Greece
Source: moderndiplomacy.eu

Africa to Host BRICS Military Training, with Iran Involved – What is the US Response?
This represents a significant step in military preparedness amidst the current tense and volatile global landscape.

Africa is a continent with great potential for cooperation. Not only does it possess significant natural resources, but its people are also cooperative in addressing and participating in regional and global issues. This country serves as proof that cooperation can be successfully achieved and that it is not solely the preserve of large nations with superpower status to engage in cooperation, nor is it limited to playing a role or participating in global political, economic, and security interests. This discussion clearly highlights the capabilities of African nations, which have long been overlooked by the global community yet are contributing to ‘Will for Peace 2026’—a naval drill involving the BRICS nations: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. This represents a significant step in military preparedness amidst the current tense and volatile global landscape.

Africa’s critical role is reflected in the fact that the country initially allowed BRICS member states to conduct military and war drills off the coast of Cape Town, near Simon’s Town, South Africa. These major powers have entrusted Africa as a strategic base for drills to prepare for future global situations and challenges. The military drills lasted for one week; this is likely to provoke a range of perspectives, making it unlikely that such drills could be held in Africa over an extended period, particularly given the participation of Eastern nations such as Iran and the United Arab Emirates, which would undoubtedly draw criticism from the United States.

The US’s sharp response to the participation of Iran and another Middle Eastern nation, namely the United Arab Emirates, in military drills off the coast of Africa is seen as a sign of US vigilance and apprehension regarding the moves that the BRICS nations might make in the face of security tensions, as well as a potential threat to security stability due to Iran’s participation in the ‘Will for Peace 2026’ drill.

The Motive Behind the War Drills in Africa

The deployment of naval military drills in Africa is intended solely to foster cooperation in multinational maritime security; these drills are being conducted as a form of response or precautionary measure by the BRICS nations to the conflict and tensions arising from the US’s handling of the oil crisis in Venezuela. Led by the superpower China in mobilizing the BRICS nations to join these war drills, this has caused concern and unease amongst superpowers such as the US, who are now questioning the situation, as other superpowers—namely Russia and China—are also participating in the drills held in Africa. These BRICS members decided to conduct naval drills in Africa due to its strategic location, specifically in the southern part of Cape Town and Simon’s Town, which is the meeting point of the Indian and Atlantic Oceans; this is one of the factors and reasons why the BRICS member states chose this region as an effective location for conducting the drills.

Furthermore, there are several other reasons, such as the fact that this part of Africa is close to the Cape of Tanjung Harapan, which is a global trade route; this is naturally a key focus for nations seeking to sustain the global economy, with appropriate maritime surveillance and control essential for the smooth functioning of global economic and trade processes.

This maritime drill is reported to have taken place over seven days; the drill ran from 9 to 16 January and was conducted as a routine technical drill.

Various Preparations for the Naval Military Drill

The well-organized preparations for conducting this week-long drill are undoubtedly the result of meticulous planning. In this drill, several vessels were deployed; both Iran and China deployed destroyers, whilst Russia and the United Arab Emirates launched corvettes, and the host nation deployed a frigate to take part in the naval military drill. In this context, it is evident that neither Brazil nor India is participating; this is due to the nature of the drill. However, this does not mean Brazil is not coordinating or participating; on this occasion, Brazil is merely acting as an observer in the maritime training process. Looking further at Iran’s participation in these joint drills, given that in 2025 Iran was officially declared a member of BRICS, this opportunity naturally represents a key priority for Iran’s participation and cooperation, serving both domestic and foreign interests. Moreover, Iran plays a significant role in the global arena, owing to the nation’s strength and capability to compete on the international stage.

Iran’s Participation in the ‘Will for Peace 2026’ Drill

Based on the views of several countries regarding Iran’s participation in this drill, it has come under increasing scrutiny, particularly from the US. Regarding the organization of this military drill, the US considers Iran’s participation to be entirely unacceptable.

