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valdaiclub.com Opportunities for BRICS and the SCO Aligning in Greater Eurasia
Given the difficulty of launching rigid formats of integration, in the case of forming the space of Greater Eurasia through the convergence of the policies and projects of BRICS, the SCO, and also other interested players and organisations, multi-level and multi-speed cooperation could work well, writes Viktoria Panova.
The past month of summit diplomacy involving the Global Majority has arguably been the most unsettling for outside parties. After all, neither BRICS nor the SCO includes representatives from Western nations in any capacity. Consequently, the potential for further deepening cooperation among the Global Majority countries across these various platforms holds special significance for the future global order. The Greater Eurasia initiative is also of particular importance, as are the opportunities arising from the alignment of BRICS and SCO cooperation projects.
The concept of Greater Eurasia is built around a simple yet ambitious premise: the vast region spanning from Eastern Europe and Central Asia to the Middle East, India, China, and Southeast Asia relies on a system of interconnected frameworks for cooperation. In this context, a key role in shaping this space falls to structures that, on the one hand, help establish rules governing both their own interactions and, potentially, those of a wider group of nations; and, on the other, include members committed to creating an integrated zone of prosperity and security across the Eurasian continent.
Two pillars—one continentBRICS and the SCO have the potential to become complementary pillars of Greater Eurasia. BRICS represents global economic, financial, and political reach, while the SCO serves as a regional framework for security, transport connectivity, and political dialogue. There is no need to artificially merge these two mechanisms; rather, the focus could be on creating a network of joint projects—and potentially, in specific instances, institutions and rules—that would eventually be open to other non-Western entities, such as the EAEU or ASEAN.
The SCO was historically formed as a regional platform for strengthening security and combating terrorism, extremism and separatism. Gradually, its spheres of interaction were expanded to transport, energy, trade and investment. If we speak of BRICS, it is a global, trans-regional structure that has gradually been asserting itself more and more loudly in laying claim to active global reform, the building of a new model of cooperation, the strengthening of global trade, and the enhancement of the role of the countries of the global majority in value-added chains, in technology transfer and in sustainable development. At the same time, the core participants in both mechanisms coincides: we are talking about Russia, India, Iran and China. The Chinese researcher Jiang Tianjiao
believes that the SCO will in future be transformed from a platform for coordinating security into a comprehensive framework of governance with an even stronger focus on the economy and mature mechanisms of internal balance. At the same time, he agrees with the general premise that BRICS will continue to strengthen as the core for coordinating the efforts of the global majority, with a further deepening of cooperation in the monetary and financial sphere and in the sphere of non-traditional security challenges. It would seem that each has its own goal and tasks, albeit with the prospect of expansion. However, combining potentials may yield a different sum than mere addition.
When 2+2 can equal 5Given their different models of interaction and the fact that the associations have different inherent aims, there is a whole series of issues where the potential for synchronising the work of BRICS and the SCO could yield the greatest result. Let us begin with the most complex yet fundamental sphere—finance. De-dollarisation is not an end in itself within BRICS; nevertheless, more than 10 years ago the association’s participants adopted a framework for the use of national currencies, and today 67% of all intra-BRICS trade is already conducted in national currencies. Work continues on creating an alternative payment system and on the technical parameters of a new investment platform. And although no breakthrough on this issue occurred following the Delhi summit, the general determination to achieve the goal of securing the conditions for sovereign and equal development was confirmed (in circumstances where both the dollar itself and tariffs continue to be used by Washington as weapons and a means of blackmail, even against those who would very much like to preserve the status quo in relations with Western countries; no other options for action remain), marking the final transition from political coordination to technical fine-tuning.
The SCO
summit in Bishkek, among other things, also noted the leaders’ commitment to “the further implementation by interested SCO member states of the roadmap for the gradual increase of the share of national currencies in mutual settlements”. And a year earlier, the SCO Development Strategy until 2035 had been adopted, which likewise set out the tasks for deepening practical cooperation in the spheres of trade, economy, finance and
investment.
Accordingly, a synchronised expansion of the use of national currencies in mutual settlements, as
well as the involvement of all SCO participants in BRICS efforts to develop an alternative payment mechanism, would help to test-run the capabilities of such a payment system across a broader number of global majority countries.
We also recall that even as long ago as last year, a decision was taken at the Tianjin summit to establish an SCO bank, although technically it has still not become operational. Despite the restrictions that persist to this day, imposed by the Western-centric system itself on the operation of the New Development Bank, an alternative path to the stalled launch of the SCO bank could be the gradual participation of non-BRICS members in the NDB.
