China
Source: www.chinadaily.com.cn

The following is the full text of the address:

Joining Hands to Build a Just and Equitable System For Global AI Governance
Keynote Address by H.E. Xi Jinping
President of the People's Republic of China

At the Opening Ceremony of the 2026 World AI Conference and High-Level Meeting on Global AI Governance

Distinguished Colleagues and Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Friends,

Seventy years ago, a group of young scholars proposed the concept of artificial intelligence (AI) for the first time at the Dartmouth Workshop in New Hampshire of the United States. In the subsequent 70 years, AI scientists and researchers from around the world ventured into this unknown territory, forged ahead through twists and turns, and made breakthroughs with persistent hard work. Seven decades later today, amid the new wave of AI development, we are gathering by the Huangpu River to discuss how to promote AI globally for the positive, for good and for humanity. All this makes our meeting highly important. On behalf of the Chinese government and people, I would like to extend a warm welcome to you all.

In the course of history, the invention of the steam engine heralded the industrial civilization, the widespread access to electricity brightened up modern society, and the birth of the Internet brought the entire world together. Each of these technological revolutions has profoundly reshaped our way of work and life, and enabled a giant leap in economic and social development.

Today, major changes unseen in a century are accelerating across the world. The new round of technological revolution and industrial transformation is advancing at a faster pace, and the world has entered an unprecedented period of active innovation on AI technologies. Intelligent connectivity, human-machine collaboration, cross-sector integration, joint creation and sharing, and other intelligent technologies are unleashing enormous power. All this carries within it great opportunities as well as challenges to governance. We human beings must answer the questions posed by our times: How to get along with thinking machines? How to ensure security when algorithm is part of decision making? How to tackle ethical challenges by technologies through adaptive governance? How to realize AI for all when the divide keeps widening? These questions demand serious consideration and real answers from the whole international community.

In China's view, all countries should take a people-centered approach and develop AI for the positive and for good. We should ensure that AI is an important driver for shared prosperity and common security. We should join hands to build a just and equitable system for global AI governance. To this end, I wish to share four observations.

First, we should adhere to the principle of openness and win-win and boost innovation-driven development. As a new engine of world economic growth and an accelerator for the shift of growth drivers, AI is moving from the digital world into the physical world. We should seize this rare, historic opportunity to encourage open source, openness, collaboration and sharing. We should facilitate technological innovation, industrial development and scenario-based application of AI. We should make coordinated advances in the transformation and upgrade of traditional industries, the cultivation and growth of emerging industries and forward-looking planning for future industries, so that all sectors and businesses can benefit from AI.

Second, we should strengthen risk-awareness and ensure that AI is secure and controllable. AI should be a trusted tool for humanity. We should take seriously the various types of inherent and secondary risks that AI may trigger. We should put in place laws and regulations, technological monitoring, early warning and emergency response systems in order to strengthen the line of security, prevent abuses and malicious use, and ensure that AI is always under human control. In the meantime, we should jointly oppose overstretching the national security concept in the field of AI and placing one country's security over that of others.

Third, we should encourage inclusiveness and promote mutual learning between civilizations. AI development and its application should not erode or undermine the diversity of world civilizations or the uniqueness of cultures of different countries. We must shape the values of AI with humanity's common values, and make good use of AI technologies to increase understanding, tolerance, exchanges, and sharing among all civilizations. We should tend to the garden of civilizations with great care to ensure that the beauty of each civilization is appreciated and shared.

Fourth, we should advocate solidarity and improve global governance. AI is an invaluable asset that encapsulates humanity's collective wisdom. We should practice true multilateralism and recognize the important role of the United Nations. We should enhance alignment and coordination on AI development strategies, governance rules and technical standards, so as to form a consensus-based global governance framework at an early date to make this frontier technology better benefit humanity. We must carry out extensive international cooperation and help Global South countries with capacity building to bridge the AI and digital divides, promote sustainable development, and prevent creating new historical injustice in AI.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Friends,

This year marks the start of China's 15th Five-Year Plan. It maps out China's economic and social development for the next five years and provides immense opportunities for the international community. In recent years, China has embraced AI with open arms. We have promoted interplay between an efficient market and a well-functioning government, strengthened AI innovation, actively advanced the AI Plus Initiative, and built a healthy ecosystem for all entities to thrive in together. The core smart economy industries are worth at least RMB 1 trillion yuan. Smart devices in countless homes truly improve people's livelihood. Intelligent Manufacturing in China has become another shining hallmark of Chinese modernization.

At the same time, China lays great emphasis on safety and security in AI development. With a deep understanding of the trends and logic of AI development, we are continuously improving laws, regulations, policies, mechanisms, application norms, as well as ethical principles to make sure that AI is safe, secure and controllable, and that this fine steed of AI gallops with both speed and stability.
As a responsible major country, China is always committed to providing international public goods relating to AI. Since I proposed the Global AI Governance Initiative, China has promoted the adoption of the U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Enhancing International Cooperation on Capacity-Building of Artificial Intelligence by consensus, published the AI Capacity-Building Action Plan for Good and for All, announced the AI Plus International Cooperation Initiative, and advocated for establishing the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO). China has been contributing steadily to the global AI governance.

We often say in China, "A single string cannot make music, and a single tree does not make a forest." AI development should not be a solo performance by a single country, but a symphony of international cooperation. Thanks to our joint efforts, WAICO has come into being in Shanghai. Our vision from one year ago is now a reality. This is a major move by China to answer the call of the Global South and unite the international community together to promote vigorously AI development and governance. It will be an important milestone in the history of AI development.

To further support global AI development and advance global AI capacity building, I hereby announce that in the next five years, China will provide developing countries with 5,000 opportunities in AI training and seminar programs; develop international AI application cooperation centers with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the League of Arab States, the African Union, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and BRICS; and enable 30 countries to use the AI-powered meteorological warning system, or MAZU, to safeguard homes around the world.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Friends,

As ancient Chinese observed, "A man of wisdom adapts to changes; a man of knowledge acts by circumstances." With AI advancing at a staggering speed, we must ensure its development is for the positive, for good and for humanity. We must make its oversight and governance precise and effective, and constantly refine measures to forestall loss of control. We should always guide AI development with human wisdom and international consensus, so that AI can truly become a mighty force that increases the well-being of humanity and advances human civilization.

China is ready to be more open, take more practical actions, and assume a more visionary perspective. We are ready to work with all parties to seize the opportunities of AI development and meet the challenges, and join hands to create a brighter future for humanity.

Thank you!

South Africa
Source: www.labour.gov.za

Chairperson,

Honourable Dr Mansukh Mandaviya, Minister of Labour and Employment of the Republic of India;

Honourable Ministers and Heads of Delegation;

Distinguished Representatives of the International Organisations;

Ladies and Gentlemen,

South Africa congratulates the Republic of India on its successful stewardship of the BRICS Presidency and commends the leadership demonstrated in advancing a practical and forward-looking agenda under the theme 'Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability'.

We also express our appreciation to the Government of India for the warm hospitality extended to our delegation and for the excellent arrangements for this Ministerial Meeting.

The four priorities before us are both timely and strategically important. Expanding social protection, promoting the formalisation of labour markets, increasing women's participation in the economy, strengthening employability through skills development and harnessing digital technologies for the benefit of all workers are essential to building inclusive, resilient and future-ready labour markets.
​ 
Honourable Chairperson,

South Africa welcomes the practical, people-centred approach underpinning these priorities, which align closely with our national development agenda and our shared commitment to advancing decent work, reducing inequality and ensuring that economic transformation leaves no one behind.
South Africa also welcomes the proposed establishment of BRICS CONNECT as an important institutional innovation that moves our cooperation beyond policy dialogue towards practical collaboration.

We believe that a platform for technical cooperation, knowledge exchange and capacity building will strengthen our collective ability to respond to common labour market challenges while respecting the diverse national circumstances and development priorities of BRICS members.

 We encourage continued collaboration with the International Labour Organisation and other knowledge partners to ensure that our cooperation remains evidence-based and responsive to the evolving world of work.

As we are going to adopt the Twelfth BRICS Labour and Employment Ministers' Declaration, South Africa reaffirms its commitment to strengthening BRICS solidarity, promoting South-South cooperation and working collectively to build labour markets that are more inclusive, productive and equitable.

We look forward to working with all Member States in implementing the commitments we make today for the benefit of our workers, our economies and our peoples.

I thank you.

South Africa
Source: www.labour.gov.za


13 July 2026

South Africa's Department of Employment and Labour has taken its place alongside fellow BRICS member states at the 3rd Employment Working Group (EWG) Meeting, which opened today and runs until 14 July 2026. The two-day technical session precedes the 12th BRICS Labour and Employment Ministers' (LEM) Meeting, scheduled for 15–16 July, under India's 2026 Chairship.

