China
Source: www.fmprc.gov.cn

On June 23, 2026, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs Wang Yi attended the BRICS National Security Advisers’ Meeting in New Delhi. The meeting was chaired by India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval. High representatives and heads on national security of BRICS countries attended the meeting and had in-depth exchanges of views on issues including response to non-traditional security challenges, counter-terrorism and cybersecurity.

Wang Yi stated that BRICS cooperation has gone through 20 years and has increasingly become a core force in the world that safeguards peace, promotes development and upholds justice. Facing the complex and profound changes in the current international landscape, China is willing to work with other BRICS countries to jointly address the urgent challenges facing human society and jointly adhere to the right direction of world history evolution.

First, uphold the international order with BRICS responsibilities. We must hold high the banner of multilateralism, firmly safeguard the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter, and unequivocally oppose unilateralism and protectionism. As the forefront of the Global South, BRICS countries should take the lead in speaking out for justice and acting fairly, and enhance their status and role in international affairs.

Second, break the security deadlock with BRICS consensus. We must advocate the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, firmly promote the political settlement of hotspot issues, and actively explore effective ways to resolve disputes through dialogue and consultation.

Third, respond to global challenges with BRICS actions. We must resolutely combat all forms of terrorism, unequivocally oppose the militarization of outer space, effectively address global energy and food security challenges, strengthen cooperation on strategic mineral resources, and unite to respond to the Ebola epidemic in Africa.

Fourth, improve governance in emerging fields with BRICS wisdom. We must closely guard against AI risks, standardize the development direction of artificial intelligence, and support the U.N. as the main channel to advance global cyberspace and digital governance.

Wang Yi noted that the vitality of BRICS lies in equality and mutual benefit, and the strength of BRICS lies in unity and mutual assistance. China will assume the BRICS chairmanship next year. China is ready to work with BRICS partners to actively practice the four Global Initiatives proposed by President Xi Jinping, promote prosperity through development, ensure stability through security, enhance mutual trust through mutual learning among civilizations, and pursue justice through governance, so as to jointly open up a future of peace and prosperity.

All parties spoke highly of the unique role and remarkable achievements of the BRICS cooperation mechanism. They stated that in the face of the impact of unilateralism and rising uncertainties in the world, BRICS countries must hold high the banner of openness, inclusiveness, cooperation and win-win results, uphold the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter, adhere to the spirit of mutual respect, cooperate to address various traditional and non-traditional security challenges, firmly safeguard the common interests of the Global South, and jointly build a multipolar world of peace, security, fairness, justice, prosperity and development.

During the meeting, Wang Yi also attended the collective meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and held bilateral meetings respectively with high representatives on national security of India, Russia, Iran, Egypt, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates.

China
Source: www.fmprc.gov.cn

On June 23, 2026, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs Wang Yi summarized the outcomes and significance of the meeting as it drew to a close.

Wang Yi noted that an important consensus reached at the meeting is that we support upholding multilateralism, advancing the political settlement of hotspot issues, and addressing both traditional and non-traditional security threats in a coordinated manner. The common message sent by this meeting is that BRICS and the Global South should uphold independence, strengthen solidarity and mutual assistance, pool more collective wisdom, and coordinate stronger joint actions. The clear direction set by this meeting is that we support further leveraging the mechanism of the Meeting of BRICS National Security Advisors and High Representatives on National Security, maintaining communication and coordination on major international and regional hotspot issues, and continuously enriching the dimensions of greater BRICS cooperation.

Wang Yi said that next year China will assume the BRICS chairmanship. He looks forward to gathering with everyone again in China to further deepen political and security cooperation among BRICS countries and to contribute BRICS wisdom and strength to world peace and security.

Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

The proverbial “interesting times” are again upon us. Unlike at the turn of the 1990s, when the change of world order per se was essentially peaceful and consensual, this time rivalry among great powers is visible, and occasionally violent. Realpolitik is back, with a vengeance. The post-Cold War global hegemon, the United States of America, is fighting back to preserve its primacy, very much against the odds. China, longtime an economic colossus keeping a reasonably low geopolitical profile, is rising fast as a technological and military power, with a growing diplomatic clout. India, resentful over Western colonial domination that for two centuries held it back economically and technologically, is determined to repeat China’s success, although in its own inimitably Indian way. Russia, having made a comeback from its catastrophic downfall as the Soviet Union, has ended its futile quest for an autonomous position within the wider West, and is charting its own way as a distinct “civilization state”.

Currently, these are the four truly sovereign major players in the world system whose policies will largely shape the new international order to replace the post-Cold War American dominance and the 500-years-old supremacy of the West.

The Leading Powers

The dynamics in the relations among these four players are high. Russia has been defending its vital national security interests against the collective West of NATO/EU countries in a proxy war in Ukraine. The conflict there, which began in 2014 with the Western-engineered coup d’etat and Russia’s reaction to it in Crimea and Donbass, escalated in 2022 to a full-scale war between Russia and the Western-backed/-trained/-equipped Ukrainian forces along a 2,000-km-long frontline. Early in the war, the Joe Biden Administration in Washington set the goal of inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia [1]—something that American leaders carefully avoided during the Cold War. The Ukraine conflict then intensified and threatened to lead to a direct clash between Russia and NATO countries, raising the specter of a nuclear conflagration engulfing not just Europe, but much of the world.

Reacting to the challenge of China’s economic and technological ascendance, the first Trump Administration in the United States dumped America’s long-lasting “hedge and engage” mode of its China strategy and opened a trade and technology war against Beijing. This course was inherited and embraced by the Biden White House. Against this background, Sino-U.S. geostrategic tensions over Taiwan and the South China Sea have heightened. An arms race between the world’s two biggest economies has quickened its pace. Donald Trump’s second coming to the U.S. presidency resulted in an even bigger emphasis in Washington’s foreign policy on thwarting China’s challenge to American global dominance.

Washington’s attempt to simultaneously hold back China and Russia has naturally provided an additional impetus for the Sino-Russian strategic partnership. The partnership itself, which began as far back as 1989 with the reconciliation between Moscow and Beijing, is largely driven by the two countries’ national interests and is not a latter-day version of the Sino-Soviet bloc of the 1950s. However, faced with American pressure, Russia and China have upgraded their cooperation and coordination, including in the politico-military field. In contrast to the 1970s, when the Nixon Administration, by means of the much-celebrated Triangle strategy, successfully managed to play Beijing off Moscow, or to the 1990s, when both Russia and China prioritized cooperation with Washington, the United States has now succeeded in turning two of Eurasia’s principal powers into its adversaries: a major strategic blunder of American foreign policy.

Meanwhile, Eurasia’s third major power, India, has been raising its international profile as a newly non-aligned power. India is on good terms with the United States, whom it sees as a vital partner in technology and a key market. New Delhi also entertains a close relationship with Russia, that has been India’s premier source of defense equipment and a highly reliable political partner. India is wary of China due to historical disputes over the border in the Himalayas, Beijing’s support for Pakistan, and more generally as an economic and geopolitical rival in Asia. In May 2025, India has had to fight a brief (87-hour) war against Pakistan, provoked by a gruesome terrorist attack against civilians in Kashmir. New Delhi’s careful balancing game is illustrated by its simultaneous membership—alongside Russia and China—in the BRICS group and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and in the QUAD format with the United States and its allies Japan and Australia.

Figure 1. World’s top 10 leading economies (2020-2024)
Compiled by PIR Center based on open sources

Figure 2. The Ranking of the World’s Top-10 Militaries (as of 2025)
Compiled by PIR Center based on open sources

Other Important Players

The four leading powers at the start of the second quarter of the 21^st century are not the only significant players on the world stage, of course. The countries of Europe—the EU member states and the United Kingdom—are desperately trying to regain their international relevance in the face of the challenge posed by the Ukraine war and the policies of the Trump Administration. Essentially, Donald Trump has reversed the state of play within the Western world. He drastically reduced Washington’s historical commitment to support and indulge U.S. allies and clients around the world. The focus of Trump’s White House has shifted from ensuring that the periphery of the American empire can thrive and expand (enabling “the march of democracy without borders”) to shoring up the empire’s somewhat hollowed-out imperial homeland (“making America great again”). Thus, Trump openly treated the Europeans, alongside Japan, Canada, Australia and others as simultaneously political vassals and economic competitors. The 47^th U.S. president is capitalizing on American security commitments, which are no longer taken for granted. One can argue that Trump’s putting price tag on U.S. support and raising tariffs at the same time is his pre-emptive strike at multipolarity. It is meant to ensure that, in a multipolar world, which is coming anyway, America is the biggest and the strongest pole of all, able to enjoy primacy with reduced responsibility.

Unable and unwilling to stand up to the United States, but adamant to remain in the game, the Europeans have used the Ukraine conflict to solidify their union by treating Russia as if it were a mortal danger to themselves. Within a few years starting from the mid-2010s, they have succeeded in re-identifying the core purpose of the EU as an anti-Russian bloc. This is a third iteration of the prime objective of European integration, since preventing another war among the European powers (after 1945); and making Europe “whole and free” by means of incorporating the Eastern European countries—all the way to the Russian border (after 1989). This explains the massive European political, financial and military investment in Ukraine, and the deep involvement of the European countries, particularly of Britain, France, and Germany, in training, equipping, advising, and guiding Kiev’s war efforts against Russia, complete with their suspected involvement in the acts of sabotage and even terrorism inside Russia.

Figure 3. A chart of Ukraine’s main donors (as of October 2025)
Compiled by PIR Center based on open sources

These activities have made Moscow fundamentally reconsider its assessment of Europe. No longer Russia’s preferred foreign partner as in the post-Cold War times, or even a seemingly reluctant follower of Washington’s policies, as during the Cold War, Europe, in many Russian eyes, has re-emerged as a coalition of historical enemies driven by a desire to defeat and if possible, destroy Russia [2]. Today’s Europe, from that perspective, has much in common with the Europe under Napoleon that invaded Russia in 1812, or under Hitler in 1941. Both those invasions assembled combined forces of many countries which were allied or subservient, respectively, to Paris and Berlin. The difference is that the united political Europe of the 2020s, while it has as much hatred, fear and contempt for Russia, has far less power than its historical predecessors. Yet, the degradation of Europe’s strategic thinking as well as its absence, since the 1950s, from strategic decision-making, even about itself, raise concerns in Russia about the potential for European countries’ fateful miscalculation.

