Russia
Source:
russiancouncil.ru In the context of the current conflict in the Middle East, Russia finds itself in a structurally ambivalent position. Moscow cannot be clearly characterized as either benefiting from or losing as a result of the ongoing war. The situation is unfolding along multiple trajectories simultaneously—across each of them, the balance of gains and costs varies significantly.
Economic Dimensions of the Conflict
Among the advantages often cited for Russia in connection with the Middle Eastern conflict is the rise in oil prices. At its peak, Brent crude exceeded $118 per barrel. In the short term, rising oil prices typically increase oil revenues in the state budget, part of which, under favorable market conditions, can be directed toward replenishing reserves or financing expenditures.
In March, Russia’s revenues from oil and petroleum product exports nearly doubled compared to February, reaching
$19 billion.
The United States has partially eased sanctions pressure on Russian oil through a series of general licenses
issued by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), allowing the continuation of certain transactions involving Russian crude and petroleum products. These measures were primarily aimed at stabilizing global energy markets amid heightened tensions around Iran. In this sense, the situation creates conditions in which the conflict indirectly generates more favorable circumstances for Russia in the energy market.
However, when shifting to the medium- and long-term perspective, a number of additional challenges emerge.
Alongside rising oil prices, volatility in the global energy market is increasing, making long-term planning less predictable.
At the same time, the partial easing of certain U.S. restrictions, aimed at stabilizing the market in the context of the conflict with Iran, is situational in nature and does not indicate a structural change in the sanctions regime.
Thus, the economic advantages are largely short-term in character.
The conflict in the region increases overall business risks both in the countries of the Gulf and in Iran, as well as in the Middle East more broadly. This directly affects the willingness to participate in long-term projects. Freight costs are rising significantly, and in some cases insurance companies refuse to assume risks associated with potential escalation. OPEC+ has traditionally provided a degree of predictability in the oil market, which is particularly important for Russia. At the same time, emerging internal divergences within the framework, including the recent decision by the United Arab Emirates to withdraw from OPEC+, point to longer-term structural challenges that may affect the sustainability of this mechanism, independently of the current conflict dynamics.
This is especially important for Russia given its economic presence in the region. As a result, even with trade flows preserved, a slowdown effect emerges: declining investment activity, rising logistics costs, increasing transaction costs, and so forth. All of this creates long-term pressure on Russia’s economic cooperation with regional states.
Regional Structure of Interests
Russia has traditionally sought to pursue a diversified approach to the Middle East, maintaining working relations with a broad range of actors, including Arab states, Iran, Turkey, and Israel. However, in the context of the current conflict, this balancing posture has come under increasing strain.
Arab countries, including the Gulf monarchies, rank among Russia’s key priorities in the Middle East. This is reflected, among other things, in the high level of political engagement. In recent years, numerous high-level meetings have taken place with the leaders of Arab monarchies, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and particularly frequently the United Arab Emirates.
Beyond bilateral formats, multilateral mechanisms are also important. In particular, there exists the “Russia–Gulf Cooperation Council” format, within which ministerial meetings are held, allowing the parties to coordinate positions on key political and economic issues. There is also important interaction within BRICS, in which the UAE participates. Among Gulf states, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are partners of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Egypt, although located in another subregion, is part of the BRICS framework and also a partner of the SCO.
Economic ties with the Arab world are particularly significant and visible.
For example, in terms of trade and economic cooperation, Russia’s trade turnover with the UAE exceeded
$12 billion in 2025, making the UAE the leading Arab country in terms of trade with Russia and the second largest partner in the Middle East after Turkey. Trade is only one element of a much broader system of interaction. A substantial role is played by coordination in the oil market within the framework of OPEC+, which is of strategic importance for Russia. Media reports have also pointed to interactions related to the so-called “shadow fleet” and parallel imports.
Investment cooperation occupies a significant place as well. There is active collaboration between the Russian Direct Investment Fund and its partners in Saudi Arabia, while in 2025 Russia and Qatar signed an agreement to establish a new investment platform. Cooperation also extends to other countries in the region.