Another sphere is that of security. For the SCO it is more primary and organic, whereas within BRICS any undue emphasis on questions of military-political coordination is intentionally avoided. Thus, while periodic joint exercises are natural for the SCO (the most recent counter-terrorism exercises took place in Iran in December last year—Sakhand Anti-Terror 2025), we recall that the Will for Peace 2026 exercises initiated by South Africa at the beginning of this year and initially positioned as a “BRICS plus” format failed to attract all the members. Nevertheless, a certain division of roles, with practical cooperation on the part of the SCO and a theoretical framework and political dialogue on global risks and the coordination of positions of the global majority on the part of BRICS, could offer a workable format. In turn, such mutual complementarity leads to the formation of a safer environment for trade, investment, and the realisation of transport connectivity among the countries participating in both associations.
The SCO’s mission and its very nature as international organisation has been the subject of much debate. Oleg Barabanov, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club, explores one potential source of clues towards the self-perception of the SCO—the organisation’s founding documents and ample summit declarations.
Questions of global governance themselves are, in turn, more organic to BRICS, yet we see analogous approaches being conveyed in SCO documents regarding the reform of the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, and the enhancement of the role of the Global South. In this case, there is an opportunity to act, within the framework of the existing universal institutions, as a broader platform, with the possibility of involving all BRICS member states and their partners, the SCO countries, including dialogue partners and observers, as well as the countries of the EAEU and ASEAN. Such a unified voice would be difficult to continue to ignore.
Another potential area of convergence is energy and critical resources. Back in 2006, the Russian president proposed establishing an SCO Energy Club within the framework of the SCO, while eleven years later an Energy Research Platform was initiated under the aegis of BRICS. On the one hand, the very format of these institutions does not imply a serious coordination of the positions of the participating countries; on the other hand, it is at the very least an opportunity to regularly compare notes on the most sensitive issues for both producers and consumers of energy within these mechanisms, identifying the most promising paths towards ensuring a just energy transition, while taking into account the sovereign interests and particular characteristics of all the participating countries. Moreover, in a format of convergence, what may be at stake is not only, and not so much, ensuring the resilience and security of supplies and the development of regional networks, but, when combined with questions of critical minerals, one can speak of creating value-added chains (incidentally, this was precisely one of the points emphasised at the most recent BRICS
summit in Delhi): deeper processing, the manufacture of equipment, the development of joint technological standards, and so on.
Ensuring digital connectivity and fostering cooperation in the field of artificial intelligence could also prove to be crucial. Last year in Rio de Janeiro, BRICS leaders adopted a declaration on global AI governance; more recently, ahead of China assuming the BRICS chairmanship, Xi Jinping proposed an initiative to establish an international AI centre,
advocating for the “development of open-source AI in a spirit of cooperation and sharing”—all in addition to the World AI Cooperation Organisation (
WAICO) previously initiated by China. Furthermore, a shared agenda could encompass secure data exchange channels, digital trade documents, and interoperable payment standards. While each individual initiative warrants detailed study, one thing is certain: for BRICS and SCO nations—and the Global Majority at large, characterized by widely varying levels of technological development—what matters is not closed platforms but open rules that prevent the creation of new dependencies on any single centre of power.
Other areas of potential convergence of policies and approaches, as well as work on concrete joint projects, could also include the development of transport connectivity, the ensuring of food security and the creation of joint strategic reserves, climate resilience projects, and many other points of interest.
The guiding principle is multi-level and multi-speed integrationGiven the difficulty of launching rigid formats of integration, in the case of forming the space of Greater Eurasia through the convergence of the policies and projects of BRICS, the SCO, and also other interested players and organisations, multi-level and multi-speed cooperation could work well. Incidentally, despite the fact that further expansion within BRICS is for the time being rather counterproductive, a gradual involvement not of individual countries as partners, but of entire regional organisations, could serve as an alternative. Recently, certain experts have begun to express the view that it would be advisable to involve the AU in the work of BRICS (by analogy with its earlier involvement in the work of the G20); possibly, such a Solomonic solution could in the future indeed prove to be the inclusion in the work of the association not only of the AU, but also the SCO, ASEAN, the Arab League, CELAC and other organisations composed of representatives of the global majority.
This would fully correspond to the logic of multipolarity and equal development. If we return from the global to the Eurasian level, then such an approach, together with multi-level cooperation on individual projects, could correspond to the spirit of Eurasian partnership—a space with several centres of power, diverse economies, different foreign-policy orientations and several cultural-civilisational codes. If we follow this logic, Greater Eurasia could become one of the key centres of the future polycentric architecture of the world, where BRICS and the SCO are pillars of the future world order.