What is particularly stunning is the change in Russian attitudes toward Germany. Russians forgave Germany for the horrendous civilian casualties (over 15 million out of 27 million people) resulting from Hitler’s invasion. They gave their consent for the two German states’ unification and withdrew their troops from East Germany. They subsequently even thought that Germany was their country’s best friend in Europe, and approached it accordingly. Now, Russians are stunned to see Berlin as the frontrunner among the supporters of the Kiev regime—a regime whose ideological roots go all the way to erstwhile Nazi collaborators in western Ukraine who are elevated now to the position of father figures of the present-day Ukrainian state. Besides supporting Kiev, Berlin aims at massively expanding Germany’s defense industry and turn the country into the main pillar of Europe’s military might. Germany’s and Europe’s rearmament and remilitarization plans are being laid out explicitly with the objective of being able to fight Russia already in the medium term. Fifty years after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which stabilized the Cold War’s bipolar order, and 35 years after the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, which appeared to offer a prospect for cooperation and integration across the now defunct Iron Curtain, NATO and Russia are closer to a shooting war between themselves than they have been at any time since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

East Asia and Eastern Europe are not the only battlefields in the new confrontation. In the Middle East, the decades-old Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict has been replaced by one between the leading regional powers, Israel and Iran. The Israeli leadership, with full backing of the United States, has used the 2023 mega-terrorist attack by HAMAS to try to deal a crushing blow to its main regional rival, Iran, which is a member of the China- and Russia-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the BRICS group. In June 2025 Israel and the United States attacked Iran’s nuclear facilities to annihilate the program. Iran hit back at Israel with its own missiles. As a result, Tehran’s nuclear program has suffered a setback, but it has not been bombed out of existence. New clashes between Israel/U.S. and Iran are thus likely—unless Iran bows to the pressure and changes course, which cannot come without a major domestic clash of interests.

The fact that in the shooting wars between the nuclear powers: Russia, on the one hand, and America, Britain, France, on the other, in Ukraine; between India and Pakistan in South Asia; and between Israel and the United States against near-nuclear Iran in the Middle East, nuclear weapons have not been used, so far, should not breed illusions: for the major powers of the world, war has re-emerged as a usable tool not only in the peripheral engagements (as in, e.g., Afghanistan), but in direct major-power conflicts—by proxy or not.

Russian Transformation

Against this background, the trends in Russia’s situation noted in the previous edition of the Security Index have grown stronger. Above all, the country’s domestic transformation, while difficult, is deepening. The notion of Russia as a unique civilization state first enshrined in the 2023 Foreign Policy Concept [3] is being more widely accepted. The country’s political system—with its clear emphasis on the central role of the State and the importance of the unity of leadership—is being less and less linked to the Western concept of liberal democracy. Instead, it is being increasingly legitimized by Russia’s own historical experience and the practical needs to withstand the pressures from the West and the complexities of the ongoing war environment. A new set of values is emerging—away from the post-Soviet dominance of money and material benefits, and closer to the traditional Russian emphasis on patriotism, family and things spiritual. Some sort of a cultural revolution is quietly taking place, though its victory is still far from assured.

Russia’s war effort is being supported by its defense industry which has been able to dramatically increase production of weapons and materiels. Russia is in fact competing against the combined capacities of Ukraine’s Western backers. While the economy at large has not been completely mobilized for war, an industrial policy has begun to emerge, with the state becoming much more active in directing economic development than at any time since the end of the Soviet period. Despite the 30,000-plus Western sanctions and other restrictions imposed on Russia over the past decade, but particularly since 2022, and the inevitable hardships of the war, including its substantial human losses, patriotism is running high [4], with the support for the Kremlin policies, including the conduct of the war, remaining steady at a record-high (around 80%) level.

One major change in Russia’s international environment has been Europe emerging as the principal foreign adversary, and even an enemy of Russia, replacing the United States in that position. Britain, France and above all Germany are now widely considered Russia’s principal foes, a throwback to the 19^th and early 20^th centuries. In Germany’s case, a parallel with the 1941 Hitler invasion of the Soviet Union is all too obvious. This is a reaction in Moscow and across Russia to the Europeans’ coming to the fore of the Western effort to support Kiev politically, financially and militarily—following Trump’s desire to stop the fighting or at least distance himself from what he calls “Biden’s war”. The result is that Europe, which after the end of the Cold War was considered the world’s model region in terms of demilitarization, reconciliation and cooperation, isbecoming one of the main hotbeds of tension and a likely battlefield, even after the end of the shooting war in Ukraine.

Toward the United States, the attitudes in Russia have become more nuanced with the advent of the Trump Administration. America remains Russia’s most formidable adversary; however, there is a hope that some sort of an understanding could be reached with Washington which at least would lead to Trump winding down its participation in the Ukraine war. Should that happen, there is a potential for a modicum of U.S.-Russian cooperation elsewhere, in particular in the economic field. This hope, which resulted from the August 2025 Alaska meeting between Presidents Putin and Trump, is tempered, however, by the existence of the dominant anti-Russian majority within the U.S. political class, with the neocons on both sides of the aisle still in positions of power and influence. Reversing that course and adopting a realist and pragmatic attitude toward Russia would require nothing less than a revolution in U.S. foreign policy. As Trump’s attempts at brokering peace in Ukraine have demonstrated, a coalition of American Democrats; the neocons from both parties; and U.S. European allies can massively weigh in on Trump’s policies.

Russian Priorities

Russian foreign policy priorities have basically remained unchanged since 2022. If anything, they have become more pronounced and better established. Top among them is strengthening the country’s real sovereignty. This means enhancing Russia’s economic resilience in the face of sanctions and restrictions; expanding the country’s technological capabilities and reducing its dependence on others; acquiring intellectual sovereignty complete with the philosophical underpinnings of a unique worldview and some sort of a practical ideology that would guide the state and provide a clear orientation for the bulk of the Russian people. Four years into the war, all of this, of course, is still more of a plan than actual reality.

Moscow’s short-term—up to three years—priorities are focused on achieving an acceptable outcome in Ukraine. This means a stable political settlement, not a truce. In security terms, this would mean transforming Ukraine into a neutral buffer state between Russia and the NATO/EU Europe. In future, Ukraine should be forever barred from joining NATO; host no foreign forces in its territory, whether on a permanent (bases) or a temporary basis (exercises, training missions, and the like); accept limits on its military power and defense industry. More broadly, Russia seeks a politico-military equilibrium on the dividing line between itself and NATO, making the situation on its western flank essentially predictable, but much of this is for the medium- and longer-term future.

In territorial terms, an acceptable settlement would mean securing the entire territories of the four regions—two in Donbass (Donetsk and Lugansk) and two in Novorossia (Zaporozhie and Kherson) which joined Russia in the fall of 2022 and are now part of the Russian Federation’s constitutional space. Moscow is determined to assume full control all of those territories, about a third of which is still in Kiev’s hands. To achieve this, Moscow is prepared to trade some small pieces of land in Kharkov, Sumy and other Ukrainian oblasts that Russian forces hold. Russia would also insist on the international recognition of the its borders, including, besides Donbass and Novorossiya, also Crimea and Sevastopol, which acceded to Russia in 2014.

In political terms, Russia wants a neutralist regime in Ukraine to replace the one which it sees as having Banderist (i.e., pro-Nazi) roots, and which espouses ultra-nationalist and Russophobic ideology, and practices terror. In a crude comparison, Moscow would probably settle for a regime that is reminiscent of the one established in Finland, a Hitler ally, which it defeated in 1944. This means a predictable government, broadly loyal to Russia in foreign and security policy terms, and widely autonomous in handling domestic affairs. Such a regime would need to rediscover Ukraine’s bilingual (Ukrainian/Russian) character, restore the position of the Russian language and culture alongside the Ukrainian language and heritage, and honor the rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church that is affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate.

To help achieve these objectives, Russia’s foreign policy strategy would need to cement Moscow’s relations with Minsk. In the course of the Special Military Operation in Ukraine, Belarushas emerged as Russia’s only true ally among the former Soviet republics. The Union State of Russia and Belarus has recently acquired a nuclear dimension. Moscow’s new nuclear doctrine has explicitly extended a nuclear umbrella to Belarus. For the first time since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has deployed its non-strategic nuclear weapons in the neighbouring country. Medium-range nuclear-capable missiles, such as the Oreshnik, are also on its way for deployment there. Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko, in power since 1994, won another five-year term in 2025. It is in the Russian interest that power transition in Belarus, whenever it happens, results in an even closer relationship between the two countries.

Map 1. Map of the countries near the Eastern EU border
Source: CNN (https://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2023/07/29/wagner-forces-poland-border-nato-leighton-nr-vpx.cnn)

Moscow’s other overt wartime ally has been the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). A friend in need is a friend indeed: Moscow’s ties with Pyongyang have been strengthening rapidly. The Korean People’s Army (KPA) 11,000-strong deployment to the Kursk region in 2024-2025 was instrumental in liberating part of the region from the Ukrainian forces. As long as the war continues, Russia would materially benefit from a fresh deployment of the KPA troops to the Russo-Ukrainian border that would relieve Russia’s own forces to fight inside Ukraine. Continued provision to Russia of North Korean artillery ammunition and other materiel constitutes important assistance to Russia’s war effort as it faces the Western coalition’s massive support for Kiev. In return, Moscow is providing North Korea with the things that Pyongyang values, from energy to space technology. Based on the 2024 bilateral treaty on strategic partnership which includes a mutual military assistance clause, Russia and North Korea have upgraded their relationship to a functioning alliance.

Expanding and deepening ties with non-Western countries—often referred to now as the Global Majority—is Moscow’s top diplomatic priority, particularly in terms of economic security and political dialogue. BRICS members stand out as the most important group in that category. In particular, Russia’s relations with China are of critical importance, given the geopolitical position of both countries vis-à-vis each other, China’s huge industrial capacity, its energy and other raw materials requirements (which Russia can help satisfy), technological prowess, military power and diplomatic clout. Even though Beijing professes neutrality in the Ukraine conflict, and its stake in protecting its access to the Western markets makes it careful while doing business with Russia, China’s de facto backing of Russia (even if it is limited) is of unique importance to Moscow. Making sure that the Russo-Chinese strategic partnership continues to grow strong and develop is a first-order priority to the Kremlin.