At the same time, in the military-political sphere, cooperation with Arab states remains more limited. Although Russia conducts certain joint activities (for example, exercises with Egypt) the scale and depth of this interaction are significantly less developed than in the Russia–Iran track. This is largely due to sanctions-related risks that constrain Arab states from deepening military-technical cooperation with Moscow.
The Iranian Dimension
Against this background, relations with Iran take on a different character. Trade turnover here is more modest. In 2025, it amounted to over
$4.8 billion. This represents an increase, but still relatively limited. A number of key projects face constraints. For example, the International North–South Transport Corridor has yet to be fully implemented due to engineering limitations, including the inability to complete a relatively small but critically important railway section, namely Rasht–Astara. Amid escalating tensions, the prospects for this project are becoming less clear.
However, despite the limitations in economic interaction, Iran remains an extremely important partner for Russia in the military-political sphere.
This primarily concerns military-technical cooperation. According to
media reports, Iran supplied Russia with drones prior to the conflict in Ukraine. Russia, according to
sources, has supplied combat aircraft to Iran. Agreements have reportedly also been
reached on the transfer shoulder-fired missiles from Russia to Iran. In addition, Russia and Iran conduct joint military exercises, including in the Caspian Sea, as well as naval maneuvers involving China.
Iran is integrated into the same multilateral structures as Russia, being a member of both BRICS and the SCO.
Anti-U.S, sentiments, which characterize part of the Iranian political elite to a greater extent than in the Arab monarchies, is perceived in Moscow as a potential basis for coalition-building in opposition to the United States.
Thus, both Iran and the Arab states, including the Gulf monarchies, are priorities for Moscow. While Arab countries are particularly important from an economic perspective, Iran holds significance for Russia in terms of security cooperation. Although Russia has conducted exercises with countries such as Egypt, the level of security cooperation with Iran is considerably higher.
At a more informal level, particularly in some regional media, Iran is sometimes portrayed as a de facto ally of Russia, occasionally with comparisons drawn to the U.S.–Israeli relationship. However, the actual structure of relations is fundamentally different. By comparison, the U.S.–Israeli alliance includes direct security guarantees and systemic military support. Russia–Iran interaction is far more pragmatic in nature.
Military cooperation in this case is based not on gratuitous assistance, but rather on arms trade and technological cooperation, without mutual defense obligations. In this sense, it is not an alliance in the classical understanding, but rather a strategic partnership encompassing both political and economic dimensions. In January 2025, Russia and Iran signed a
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, formalizing the close ties between Moscow and Tehran and, as expected, potentially serving as a driver for further development of bilateral relations.
A comparison with the strategic partnership
agreement between Russia and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is illustrative in this context. Unlike the agreement with Iran, it contains explicit provisions on mutual military obligations, which, in particular, served as a basis for the deployment of DPRK troops to the Kursk region in the context of the conflict with Ukraine.
No such provisions exist in the Russian–Iranian agreement. This means that Russia has neither legal nor political obligations to participate in the conflict on Iran’s side.
The Practice of Balancing
At the same time, Russia’s regional strategy is inevitably constrained not only by the need to balance between Iran and the Arab monarchies, but also by a number of other critically important vectors, above all, relations with Israel and the United States.
Relations with Israel, despite their complexity, remain constructive. They include a certain level of economic interaction, but equally important is the continuous monitoring of Israel’s position, including in the context of the conflict in Ukraine. Moscow appears to take into account that Israel has so far avoided crossing certain “red lines” in terms of military cooperation with Ukraine. An additional factor is the dense network of societal ties, given the presence of a sizable Russian-speaking community in Israel.
In parallel, there exists a Russian–U.S. track that also shapes Moscow’s behavior. Russia has maintained a negotiation process with the United States and, to some extent, counts on the possibility of Washington’s involvement in a settlement of the conflict in Ukraine on terms acceptable to Moscow. Within this logic, a sharp deterioration in relations with the United States due to the Iranian crisis would be undesirable for Russia.
The current conflict acts as a catalyst, intensifying all existing contradictions. In this situation, Russia is attempting to maneuver and avoid becoming a direct party to the conflict.
Under these conditions, Russia’s relations with Arab states and the Gulf require careful calibration. Moscow seeks to maintain a balance that becomes increasingly difficult to sustain during periods of crisis.