Convened under the overarching theme “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability," the gathering brings together senior employment officials and ministers from Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa to deepen collaboration on shared labour-market priorities.

South Africa's technical delegation to the EWG is led by Mr Sipho Ndebele, Acting Deputy Director-General for Labour Policy and Industrial Relations. The country's ministerial delegation will be headed by the Honourable Deputy Minister of Employment and Labour, Mr Jomo Sibiya, for the LEM Meeting later this week.

The first day of the Working Group was devoted to finalising outstanding paragraphs in the draft BRICS Labour and Employment Ministers' Declaration, alongside technical presentations and member-state interventions under Priority 1: Advancing Social Security and the Formalisation of Labour Markets.

Expert contributions from the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the International Social Security Association (ISSA) framed the discussions, drawing on global and BRICS-specific evidence to address extending social protection coverage and facilitating transitions from informal to formal employment. Delegates then shared national policy approaches, reinforcing the value of structured cooperation among BRICS economies in tackling these persistent challenges.

Priority 2: Enhancing Women's Participation and Inclusion in the Workforce will take centre stage on 14 July, along with the remaining priority areas:

· Cooperation on employability.
· Skills mapping and skills development; and
· Leveraging digital technologies for the benefit of all workers, including gig and platform  workers.

As the EWG serves as the primary technical forum for negotiating and refining the draft Declaration, its outcomes will be presented for consideration and adoption at the 12th BRICS Labour and Employment Ministers' Meeting later this week.

South Africa's active engagement underscores its enduring commitment to decent work, social protection, skills development, and inclusive labour markets—advances that are strengthened through sustained multilateral cooperation among BRICS member states.

South Africa
Source: www.labour.gov.za

South Africa has thrown its weight behind the 12th BRICS Labour and Employment Ministers' Declaration, with Deputy Minister of Employment and Labour, Mr Jomo Sibiya, underscoring the urgency of building labour markets that are inclusive, resilient and ready for the future.

“The priorities we have agreed upon are not just timely, they are essential," said Deputy Minister Sibiya. “They speak directly to the lived realities of workers across the Global South."

Speaking at the 12th BRICS Labour and Employment Ministers' Meeting in Hyderabad on 15 July 2026, Deputy Minister Sibiya highlighted five critical fronts: expanding social protection, formalising labour markets, boosting women's economic participation, strengthening employability through skills development and harnessing digital technologies for the benefit of all workers.

“These are the pillars of a just and dynamic future of work," he added.

The Ministers' Meeting serves as the highest political forum within the BRICS Labour and Employment Track. It offers a vital space for reviewing the work of the Employment Working Group, exchanging policy responses to emerging labour market challenges, deepening South-South cooperation, and adopting the annual declaration.

Deputy Minister Sibiya praised India's stewardship of the BRICS Presidency under the theme “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability," noting that the agenda is both practical and forward-looking. He stressed that the four priority areas align seamlessly with South Africa's national development goals, advancing decent work, reducing inequality and ensuring that economic transformation leaves no one behind.

A standout achievement of India's Presidency, he said, is the launch of BRICS CONNECT the Cooperation Network for Capacity Building, Employability, New Skills and Technologies.

“This is a game-changer," said Deputy Minister Sibiya. “It moves us beyond dialogue into delivery. It is a voluntary, practical framework for technical cooperation, knowledge exchange and institutional capacity building among member states."

He urged continued partnership with the International Labour Organization and other knowledge institutions to keep BRICS cooperation grounded in evidence and responsive to the rapidly changing world of work.

The 12th BRICS Labour and Employment Ministers' Declaration, adopted on 15 July 2026, reflects consensus across member states on four pillars:
· Advancing social security and labour market formalisation.
· Enhancing women's workforce participation and inclusion.
· Cooperation on employability, skills mapping, and development.
· Leveraging digital technologies for all workers including those in the gig and platform economy.

The Declaration charts a collective policy path for future cooperation, reinforcing commitments to decent work, inclusive labour markets, social justice and sustainable development. It also formally endorses BRICS CONNECT as a key mechanism to turn these commitments into action.

South Africa's active participation reaffirms its dedication to multilateral engagement on labour and employment, championing a people-centred future of work and driving policy innovation across the Global South.

“South Africa stands firm in its commitment to BRICS solidarity, South-South cooperation, and the shared goal of building labour markets that are more inclusive, productive, and equitable," concluded Deputy Minister Sibiya. “We look forward to working with all member states to implement these commitments for the benefit of our workers, our economies, and our peoples."

Russia
Source: bricsmagazine.com

Chinese startup Moonshot AI unveils Kimi K3, taking 4th place globally

Chinese startup Moonshot AI has unveiled its Kimi K3 AI model, which immediately took 4th place in the global Artificial Analysis Intelligence Index ranking among 563 language models. It is the world’s largest open AI model, with 2.8 trillion parameters, and according to analysts, it has come closer than ever to matching the capabilities of leading Anthropic and OpenAI models. The model supports text, image, and video processing and costs almost half as much as Claude Opus 4.8.

Russia and India strengthen cooperation within BRICS

Following Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Moscow on July 8-9, both sides confirmed that BRICS and the SCO remain key formats for cooperation between the two countries.

Economically, the focus is on further de-dollarization: 70% of Russian-Indian trade turnover is already conducted in national currencies. The countries are also developing cooperation on national payment cards and the North-South transport corridor, and plan to increase mutual trade to $100 billion by 2030.

BRICS points its telescopes: hunting for cosmic flares

Brazil, China, and South Africa have signed a memorandum establishing the GOTTA-BRICS Pathfinder Network, an international observation network for studying short-lived cosmic phenomena such as stellar flares and other dynamic processes in space. Coordination on the Brazilian side is led by the National Astronomical Laboratory at the Pico dos Dias Observatory, while China and South Africa are represented by the Xinglong and Lenghu observatories and the South African Astronomical Observatory, respectively. The project involves developing technologies for managing distributed telescope networks, including real-time AI, and will serve as a preparatory stage for the larger BITDN project.

India successfully launches its first private rocket into space

Skyroot Aerospace successfully launched the Vikram-1 rocket from Satish Dhawan Space Centre in Sriharikota — the first privately built orbital rocket to launch from Indian soil. The mission, named Aagaman, marks an important milestone for India’s growing private space sector, coming 46 years after the first successful launch of the SLV-3 satellite. The launch’s success could make Skyroot the first Indian private company to place a payload into orbit.

The Global South unites around AI: a new organization born in Shanghai

29 countries have signed an agreement establishing the World AI Cooperation Organization, an intergovernmental body intended to promote international cooperation and global governance in AI. Founding countries include Russia, Belarus, Serbia, Cuba, Brazil, and Venezuela, along with 10 African and 12 Asian nations; the organization’s headquarters will be in Shanghai. The signing ceremony took place in the presence of UN Secretary-General António Guterres and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. The initiative was first proposed by Beijing a year earlier, though no country had formally committed to participation until now.

South Africa
Source: iol.co.za

There is nothing glamorous about a "joint meeting of SADC Ministers responsible for Energy and Water." No fireworks, no viral soundbite, no drama for the news cycle. And yet this is exactly the kind of gathering that quietly decides whether the region moves forward or stays stuck. This week Pretoria is hosting SADC's Energy and Water Ministers, running from Tuesday through Friday, with South Africa in the chair's seat because it currently leads the relevant SADC Sectoral Committees. The agenda sounds technical. The stakes are not.

The Unsexy Sectors That Run Everything

Energy and water are the plumbing of any economy. You don't notice them until they fail, and in Southern Africa, they have been failing often enough that everyone notices. Load shedding taught South Africans this lesson the hard way. Zambia's hydropower crisis, driven by drought on the Kariba Dam system, taught Zambians the same lesson from a different angle. The two sectors are also inseparable. Hydropower depends on water levels, water treatment depends on electricity, and a region that can't coordinate one will struggle to coordinate the other. That is the quiet logic behind putting both ministries in the same room.

Mission 300 Is the Real Headline

Buried in the agenda is a reference to the Dar es Salaam Declaration on Mission 300, and this is where the meeting stops being routine. Mission 300, run jointly by the African Development Bank and the World Bank, is the continent's most ambitious electrification push in a generation, aiming to connect 300 million Africans to power by 2030. To put that number in perspective, it is close to the entire population of the United States. Roughly 600 million Africans currently lack electricity, representing 83% of the world's energy deficit, so Mission 300 is not a side project. It is an attempt to close the single largest energy gap on earth.