India is also Russia’s strategic partner that needs constant attention. Even though Delhi entertains close relations with the United States (institutionally through the QUAD group) and rejects any notion that BRICS is an anti-Western bloc, it has emerged as a major buyer of a discounted Russian oil—and thus an alternative to the European market that has been closing fast to Russia. The rough handling of India by Donald Trump in his tariff wars and his demand that other countries do not buy Russian oil has infuriated many Indians and tempered somewhat the pro-U.S. tilt in Indian society. For Russia, this is a positive development, which strengthens India’s strategic independence. A closer alignment among Eurasia’s three great powers, Russia, India, and China (RIC) has been Moscow’s strategic priority since the mid-1990s.Yet, realizing the potential of such an alignment it would require a fundamental improvement of the Sino-Indian relationship, which is plagued by mutual suspicion and grievances. In August 2025, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first trip to China in seven years, to attend a SCO summit, inspired some hopes in Moscow.

Relations with other members of the BRICS group, which expanded in 2024, are also prioritized in Moscow’s foreign policy, though in the short term they do not come close in significance to ties with Beijing and Delhi. Moscow’s relative passivity during the 12-day war that Israel and the United States waged in 2025 against Iran revealed the shallowness of the strategic partnership—even now treaty-based—between Moscow and Tehran. The work on the North-South logistical corridor linking Russia to India via Iran, which Russia actively seeks to re-energize, has been marking time, creating little enthusiasm in Iran. Russia has had more interaction with Iran’s Gulf neighbour and fellow BRICS member, the United Arab Emirates, which has turned into a gateway for Russians to the Middle East and beyond. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has not had a particularly good year, with two of its members—India and Pakistan—waging a short war in 2025.

Map 2. Map of SCO member states, Observers and Dialogue Partners (as of October 2025)
Compiled by PIR Center based on open sources

Russia is not limiting its Global Majority priorities to the BRICS and SCO groups, of course. It works not to lose the momentum with the African states; is busy to organize the first Russia-the Arab League summit in the Fall of 2025; builds on the already vibrant ASEAN connection—especially with Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos and Thailand. In 2024, Russia has had to witness the fall of a friendly regime in Damascus, but has been trying to salvage its two bases in Syria, which are important as a way station en route to Africa, the continent that Russia is now rediscovering for economic and other opportunities. Moscow’s decision to recognize the Taliban regime in Afghanistan signals its desire to secure its southern flank. Relations with Turkey, a NATO member with an autonomous regional policy in the Middle East, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, will continue to be a combination of competition and cooperation. It is in Moscow’s interest that the latter prevails over the former.

In Central Asia, Russia’s immediate priorities center on strengthening economic ties with the members of the Eurasian Economic Union—Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and also with Uzbekistan, the region’s biggest nation. In the South Caucasus, Russia is essentially acting in a holding pattern. It aims at containing the newly surfaced serious tensions with Azerbaijan, managing Armenia as it is drifting away toward the West, and keeping things steady with Georgia as Tbilisi defends its sovereignty now vis-à-vis the EU. At the same time, Moscow has markedly intensified its interaction with Abkhazia, materially integrating it with Russia. In Moldova, a cleft country between the EU and Russia, Moscow supports groups that favor politico-military neutrality and restoring economic links with Russia. As long as the Ukraine war lasts and sucks a lot of energy of Russian foreign policy, the former Soviet countries will probably remain on the backburner of Moscow’s foreign policy.

In the medium-term—from three to five years—Russia would need to manage the continuing confrontation with the West, promoting its interests while avoiding a head-on collision with its adversaries. The end of fighting in Ukraine will not bring peace and reconciliation with Russia’s European neighbours. Moscow’s goal would be to separate, to the extent possible, its relations with the United States from those with the European Union countries. America, with its basic self-confidence and a global agenda, may be more amenable to a more productive relationship with Russia. By contrast Europe, in a sharp contrast to Moscow’s post-1945 worldview of its western neighbours, has emerged as Russia’s main adversary. The current political elites of Europe, as they despair of the decline of their world role, appear weak, hysterical, and blindly Russophobic. In dealing with Europe, Moscow would prioritize deterrence of the anti-Russian forces, led by the United Kingdom, Germany and France, and selective engagement with those countries, like Hungary, Slovakia and potentially others, that are prepared to act in their national self-interest.

Russia’s mid-term strategy would seek to prevent a major war between NATO and Russia, which might be sparked off by renewed tensions in Ukraine; some maladroit moves by the neighbours (such as the Baltic States), or provocations (engineered, e.g., by Britain) going awry. Deterrence based on Moscow’s demonstration of its upgraded arsenal of weapons systems, now including medium-range ones, and its readiness to use them in a crisis situation, would be the chief means of war prevention.

U.S. adversity toward Russia, so deeply entrenched in the American ruling elite, will not disappear soon. Moscow, however, will remain open to contacts with Washington on some issues, from regional affairs—e.g. the Arctic, to economic cooperation—e.g., rare earths. Restoring a meaningful dialogue on strategic stability is another area of potential Russo-American interaction. Yet, the overall importance of relations with the United States in Russia’s foreign policy will be far below the levels of the second half of the 20^th and the early 21^st centuries.

Should Russia-U.S. dialogue bear fruit or even continue in a sustained mode, this could at least partially unlock the potential of Russian-Japanese and Russian-South Korean economic exchanges. Tokyo and Seoul, which would not break with Washington’s policies on Russia, bear little animus against Moscow—unlike Brussels and the European capitals. America’s Asian allies’ attitude toward relations with Russia could resemble the approach taken by Turkey, a NATO ally with a complex, but working relationship with Russia. If this happens, Moscow would be happy to resume economic cooperation.

Russia’s long-term priorities are centered on the goal of self-empowerment. Having proclaimed itself a civilization state, Russia would need to live up to that notion. The bulk of the tasks it would have to complete before the goal is reached are domestic, from winning economic and technological sovereignty to achieving intellectual independence as a “sovereign humanity” on a par with the Euro-American community, China, India, the Muslim world, and others. In foreign policy terms, Moscow’s priorities are focused on helping create a new non-hegemonic world order—post-American and post-Western.

On the world level, this means creating institutions which would be free from Western domination. BRICS looks like a useful starting platform for this. There are no illusions about the unity of BRICS, which remains highly heterogeneous in a lot of ways, but interaction within BRICS offers precious experience of institution-building without Western guidance. Essentially, the world-level effort focuses on a new financial architecture but covers a wide range of issues, from energy and food security to a dialogue of civilizations as a new way of providing guidance to humanity as a whole.

On the level of Eurasia, the world’s largest continent, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), for all its internal divisions, is a platform for managing a security and development agenda in Eurasia (without its westernmost peninsula, Europe). Russia has re-energized its effort to pioneer putting together a Eurasia-wide security architecture, which its sees as a network of close ties among the continent’s existing institutions, bilateral treaties and agreements, logistical and other business projects, technological partnerships, cultural initiatives, and the like.

Within its own neighbourhood Russia will seek closer ties with Belarus within the framework of the Union State; with members of the Eurasian Economic Union and the CSTO, especially Kazakhstan, but also Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; with Uzbekistan, Central Asia’s most populous nation. These are the top priorities, linked to what was once called, creating a Russia-led power center in Northern Eurasia. Beyond the countries of the former Soviet Union, Russia will cement its renewed ties to North Korea, and develop its links with Mongolia. In the South Caucasus, next to integrating Abkhazia and South Ossetia with Russia, Moscow will seek to win back influence with Armenia and Azerbaijan, whose relations with Moscow have become badly frayed. There, as in Moldova, Russia’s future influence will largely depend on the outcome of the war in the Ukraine.

Conclusion

With Russia increasingly focused on itself, its policies are likely to be more pragmatic. Moscow’s actions in the wider world—beyond Eurasia—will be guided by its economic interests rather than its geopolitical ambitions. The war in Ukraine has been a harsh but realistic test of Russian capacity to promote and protect its vital interests. The results, which are coming in, are both positive and sobering. The positive side is that Russia has been able to stand up to the maximum economic, financial, political, and information pressure that anyone could have brought to bear on any country in today’s world. Its domestic resilience to that combined pressure has been phenomenal. It has also been able to wage and win a limited conventional war against a medium-sized country supported, armed, trained, equipped, advised, and directed by the United States and the entire Western bloc. Within that struggle, it has been able to retain close friends and partners in the non-Western world. The war itself has provided a powerful stimulus to deal with a number of domestic weaknesses that Russia had been suffering from since the downfall of the Soviet Union. At the same time, Russia has to reckon with the entire West, for the first time in history, lining up against it; Russians have also witnessed what a successful brainwashing campaign could do with the largely Russian-speaking and to a high degree ethnically Russian population of its closest neighbour; Moscow has to take account of the dependence of virtually all countries of today’s world on the U.S. dollar and the Western-centered financial system, and of the immense power of the Western media empire. An analysis of these vulnerabilities points to what needs to be done to make sure that Russia’s security is better protected for the trials that lie ahead: turbulence in the world is unlikely to subside in the foreseeable future.

First published in the PIR Center.

1. See statements by U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin (Stars and Stripes, April 7, 2022; New York Post, CNN, April 26, 2022). Also, President Biden, according to Brazil’s President Lula da Silva (in an interview with Le Monde on June 4, 2025), “believed that Russia should be destroyed”.
2. For a detailed and very candid discussion of how Europe is currently viewed in Moscow, see Sergei Lavrov’s remarks at a press conference in Moscow on July 22, 2025, as reported by RIA Novosti News Agency, TASS, RBC and others.
3. The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation // MFA of the Russian Federation. March 31, 2023. URL: https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/fundamental_documents/1860586/ (in Russ.).
4. All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Polling (VCIOM) poll, released on August 19, 2025 // VCIOM. URL: https://wciom.com/our-news/ratings

China
Source: www.chinadaily.com.cn

BRICS should aim at common, cooperative, sustainable security

As senior officials gathered in New Delhi this week for the 16th Meeting of BRICS National Security Advisors and High Representatives on National Security, an undercurrent was the mounting resolve among developing countries to reject their long-assigned place "on the menu".