One of the reasons for the rejection of Iran’s participation is that the country is currently facing internal conflict, in the form of protests, and is seen as a state that harbors various forms of terrorism, thereby creating domestic instability. This is viewed unfavorably on the global stage, particularly given Iran’s involvement in military aggression drills in Africa, which has raised new concerns, as Iran is deemed unable to stabilize its own domestic situation and yet seeks to participate in global security matters. The US has criticized South Africa for involving Iran in these war drills alongside other BRICS member states; US concerns regarding this maritime security zone could potentially undermine regional stability, as this area serves as a global trade route.

As stated by the South African opposition party, the decision to allow Iran to participate in these security maneuvers will increase and fuel African tensions towards Washington, particularly given the criticism from the US regarding the presence of Iranian warships and Russian vessels docked in African waters; the US views this as creating friction with the security policies of Western nations.
The existing tensions in this situation are compounded by the image of Iran, a country currently embroiled in a conflict against terrorism whilst upholding human rights within the Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, it is stated that the US Embassy is perplexed by the decision-making processes within the South African government, as it is deemed not to be independent in formulating policies and decisions. As stated by the US Embassy regarding South Africa, with deep concern and apprehension over reports opposing the government’s policy regarding Iran’s participation in the ongoing naval drills. In this situation, the SANDF—South African National Defence Force—is observed to have lost its way in making decisions.

South Africa had made appeals or requests to Iran, hoping it would withdraw from the military drilling. However, it was not anticipated that Iran would ultimately be asked not to participate in the continuation of the naval drill, as evidenced by the renewed decision to ban Iran from participating in Will for Peace 2026. Iran did not participate in the drill until the end but was present during the initial preparations in South Africa.

Consequently, Iran recognized the tense situation and concluded that it was not the most appropriate decision to insist on participating in the drill whilst facing pressure from various parties regarding its involvement in the name of upholding global peace and security.

USA
Source: www.eurasiareview.com

The unfolding crisis in West Asia—triggered by the joint United States–Israel military campaign, Operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion, against Iran on February 28, 2026—marks one of the most volatile geopolitical moments of the 21st century. The scale and precision of the strikes, reportedly decapitating Iran’s top leadership, have destabilized the regional balance of power and sent shockwaves across the global system. What began as a regional confrontation is rapidly evolving into a crisis with far-reaching implications for energy security, economic stability, and international diplomacy.

At the heart of this moment lies a structural question: can emerging multilateral platforms like BRICS meet the demands of crisis diplomacy in an increasingly fragmented and multipolar world?

A Crisis For The World

The confrontation between the United States, Israel, and Iran has expanded beyond conventional warfare into a broader strategic contest. The targeting of Iran’s leadership has heightened the risk of retaliation through proxy networks, disruptions to maritime trade routes, and wider regional escalation involving actors such as Hezbollah and Gulf states.

The Strait of Hormuz—through which a significant share of global oil flows—has once again become a critical flashpoint. Any disruption could trigger cascading effects across global markets, including rising energy prices and inflationary pressures. For major import-dependent economies like India and China, the stakes are particularly high.

Expectations from BRICS: The Search for De-escalation

The crisis has also exposed the limitations of existing global governance structures. Western-led institutions have struggled to generate consensus or credible pathways for de-escalation. This vacuum has raised expectations from alternative platforms such as BRICS to assume a more active diplomatic role.

Amid rising tensions, signs of backchannel diplomacy suggest attempts to contain the conflict and explore ceasefire options. However, the broader diplomatic environment remains fragmented, marked by competing narratives, strategic mistrust, and divergent national interests. It is within this fractured landscape that BRICS faces growing scrutiny.