The financial commitments behind it are already substantial. The World Bank has pledged to nearly double its energy spending in Africa, directing up to $30 billion toward the sector by 2030, while the African Development Bank and World Bank Group together committed $48 billion in financing through 2030. Progress is measurable too: Mission 300 has already connected more than 50 million people to electricity across 40 countries, with early gains visible in Tanzania, Madagascar, Ethiopia, the DRC and Zambia. When SADC ministers sit down this week, they are essentially checking how well Southern Africa is riding a continental wave that is already moving, with or without them. 

Why Regional Coordination Beats Going It Alone

Here is the comparison worth making. A country trying to solve its energy crisis alone is like a household trying to fix a leaking roof during a storm, patching one hole while water pours in elsewhere. SADC's model, by contrast, treats the roof as shared. Cross-border grids, joint hydrocarbon infrastructure, shared pipelines and storage, these only work if sixteen member states move in step. South Africa cannot build energy security while Mozambique's gas infrastructure lags or Zambia's grid stays fragile, because power pools and transmission lines don't respect borders. This is precisely why the ministers are also expected to discuss fuel pipelines and storage facilities alongside renewable energy targets. Energy security in this region is a group project, not an individual assignment.

What This Means for Ordinary People

Strip away the diplomatic language and the meeting is really about whether a small business in Blantyre can keep its lights on, whether a clinic in rural Namibia can refrigerate vaccines, whether a factory in Durban can plan production without dreading the next outage. Water management sits alongside this because drought cycles, made worse by climate change, are already straining both farming and hydropower generation across the region. The meetings SADC has held in recent months, on food security, on the blue economy, on Madagascar's political transition, point to a bloc trying to function as more than a talking shop.

The Honest Caveat

SADC has a well-earned reputation for producing declarations that outpace delivery. Regional summits often generate commitments that quietly stall at the implementation stage, and Mission 300 itself has faced warnings that ambition will only translate into power if private capital and regulatory reform follow the political statements. So the real test of this week's meeting is not what gets announced on Friday but what gets built in the following year. If South Africa, as chair, can push the bloc from declarations toward delivery, the meeting will matter far beyond Pretoria. If not, it joins a long list of well-intentioned gatherings that changed very little on the ground.

Russia
Source: bricscouncil.ru

WAICO & BRICS: What Does the New Global AI Organization Mean for the Group?

On 16 July 2026, representatives of 29 countries signed an agreement in China establishing the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO). The new body has been granted the status of an independent intergovernmental international organization, with its headquarters to be located in Shanghai. Its founding members include China, Russia, Brazil, Indonesia, and a number of other countries from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Several BRICS members have therefore become part of the group of states shaping a new institutional platform for global AI governance.

The creation of WAICO demonstrates that international competition in artificial intelligence is moving beyond declarations, codes, and broad ethical principles toward the establishment of permanent institutions. Until recently, the most influential mechanisms for discussing AI were created predominantly by Western states and organizations, including the OECD, the G7, the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence, AI safety summits, and coalitions of countries with broadly similar political and technological approaches. These formats have contributed to the development of common principles, but the ability of Global South countries to shape their agendas has remained limited.

The response has been the gradual development of alternative approaches: promoting the agenda of fair and inclusive AI governance within the G20, BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and other regional organizations; the adoption in Russia of the AI Ethics Code signed by more than 900 organizations, including over 80 foreign participants; and China’s preparation of the WAICO initiative. All these developments over recent years reflect an effort to broaden the range of states involved in shaping the rules of global AI governance.
This background has largely determined the distinctive features of the new global AI organization. WAICO is open to sovereign states regardless of their political system, does not establish prior political or value-based criteria for participation, and focuses not only on safety but also on development and reducing the global technological divide. In this sense, WAICO could become the first permanent international institution in which access to AI models, computing infrastructure, and technological capabilities is addressed alongside the regulation of risks.

Importantly, the principles of the new organization largely correspond to the approaches promoted by BRICS. WAICO’s founding documents emphasize adherence to the UN Charter – UN Secretary-General António Guterres participated in the founding ceremony – as well as extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits, and human-centered AI development. These principles are broadly consistent with the 2025 BRICS Leaders’ Statement on the Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence. At the same time, WAICO is positioned not as a replacement for universal international mechanisms, but as an instrument for coordinating national strategies, governance approaches, and technical standards.

BRICS itself does not have a permanent secretariat or a specialized international organization capable of working continuously on AI issues, preparing projects, and supporting their implementation. If all BRICS countries eventually join WAICO, the organization could partially fill this institutional gap by providing BRICS members with an additional platform for coordinating technical approaches and advancing joint initiatives.

At the same time, BRICS is only one of several dimensions of China’s international AI policy. At the opening of the World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC), Chinese President Xi Jinping announced plans to develop applied cooperation centers with ASEAN, the African Union, the League of Arab States, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. WAICO is therefore emerging as an institution designed for a much broader framework of cooperation with the Global South. This, however, does not contradict the BRICS model, which itself remains open to engagement with many of the same regional organizations.

The composition of WAICO’s founding members nevertheless shows that there is not yet a unified position within BRICS toward the new organization. India, which holds the BRICS presidency this year, was not listed among the signatories to the agreement. The world’s most populous country is itself highly active in this field. In February 2026, New Delhi hosted the AI Impact Summit, the first major global forum of its kind to be held in a Global South country. More than 90 countries supported the summit’s final declaration, which endorsed the principle of “AI for All.” This suggests that a platform-based format, rather than a formal organization, may in some cases prove more viable for bringing together the full range of Global South countries.

Why, then, was China the country that initiated the creation of a new institution for global AI governance? And what does this mean for BRICS?

First, the practical significance of China’s initiative rests on the combination of two key elements: advanced computing infrastructure and the active promotion of open AI models. It is perhaps no coincidence that on the first day of the conference, Moonshot AI introduced Kimi K3, described as the world’s largest open-source model. Together with Qwen, DeepSeek, and Z.ai, it forms part of China’s rapidly expanding ecosystem of open AI models. For BRICS countries, access to advanced algorithms and the ability to deploy AI solutions on their own servers are particularly valuable because they allow states to retain control over data and adapt models to national languages. In the longer term, cooperation in hardware will also become critical. Access to advanced Chinese chips could provide a genuine alternative to US technologies and significantly strengthen the computing sovereignty of BRICS countries.

Second, the scale of China’s domestic market gives Beijing considerable leverage over major American technology companies. A clear example is Apple’s planned use of Alibaba’s Qwen model and Baidu technologies to launch Apple Intelligence in China. Beijing is able to impose its own conditions on the world’s largest technology corporations, including requirements related to localization and the integration of AI services. At the same time, the broader trend toward stronger national control over digital infrastructure is also visible across other BRICS countries. Governments are increasingly requiring major AI companies to localize data and comply with national regulatory requirements, making the idea of a common organization for AI governance particularly relevant.

Third, the speed with which Beijing develops regulatory frameworks in response to emerging technological challenges deserves particular attention. For example, updated rules for AI companion services in China entered into force on 15 July. Platforms are now required to prevent the formation of emotional dependency and introduce additional safeguards for minors. In this area, China is effectively moving ahead of many other countries by introducing solutions to risks that are only beginning to be debated in other jurisdictions. Such regulatory experience could become an important contribution to the work of the new organization.

Of course, a certain degree of asymmetry within WAICO will be inevitable at the initial stage. The organization was created on a Chinese initiative, its headquarters are located in Shanghai, and China possesses larger AI models, stronger technology companies, and more extensive computing infrastructure than most of the other participating states. However, this should be viewed not only as a risk of increasing Chinese influence, but also as an initial structural condition that can be balanced as the organization develops. After all, the fact that the United Nations headquarters is located in New York does not make the UN a pro-American organization. What is therefore needed are transparent governance rules, balanced representation of participating states in governing bodies, rotation of leadership positions, and joint determination of research and technological priorities.

The establishment of WAICO does not in itself guarantee the emergence of an alternative global order in artificial intelligence. Unfortunately, any real “order” in this field is not yet even visible on the horizon. We are currently at a stage of intense competition for leadership in AI and a broader restructuring of the international system. Precisely for this reason, BRICS countries should make use of every effective format that can help reduce technological inequality and strengthen their capacity to participate in shaping the future global AI landscape.

The material was prepared specially for the BRICS Expert Council-Russia

Russia
Source: eng.globalaffairs.ru

Debates on global governance are usually framed in terms of institutional collapse or systemic breakdown. However, this diagnosis misses a more subtle but far more significant symptom—its mutation. The contemporary international order is not abandoning multilateralism; rather, it is undergoing a structural transformation from within. Its formal institutions created after 1945 remain in place, but their regulatory capacity is systematically hollowed out by the very great powers that are meant to sustain them.