Representing nearly half the global population and about 40 percent of the world's GDP, the grouping has evolved from a coordination mechanism for its founding members into one of the most important platforms for the Global South to amplify its voice and influence. Its growing focus on security cooperation indicates that countries long relegated to the margins of global security governance are no longer content to be at someone's mercy.

That broader transformation formed the backdrop to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's visit to New Delhi for the security meeting.

The series of bilateral meetings Wang had with officials from different countries on the sidelines of the BRICS gathering, including India's National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, Deputy Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council Qadir Nizamipour and South Africa's Minister in the Presidency Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, show China's commitment to enhancing communication and coordination with the BRICS members.

A common thread ran through those discussions. In a world facing mounting security challenges, closer cooperation and coordination are essential.

BRICS members increasingly see themselves as stakeholders in a multipolar international order. Security should encompass economic resilience, social stability and human well-being.

BRICS therefore serves as a builder of multilateralism at a moment when the practice is under strain. The grouping's appeal lies in its rejection of the old either-or logic that has long dominated geopolitics and its upholding of dialogue instead of confrontation, partnership instead of bloc politics, and cooperation instead of containment. In an age seemingly defined by polarization, such common-sense ideas should prevail.

Just as importantly, BRICS should champion political solutions to international disputes.

Too many crises today are framed through the lens of military options before diplomatic ones have been exhausted. Lasting peace cannot be imposed; it must be negotiated. That requires respecting legitimate security concerns, seeking common ground and refusing to allow disagreements to become permanent barriers.

The larger question hanging over global politics is who gets to write the rules. BRICS is a defender of fairness and justice in a system that was designed without the full participation of developing countries. The grouping advocates a more representative multipolar order and a more inclusive form of globalization — one that reflects today's realities rather than yesterday's hierarchies.

Underlying much of this vision is China's Global Security Initiative, which calls for common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. Its central premise is difficult to dismiss: in an interconnected world, security cannot be hoarded by a few and denied to the many.

The conversations in New Delhi suggest that, despite the grouping's differences on some issues, its members are increasingly inclined toward a common understanding that BRICS should evolve into a force promoting a more balanced international order through cooperation.

BRICS members should strengthen security cooperation by managing internal security matters effectively and delivering visible results in both traditional security and nontraditional areas such as technology governance and counterterrorism.

The overextension of "security" by some countries, however, is becoming an excuse to weaponize economic and trade policies — a dangerous trend that warrants collective attention.

Security challenges today are inextricably linked — no country can be secure at the expense of another. The only viable path forward is common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, grounded in respect for sovereignty and a commitment to dialogue over confrontation.

China
Source: www.chinadaily.com.cn

China to assume rotating presidency of BRICS next year

China's top diplomat Wang Yi said on Tuesday that China will assume the rotating presidency of BRICS next year, expressing the country's readiness to host fellow BRICS countries for further cooperation.

Wang made the remarks before the conclusion of the 16th Meeting of BRICS National Security Advisors and High Representatives on National Security held in New Delhi, capital of India.

China looks forward to welcoming all parties again next year, he said, adding that Beijing hopes to work with other BRICS countries to further deepen political and security cooperation and contribute BRICS wisdom and strength to world peace and security.

China
Source: www.chinadaily.com.cn

Unilateralism and the law of the jungle are undermining countries' legitimate rights and interests and damaging the norms governing international relations, making it necessary for BRICS countries to strengthen solidarity and coordination, China's top diplomat said on Monday.

Meeting with South African Minister in the Presidency Khumbudzo Ntshavheni in New Delhi, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said BRICS countries, as backbone forces of the Global South, should work together to uphold international fairness and justice and safeguard world peace and stability.

He described China as a trustworthy friend and partner of both South Africa and the continent of Africa.

China and South Africa should uphold mutual respect and win-win cooperation, keep improving exchange mechanisms at all levels, and consolidate and deepen strategic mutual trust, Wang said.

Wang called on the two countries to make full use of policy dividends such as zero-tariff treatment and the "Green Channel 2.0" for African agricultural and food products entering China so as to inject strong impetus into China-South Africa and China-Africa efforts to jointly advance modernization.

Ntshavheni said South Africa firmly adheres to the one-China principle and is ready to strengthen coordination and cooperation with China on multilateral platforms.

South Africa looks forward to maintaining close high-level exchanges with China, strengthening cooperation in trade, investment, cybersecurity, infrastructure and other fields, and lifting South Africa-China and Africa-China relations to a new level, she added.

Both Wang and Ntshavheni are in New Delhi to attend the 16th Meeting of BRICS National Security Advisors and High Representatives on National Security.

China
Source: www.chinadaily.com.cn

China and India should view each other as cooperation partners rather than competitors, respect each other's core interests and properly handle sensitive issues, China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi has said.

Beijing's top diplomat also called on the two countries to speed up the restoration of dialogue mechanisms and promote exchanges in trade, finance, law enforcement, media and other fields, as the two Asian neighbors work to keep bilateral relations on a healthy and stable track.

Wang made the remarks when meeting with Ajit Doval, India's national security adviser, in New Delhi, on Monday. Wang is in India to attend the 16th Meeting of BRICS National Security Advisors and High Representatives on National Security.

Noting that India is an important neighbor of China, Wang said the two countries' leaders share the view that China and India are cooperation partners, not competitors.

This represents the most important strategic consensus between the two sides and provides important momentum and strategic guidance for the sound and steady development of bilateral relations, he added.

With joint efforts from both sides, exchanges in various fields have gradually resumed, communication and cooperation are moving forward in an orderly manner, and the border areas have remained generally peaceful, Wang said.

Such achievements have not come easily and should be all the more valued, he added.

Wang urged the two sides to support each other's development and revitalization through cooperation, and help accelerate the modernization process of the Global South.

The two sides should place the boundary question in an appropriate position and prevent it from affecting the overall development of bilateral relations, he said.

Wang also called on both countries to actively guide various sectors of society toward a correct understanding of each other, so as to build a solid public and social foundation for improving bilateral relations.

As the world's two most populous economies, China and India should not only view bilateral ties from a long-term perspective, but also advance cooperation with a global vision, he said.

China supports India in fulfilling its responsibilities as the BRICS chair and is ready to work with India to promote the development and growth of the BRICS mechanism, Wang added.

Doval told Wang that India is willing to continue viewing relations with China from a strategic perspective, accelerate the improvement of bilateral ties, properly handle differences and strive for win-win outcomes.

Noting that India's position on the Taiwan question remains unchanged, he said India is ready to work with China to support each other's core concerns, jointly safeguard multilateralism and uphold the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Mr Dynkin,

Ladies and gentlemen,

First of all, I would like to once again congratulate you, Mr Dynkin, and through you, the entire team of the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences on the 70th anniversary, which the institute marked in April 2026.

I would like to once again wish our colleagues good health, new creative achievements, inspiration, and all the best. I appreciate another opportunity to participate in the Primakov Readings, which have traditionally brought together a representative group of participants and officials, scientists and experts from Russia and many other countries.

Attending this forum is a form of paying tribute to Yevgeny Primakov, his outstanding personality, rich creative heritage and ideas, which continue to be fully in demand in our daily work.

It has been stated on numerous occasions, including at this forum, that Yevgeny Primakov not only forecast and formulated the imminent advance of multipolarity in the middle of the 1990s, when the West anticipated an era of its global domination, but also started steering Russia’s foreign policy ship in the direction of the rising, more just polycentric world order.

It was a figure of speech. As you know, in practice this took the form of the turnaround made by Primakov’s plane when he understood that he was flying to a country that had launched yet another aggression.

Life itself subsequently proved him right, overturning the shallow views of the advocates of “the end of history” who rejected any alternative to the ultra-liberal development mode. Yevgeny Primakov wrote in his article he wrote 30 years ago, titled “International Relations on the Eve of the 21st Century: Issues and Prospects”: “No single country can stand alone against the legion of problems.”
This realisation is beginning to make headway, although belatedly and with considerable difficulty, among representatives of the Western political and intellectual elites. About a year ago, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said when speaking about global problems: “America cannot solve every single one of them.” 

Moreover, there was a meeting in Riyadh in February 2025. It took place at the initiative of the United States and was attended by then US National Security Advisor Michael Waltz and Presidential Aide Yury Ushakov. While presenting the foreign policy of the second Donald Trump administration, Marco Rubio made several important points, above all on the need to work together by recognising each other’s national interests. He even said that we had to cooperate and make sure to benefit from the available opportunities whenever our national interests coincided. But if these interests differ, which happens in most cases, we had to prevent these differences from sliding towards confrontation, let alone a military clash.

However, having realised the impossibility for them to lead single-handedly, the United States, and the West in general, have not been ready to accept the objective reality of an emerging multipolar world order. They prefer propping up their weakening positions by forcing others to side with them, imposing sanctions, enacting bans, issuing threats and taking other illegitimate measures to force the Global Majority to play their game.

The West persists in its refusal to abide by the universally recognised international norms as set forth in the UN Charter, and has never fully respected them, in fact, even if everyone signing and ratifying the Charter undertakes to fully comply with its norms in their entirety and interconnection. This includes the sovereign equality of states and non-interference in domestic affairs, as well as respecting and guaranteeing human rights regardless of race, sex, language, or religion, to quote the UN Charter.

I mentioned this quote for a reason. You must understand that neither language nor religion do not benefit from protections in Ukraine as set forth in the UN Charter. A neo-Nazi junta is in control there, while the West watches on in silence.

I listed several principles – the West either fails to comply with them or follows them in a selective manner the way it deems fit for promoting its own interests at a specific juncture, which usually happens at the expense of other international actors and affects the integrity of international relations.

When Kosovo was declared as an independent state without holding a referendum, considering that there were no conflicts or hostilities, it was a good thing for them. But when people in Crimea responded to a government coup and wanted to counter armed fighters, who intended to storm the building of Crimea’s Supreme Council, by holding a referendum and deciding to reunite with Russia, the West refused to accept it by arguing that this is a matter of territorial integrity rather than the right to self-determination.

This duplicity has been on display regarding Greenland recently. During a news conference, Spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General Stephane Dujarric was asked for his opinion on what President of the United States Donald Trump said regarding his policy towards Greenland. Dujarric’s answer consisted of saying that they wanted this issue to be resolved based on international norms and by respecting Denmark’s territorial integrity and the right to self-determination. Our journalist then asked him whether this formula applied to Crimea and Ukraine in general. Stephane Dujarric’s answer consisted of saying that this was not the case, and that it was a matter of territorial integrity and nothing else.