Jeffrey Sachs on March 2:“It’s not only Trump but there’s no brake, there’s no foot on the brake. This is only an accelerator towards expanded war right now. And the only way that it can stop is if the BRICS countries – and that means India, that means Brazil, that means Russia, that means China, that means South Africa and others – and it’s Iran, which is a member of the BRICS, says, ‘This is not the way the world can work.’ They have to stand up to American hegemony. This is the only way the world can be safe. And so this is actually a responsibility of the BRICS right now, which is the only standing bulwark against America’s global empire”.

BRICS: From Economic Bloc to Diplomatic Actor?

Originally conceived as an economic grouping, BRICS—comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and new members including Iran—represents nearly half the world’s population and over a quarter of global GDP. It has increasingly positioned itself as a voice of the Global South, advocating a more inclusive international order.

The inclusion of Iran has added a new dimension to the bloc, bringing West Asian geopolitics directly into its internal deliberations. Tehran views its membership as a strategic success and has actively called on BRICS to adopt a stronger stance against what it perceives as Western military aggression. This expectation exposes a fundamental tension within the bloc.

BRICS is not a military alliance. It lacks binding mechanisms for collective security and relies on consensus-based decision-making. Its strength lies in dialogue and coordination—not coercive power. As a result, member states remain cautious about transforming it into an explicitly anti-Western platform.

Internal Divergences Within BRICS

The crisis has highlighted significant internal differences:

• Russia has condemned US and Israeli actions while advocating diplomatic resolution.
• China has emphasized stability and dialogue, consistent with its non-interference doctrine.
• India has adopted a calibrated stance, balancing ties with the United States, Israel, and Iran.
• Other members similarly navigate complex relationships with Western powers.

These divergences, combined with BRICS’ consensus-based structure, limit its ability to respond swiftly and cohesively. While symbolically influential, its capacity for coordinated geopolitical action remains constrained.

India’s Chairship: A Defining Moment For BRICS

India’s BRICS Chairship in 2026 comes at a critical juncture. Its policy of strategic autonomy and multi-alignment positions uniquely within the bloc. With strong ties across all major stakeholders in the conflict, India has the credibility to act as a bridge-builder.

The challenge lies in preventing polarization within BRICS while demonstrating its relevance in global crisis management. This requires shifting from rhetorical positioning to pragmatic diplomacy—acting collectively rather than as individual nations.

BRICS as a Platform for Mediation

Rather than functioning as a counterweight to the West, BRICS can redefine itself as a facilitator of dialogue. Even modest initiatives could have meaningful impact:

• Encouraging restraint among conflicting parties
• Supporting backchannel negotiations
• Promoting ceasefire frameworks
• Providing neutral platforms for engagement

Such efforts would enhance BRICS’ credibility and demonstrate that emerging powers can contribute constructively to global peace.

India’s Chairship theme— “Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation, and Sustainability”—can anchor this approach within a broader “Humanity-First” framework, emphasizing stability, inclusivity, and conflict prevention.

The urgency is amplified by economic realities. West Asia remains central to global energy flows, and prolonged disruption would have severe global consequences. Ensuring energy stability and citizen safety must therefore remain a strategic priority.

A Defining Moment for BRICS

This crisis could shape the future trajectory of BRICS. It presents an opportunity for diplomatic evolution—transforming the bloc into a credible platform for mediation and global engagement.
However, this will depend on its ability—under India’s leadership—to reconcile internal differences and find common ground on major global challenges, including the West Asia crisis and the ongoing Ukraine conflict.

A key prerequisite is improved cohesion among core members, particularly India and China. Managing their differences, if not resolving them, will be essential for BRICS to function effectively as a unified platform.

The Moment for a BRICS-Led Initiative

A carefully calibrated BRICS-led initiative offers a viable pathway toward de-escalation without deepening global divisions. Such an approach should complement, rather than confront existing diplomatic efforts.

A constructive joint framework could include:

• Immediate Ceasefire Appeal grounded in humanitarian concerns
• Facilitation of Dialogue through informal diplomatic channels
• Energy Security Cooperation to stabilize global markets
• Humanitarian Engagement for civilian protection and recovery

Crucially, such an initiative must avoid ideological rigidity. Its strength lies in acting as a bridge—connecting competing narratives rather than amplifying divisions.

