a meeting of the BRICS countries’ culture ministers on the sidelines of the 10th St Petersburg International United Cultures Forum.

Folk dance cross-classes will be held at the Beijing Dance Academy. There are plans for a Round Dance of Friendship international youth flash mob.

The programme traditionally includes the Russia National Show by the Kostroma National Ballet at the Beijing Tianqiao Performing Arts Centre, which will introduce Chinese audiences to the dance culture of the peoples of Russia.

This year, the Global Dance Overture has already been held in Egypt and the United Arab Emirates and will being held in China soon. Its destinations in 2026-2027 include Brazil, India, Ethiopia and South Africa.

The project is designed to bring people closer together on the basis of common cultural and humanitarian values, and to implement educational folk dance choreography projects, including the cross-study and promotion of the culture of friendly countries at home.

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