This was a statement by the UN Secretary-General’s representative. By the way, citizens of NATO member countries have filled all the key senior roles which define the way the UN and the entire UN system work. We believe that this way of acting by our Western colleagues is the main reason which explains these attempts by the Western minority to impose this game without rules or power politics on the Global Majority.

The current situation has another peculiarfeature: The West does not hesitate to change its attitude towards the so-called “rules” with which it tried, until now, to substitute international law. As soon as the West realised that free trade, fair competition, the inviolability of property and the free flow of capitals made it possible to unlock the potential of new powerhouses in Asia, Africa and Latin America, it immediately weaponised the dollar and other global currencies, unleashed sanctions and tariffs wars and moved to confiscate gold and currency reserves and other material assets. By jeopardising all achievements and the very future of its own brainchild - economic globalisation - the West is also destroying the foundation of the system of international security that took decades to evolve.

NATO emphatically refuses to honour its verbal (as they say) commitments given to the leadership of the Soviet Union and new Russia, as well as written legal and political obligations. This implies written, rather than verbal, obligations, signed by the top leaders of Western countries together with us at OSCE summits.    

First of all, they flatly reject the principle of equal and indivisible security. According to this principle, formalised by the above-mentioned documents, security is indivisible, and no one has the right to strengthen their security by infringing upon the security of others. No country, group of countries or organisations can claim the right to dominate Euro-Atlantic space. I believe that it cannot be express more clearly. To my mind, there is no need to explain to everyone in this room the fact that NATO is expanding its domination, in the first place.

For many years, Russia has contended with the Atlantic community’s irresponsible course of geopolitical expansion eastward, right up to our borders. Furthermore, we’re concerned about NATO’s dangerous efforts to achieve global military and military-technological superiority, or its aggressive expansion of influence across Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific region.

Not long ago, at a news conference, former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg was laying out the Alliance’s “Indo-Pacific strategies.” When it was pointed out that NATO’s job is supposed to be the territorial defence of its members, he responded – without so much as a blink – that while that was true, the current threats to the territorial integrity of member states originate from the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, Southeast Asia, and beyond. That is the line they are taking. They are actively building up their presence there, as you know. We can discuss this in more detail later.

Among the more recent manifestations of policies that undermine international stability is, of course, US action in Venezuela under the pretext of combating drug trafficking. That culminated in the forcible removal of the legitimately elected President Nicolás Maduro, and, more bluntly, in the effective placement of Venezuela’s most profitable oil sector under US control – as President Trump himself officially announced just the other day, complete with figures.

When aggressive, offensive approaches encounter obstacles or reach a dead end, the West suddenly remembers diplomacy and the importance of compromise and mutually beneficial solutions.
Russia supports the agreement to end hostilities between the United States and Iran. We support the ongoing negotiations and are ready to assist, if our good offices are needed, in developing a comprehensive long-term agreement between the two countries – and, more broadly, a settlement involving their neighbours.

We hope that the restoration of free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz will benefit the energy and food security of the Global South, and that the stabilisation of the military-political situation in the Persian Gulf could well serve as a basis for launching a broad dialogue on a new security and cooperation architecture for this strategic region and the Middle East as a whole.

As recently as late May this year, Russia continued its long-standing efforts to promote this process by updating its Collective Security Concept for the Persian Gulf. We have circulated the document among the Gulf states. We understand that its practical relevance and viability depend, first and foremost, on those countries themselves. At the same time, as was the case when we first advanced this initiative many years ago, we envisage the possible participation of neighbouring states, as well as non-regional actors, provided that the countries of the region are interested in such involvement. I also hope that the academic and expert community will contribute to refining the parameters of this Collective Security Concept for the Gulf.

In brief, the Concept envisages a stage-by-stage progress towards diffusing the conflicts that are still lingering in the region, the development of confidence-building measures among the Gulf states, and alignment of interests of regional countries with those of international actors involved in promoting stability and cooperation in the Gulf and the Middle East as a whole. Achieving these objectives will undoubtedly require considerable diplomatic skill and, I would add, sustained effort from all interested parties.

The same is true today of efforts to achieve a just settlement of the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict, which has been one of the most serious sources of regional and international tensions for decades and has now been relegated to the periphery of the global agenda. It is clear that this knot can only be untangled by righting the historic injustice suffered by the Palestinian people and finally enabling them to exercise their internationally recognised right to establish an independent and viable state, while fully safeguarding Israel’s legitimate security interests.

Of course, it is often argued that realities on the ground make such a prospect increasingly remote, if not impossible. Nevertheless, both international law and moral justice are on the side of the Palestinians. This is something that should never be forgotten.

We are now witnessing what amounts to a rejection of the entire body of UN resolutions adopted on this issue. Even the resolution adopted in autumn 2025, which endorsed President Donald Trump’s plan for Gaza without any reference to the West Bank, is now under threat. That resolution proposed an entirely new approach, focusing solely on Gaza and its population and making no mention of the creation of a unified Palestinian state.  Yet even this initiative has encountered what appears to be an insurmountable obstacle. Russia and China abstained rather than exercising our vetoes only because our Arab friends, including the Palestinians themselves, strongly urged us to do so.

The experience of centuries of diplomacy teaches a simple lesson: the golden rule of any lasting conflict settlement is the unconditional elimination of its root causes. Incidentally, addressing the root causes of conflicts is one of the key elements of the Global Security Initiative put forward by President Xi Jinping in February 2023. For us, this principle applies above all to the Ukraine crisis, which, in our view, was artificially created by the West as part of the expansion towards the Russian borders that I referred to earlier.

After many years of what have ultimately proved to be futile and ineffective attempts on our part to persuade others, a simple truth must be recognised: Russia’s adversaries cannot indefinitely and with impunity ignore our clearly stated warnings about the inadmissibility of creating threats to our national security and violating every conceivable commitment regarding the legitimate rights of the Russian and Russian-speaking population of Ukraine. These include the right to use the Russian language freely, the freedom of Russian-language media, access to Russian culture and the rights of the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

I am convinced that a political and diplomatic settlement of the situation around Ukraine remains possible. President Putin has repeatedly spoken about this. Such a settlement requires concrete, legally binding security guarantees based on the principle of indivisible security, including guarantees for Russia’s security along its western borders.

At the same time, the West must understand – and the sooner the better – that it must abandon its plans for military-political, geo-economic and ideological expansion in areas that are of vital interest to Russia. I have already referred to the rights of our compatriots. This is an absolute and indispensable requirement that cannot be treated as part of any negotiating package. It is an obligation that stands on its own. The UN Charter and, incidentally, the Constitution of Ukraine – which remains in force, despite legislation that directly contradicts it – guarantee the rights of Russian and other ethnic minorities.

In August 2025, the leaders of Russia and the United States reached a number of understandings regarding political pathways out of the Ukraine crisis. We remain committed to those understandings. In essence, they originated with the US side, while President Putin agreed to the proposals put forward to us only after they had been carefully examined.

Today, the ball is not in our court, although there are increasingly frequent attempts to pass it to us from an offside position, to borrow a metaphor from the ongoing FIFA World Cup. That will not work. For Russia, this is a matter of principle. We will not trade fundamental interests for temporary or intermediate arrangements, nor will we accept ultimatums imposed by others.

This is something certain figures in countries west of Russia should bear in mind. While supplying the Kiev regime with weapons, they are simultaneously attempting – apparently having already written off the outcomes of Anchorage – to impose their vision of talks as a process leading to “Russia’s capitulation”. Such behaviour does little credit to those who aspire to be regarded as statesmen and will certainly not produce any positive results.

Nevertheless, as a responsible power, Russia remains open to dialogue with all those who are prepared to engage honestly – this is the key point – and on the basis of mutual respect and equality. Until Europe, or the West as a whole, is ready for such an approach, we will continue working with the Global Majority on a constructive international agenda. There is no shortage of work to be done.

Multipolarity will not push the world into chaos and confrontation, as its critics claim, but will help balance interests on the basis of international law. A relevant example is relations between Russia and China, or more precisely, their comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction. These relations can serve as a model of equal mutually beneficial cooperation between major powers. Foreign policy ties between Moscow and Beijing are a major factor of international stability and a model for a safe and just future. The contours of this model have been outlined in many documents adopted at Russian-Chinese summits. They have been itemised once again in the Joint Declaration on the Formation of a Multipolar World and a New Type of International Relations, which the leaders of Russia and China adopted a month ago during President Putin’s official visit. I have no doubt that the expert community has paid attention to this important document.

I would also like to say a few words about our relations with India, which have been defined as special and privileged strategic partnership. They have a long history as well. We continue to comprehensively develop them while trying to stimulate the trilateral RIC – Russia-India-China – group. That format was shaped about 30 years ago at the initiative of Yevgeny Primakov and formed the core of BRICS.

BRICS and the SCO provide a convincing example of the principles of sovereign equality and mutually beneficial cooperation in a multilateral format. Their philosophy resonates with all states that pursue an independent foreign policy and promote primarily their national interests. BRICS and the SCO are interesting for everyone who reject the “leader-follower” concept underlying the West-centric unions and mechanisms. In our associations, cooperation is based on mutual respect and readiness to search for consensus solutions even when this is a challenging task. These things happen, and quite often. But the solutions we eventually find are guaranteed to serve common interests. That is why the number of countries willing to join the operations of BRICS and the SCO keeps growing, namely, in Central and Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America.

We are optimistic about the future of these organisations, whose composition reflects the realities of a multipolar world better than, say, the G7. Not to mention the fact that we don’t take sides against anyone but are focused on the development of each participant and all of them together. An analysis of the outcome of the G7 summit in Evian shows that the group remains stuck in the paradigm of containing Russia and China, the infamous “with us or against us” principle. The group is trying to impose its unilateral approaches on the world. As Yevgeny Primakov wrote, unilateral approaches can only incite rivalry and ultimately provoke a chaotic and unpredictable drift of international relations.

We have pointed out before that “regional solutions for regional problems” is one of the basic rules of a more just multipolar world. Special attention in this regard should be given to the Eurasian continent, which is home to several ancient civilisations and has vast resources and potential. The development of Eurasia on a modern rational basis can be promoted by the implementation of President Putin’s concepts of Greater Eurasian Partnership and Eurasian security architecture. They will be the theme of the fourth Minsk conference, where we will discuss the Russian-Belarusian idea of developing a Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity.