To understand this dynamic, we must look past the universalist rhetoric of the ‘rules-based international order.’ As Hans Morgenthau (1948) observed, the institutional architecture of multilateralism always functioned as a “Holy Alliance within the Holy Alliance”—a legal framework designed to concentrate effective power within a selective group of dominant states. Instead of establishing an impartial international arena, the global juridical order merely reproduces functional asymmetries. In this realist scheme, international law often operates fictionally (Zolo, 2000): designed as ethics to define international justice, it actually embodies the structural capacity of those who command the dominant military and economic networks, setting the rules and its boundaries.

Coercion operates simultaneously on two levels: 1) formal—through multilateral frameworks providing diplomatic cover, and 2) substantive—through weaponized interdependence that enables routine deployment of permanent coercion.

In fact, we are witnessing an inter-systemic change with the formal structures remaining intact but their regulatory substance being drained out. This change rests on the normalization of permanent coercion. Coercive practices—financial, commercial, technological, and strategic—are no longer exceptional measures used to address crises; they have become routine mechanisms of interstate competition.

Great powers no longer seek to dismantle the multilateral system; instead, they instrumentalize its central nodes. While offensive realism explains the baseline incentives for states to maximize relative power in an anarchic environment (Mearsheimer, 2001), the use of specific mechanisms of contemporary competition is rationalized by weaponized interdependence (Farrell and Newman, 2019). In a highly interconnected global economy, structural power is exercised through control of the critical infrastructure of international exchange. States that occupy central positions in global networks can monitor, exclude, or choke adversaries, transforming connectivity into an unprecedented geopolitical lever.

This distinction matters because the persistence of institutional form can easily be mistaken for the persistence of institutional function. In reality, the sustained multilateral procedures serve to conceal a deeper transformation in the distribution and exercise of power. The most significant change is not that states have stopped invoking rules, but that the rules increasingly operate within environments shaped by coercion. In this sense, multilateralism does not disappear; it becomes increasingly dependent on the structural capacities of those actors which are able to activate, suspend, or reinterpret its mechanisms.

The vectors of Structural Coercion

The shift from rule enforcement to infrastructural weaponization manifests itself across multiple domains of global governance, turning once-neutral regulatory frameworks into asymmetric instruments of pressure.

Intra-Institutional Obstruction: The WTO Appellate Body’s Paralysis

The erosion of the multilateral trading regime is vividly illustrated by the structural paralysis of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism. By unilaterally blocking the appointment of new members to the Appellate Body, the U.S. effectively dismantled the system’s second-instance adjudication (Barrueco, 2025). This means that panel reports are now stripped of legal finality.

This strategy points to the WTO’s functional hollowing out. It demonstrates how a dominant actor can utilize an international institution to serve own immediate interests, turning a multilateral framework into a defective mechanism and depriving vulnerable states of their primary legal shield against unilateralism.


Network Weaponization: Market Access and Secondary Pressures

Economic networks are now increasingly used as levers of disciplinary power in interstate competition. China’s synchronized trade restrictions on Australian exports—targeting barley, beef, wine, and coal following Canberra’s alignment with Western security demands (Ferguson, Waldron and Lim, 2023)—showcase how central nodes of value chains can be weaponized under the guise of technical or sanitary regulations. This practice is not entirely new, but its growing scale and frequency suggest a radical shift. Similarly, Beijing’s secondary supply-chain pressure against European firms linked to Lithuania (WTO, 2022) demonstrates how targeted economic insulation can be used to punish diplomatic deviations.

This dynamics has triggered a reactive institutionalization of coercion, exemplified by the EU’s Anti-Coercion Instrument, established by Regulation 2023/2675 (European Union, 2023). The use of this instrument, designed to neutralize foreign economic pressure through legal deterrence and commercial countermeasures, proves that globalization has ceased to function as a neutral arena of exchange. It has been transformed into a highly securitized space structured by strategic chokepoints, where even major regional powers must institutionalize counter-coercive capabilities to preserve autonomy.

 Sovereign Revisionism: U.S. Unilateral Tariffs

The expansion of broad-based import tariffs justified under national security exemptions (such as Sections 232 and 301 of the U.S. Trade Act) exemplifies how multilateral commitments are systematically subordinated to unilateral decisions (Mulder, 2025). When a hegemonic power perceives that the structural costs of maintaining a liberal trading order outweigh its relative gains, it expands its autonomy by redefining the boundaries of rule application. Under this logic, tariff pressures are no longer exceptional anomalies, but regular, structural mechanisms deployed to manage interstate competition and make market access a permanent lever of geopolitical coercion.

 Systemic Infrastructure Exclusion: The Case of Russia

The economic and financial sanctions imposed on Russia are the pinnacle of permanent coercion exercised through control over global systemic infrastructure (Dowlah, 2025). Rather than introducing selective trade restrictions, Western powers leveraged their structural dominance in international payments by:

• freezing Russian Central Bank assets and foreign reserves;
• enforcing targeted exclusion from the SWIFT financial messaging system;
• restricting access to dollar- and euro-denominated capital markets.

From the perspective of weaponized interdependence, the global monetary sysatem functions as a perfect structural chokepoint capable of isolating a state from vital transnational flows. Here lies the core contradiction of the contemporary international legal order: while the discourse justifying these measures claims to defend the ‘rules-based order,’ the capacity to enforce them depends entirely on an asymmetrical distribution of power over global infrastructure. Normative universalism is thus being unmasked as a fiction, blurring the boundary between economic coercion and strategic warfare.

These cases reveal that institutional structural persistence coexists with operational asymmetry.

The WTO case shows how enforcement can be neutralized from within; the China-related cases illustrate the weaponization of market access and supply-chain dependence; the European response demonstrates the institutionalization of counter-coercion; and the anti-Russia sanctions regime reveal the strategic centrality of financial infrastructure.

Remarkably, coercion is exercised through the very mechanisms that sustain global interdependence.

 The Transfiguration of Warfare: Coercive Unmasking

The hollowing out of rules-based multilateralism inevitably transforms the ontology of military conflicts. As institutional predictability declines, warfare abandons the long-standing requirement for universal normative legitimacy, operating as a primal tool for managing geo-economic interests (Blackwill and Harris, 2016). Historically, great powers felt compelled to drape their military interventions in the vocabulary of humanitarianism, promotion of democracy and human rights. Today, normative justifications are abandoned in favor of a brute, transparent coercive unmasking.

The U.S.’s recent coercive interventions graphically illustrate this shift. The 2026 U.S. operation to capture the Venezuelan president (Barabanov, 2026) was a direct enforcement that sidestepped multilateral mediation, even as it remains intertwined with broader methods of economic and financial pressure. Similarly, Trump’s territorial claims over strategic regions such as Greenland suggest a growing willingness to translate structural advantages into more explicit geopolitical assertions (Gupta, 2025). These developments indicate that coercion is no longer an exceptional, but increasingly consistent practice, employed across military, economic, and infrastructural domains. It signals not so much a breakdown of order as a more contested power reconfiguration, where managing transnational circulatory systems becomes the central condition for exercising power.

Furthermore, this transition signals the rise of a ‘geopolitics of flows,’ where territorial control is reconfigured around strategic nodes and global supply chains. U.S. hegemonic ambitions regarding Greenland and the escalating tensions over the Arctic do not signify a nostalgic return to 19th-century imperialism; rather, they reflect a cold calculation to control global energy routes and critical minerals. Westphalian principles, such as territorial integrity and non-intervention, are now treated by structurally dominant states as mere interpretive obstacles to be ignored whenever national vital interests prevail.

Crucially, contemporary conflict has been transfigured into an asymmetric ‘police execution’ (Zolo, 2007). Rather than serving as a legal punishment imposed for breaking a law enforced by equal sovereign states, penalties are now meted out from a position of absolute hierarchical and technological superiority. Certain actors arbitrarily assume the de facto mantle of global police forces while selectively relegating non-compliant nations to the status of ‘rogue states.’ This allows dominant powers to execute punitive actions, externalize the material and political costs of aggression, and deprive the targeted state of any effective legal protection.

In this world of weaponized connectivity, kinetic military intervention becomes the final, complementary act of an encirclement previously executed within the transnational financial and energy networks, though the boundary between these domains is increasingly difficult to sustain.

Strategic Agency without Structural Backing

The empirical vectors of permanent coercion and the transfiguration of warfare do not merely alter the geopolitical balance, they fundamentally dismantle the institutional conditions that sustain what this paper conceptualizes as strategic agency without structural backing. This analytical category theorizes the specific, calibrated modalities of international action deployed by states that lack material, military, or structural power within a system marked by profound structural asymmetries.