For BRICS, this is both a test and an opportunity. Its response will influence not only its own evolution but also the broader trajectory of global governance. In an era defined by rivalry and uncertainty, leadership is no longer about dominance, it is about connection. BRICS, under India’s stewardship, has the opportunity to demonstrate this principle along with the UN.

The ancient Indian ethos of “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam”—the world is one family—captures this vision. It affirms the interconnectedness of humanity and underscores the need for unity in diversity. If BRICS can embody this spirit, it can contribute meaningfully to a more balanced and peaceful world order.

USA
Source: www.nature.com

Abstract

This study investigates the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU), clean energy (CE), and clean technology (CT) on the shadow economy across BRICS countries from 2001 to 2022. Using a robust econometric framework that includes Cross-Sectionally Augmented Autoregressive Distributed Lag (CS-ARDL) models, cointegration tests, and nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) estimations, the analysis captures both symmetric and asymmetric dynamics in short- and long-run contexts. The results reveal that a 1% increase in EPU leads to a 0.29% rise in the shadow economy in the long run, indicating significant regulatory evasion during uncertain periods. Conversely, CE and CT reduce the size of the shadow economy, with long-run elasticities of −0.31 and −0.25, respectively, suggesting their role in fostering transparency and formalisation. Asymmetric analysis further indicates that increases in EPU have a stronger adverse effect than decreases have in mitigating informality, and reductions in CE and CT amplify shadow economic activity more than their positive changes reduce it. The study employs panel data econometric techniques that correct for CD and slope heterogeneity, ensuring robust inference. The findings underscore the necessity of policy predictability, institutional strengthening, and sustained investment in green innovation to curb informal economic behaviour. Policy recommendations include expanding access to clean technologies, ensuring consistent energy transition strategies, and enhancing economic governance to foster a more inclusive and formal economic environment in emerging economies.

Russia
Source: en.interaffairs.ru

Tensions are rising between Brazil and the United States: Washington’s demands over drug gangs, foreign prisoners, and refugee data raise concerns in Brasília about sovereignty and intervention. As Brazil resists, the dispute reflects broader clashes over BRICS, China, and the region’s future balance of power, ‘InfoBRICS’ writes.

Washington has proposed that Brazil accept foreign prisoners captured in the US, while demanding a concrete plan to dismantle the drug gangs PCC, Comando Vermelho, alleged Hezbollah-linked networks, and Chinese criminal groups operating in Brazil. It also seeks biometric data sharing on refugees and migrants entering Brazil. These demands carry veiled threats, especially given recent US actions in Venezuela and Mexico.

Lula’s government has rejected the proposals so far, fearing that refusal could lead to the formal designation of PCC and CV as terrorist organizations. Such a label would enable extraterritorial sanctions and possible American operational involvement, thereby undermining Brazilian sovereignty.

Washington’s policies toward Brazil often mix economic pressure with geopolitical signaling

Tensions between Brasília and Washington have already spilled into diplomatic incidents. Earlier this month, Lula blocked a Trump administration adviser from entering Brazil to visit former president Jair Bolsonaro in prison, responding bluntly that such visits would only occur if Brazilian officials received equal treatment in the US.

Washington’s policies toward Brazil often mix economic pressure with geopolitical signaling. Trump’s tariffs were thus a kind of power play aimed at “bullying” Brazil, particularly over its alignment with BRICS and China. Brazil’s growing economic ties with Beijing have long irritated Washington: the South American country today exports far more goods to China than to the US, for one thing.
Another layer of the dispute concerns digital sovereignty and information control. Today, with Big Tech closely intertwined with US geopolitical interests, as it is, such disputes are hardly trivial.