We don’t claim a monopoly. We are ready to discuss any other initiatives on the development of the Eurasian continent, including within the SCO or Kazakhstan’s initiative for the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). But this Eurasian character should be given a place in global affairs, because Eurasia, although the biggest continent, is the only part of the world that has many regional and subregional structures but not a single continental organisation.

Africa and Latin America have many integration associations. But they also have continental organisations – the African Union and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).

The initiatives advanced by President Putin are not closed to any country or organisation in Eurasia that are ready to diligently work on the foundations of our common prosperity and stability. We will be delighted if participants in the Primakov Readings contributed in this process, primarily in the promotion of the intellectual aspects of these initiatives.

As President Putin said during the ceremony for presenting letters of credence at the Kremlin in January 2026, “Peace does not come by itself. It must be built, day-by-day.” Therefore, the task of both classical and scientific diplomacy is to find well-calibrated approaches to contemporary challenges through painstaking daily work.

I am confident that your forum is taking place at this historical moment.

Question (retranslated): The UK is currently going through political turbulence. We are about to have a new prime minister. What are the prospects of short-term and long-term improvement in Russia’s relations with Europe? Are there any prerequisites for that?

Sergey Lavrov: Both the President of Russia and myself have addressed this matter many times. Yours is not a question for us but for our European neighbours – our former partners in several organisations. There used to be a Russia-NATO Council and the Russia-EU Cooperation Council. G7 used to be G8. There used to be many communication formats. At least these frameworks helped us understand each other better. We have never agreed on issues completely – just like there is no full agreement within G7 or any other body.

These formats allowed us to speak out and receive responses. All this was shut down overnight and not by us. Perhaps you should address this question to your colleagues.

Your country is in the middle of changing prime ministers. British public will probably have a discussion of what to do next. I believe it is high time you asked these questions.

Speaking of talks, Keir Starmer himself said that there is no need for them and more pressure must be put on Ukraine. They didn’t talk – they just did. They did everything for Ukraine to intensify its terrorist activity. Without direct British and American help with target location data and aiming, it would be impossible to do what Ukraine is currently doing to commit terrorist attacks on Russian territory.
I suppose your question concerns not only Britain but other Western countries as well – primarily European countries that have rejected any contacts with Russia from the get-go and started plundering our resources. As you know, Euroclear blocked Russia’s gold currency reserves. It was reported yesterday that yet another 6.5 billion euros in interest from Russia’s gold currency reserves were transferred to Ukraine. A total of 45 billion euros have been transferred in four years. They claim this money is not the part of the Russian Central Bank’s deposit regulated by the agreement but rather the revenue in excess of the interest accrued to the Central Bank. This is still stolen money. One thing is when you can freely dispose of money and receive the interest as stipulated by an agreement with Euroclear while the excess remains with them. Another thing is when your money is under freeze and they tell you to sit still and wait while they continue to earn extra revenue and give it to Ukraine. This is serious in terms of the Western countries’ attempts to convince everybody that the former world order, which they created and which operated under modern global governance institutions like the IMF, the WTO and the World Bank, is still relevant.

These actions undermine the already fragmented globalisation system to such an extent that even US President Donald Trump, who expressed the United States’ position following the talks with Iran and was asked whether it was reasonable to unfreeze Iran’s money, said that the money should be given back to Iran otherwise trust in the dollar would be eroded. The same principle can be applied to the other countries’ immense reserves that are frozen in the West. Of course, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the reputation of the US dollar and other currencies exploited in the economic and financial war is going downhill.

French President Emmanuel Macron made many statements following the G7 summit in Évian-les-Bains and the European Council summit in Paris. According to him, the question is not who, when and how will negotiate with Russia but when Russia – that has received many proposals in recent months – will say that it is ready for talks with Ukraine in the presence of Americans and Europeans. He added that the West’s priorities lie in the military and other aid to Ukraine, intensifying pressure on Russia – and yet, they allegedly remain open to receiving a signal from Moscow. Is he kidding?

European Council President António Costa has affirmed that the EU is considering not negotiations with Russia, but rather an escalation of pressure upon Moscow. He has reiterated that the European Union must not and cannot serve as a mediator, as it is unequivocally aligned with Ukraine; yet, paradoxically, it claims a seat at the negotiating table. What, then, do they intend to discuss from such a position? Is their aim to present Russia with an instrument of surrender? This is entirely unserious, and wholly inadequate to the role Europe occupies in world affairs. Nevertheless, it demonstrates that the neo-colonial mentality and ambitions are still very much alive and continue to drive numerous initiatives and positions adopted by Europe.

President of France Emmanuel Macron publicly chastised European Council President António Costa over the fact that a member of his staff had twice engaged with Moscow’s representatives. He declared such contacts unacceptable and asserted that all parties should convene and decide collectively. This is sheer hypocrisy. After all, President Macron himself dispatched envoys, and they were duly received. There were envoys from London as well. We never refuse requests for dialogue. President Vladimir Putin has made this absolutely clear. The reality is that we know the value of such exchanges.

On April 24, 2025, during a news conference in Madagascar, President of France Emmanuel Macron declared that, purportedly, the only requirement regarding Ukraine is for President of Russia Vladimir Putin to finally cease lying. And yet, they proceed to send envoys. His foreign minister proclaims that Vladimir Putin’s colonial obsession is wearing down his people ever more each day and discrediting the Russian nation. Federal Chancellor of Germany Friedrich Merz stated on September 2, 2025, that Vladimir Putin is possibly the most brutal war criminal of our time. Then these same individuals assert they will await Russia’s agreement to negotiations.

Federal Chancellor of Germany Friedrich Merz has also pronounced that Vladimir Putin will not stop, just as in 1938 the Sudetenland proved insufficient. And this from a German. He further stated that if we yield to Vladimir Putin now, it would be tantamount to the policy of appeasing Adolf Hitler.

Such are the figures with whom you are engaged. True, you have departed from the European Union, and now you are contemplating rejoining.

But, once again – President Vladimir Putin has emphasised on numerous occasions (he is a remarkably patient and courteous man) that we never refuse contacts which are beneficial and necessary for any of our neighbours, for any other country, to convey their serious concerns. If they merely arrive and repeat all that, then it is utterly futile.

Three ambassadors from Britain, Germany and France requested an audience at the Russian Foreign Ministry after that “troika” met with Vladimir Zelensky on June 7, this year, in London. They attended. My deputy Mikhail Galuzin received them. They expressed their wish for the Ukraine crisis to be resolved, and for Europe to play its part. My deputy set out our position and enquired exactly what they were proposing, what principles of settlement they advocated, and what their substantive contribution would be. They responded that their contribution was the statement made on June 7, this year, in London. You have probably read it. It asserts that Russia must “capitulate,” halt at the line of contact. An occupation stabilisation mission would be deployed on the western side of the line of contact. Russian assets would be frozen until our country pays all reparations. That is their “constructive” contribution.

What do you think: in this situation, would it even be appropriate for us to contemplate proposing any initiatives to our European partners? Everything that was proposed in the 1990s, in the late 2000s, everything that was operative – all of it served the collective benefit. They chose to abolish that collective benefit, principally to Europe’s own detriment. Thus, we know precisely how we will resolve our tasks.

Should Europe unexpectedly present something genuinely constructive (after all, in some countries new people are assuming power), then we will likely be prepared to listen. Once we have listened, we will reach our own conclusions as to whether it is suitable or not. However, in any aspect of our foreign policy, to rely in any manner (in terms of achieving the objectives of development and strengthening Russia’s international standing) upon Europe’s promises or expectations – we simply have no right to do so any longer.

Question: You have mentioned BRICS countries. We can see that the number of member states has almost doubled. There are many partner countries and even more countries that would like to receive partner status in that association. This is fuelling BRICS’ aspirations. Do you think it should focus on the basic, key issues to achieve success, or we should expand the list of subjects to suit the aspirations of each participating country? How do you think this should happen?

Sergey Lavrov: The number of full members has increased from five to ten. This is not how it happened when BRIC accepted South Africa, and the addition of one country posed questions that needed to be clarified to ensure forward movement. When BRICS turned into a group of ten, it was decided to give the new members time to become adjusted to each other. I believe that it is a correct decision.

During the meeting of the BRICS Council of Foreign Ministers in India, we held a difficult conversation between our Iranian and Emirati friends. This happened in the hottest period of the Gulf confrontation. But we eventually managed to coordinate a joint document, despite the highly emotional opinions expressed by both sides. This is a case in point. But there are also other examples that go deeper, to clashing economic interests. That is why it has been decided against pushing for further expansion for a few years. But the partner countries attend these events, which is creating grounds for giving BRICS a more universal dimension.

As for the agenda, BRICS is not an organisation but an association. This is its strong side, because it would be wrong to create a rigid structure, at least at the current stage, especially a global structure rather than a continental or regional one. We have the UN. And there is the Board of Peace created at the initiative of US President Donald Trump. Many find this confusing. That is why we, at least Russia, won’t propose formalising BRICS.

At present, the annual agenda is determined by the rotating presidency of BRICS. However, practice shows that every successive presiding country strives to ensure continuity. For example, during India’s presidency we have been actively working to implement the initiatives, which Russia presented during the Kazan summit in the autumn of 2024. Therefore, I believe that we should keep our feet on the ground. It is true that many countries are willing to join our group, which is an inspiring fact. We will use it to look for new forms of partner engagement, and a day will probably come when we will expand BRICS again.

Question: Allow me to raise an extremely painful issue for my country, because there are not only military and economic blocs but also civilisational realities. We – Bulgaria and Russia – live in a Slavic-Orthodox civilisational sphere, where Russia is the indisputable leader.

You have recently mentioned the growing number of pragmatic voices in the EU speaking about a diplomatic solution to the conflict in Ukraine. Our president, who has recently assumed the office of prime minister, has joined these voices. It was a landslide victory. I think that he has been elected because he always, since the first days of the special military operation, said that Russia can’t be defeated on the battlefield, that the problem should be addressed through negotiations and diplomacy, and that Russia must not be excluded from discussions of European security.