The Global South now faces a profound strategic dilemma: while universal multilateralism historically functioned as an asymmetric shield enabling predictable dispute mediation, the current normalization of permanent coercion reduces rules to a legal veneer, severely narrowing the room for maneuver for states lacking structural power.

Far from being a systemic anomaly, strategic agency without structural backing constitutes a rational, deliberate statecraft. It is, however, structurally conditioned by a foundational requirement: the existence of a rules-based normative framework endowed with a minimum threshold of institutional credibility and operational predictability. Under the aegis of traditional multilateralism, less powerful states—particularly in Latin America and across the Global South—consistently drew upon international law and stable multilateral fora not as abstract moral preferences, but as vital strategic resources. When international norms are perceived as relatively stable and universally applicable, weaker actors can leverage them to channel asymmetric disputes, legitimize foreign policy positions, form diplomatic coalitions, and constrain the discretionary exercise of power by hegemonic states.

This form of agency depends less on the material attributes of power than on the availability of institutional procedures permitting to partially translate legal arguments into political leverage. For states lacking control over military, financial, or technological infrastructure, multilateralism historically offered a limited but meaningful capacity for action. It did not eliminate hierarchy, but it created a procedural space where weaker actors could delay, contest, expose, or diplomatically reframe asymmetrical pressures. In this sense, international law operated not as a neutral guarantee, but as a strategic language through which vulnerable states could seek recognition, build coalitions, and raise the political costs of unilateral coercion.

The transition towards permanent coercion brings a fatal tension into this mechanism.

As great powers shift from normative compliance to selective instrumentalization and infrastructural weaponization, the universal framework is hollowed out of its substance—capacity for ordering.

Rules continue to be invoked as a superficial language of legitimation, but they no longer function as real constraints on material power. Consequently, the strategic value of multilateralism as an instrument of asymmetric insulation is drastically diminished.

The problem, therefore, is that the conditions that make weaker states’ agency effective are progressively degraded. Agency remains possible, but it becomes more reactive, more exposed, and more dependent on the actors that control the infrastructures of enforcement. Not only is the legal framework eroding, but also the fragile mediation that allowed states without structural power to transform normative claims into a diplomatic resource is no longer operative.

These observations shed light on the structural limitations of alternative institutional frameworks like BRICS. While politically potent for diplomatic coordination among revisionist and emerging economies, they cannot ensure predictability for weaker states. This also explains BRICS’s weakness, which lies not in the lack of political will, but infrastructure. Specifically, BRICS lacks:

• a unified, binding legal architecture;
• standardized and enforceable dispute-settlement mechanisms;
• independent, comprehensive control over the core global financial infrastructures.

Without autonomous payment systems, binding dispute-settlement mechanisms, and reliable mechanisms of legal coordination, alternative coalitions like BRICS may express dissatisfaction with the existing order, but they are not yet able to reproduce the stabilizing functions that made multilateralism strategically useful for weaker states.

Furthermore, the fragmentation of the Global South itself—compounded by deeply divergent levels of development and conflicting foreign policy alignments—prevents the formation of a cohesive coalition capable of anchoring a new normative regime. In this inter-systemic interregnum, the collapse of institutional predictability means that the room for maneuver for countries with strategic agency but without structural backing is squeezed, forcing weaker states into a highly volatile arena where form is entirely divorced from function.

*  *  *

The transformation of contemporary global governance cannot be adequately explained by institutional collapse or a crisis of the multilateral order. The multilateral order is undergoing a more insidious change—a functional hollowing out of its regulatory capacity from within. Formal structures persist, international law remains the nominal language of diplomacy, and institutions retain their architecture. Substantively, however, their ability to act as effective constraints on power is eroding, rendered contingent upon and subservient to the underlying power reconfiguration.

This transformation can be conceptualized as ‘permanent coercion.’ Coercion is no longer used as an exceptional tool; it is now routinely embedded in the everyday operation of multilateralism. By weaponizing critical nodes within global economic, technological, and financial networks, dominant powers have transformed interdependence into a mechanism of geopolitical discipline, stripping global governance of its normative neutrality.

What appears as the continuity of multilateralism conceals a deeper transformation—the consolidation of a structurally stratified and operationally selective order.

Russia
Source: valdaiclub.com

In an international system that is experiencing a period of transition and shifts in the global pecking order, the BRICS organisation may emerge as the next fully-fledged global governance institution. To achieve this ambitious end, the group must steer clear of traditional self-centred great power politics that characterise Western-led blocs, writes Timofei Bordachev, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club.

At present, the most absurd course of action for BRICS would be to attempt to imitate one of the structures created over recent decades, and even earlier, by powers whose predominance in world politics was based on military might. This is precisely why, when considering the role that this platform could play in global governance, it makes no sense whatsoever to even contemplate reproducing within it those practices that are generally regarded as successful. This is primarily due to the underlying logic of its purpose that we have already mentioned: all the international organisations of the past and present known to us are either legal manifestations of the balance of power between their members, or formal expressions of their intentions towards the other countries and peoples of the world.

BRICS, by contrast, is not founded on a balance of power, does not seek to codify the relative strength of military capabilities among its member states that might be revealed as a result of conflict, and was not created to coordinate the policies of a narrow group of countries on the world stage in the traditional sense of the term. Therefore, the movement towards greater stability and effectiveness of BRICS should, it seems, begin with the question of the most general objectives shared by its member states, which connect their domestic and foreign policy agendas. We will now attempt to explain what is meant by this and why it appears to be of greatest importance.

Any international cooperation must serve the fundamental interests of its participating countries. European integration, for example, whose institutional embodiment is now the European Union, was originally the unification of countries that had suffered the heaviest defeat in the Second World War (1939–1945), had partially lost their sovereignty in military affairs through participation in NATO, and, as a result of all these circumstances, sought to consolidate their new strategic position. The most important task of the European elites at the moment when integration was created was to preserve their positions of power and strengthen their material foundations through the integration of markets and joint engagement with their most important external economic partners.

Domestic objectives were the dominant factor in this case, and it was on this basis that sufficiently effective mechanisms of influence over global politics and the global economy were later developed. At the very least, these mechanisms far exceeded the actual geopolitical capabilities of countries such as Germany, France, or Italy, not to mention their smaller allies.

Another example is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), whose emergence in the late 1960s was a wise and far-sighted response to the challenges that immediately confronted a significant group of Asian countries after they gained independence. Its goal was to prevent conflicts during the process of establishing sovereign statehood and to avoid competition on the international stage.

Another strong example is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), created 25 years ago to address an important and specific challenge: stabilising the “internal perimeter” of Greater Eurasia in a region directly affecting the security interests of Russia and China, while also being home to Central Asian countries that were then particularly vulnerable in this regard. These objectives were purely internal in nature for a clearly defined region and were, it should be noted, achieved with considerable success.

It is important to bear in mind, however, that the effectiveness of both organisations is also limited by their original functions. For the European Union, the attempt to create a fully fledged political union has ended in failure; for ASEAN, significant difficulties arise from its aspiration to influence the domestic political development of its members or to formulate common approaches to the most important challenge facing Asian politics today—the confrontation between China and the United States; and the SCO has so far been unable to demonstrate a significant role beyond its original area of responsibility.

The UN approached its eightieth anniversary not simply with a wealth of experience, but at a turning point in time, where two visions of the future clash: the West seeks to rewire the global governance system to suit its own standards, while the countries of the World Majority insist on a return to genuine principles of equality and sovereignty. The outcome of the reform will determine whether the organisation remains a universal forum for all or becomes an instrument of global inequality. This and other reflections are provided by Lilia Romadan, a PhD candidate in political science. The author is a participant of the Valdai – New Generation project.

Politically, organisations created to establish joint policies towards external actors, or those combining domestic and foreign policy objectives, are more effective. The Group of Seven, for instance, cannot be viewed merely as an institutional expression of American leadership—it is indeed a highly effective instrument through which the West confronts the rest of humanity. It is no coincidence that it emerged in the mid-1970s: at that time, the sources of the West’s historical dominance in world affairs were simultaneously becoming exhausted, while the signs of a crisis in the confrontation between the United States and Europe, on one side, and the USSR-led opposition on the other, were becoming increasingly evident.

It was then that, for the coordination of joint defence and offensive efforts, the unique format of the “Seven” emerged—a structure that, in earlier eras, historians might have regarded as a prototype of a world government. Over time, however, the ability of the group’s members to influence the global order declined, including as a result of China’s growing economic power and Russia’s resurgence, while the need to strengthen its internal discipline increased.

As a result, today no one in their right mind can imagine the “Seven” as an organ of global governance. Yet we can all easily recognise it as a fairly effective military-economic “headquarters” of the West, where it plans campaigns against the rest of humanity. There is no reason to believe that BRICS, which by its very nature rejects the division of the world, could contemplate such a mission or trajectory of development.