The tech industry remains deeply integrated with US intelligence and defense sectors, and increasingly shapes foreign policy decisions. So much for the simplistic narrative that Washington’s policies are purely about democracy or crime fighting. That being so, the current tensions reflect a broader geopolitical subtext. Brazil is, after all, the largest economy in Latin America, a key BRICS player, and a potential technological and industrial hub for the Global South.

Washington’s security arguments in turn deserve scrutiny in light of recent developments elsewhere in the region. In Mexico, CIA-assisted operations recently led to the killing of Nemesio “El Mencho” Oseguera Cervantes, leader of the CJNG cartel. The immediate result was widespread cartel retaliation, highway blockades, attacks on security forces, and chaos across dozens of cities. Such decapitation strategies often fragment criminal groups rather than eliminate them, thereby intensifying violence.

The United States is hardly operating from a position of unlimited strength

If Washington now seeks similar tactics against Brazilian gangs, the results could be unpredictable enough. Brazil’s criminal networks are deeply embedded in local economies and prison systems. A blunt external intervention could easily trigger unintended consequences.

Yet the United States itself is hardly operating from a position of unlimited strength. The Trump administration remains deeply engaged in the Middle East, particularly amid escalating tensions with Iran. Resources are stretched thin, as exemplified by its diverting of South Korean-based anti-missile systems to the Middle East. Thus, Washington may increasingly rely on indirect pressure tactics in Latin America, ranging from sanctions and intelligence cooperation to diplomatic coercion.

Meanwhile, Brazil’s geopolitical role continues to expand. The country remains central to BRICS initiatives on financial and digital sovereignty. As I noted in October 2024, BRICS began discussing a new framework for global data governance and digital infrastructure, and that could challenge Western technological dominance (recent European discussions mirror this). Brazil is also exploring nuclear cooperation with partners such as Russia, a move that inevitably attracts attention in Washington.

So, is Brazil the next target in the hemisphere? The signs are certainly there.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Question: South African media recently reported that the United States is allegedly trying to pull South Africa out of the BRICS format. Furthermore, the format has come under criticism for its lack of consolidated support for Iran, a member of this group. How would you comment on all these reports? And how are current events, particularly the conflict in the Middle East, affecting the BRICS format?

Maria Zakharova: Let’s take this from the top. We have seen these leaks – anonymous sources, the usual game. South African representatives were asked to comment, and on March 11 of this year, South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Ronald Lamola stated clearly at a news conference that the US Ambassador to Pretoria, Leo Brent Bozell, had made no formal or informal demands for South Africa’s withdrawal from BRICS. That said, to say Washington is not fond of BRICS would be something of an understatement. For reasons best known to itself, the United States appears to view BRICS as a challenge, a threat, a thorn in its side. They are not exactly shy about making that known.
Now, regarding the escalation in the Persian Gulf region – caused, I must reiterate, by the unprovoked and wholly unjustified aggression of the United States and Israel against Iran – this is undoubtedly having a negative impact on regional and global stability, and on international relations more broadly. The Russian Foreign Ministry, and Minister Lavrov personally, have addressed this repeatedly. But it is worth noting that other BRICS countries have also issued their own national statements on the matter. And within the association itself, we are actively discussing this issue. Everyone involved (and I am speaking specifically about the BRICS format) has a shared interest in de-escalation and in finding a political and diplomatic resolution to the current crisis.
Yes, there are different formulations. Different countries express themselves differently. That is entirely normal in diplomacy. The key point is that all BRICS countries remain committed to strengthening practical cooperation within this format and to achieving concrete results. And we stand ready to fully support our Indian friends, who hold the chairmanship this year, in that endeavour.
But do you see how the spotlight is being shifted? BRICS is being criticised for a lack of consolidated positions, for not speaking loudly enough. Yet since February 28, we have seen two countries shelling the civilian population of a sovereign state on a daily basis, while that state defends its territory. The escalation grows by the day. And somehow, it is BRICS that is being criticised. Do you not find that strange?
It seems to me there is plenty of common ground for criticism here. Not because we are friends operating on the principle of “who are we ganging up on today?” but because of objective reality. Every BRICS member has its own understanding of how this situation could be resolved. Each state, in its own language, with its own formulations, based on its own analysis, has expressed a view. There is no fundamental contradiction, no irreconcilable divide between these positions. Let us focus our critical attention where it truly belongs. There is no shortage of real grounds for serious criticism today. But somehow, while some are busy bombing, it is BRICS that comes under criticism.