The goals and objectives set by President Putin at the beginning of the special military operation have not changed. Under what conditions would Russia be ready for negotiations and diplomatic efforts in light of the current situation on the frontline?

Sergey Lavrov: We were at the negotiating table or somewhere close to it ever since the Ukrainian state entered its current degradation trajectory.

In late 2013 and early 2014, the West orchestrated a Maidan movement just because then-President of Ukraine Viktor Yanikovich understood that by signing an association agreement with the European Union, he would forfeit the advantages of being part of the CIS free trade zone. This was a purely pragmatic move. But for them, this was something unforgivable. All he wanted is to buy some extra time to talk this over.

By the way, President Vladimir Putin was ready to help. We approached President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso with a proposal to have a trilateral meeting for Ukraine, Russia and the European Commission in order to come up with a solution. You want to have duty-free trade with Ukraine, while we have no tariffs in our trade with Ukraine. At the same time, we protect ourselves from European goods. Moreover, we were able to secure robust protectionist measures when we joined the WTO. This was an obvious fact. Jose Manuel Barroso responded by pretending that it was not our business and saying that the EU did not seek to interfere with the way we traded with Canada, for example.

We had a representative at the talks in the early days of this Maidan-style confrontation. But when it became clear that Ukraine’s leaders were giving it all up and renouncing their legitimate rights, we recalled our representative. However, we did not have any objections against them signing this agreement. After all, Viktor Yanukovich was a legitimate president at that time. Still, we did not want to have anything to do with the positions the West had forced on him by threats and blackmail.

They managed to sign an agreement with the opposition. It provided for creating what was called a national unity government for five or six months, to be followed by a presidential election. The president had to refrain from using any executive power apart from running the security service that ensured his safety. He gave everything up.

President Vladimir Putin later said that he received a phone call from then-President of the United States Barack Obama who asked not to block this idea. President Vladimir Putin said that if the current President took this decision, he is President and the whole world recognises his legitimacy, so what could he, Vladimir Putin, do about this. But the very next morning, the opposition took over all the government buildings. Arseny Yatsenyuk went to Maidan square to say that they had to be congratulated for creating the so-called government of victors. But it was just on the previous day that they signed an agreement to form a national unity government for preparing a presidential election. Nevertheless, they were quick to form this government of the victors the very next day.

The first harbinger was their move to cancel the official status of the Russian language. The second act consisted of sending fighters to Crimea. You know the rest of the story.

However, at the next talks in the so-called Normandy format, we were there until the very end. We thought that having spent 17 hours without sleeping in Minsk in February 2015 would not be in vain, especially considering that we came forward with the initiative to have this document approved by the UN Security Council. It was approved unanimously.

Not that long ago, former Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel and former presidents of France and Ukraine, Francois Hollande and Petr Poroshenko, who signed this document alongside Vladimir Putin, said that they never intended to abide by this agreement, as if there was something to be proud of. They said that all they wanted was to win some time because Ukraine was too weak at that time.
Then we took part in the third talks at the start of the special military operation. It took place in Istanbul. You know all this. The Ukrainian delegation brought a document. In it, it set forth principles that could serve as a foundation for an agreement. Both the Ukrainians and Russia initialled these principles as drafted by Ukraine. After that, there was a visit by then-Prime Minister Boris Johnson – this is to answer the question from our British colleague. The British are involved in various manners without waiting for us to ask them to do something or to refrain from doing something.

After that, there were the Istanbul talks, which later moved to Geneva for a single round, and there was another round in Abu Dhabi. Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky headed our delegation. There were also military officials and representatives of economic agencies. It all came to a halt a year ago when during one of these rounds the Ukrainians said that this was a weak negotiating format since it was led by low-level officials and focused exclusively on humanitarian matters.

We heard it and suggested significantly raising the level of delegation heads (I can’t tell you to which level but a very high one) and create three working groups, to address humanitarian, political, and military issues. If somebody thinks there should be other tracks, besides humanitarian issues, there you are. They stepped aside, no reaction, and several months later, in the autumn of 2025, simply said that they were no longer interested in the talks. That’s it.

So now, when Zelensky is painfully demanding talks, find his statements from 2023, 2024 or 2025, where he, their entire leadership and the government of Ukraine claimed that there would be no talks with President Putin. Zelensky even said that for Ukraine, even keeping Putin alive would be a compromise. Read it. And this is the person who is currently “controlling” the entire Europe and also setting sights on the United States.

We are open to talks at any time but the proposal must be serious. Moreover, we are ready to resume the process that was unfolding with participation of Vladimir Medinsky. This process is not complete and there are quite a few interesting proposals on the table. At the beginning of the Q&A, I quoted French President Emmanuel Macron, President of the European Council Antonio Costa, and some other officials. They say, here is your ultimatum, that they are not mediators because they side with Ukraine, but they will sit next to Ukraine at the negotiating table, and only Russia is against it. I believe this is not a sane position but some schizophrenic logic. Summing up: yes, we are always ready but, I will repeat, we will sit down for talks if there are reasonable ideas, proposals and adequate people on the other side. We are not taking anything at face value.

We’ve been told, let’s agree on a ceasefire along the contact line and then start talks. No, we’ve already done that before, when an agreement was reached and initialed in Istanbul. We ceased fire as a goodwill gesture and even withdrew troops from Kiev – President Putin has talked about this more than once. What immediately happened was Boris Johnson and Bucha. After we withdrew the troops, there were three quiet days when the mayor of Bucha was running between TV cameras and claiming that the town was liberated. Three days later, a BBC crew arrived and filmed dead bodies in clean clothing carefully placed in the dirt on the main road in this very Bucha. It was a major street. Nobody could see those bodies for three days? This is madness. Everybody know where this is coming from.

Western media recently published an investigation of this entire story. Most definitively, the British ran the show and fuelled the media blaze. In follow-up, they adopted another batch of sanctions. The same incident was used as an argument by then British prime minister Boris Johnson to prevent Zelensky from signing the document and force him to fight on.

The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office and the Investigative Committee sent an official request to the UN Secretary-General and the Human Rights Council, but no adequate response followed. They claim they lack information. I asked UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, both one-on-one and publicly at the Security Council, to send an official request to Ukraine for the names of the people whose bodies were shown by BBC. Okay, you lack information, but the United Nations and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights can file a request. We have been trying to get a response for three years.

First, we were told that that would create some sort of risks for their families. What risks and for what families? Speaking of which, not a single family member has come out. When somebody gets killed and brutally tortured, their families usually cause a stir and go to human rights organisations. Here, just deadly silence. We won’t let it rest at that. I raise this issue every time. Last April, I sent yet another official request to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. Nothing. I will remind him.

Antonio Guterres is not someone who surprises me the most – after all, he is partial and has repeatedly proved that he is, with actions that were expected from him by the West, including in the confrontation with Russia. Here is what amazes me more: since the launch of the special military operation, every time I attend the UN General Assembly in New York and hold a news conference, the entire group of accredited journalists is present. The house is full, maybe 80 people, and I know many of them personally. They have been working there since my time as Russia’s Permanent Representative to the UN. And along with other topics covered during the news conference, I remind them about Bucha. I say that my official requests are met with radio silence. Is there a way to play on your journalistic pride to make you deal with this case? Journalists conduct investigations. I speak about this matter every year – and nobody raises a finger.

So, of course, we are ready for talks but we won’t allow any cheating. Sometimes we may be naïve and let ourselves be misled due to certain lack of guile, but these days, we are particularly vigilant.

Question: My name is Pankaj Saran. I served as India’s Ambassador to Russia for several years. I have been engaged for many years in cultivating our bilateral relations. I would like to avail myself of this occasion to pose the following question. During the 2023–2024 United States presidential election campaign, the majority of Republican candidates, including the current US President Donald Trump, made unequivocal statements concerning the war in Ukraine. They declared – and I quote – that this is a war that ought never to have begun. They opposed the war. This stance diverged fundamentally from that of the Democrats.

In 2025, US President Donald Trump once again asserted that this war was a mistake, and he undertook a commitment to resolve this conflict. On this issue, there existed disagreements exclusively between the Americans and the Europeans. I would like to ask the following: Do you consider that, with a figure such as Donald Trump in the White House – a president who possesses his own vision of the Ukraine conflict – a window of opportunity has emerged? He is endeavouring to identify a solution, a means of overcoming this impasse. There were positive signals, beginning with Anchorage and other negotiations. Do you believe that this window of opportunity remains open? Furthermore, in this context, do you believe that parallels may be drawn, or a proof of concept established, if I may employ that phrase, with developments in the context of deals between Iran and the United States? Might such mechanisms be applicable to the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, in order to elaborate a comparable document?

Sergey Lavrov: We welcomed the stance of US President Donald Trump upon his return to the Oval Office, when he stated his intention to pursue dialogue with Russia and to facilitate efforts to resolve the Ukraine crisis. This is an entirely normal position for a rational statesman, in stark contrast to the posture adopted by those presently at the helm of European nations, who have severed all relations with us – as did former US President Joe Biden. This is a welcome departure from those who have repudiated the very notion of dialogue, which constitutes the essence of politics and diplomacy. US President Donald Trump and President of Russia Vladimir Putin held a telephone conversation and agreed that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and I would meet in Riyadh in February 2025 – I have already referred to this meeting.

It was a fruitful encounter. We discussed conceptual matters, specifically that the cornerstone of the new administration’s conduct on the international stage, as articulated by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, is the unequivocal principle of MAGA – Make America Great Again. This does not denote the proliferation of ideology, but rather the safeguarding of national interests as understood in Washington. He elaborated that they fully acknowledge that others, too, possess national interests and are prepared to collaborate. The thrust was that, where national interests align – which, admittedly, will be rare – it would be inexcusable to squander the opportunity to achieve something mutually beneficial in the material domain. Conversely, where interests do not converge – a far more frequent occurrence – it would be a grave error to permit such divergence to deteriorate into degradation and confrontation. We are in complete accord with this approach.

Turning to the Ukraine crisis, I should note that, as of February 2025, the Americans were still only tentatively formulating their approach, yet it was abundantly clear that they grasped the underlying causes, unlike their European counterparts. US President Donald Trump has repeatedly affirmed that there should be no NATO membership for Ukraine. Since his arrival in the White House, he has stated on numerous occasions that Russia’s position in this regard is entirely comprehensible – no one desires such a military irritant on their borders. US President Donald Trump has underscored that this Russian position was established long before President of Russia Vladimir Putin, and thus should not be disregarded.