NATO, in turn, combines internal objectives—the preservation of power in Europe by entrenched elites—with external ones—the maintenance of the West’s “military camp” in an appropriate state of readiness. However, it cannot, and even theoretically could never have become, an organ of global governance. Attempts to portray the alliance as a “world policeman” were seriously undertaken either during the most euphoric period for the West immediately after the end of the Cold War, or in the early 2000s, when US allies were alarmed by the unilateral military activism of the American government. It should be noted that something similar can be observed today as well.

Needless to say, BRICS also cannot possibly seek to increase its effectiveness by attempting to transform itself into a closed club. Firstly, this would contradict its original political concept. Secondly, it would be a fundamentally unsuccessful idea, since it does not correspond to the interests of any of the association’s member states.

Thus, when considering how BRICS can simultaneously stabilise itself after its expansion in 2024–2025 and assume a more prominent role in global governance, we can suggest the following: the solution could combine the joint achievement of the most important objectives of its member states while also being of interest to the rest of the world.

There can be little doubt that no model of global governance imposed by a narrow group of states would be accepted today—it must be oriented towards the genuine interests of the majority of the international community.

It seems that, in the foreseeable future, such “fundamental” interests of BRICS countries and the entire world lie in joint progress towards the very Sustainable Development Goals that the United Nations has long been working to advance. At the same time, we can see that Western dominance in the bodies of most global institutions prevents any serious discussion of implementing these goals for the benefit of all humanity and the most vulnerable states.

At the same time, the BRICS countries themselves are undoubtedly united by the idea of their own sustainable development within the framework of well-known priorities—albeit naturally on a different scale and with a different level of commitment to addressing current challenges. The mechanisms of development governance that BRICS states can implement within the association would also be met with great interest by the broader international community of the World Majority.

In particular, it would be attractive to begin with a joint BRICS initiative for one of the regions of the planet most plundered by the West—the countries of West Africa.

South Africa
Source: iol.co.za

Jakarta played host this week to a meeting that could reshape how people and cargo move between Southeast Asia and the Gulf. Indonesia's Transportation Minister, Dudy Purwagandhi, sat down with his Saudi counterpart, Saleh bin Nasser Al-Jasser, Minister of Transport and Logistics Services, on Monday, and the two walked away with a broad agenda covering planes, ships, trains and the people who run them.

It's not a new relationship. Indonesia and Saudi Arabia have been working together on air links since 1988, when the two countries first signed an Air Transport Agreement. But officials on both sides now say that decades-old foundation is ready for an upgrade, one that stretches well past aviation.

More Airports, More Room to Grow

One of the more concrete outcomes from the meeting is an expanded roster of airports cleared for international flights between the two countries. Yogyakarta and Banda Aceh are now in the mix, joining the existing network of gateways connecting Indonesian travelers to Saudi destinations.
Purwagandhi framed the move as a response to simple demand. Travel between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia has been climbing steadily, and much of that traffic has a religious dimension, Indonesian umrah pilgrims make up a large share of passengers flying the route. That's part of why one Indonesian carrier has already added more scheduled flights to Jeddah and Medina since December 2025, according to the minister.

Purwagandhi was careful to frame the expansion as a two-way street. He said any growth in flight access needs to come with fair conditions for airlines on both sides, better service standards, and continued adherence to each country's aviation rules, not a lopsided arrangement that favors one flag carrier over another.

There's also a symbolic ask tucked into the aviation talks: Indonesia wants Saudi Arabia's backing for its bid to join the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organistion, with the vote coming up at ICAO's special session in Montreal this November. Landing a council seat would give Jakarta a stronger voice in shaping global aviation policy, something officials clearly see as worth lobbying hard for.

On the ground in Jakarta, the Saudi side got a small operational win of its own to celebrate too, Indonesia has agreed to shift hajj and umrah flight operations to Terminal 2F at Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, a move Purwagandhi said should make the pilgrimage journey smoother for the thousands of travelers who pass through each year.

Beyond the Runway

What makes this round of talks different from routine aviation diplomacy is how much ground it covers outside the airport gates. Indonesia has thrown its support behind a batch of memoranda of understanding Saudi Arabia wants to draft, touching transport safety investigations, maritime shipping, and rail. Purwagandhi says he's putting a technical team on the case to work through the details without delay.

Rail and maritime cooperation may sound like a footnote next to flashier aviation headlines, but for Indonesia, an archipelago nation where inter-island shipping and rail expansion are constant policy priorities, deeper Saudi involvement in those sectors could open doors for investment and technical know-how the country doesn't currently have in-house.

Al-Jasser's Jakarta trip wasn't limited to Purwagandhi's office, either. He also met with Coordinating Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono to talk through infrastructure projects and broader investment opportunities, and toured Jakarta's mass rapid transit system firsthand, a visit Saudi officials described as a chance to study urban transport models that could inform the Kingdom's own city-planning ambitions. Yudhoyono, for his part, said he expects the partnership to produce tangible results across aviation, shipping, rail and logistics in the years ahead.

A Bigger Diplomatic Backdrop

None of this is happening in isolation. The transport push follows an agreement last July between President Prabowo Subianto and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Jeddah, where the two leaders committed to deepening strategic cooperation across several sectors, transport among them.

Human capital is also on the table. Purwagandhi raised the idea of formal workforce exchanges, floating internships and job placements for graduates of Indonesia's transportation academies at Saudi transport firms, alongside faculty exchanges between the two countries' training institutions. He pointed to Indonesia's aviation, maritime, rail and land-transport graduates as a ready talent pool that Saudi companies could tap.

Whether any of this translates into signed deals soon remains to be seen, most of what came out of Monday's meeting is intent rather than ink on paper. But between the airport expansions, the ICAO lobbying, and the wider MoU wishlist, both governments have signaled they want this partnership to look a lot bigger a year from now than it does today.

South Africa
Source: iol.co.za

Egypt's engineering sector has quietly become one of the country's export success stories, and now officials want to turn that momentum into something much bigger. The government's target: push engineering exports from roughly $6.5 billion in 2025 to $13 billion by 2030, effectively doubling the sector's footprint on global markets within five years.

The plan comes out of a joint effort between the Export Development Fund and the Engineering Export Council of Egypt, whose leaders met recently to map out how the country will get there. Rather than a single headline policy, what emerged looks more like a wide-ranging overhaul of how Egypt supports the companies that make and ship engineering products abroad.

Rebuilding the Support System

At the center of the plan is a rethink of how the state backs its exporters. Hatem El-Nawawy, who heads the Export Development Fund, said the new approach is meant to go beyond simply handing out financial incentives. Instead, the fund wants to help manufacturers get export-ready from the ground up, meeting international compliance standards, building the operational capacity to scale up production, and generally becoming more competitive once their goods hit foreign shelves.

That shift also means modernising the bureaucratic side of exporting. Officials are pushing to digitize export procedures, cut down the friction of dealing with government paperwork, and make the whole process of coordinating with exporters faster and less cumbersome. For manufacturers who've long complained about red tape slowing down shipments, that piece of the roadmap may end up mattering as much as any subsidy.

Leaning on Trade Deals Already on the Books

Egypt isn't planning to build all of this from scratch, a lot of the strategy leans on trade agreements the country has already signed. Officials want to make fuller use of the African Continental Free Trade Area, which opens access to a market of more than a billion people, along with the MERCOSUR agreement covering South America's largest economies.

Sherif El-Sayyad, who chairs the Engineering Export Council, has been vocal about Africa and South America being key to hitting the 2030 number, since neither region has historically been a dominant destination for Egyptian engineering goods compared to established markets in Europe and the Gulf. Deepening those two trade relationships would give Egyptian manufacturers a meaningfully bigger playing field.

The strategy also calls for weaving Egyptian companies more tightly into global supply chains, growing local production of components rather than relying on imported parts, and shifting the export mix toward higher value-added goods, the kind of products that earn more per unit and are harder for lower-cost competitors to replicate.

A Sector Already on a Growth Streak

The ambition doesn't come out of nowhere. Egypt's engineering exports have been on a consistent upward run for the past two years. The sector posted a record $3.1 billion in the first half of 2025 alone, and full-year 2025 figures came in strong across the board, with electrical and electronic products, machinery, and transportation equipment all posting double-digit growth. Early 2026 data suggests the pace hasn't slowed, El-Sayyad has pointed to nearly 20% year-on-year growth in the sector during the first four months of this year.