India
Source: www.thehindu.com

On scientific collaborations in BRICSBRICS functions as a collaborative force aimed at establishing a multipolar world system. Cooperation in science, technology and innovation has been a key agenda for the grouping and has expanded over the years to include socially relevant areas such as energy, water, health and the environment

The BRICS grouping, comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, is a globally significant collective defined by its substantial contributions to global GDP, scientific and technological capacity, natural resources, and total population. Since its formation, the group has evolved into a prominent international voice, representing countries that seek to challenge and provide an alternative to Western hegemony. BRICS functions as a collaborative force aimed at establishing a multipolar world system. While the group’s positions on global finance and macro-economic issues are widely recognised, the depth of cooperation among member states regarding science, technology, and innovation (STI) remains less publicised.

At a time in which global scientific collaboration is increasingly dictated by geopolitical tensions, techno-nationalism, and strategic competition, often manifesting as sanctions and export controls, BRICS assumes a critical role in the global STI landscape. Through this platform, member nations coordinate their strategies, amplify their collective voice in global economic governance, and influence development finance through institutions like the New Development Bank.

These members are also vital contributors to global trade, energy production, and the supply of essential natural resources. The 2022 launch of BRICS+ signaled a move towards a more inclusive forum, fostering development and political cooperation across the Global South to reduce technological dependencies. This collaboration is now a concrete effort to build shared capacities through various framework programmes. The group’s current membership has expanded to include Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Iran.

Cooperation in STI

Cooperation in STI has been a part of the BRICS agenda since its early years. It was formally recognised in 2011 and later consolidated in meetings between senior officials and the BRICS Ministers of Science, Technology, and Innovation. A pivotal 2015 memorandum of understanding established STI as a core strategic pillar, providing the necessary institutional framework and operational signals for collaborative research and capacity-building. This framework has since expanded the scope of cooperation, allowing members to leverage their complementary strengths to address shared development challenges and advance frontier sciences.

The first BRICS Action Plan for Innovation Cooperation (2017-2020) tasked the Science, Technology, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship Partnership (STIEP) Working Group with implementing various programmes. These initiatives focused on entrepreneurship networks, the role of youth and women in STI, and collaborations regarding technology transfer and business incubators. Over time, BRICS has moved from early joint research calls focused on fundamental science toward prioritising innovation and technology transfer.

These priorities are formally identified in annual ministerial declarations. The BRICS Ministers of Science, Technology, and Innovation meet once a year to approve and sign strategic documents. Within each member country, one or two lead agencies coordinate these activities, issue calls for proposals, and prepare project lists for approval during the respective country’s presidency. For example, during India’s chairmanship, the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Department of Biotechnology (DBT) serve as the lead agencies.

A clear emphasis on innovation-driven and technology-enabled ecosystems is evident in recent summit themes and initiatives such as iBRICs and the BRICS Technology Transfer Centre (TTC). The TTC has made notable progress in creating policy frameworks and institutional links for cross-border technology commercialisation. However, despite this progress, large-scale commercialisation of these technologies remains limited.

The focus of BRICS joint research calls has transitioned from basic science and enabling technologies to include more socially relevant areas such as energy, water, health, and the environment. The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated this shift, placing a premium on public health, vaccine research, biosecurity, and digital health. Recent calls have integrated high-performance computing (HPC), advanced materials, information and communication technology (ICT), and space-related applications. Scientific collaboration has strengthened over time, with a growing focus on artificial intelligence and data-intensive science.