Russia cannot afford a serious rupture with either Iran, the Arab monarchies, the United States, or Israel. Rhetoric in certain cases may be quite harsh (for example, in response to U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran), yet in practice Russia seeks to prevent escalation into a full-scale crisis.
Numerous contacts with Arab states have been recorded after the outbreak of the conflict. Russia has held telephone conversations with leaders of Arab states. In addition, Egypt’s foreign minister has paid a visit to Russia. All of this indicates a continuous process of coordination with the Arab world regarding the evolving situation. This does not imply full alignment of positions, but rather an exchange of assessments aimed at better understanding mutual interests.
Following the outbreak of the conflict, a telephone conversation took place between Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump. During the discussion, the situation around Iran was also addressed. There are grounds to assume that possible “red lines” and acceptable frameworks of behavior may have been discussed. Although the content of the conversation has not been disclosed, subsequent developments suggest that certain signals were conveyed.
A separate dimension is Russia’s behavior within the United Nations, particularly in the Security Council. In general terms, Russia’s position includes condemning the actions of the United States and Israel as initiators of the strike on Iran. At the same time, Iranian strikes against Arab states do not receive the same level of harsh political assessment.
Russia proposed a draft resolution condemning the U.S. and Israeli attack on Iran. However, this resolution was not adopted, as the United States exercised its veto power. As a result, the actions of the initiators of the military operation were not condemned by the UN Security Council.
At the same time, Bahrain introduced a resolution condemning Iran for strikes against Arab states. In this case, Russia and China refrained from blocking the resolution and did not use their veto, allowing it to pass. This constituted an important political signal to the Gulf states. Russia does not support attacks on their territory. At the same time, Russia
considers the adopted resolution to be one-sided and “does not fully reflect the root cause and overall picture of the conflict in a balanced manner.”
Thus, the initiators of the conflict were not condemned, whereas Iran’s retaliatory actions, affecting not so much the initiators as Arab states, particularly in the Gulf, received institutional condemnation through the UN mechanism. This configuration also diverges from the position of the UN Secretary-General, who
condemned all parties to the conflict—the United States, Israel, and Iran alike.
A separate episode requiring attention concerns the resolution introduced by Bahrain in April regarding the necessity of reopening the Strait of Hormuz. The context of the discussion was highly sensitive. On the one hand, there were reports of a possible suspension of hostilities; on the other, there were ultimatum-like
statements by Donald Trump addressed to Iran, including warnings that “a whole civilization will die.”
In this situation, Russia adopted a different position and exercised its veto power. This decision can be explained by a combination of factors.
First, Moscow likely proceeded from the assumption that the adoption of the resolution would have increased the imbalance. Under conditions where pressure on Iran was already present, the emergence of an additional condemnatory or restrictive document could have created a situation in which the state subjected to the initial strike would face further institutional pressure.
Second, the wording of the resolution itself was of significant importance. It was sufficiently broad and allowed for multiple interpretations, including with
regard to the use of force to reopen the strait. In the absence of clear limitations, this potentially created legal space for expansive interpretation, up to and including the legitimization of military action. This could have opened the way for the United States to justify further escalation.
As a result, Russia blocked the resolution. Notably, a ceasefire was reached shortly thereafter, which to some extent reinforced the argument that diplomatic instruments, at least in the short term, played a stabilizing role.
Risks and Strategic Approach
Despite certain short-term gains associated with rising oil prices, the current conflict generates a complex set of risks for Russia, some of which are long-term in nature. Beyond the previously described challenge of maintaining balance and avoiding deterioration in relations with key partners, several additional risks emerge.
First, there is the risk of Iran weakening as a partner. According to some
estimates, approximately 80% of Iran’s air defense systems have been destroyed, more than 90% of its fleet has been sunk, and around 90% of weapons production facilities have been attacked. This significantly reduces the country’s military potential and its ability to sustain a balance of power in the Middle East.
Second, there is a risk of internal destabilization in Iran, potentially extending to scenarios in which it could acquire characteristics of a “failed state.” In such a case, Russia would risk losing one of its key regional partners. While this scenario does not currently appear highly probable, it remains potentially dangerous, including due to the broader destabilizing effects it could generate across the region.