That track record is part of why officials feel confident the 2030 target is realistic rather than aspirational. Growth has been broad-based, spanning cables, automotive components, home appliances, and industrial machinery, with demand climbing not just from traditional partners in Europe but also from Gulf Cooperation Council states, African markets like Nigeria and Kenya, and even more distant destinations including the United States and China.

Industry officials have also framed the sector as one of seven priority industries under Egypt's Industrial Strategy 2030, giving it a formal seat at the table alongside the country's broader industrial diversification push.

Part of a Much Bigger Export Push

The engineering target isn't standing alone, it's one piece of a considerably larger export ambition. El-Sayyad has tied the sector's $13 billion goal directly to the government's overarching aim of pushing Egypt's total exports to $100 billion by 2030, a figure that would represent a dramatic jump from where the country's export economy sits today.

Whether Egypt hits either number will depend on plenty of factors outside any single ministry's control, global demand, currency stability, and competition from other manufacturing hubs chief among them. But with a support system overhaul now in motion and a sector that's already been outperforming expectations, officials in Cairo clearly believe the pieces are falling into place for engineering to become one of the anchors of the country's export economy over the next five years.

Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org

Harmonizing South-South trade agreements

With protectionist measures in the world economy picking up pace in recent years, the realm of South-South economic cooperation has been seen increasingly by developing economies as a way to compensate for the rising intensity of adverse shocks. The largest economies of the Global South such as China and India have been particularly active in concluding trade accords with other developing economies, which has been accompanied by a further re-direction of trade flows towards the South-South segment of the world economy. In particular, China is working on FTAs with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as well as upgrading the China-ASEAN FTA to include digital and green economy cooperation, while India is also exploring the venues to upgrade its trade pact with ASEAN, as well as to build closer ties with the GCC and developing economies such as Chile, Peru and Oman. The common focal points in the South-South trade policy efforts of China and India are hence the regional blocs of ASEAN as well as the GCC and ongoing work by the two largest BRICS economies to upgrade their trade relations with these regional integration arrangements could provide a basis for bringing closer the frameworks of trade agreements emerging in the BRICS+ space.

In terms of trade policy, BRICS core members could be divided into three groups – those that have significantly delegated trade policy to their respective regional integration arrangements (Brazil with Mercosur, Russia with the Eurasian Economic Union, South Africa with the South African Customs Union); those with partial delegation: UAE (via GCC) and Indonesia (via ASEAN); and economies that have full autonomy and no significant delegation to their respective regional arrangements: India, China, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran. If Saudi Arabia were to join the bloc as a full-fledged core member, it would join its GCC counterpart UAE in the category of partial delegation of trade policy. This in turn implies that half or more than half (with Saudi’s possible membership) of BRICS core members have a varying degree of delegation of their trade policy to the respective regional integration arrangement. What this means is that for the trade policy agenda within BRICS+ to advance meaningfully, the regional arrangements of the Global South need to form cooperative platforms to discuss the possible modalities of “RTA-to-RTA” trade accords as well as the possibilities for harmonizing trade deals within the BRICS+ circle, facilitating thus the multilateralization of trade accords across the Global South.

Such a path to greater prominence of RTAs in BRICS+ could be pursued via several tracks. One is for the regional arrangements with significant trade policy delegation from the national to regional level (Mercosur, EAEU and SACU) to lead the “integration of integrations” effort – the respective BRICS core members represented by Brazil, Russia and South Africa could form a troika focusing on building working groups (possibly within the framework of the BRICS Business Council) to sustain the momentum of such policy discussions. A complementary track could bring together India and China (as the largest and some of the most active BRICS members in building FTA accords with developing economies) together with the UAE (GCC) and Indonesia (ASEAN). The accords currently negotiated by China and India with the GCC and ASEAN could form a basis for harmonizing South-South trade deals with the view to replicating such accords across other members of the BRICS+ circle.

The harmonization and greater coordination of such accords does make sense and the discussions between ASEAN and India show why – the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) allows 35% value addition in terms of rules of origin, leaving it vulnerable to influxes of Chinese components. In this context, aligning rules of origin across the China-ASEAN and India-ASEAN FTAs and coordinating anti-circumvention measures would serve to keep a lid on tariff arbitrage. These steps could be further complemented by discussions on a coordinated approach to lowering non-tariff barriers (NTBs), including via employing mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) for product standards and technical regulations. Greater coordination of tariff levels and the scope of coverage of FTA accords (including the share of goods covered by lower tariffs) would also serve to reduce the tensions and frictions between such trade accords. Since ASEAN and the GCC are among the most active participants in the widening cob-web of trade deals across the BRICS+ space, their representatives from the BRICS core could work together with India and China to breathe life into the regional/RTA agenda as well as trade policy coordination more broadly. This in turn could result in regional blocs such as ASEAN and the GCC delivering an important contribution to the amelioration of the economic/trade dialogue across BRICS core members, including between China and India.

In the end, trade policy coordination within BRICS+ is yet to evolve and the most straightforward path in my view lies via the creation of a common BRICS+ platform within the WTO as well as a BEAMS (BIMSTEC, Eurasian Economic Union, ASEAN-China FTA, Mercosur, SACU/SADC) horizontal platform for regional integration arrangements[1] that would provide the possibility for discussions on common FTA frameworks and approaches to the harmonization of South-South trade agreements. If the latter BEAMS/BEAMS+ platform remains out of reach, incremental and plurilateral efforts undertaken by some of the leading regional blocs in the BRICS+ space such as the GCC and ASEAN could serve to build a momentum for the regional integration arrangements of the Global South to play an increasingly prominent role in the BRICS+ economic policy agenda.

[1] https://www.brics2018.org.za/shining-beams-brics/

China
Source: www.chinadaily.com.cn

The BRICS mechanism is more relevant in the current geopolitical environment as a platform to offer alternative solutions, South African scholars say.

Ari Sitas, an emeritus professor at the University of Cape Town, said the rise in unilateralism, protectionism and conflicts in various parts of the world has given BRICS a more important role to play.

"BRICS is relevant more than it started because it has to provide a counterweight to random decisions that are taken based on power in the world now. It owes the developing world a protective umbrella from the madness that is happening to the rest of the world," said Sitas.

"BRICS can provide (a) counterpoint to the dynamics in the world's systems now, and it should continue to be tolerant between countries," said Sitas, who is also former chairperson of the South African BRICS Think Tank.

He added that BRICS is not only reshaping economics and redefining who produces knowledge and scientific research worldwide, but also helping to advocate for peace.

Since its inception, some media outlets said it would "collapse" in the same year while others said its formation was a bad idea, but it is thriving and expanding with new members, he said.

Cecil Masoka, director for Europe and the Gulf States at South Africa's Department of Science, Technology and Innovation, said BRICS has used bilateral relations to advance its agenda. He said BRICS has made achievements in many areas including science, technology and innovation, which are evident if one deeply examines the different work streams.

Masoka said South Africa does not have the financial muscle to build global large-scale research infrastructure for science, technology and innovation like China and Russia, but BRICS cooperation has helped bridge that gap.

"The bilateral relations among BRICS members have allowed us to send our students to access these research infrastructures and undertake research in cutting-edge technologies with people from different countries," said Masoka.

He explained that when those South African students return to the country from studying in BRICS countries such as China, they make productive contributions to the country. Masoka said the trade and industry working group has resulted in an increase in exports of South African goods to the markets of other BRICS members such as China.

South-South solidarity

Rasigan Maharajh, chief director of the Institute for Economic Research on Innovation at South Africa's Tshwane University of Technology, said BRICS has strengthened South-South solidarity, reaching back to the 1955 Bandung Conference. He explained that BRICS and subsequently BRICS+ have become a major platform for deliberating the political, social, economic, and ecological dimensions of global transformation.

The expansion of improved productive capacities, capabilities, and competencies is undoubtedly necessary to redress material inequalities in the quality of life, said Maharajh.

He said BRICS should invest in science and technology development, unlike NATO, which recently committed to raising member states' military expenditure to 5 percent of the gross domestic product.
BRICS has established institutions such as the Contingent Reserve Arrangement and the New Development Bank, which have given South Africa loans to address water scarcity through a cross-border project with neighboring Lesotho.

The writer is a freelance journalist for China Daily.

China
Source: www.chinadaily.com.cn

Leaders and experts from BRICS nations and beyond gathered at the 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference in Shanghai on Friday to forge a consensus on making AI accessible to all of humanity.

The Win-Win BRICS forum, held under the theme "From consensus to practice: making artificial intelligence a global public good benefiting all humanity", brought together government officials, UN representatives, and industry leaders to address the digital divide in AI capabilities.

"We are undoubtedly living in the age of artificial intelligence," said Tshilidzi Marwala, UN under-secretary-general and rector of the United Nations University. "But access to an international public good is measured by who can actually use it."