While working groups reflect these shared development priorities, their progress varies across different fields. Significant progress is visible in ICT and HPC, highlighted by the establishment of the BRICS Institute of Future Networks, as well as in space cooperation following a 2021 intergovernmental agreement. Conversely, areas that require heavy infrastructure or are more exploratory, such as mega-science projects and ocean or polar research, have developed slower.

The expansion of BRICS has positioned it as a more inclusive platform for knowledge exchange and collaborative research. The 2025 Declaration on AI, elevated artificial intelligence from a sub-theme, to a central pillar of multilateral governance. This declaration outlines a vision for AI governance that is equitable, inclusive, and development-oriented, moving the partnership towards a strategic collaboration with direct economic and societal relevance. While the 2021-24 Action Plan focused on networking and thematic frameworks, subsequent plans aim to scale projects for greater impact, focusing on biotechnology, climate tech, industrial innovation, and AI.

Under India’s 2026 Presidency, with the theme ‘Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability’, the group is positioned to deepen its scientific partnerships. The goal is to leverage expanded membership to strengthen capacities and address challenges like digital divides, public health crises, and climate resilience. However, participation from new members remains uneven; among the most recent additions, only Egypt and Iran joined the call for proposals issued last December. Additionally, the China-BRICS Research Centre on New Quality Productive Forces was recently inaugurated in Beijing. This center serves as an international platform for academic exchange and technological research.

Consequences and concerns

When compared to nations like South Korea, the National Innovation Systems (NIS) of BRICS countries exhibit various strengths and weaknesses. Specifically, gross domestic expenditure on research and development (GERD) is relatively lower across the group, with the exception of China. Research suggests that the gap between BRICS nations and South Korea is wide, and member countries excluding China have significant catching up to do according to various innovation indicators. With the expansion into BRICS+, the innovation systems of new members also require assessment and strengthening. This strengthening could be a priority for BRICS over the next decade, with the potential to eventually replicate these improvements across the broader Global South.

As noted by Stanford University visiting scholar Irina Dezhina, the heterogeneity of new members in terms of both economic development and scientific capacity makes it difficult to reconcile differing interests. Consequently, BRICS+ may need to focus on catalysing new “paired links” between specific members. Comparisons to the European Union (EU) suggest that BRICS could learn from the EU’s wide variety of STI programs, as BRICS currently offers more limited options. Further, although competition for funding is intense, the total funding available remains modest.

Experts suggest that these programmes must reach a new qualitative level to effectively respond to major global challenges. Currently, however, research into STI cooperation among BRICS nations is limited, and the existing mechanism lacks a framework for regular study to provide data-driven inputs to member countries.

A way forward

While BRICS countries have achieved significant collaboration, there are questions regarding whether the current framework is sufficient for future needs. A primary concern is the lack of a permanent mechanism to manage STI cooperation. The current system, where the lead role rotates annually with the presidency, is not ideally suited for long-term requirements. BRICS could potentially model a central mechanism after the EU’s Horizon Program, establishing a Secretariat to manage funds, issue calls for proposals, monitor progress, and review outcomes.

Developing a few long-term Mega-science Projects could also foster deeper cooperation. The framework for STI cooperation should eventually expand beyond just funding science and technology projects; it should promote research into the governance of STI and the impact of emerging technologies on BRICS+ nations. This would facilitate greater coherence in international treaty negotiations and help build capacity for STI governance.

In conclusion, while STI cooperation within BRICS has progressed significantly since 2015 despite various constraints, there is substantial room for improvement. Making the framework more effective, agile, and credible will enhance the group’s legitimacy in the global arena. As the chair of BRICS+ in 2026, India has the opportunity to lead this transition.

Krishna Ravi Srinivas is Adjunct Professor of Law, Director CoE in AI & Law, NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad. Sneha Sinha is Consultant, Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS), New Delhi