Finally, uncertainty remains regarding whether the current dynamics will lead to a genuine strengthening of Russia–Iran relations. On the one hand, the intensification of anti-U.S, sentiments within Iranian elites and the growing influence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps may contribute to a closer orientation toward Russia. On the other hand, criticism of Moscow may intensify within Iranian expert and political circles, particularly regarding the perceived insufficiency of support.
Under these conditions, Russia’s strategy can be characterized by a predominantly reactive, wait-and-see posture.
The essence of this approach lies in attempting to outlast the most acute phase of the conflict while minimizing direct involvement in choosing sides, yet at the same time preserving the capacity for diplomatic influence and seeking to maintain a balance of power wherever possible and where such efforts do not create additional imbalances.
One element of this policy is the attempt to act as a channel of communication between the parties. In particular, there have been
reports that Russia previously facilitated the exchange of signals between Iran and Israel regarding their unwillingness to be the first to initiate hostilities. This, at a minimum, allowed for a delay in the outbreak of fighting. Such a function, if further developed, could become one of the instruments of Russia’s regional policy.
At the same time, Moscow’s support for Iran remains strictly limited and is primarily confined to the political and diplomatic level, particularly in the context of condemning U.S. and Israeli actions. Support for Iranian strikes against Arab states is excluded.
At the strategic level, Russia traditionally proceeds from the need to build a more sustainable security architecture in the region. In this context, it has previously advanced the
Collective Security Concept for the Gulf, which implies the creation of confidence-building mechanisms and escalation prevention among key regional actors.
The current conflict is more likely to lead not to the abandonment of this idea, but to its revision. Attempts to adapt the concept to new realities are expected, above all, the growing level of mistrust between Iran and Arab states, as well as the intensification of external involvement.
At the same time, Russia continues to emphasize the need for a comprehensive settlement of the Iranian issue. In this approach, it diverges from the logic of the United States, which is more focused on resolving the challenges of the current phase of the conflict: de-escalation without addressing structural causes. For Moscow, the systemic level remains central, including the nuclear program and the sanctions regime, and in this regard its position partially converges with that of Iran.
Many of these issues were, to a large extent, addressed within the framework of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), concluded in 2015, from which the United States withdrew in 2018 under the administration of Donald Trump. Following this, Iran gradually increased its level of uranium enrichment, intensifying suspicions regarding a potential pursuit of nuclear weapons. These suspicions subsequently became one of the key justifications for military strikes—both during the Twelve-Day War in June 2025, and within the current escalation.
What Does It All Mean?
Overall, Russia reacts negatively to the current crisis. It complicates the process of building relations with regional actors and forces Moscow to make difficult decisions, which it frames as efforts to restore the balance of power.
At the same time, the situation does not fundamentally alter Russia’s overall position in the Middle East. The region extends far beyond conflict and security imbalances, encompassing a wide range of economic activities, including nuclear energy projects in countries such as Egypt, Iran (Bushehr), and Turkey (Akkuyu), as well as cooperation in agriculture, food security, and other sectors.
Russia continues to maintain its presence in the Middle East, including in the security domain. For example, there are no clear indications that the current crisis has led to a fundamental shift in Russia’s position in Syria, which remains one of Moscow’s key priorities in the region. While some adjustments to Russia’s military presence are being discussed, these appear to reflect broader dynamics rather than a direct consequence of the conflict around Iran.
The current crisis provides Russia with an opportunity to position itself as a mediator and facilitator of negotiation processes, or at least as a party capable of helping actors exchange signals.
The concept of collective security proposed in 2021 has become outdated in its original form, yet the underlying idea creating confidence-building mechanisms and improving the regional security architecture, including with the participation of external actors, remains relevant. Middle East is a critically important region, and the Gulf is a critically important subregion, the stability of which has far-reaching implications.
Russia is likely to attempt to contribute to the stabilization of this region, although its efforts to maintain balance may at times be interpreted by other actors as taking sides in the conflict. In reality, however, Moscow’s objective remains the preservation of a balance of power, a task that becomes significantly more difficult under conditions of crisis.