With BRICS countries representing more than 40 percent of the world's population with a total exceeding 3 billion people, Marwala emphasized that AI must not remain a privilege of the few.
William Kabogo Gitau, cabinet secretary of Kenya's Ministry of Information, Communications and the Digital Economy, underscored the barriers facing developing nations. "The distance between our people and AI tools is a practical problem," he said. "The Global South comes to this forum with its perspectives and priorities."

Gitau stressed that public value lies in applying AI to areas including agriculture, healthcare, education and public services.

The forum produced several initiatives designed to translate principles into action. Key deliverables included the Global AI Industry Capacity Building Initiative and the Global AI Legal Infrastructure, aiming at providing support for enterprises conducting cross-border cooperation, enhancing compliance capabilities and expanding into international markets.

Zhang Ying, deputy secretary-general of the Shanghai Municipal People's Government, emphasized the city's role as a bridge for BRICS AI cooperation. "Shanghai is an important window for China's opening-up and a hub for AI industry development," Zhang said. "In 2025, the city's AI industry reached nearly 640 billion yuan ($94.4b), growing 39.5 percent. We are committed to promoting global win-win cooperation in artificial intelligence."

Alaa Abdulaal, chief of Digital Economy Intelligence at the Digital Cooperation Organization, framed AI as fundamentally reshaping global interdependence. "AI is no longer simply an emerging technology. It is becoming a driving force behind industrial transformation, economic growth and global competitiveness," she said.

"No single country or organization can unlock AI's full potential alone," Abdulaal added. "The question is not only how we accelerate innovation, but how we ensure countries, institutions and innovators can work together to build sustainable ecosystems and shared prosperity."

Indonesia's Ambassador to China Djauhari Oratmangun praised China's leadership in high-tech development and innovation, while calling for deeper collaboration. "We should strengthen cooperation in building advanced industrial ecosystems and invest in education and talent development through joint training and research," he said.

"The China-BRICS Artificial Intelligence Development and Cooperation Center provides an important platform to advance these shared goals," Oratmangun added. "I look forward to seeing our shared aspirations translated into concrete projects, joint platforms, talent exchanges and viable initiatives that deliver real benefits for our people."

Russia
Source: en.interaffairs.ru

The first grandiose Ball of BRICS nations, dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the association's establishment, took place in Moscow at the foot of the ancient Kremlin walls in Gostiny Dvor at the end of June. The event served as a magnificent finale to the "BRICS Horizons" Forum, combining a rich business program with a unique cultural spectacle. The Ball brought together more than 500 guests from Russia and 50 countries across different continents. Among the honored guests were Ambassadors Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, consuls, cultural and economic advisers, politicians, deputies, financiers, entrepreneurs, and public figures.

Marina Nesterenko, Chair of the Organizing Committee, emphasized: "The 'BRICS Horizons' Forum represents a strategic instrument where business contacts are organically complemented by acquaintance with the national traditions of the member states. The business segment served as a discussion platform for addressing key issues: the new financial architecture, settlements in national currencies, central bank digital currencies, cybersecurity, and the development of creative industries." According to Marina Nesterenko, the Ball was conceived to create an atmosphere of trust and open dialogue between representatives of government structures, diplomatic missions, and the business community. "It is precisely this combination of business and cultural diplomacy that allows interaction between member countries to reach a qualitatively new level," noted Nesterenko.

Prominent figures in international diplomacy delivered welcoming addresses at the ceremonial opening: Vicente Barrientos (President of the BRICS Center, Chairman of the Ball Committee) emphasized: "If two centuries ago at the Congress of Vienna the ball served as 'soft power' for redrawing the map of Europe, then today the 'BRICS Ball' must become 'soft power' for shaping a new world order." Denis von Meck, a member of the Ball Committee, a renowned people's diplomat, and a direct descendant of the legendary Davydov, Tchaikovsky, and von Meck families, spoke about the key role of cultural people's diplomacy in strengthening mutual understanding between peoples, noting that behind every diplomatic protocol there are living people connected by a common cultural memory and historical heritage. His speech was received with deep attention and support from the audience, as it reflected the essence of what was happening: behind official protocols stand living people, connected by common cultural codes and historical memory.

Honored guests at the ceremonial opening of the BRICS Ball

Greetings to the participants of the BRICS Ball were extended by Vladimir Gamza (Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation Council for the Financial Market and Investments), Alexander Murichev (Vice-President of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Chairman of the Board of the FBA EAS), Sergey Lodočkin (President of the International Public-Business Center "BRICS House"), Ravil Sataev (publisher of the international journal Molecula), and Purnima Anand (Indian public figure).

A special highlight of the Ball was the photo zone organized at the initiative of Denis von Meck, featuring a large portrait of Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky and interior fragments stylized in the era of the composer. Here, guests could also view and photograph themselves with unique original 19th-century photographs of the great composer from the family archive of the von Meck-Tchaikovsky families, provided by Denis von Meck. This exhibition allowed Ball participants to touch the living history of Russian musical culture. All the more so as beautiful couples from BRICS countries waltzed to the music of the great composer. According to participants and organizers of the festive event, the success of the Ball and the guests' engagement in the dance represent an invaluable creative contribution by Gediminas Taranda, Honored Art Worker of the Russian Federation.

Gediminas Taranda and Denis von Meck in interiors stylized in the era of P.I. Tchaikovsky

Musical accompaniment was provided by the "BRICS Ball Orchestra" under the direction of conductor Pavel Soldatikov, who performed works by Tchaikovsky, Borodin, Lehár, and Strauss. The concert program featured soloists from the State Academic Bolshoi Theatre, Alexander and Olga Krasnov, as well as laureates of international competitions from Brazil, India, and China.

Artists from the People's Republic of China perform

Within the framework of the Ball, a solemn award ceremony took place—the "Star BRICS Award." Honored figures of culture, sports, and business received the awards. Among them were Sammy Kotwani (President of the Russian-Indian Business Alliance) for his contribution to the development of international cooperation in BRICS countries; Ekaterina Sirotina (Honored Coach of Russia, choreographer-director for rhythmic gymnastics) for her contribution to the development of educational programs for coaches and athletes of BRICS countries; Alexander Nesterov, Evgeny Trifonov, and Alexander Sunozov for their contributions to the development of economy and culture. As Denis von Meck told International Affairs magazine, the International Charitable Foundation named after Nadezhda von Meck, whose founder and president is Denis Andreevich, prepared special valuable gifts for the Award laureates. Each gift emphasized the significance of the recipients' contributions, as recognized by the jury, to the development of cultural cooperation between BRICS states.

The Master of Ceremonies of the BRICS Ball, Marina Nesterenko, drew a historical parallel with the "dancing" Congress of Vienna of 1814–1815, which took place in the capital of Austria-Hungary following the Napoleonic Wars: "Then, the most important decisions were made not only at card tables but also at balls. It was precisely in dance, in social conversation, that trust was born, which was then sealed with signatures under treaties. We are reviving this tradition today. The notes of a swift waltz can be no worse than a diplomatic note." Regarding the distinctive features of the early 19th and early 21st centuries, Marina Nesterenko noted: "Two hundred years separate two eras. Then, in Vienna, they danced to redraw the map of Europe. Today in Moscow, we dance because a new map of the world is already taking shape. The main goal is to show that in this new world, there is room not only for economy but also for culture and human warmth."

Director-Producer of the Ball Polina Bakhtalina-Berten explained the artistic concept: "Our task is to unite five cultures in one performance. The evening's program brings together Brazilian samba, Russian waltz, and traditional Indian dance. Opera arias will be sung in the languages of BRICS countries. Opera is a language understood without translation." The First International Ball of BRICS countries in the format of a social event became a kind of manifesto of a new multipolar culture, where respect for the traditions, art, and historical memory of each nation of the Association becomes the foundation for building a just world order. As Marina Nesterenko noted, the cultural program presents the heritage of BRICS countries as part of a single galaxy of cultures, where each country is a unique star with its own light and gravitational pull, but all are moving toward a common goal—peace, development, and cooperation. "We are a single orbital station, where everyone has their own role, but a common goal: peace, development, and cooperation," emphasized the Chair of the Organizing Committee.

Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

Working Paper No. 97 / 2026

This working paper examines the strategies pursued by South Africa, Ethiopia, and Egypt in engaging with BRICS. Despite their diverse national contexts, all three countries view BRICS membership as a means of strengthening their international agency and promoting more equitable socio-economic development. Using the African cases as a lens, the paper identifies the main drivers of BRICS enlargement and assesses both the opportunities and the challenges associated with the bloc's growing African dimension.

African Countries in BRICS: New Opportunities for Economic and Political Cooperation, 2.1 Mb