One would assume that this is the principal nation within NATO. Its President has unequivocally delineated his perspective on the matter. We exercised patience; a year elapsed. For several months now, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, when addressing the Ukraine issue, has remarked that NATO’s doors remain open to Ukraine – not immediately, but in due course, they will assuredly be open. When US President Donald Trump articulated his outlook regarding the world, Europe, relations with Russia and China – particularly at a time when all were keeping a low profile, suspecting he would devote less attention to Europe, leaving it to contend with its own problems, whilst he focused on Latin America and, as widely reported, prepared for confrontation with the People’s Republic of China – I recall thinking that it would be apt to refer to Europe’s tether not as transatlantic, but as “Trumpatlantic.”

Such was our impression, yet circumstances have now shifted considerably. On June 23, 2026, Kievskaya Pravda – a media outlet in Ukraine – reported that, following a meeting in Évian with Vladimir Zelensky, US President Donald Trump had given the green light to intensify sanctions against Russia, to apply additional forms of pressure, and to escalate military operations against Russian territory, including strikes deep within the country, according to an anonymous source. I do not believe this reflects reality. It is, rather, wishful thinking. Nevertheless, Anchorage was mentioned.
Let me stress that, prior to the Alaska meeting, US President’s Special Envoy Steve Witkoff visited Russia and presented a highly specific proposal. President Putin examined it carefully, and in Anchorage he informed President Trump that there were certain aspects on which he had assumed responsibility. He accepted the US proposal, although it already reflected a compromise on our part.
Now we are being told that, since things are not progressing as hoped, we should make further concessions. In fact, we did not make concessions there. We reached an understanding on how to end the hostilities and move on to addressing all other issues at the negotiating table. We were confident that this approach would help achieve the objectives set by President Putin, albeit in stages.
We believed an agreement had been reached. Yet a week passed, then another. President Trump travelled to Washington to “consult” with European leaders. We all saw that unfold. Vladimir Zelensky was evidently consulted as well. To this day, however, we have received no response to the US proposal that we supported. That is the current situation.

At the same time, I do not wish to create unnecessary tension. Our US interlocutors continue to tell us that Presidents Putin and Trump are committed to advancing their respective national interests while seeking a balance between them, and that this could lead to a very promising outlook. They say that Ukraine is not their war but Joe Biden’s, and that it would never have begun under President Trump. They also point out that by the time President Trump returned to office, Ukraine was already at the top of the international agenda. They believe that it should be removed from that position.

We genuinely believed that after the American proposal was accepted in Alaska, this issue had effectively been taken off the agenda, as suggested by the United States. In practice, however, events unfolded differently. After Alaska, I met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in New York in September 2025 and reminded him that we were still awaiting a response. He said they were working on it and that there were “difficulties”. Yet this was their proposal.

Meanwhile, shortly after our meeting in New York, the Biden-era sanctions were extended once again, while new sanctions were imposed on Lukoil and Rosneft. The Pentagon has now established new programmes dedicated entirely to Ukraine. Plans are reportedly under way to create a training facility in the United States to develop methods of warfare based on the experience of the conflict in Ukraine. At the same time, there appear to be no restrictions beyond practical limitations on arms sales to Europe so that it can continue to “pump” Ukraine with weapons.

In practical terms, therefore, nothing positive has been achieved. We have not even been able to recover our diplomatic property, let alone restore direct air links. As early as the beginning of 2025, we proposed removing members of both the Russian Federal Assembly and the US Congress from sanctions lists. In practical terms, such sanctions achieve little. They merely provide some people with moral or emotional satisfaction from seeing others sanctioned. Yet on all these issues there has been complete silence.

At present, the main problem in our relations with the United States is the following: we were suddenly informed that, henceforth, all children born in the United States to staff of consular missions would be regarded as US citizens. They would be issued the relevant documents and would only be able to cross the US border in either direction on the basis of US papers, as American citizens.
We have tried to explain that it is unclear on what basis such a practice rests. We are told that diplomatic conventions fully guarantee immunity, whereas the international convention on consular relations does not provide the same level of immunity. This is, in essence, a completely artificial issue. It is inconceivable that a Russian diplomatic or consular family would be forced into a situation where their child is made an American citizen and, while on US territory, is subject exclusively to US law. Nothing like this exists anywhere.

This is also taking place against the backdrop of discussions in the US Supreme Court on the principle of citizenship by right of the soil. President Trump has expressed opposition to maintaining this provision. However, that is an internal American matter. What does it have to do with Russian diplomats and their children?

So there are quite a number of issues. Nevertheless, we remain open to dialogue and we greatly value – and I say this sincerely, without any irony – the fact that, despite everything I have just mentioned and much more that could be added, the US administration continues to maintain dialogue. This is better than silence and the escalation of tensions. We are therefore ready to continue these discussions.

Returning to the issue we began with, the Ukraine issue, we would like to understand what exactly happened in Evian. Because if one listens to President of France Emmanuel Macron, Anchorage has been “buried” and President Trump has returned to the “family” as a kind of prodigal son or prodigal father, and now “everyone is together again.” But the Americans have not explained to us what conclusions they drew from the G7 summit in Evian, how they assess its outcome, or what their future line will be.

What is being discussed, according to Presidential Aide Yury Ushakov and Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov, is another visit by US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. We will, of course, listen to what they have to say.

Question: What outlook do we have for relations with Japan and South Korea? Specifically, how do you view the intensification of cooperation in science, the humanitarian area, and education?

Sergey Lavrov: We maintain cultural ties with Japan and South Korea. A Russian cultural festival is held annually in Japan, and there are also certain events with [South] Korea. Our representative, the Special Presidential Envoy for International Cultural Cooperation, Mikhail Shvydkoi, is in contact with his counterparts. I believe this is useful.

Russian concert tours in Japan and [South] Korea are always in great demand. In my view, the Japanese are acting sensibly by not breaking off cultural ties, which should have nothing to do with wars or politics. This is in contrast to what we see in Italy, for example, where there have been disgraceful decisions not merely to deny performances but to cancel already agreed tours by Anna Netrebko and Ildar Abdrazakov. We therefore welcome the development of cultural ties with Japan and South Korea.

But there is a consideration that goes beyond the Far East, Japan and Korea. There have been many political discussions. They probably talked also about restoring relations. Even Finnish President Alexander Stubb, who once said that NATO is returning to its core roots as a military deterrent against Russia, has recently stated that they should talk to Russia. They don’t care much about the consistency of their statements.

The idea that they will need to do something, to find a place for Russia in the system of European security is probably worth discussing, though not because we want to be embraced or embrace anyone, but because we are neighbours.

We don’t want Germany, which has deployed 5,000 troops in Lithuania, to approach our border again, especially in light of the statement by German Chancellor Merz I quoted, who spoke about appeasing the “aggressor,” meaning Putin. But I can also quote Merz who said immediately after assuming power as chancellor (which he only succeeded in doing on the second try) that he would do his best for Germany to again become the largest military power in Europe. When he says “again,” does he understand what this means and how this is interpreted by those who defeated fascism and strangled the beast?

However, we need to come to agreements as neighbours. We don’t want a future described by President of France Macron. He proposed a “European political community” that implies the OSCE without Russia and Belarus. The United States is not involved; they have other things on their mind. The Europeans have met several times, preparing concepts they subsequently promote at the EU and NATO.

As for the Ukraine issue, their idea is to stop the hostilities and launch endless discussions, which won’t produce any result, demanding that Russia create a demilitarised zone. But their ultimate desire is to deploy their troops in what remains of Ukraine. They are openly speaking about a “stabilisation force” as the core security guarantee Europe will give to Ukraine. In other words, they want to build another Berlin Wall for all eternity. Do we want this? I don’t think so.

Once again, we don’t need any “embraces.” What we need is normal civilised neighbourly relations, which will be pragmatic, allowing businesses to benefit and the governments to improve social conditions in their countries. But I don’t know how we can achieve this goal.

The OSCE is half-dead. Tell the truth, I discussed this issue with my deputy, Alexander Grushko. It is for our president to decide, but I would have withdrawn from that organisation if not for one consideration. The other countries won’t pull out. Not that we will feel uncomfortable, but it doesn’t hurt to have a platform where they openly throw mud at you while you can responds by presenting facts. Those who threw mud at you can’t respond to facts. Therefore, we won’t withdraw from the OSCE even though we are fully aware of its essence.

When our good friend, Secretary General Feridun Sinirlioglu proposes new OSCE services, trying to make it more acceptable to all sides, we feel for him because the West won’t allow this. The West needs the OSCE to be a place where they can throw mud at us.

My final idea concerns the kind of relations we can maintain with Japan, Korea and the West. Take the United States. As I said, it maintains an active dialogue [with us], confirming optimistic forecasts. After we settle the Ukraine crisis, Russian-US relations will be given a powerful mutually beneficial momentum. After the Alaska summit, we thought that the time was right to offer the same compromise to Zelensky. We don’t know if this was done. “There is no feedback,” as the French say.
However, this pause in the Ukraine settlement has been accompanied with increased economic pressure on us. I have cited Rosneft and Lukoil: the Americans want to take over their international business, including in North Africa, Serbia, Hungary and other places.

Venezuela, too, possesses oil reserves. It is likewise a nation that has engaged in close collaboration, including in energy matters, with both China and Russia. In an entirely unprecedented fashion, Nicolás Maduro was removed from office under the pretext of heading a drug cartel. Now it transpires that the true issue was never the drug cartel, but rather Venezuela’s oil industry, which – it would appear – has now become, in effect, American.

Regarding the Strait of Hormuz, the President of the United States, Donald Trump, has declared that, should anything go awry, he will assume control and claim 20 percent. Thus, ostensibly, this too pertains to oil.

There exists an American doctrine or strategy – I am not certain of its precise designation – but it is a strategic document that establishes the objective of dominating global energy markets. At present, the Americans are conducting negotiations – at least, we have been informed that there is a plan to acquire the European segment of Nord Stream, restore its functionality, and bring it under their control. Nothing other than our gas can be transported via that route; therefore, we will supply the gas and, I suspect, they will resell it at a considerable premium.

When and if – and, indeed, “when” seems the more likely scenario – this Ukrainian saga draws to a close, we will sit down with our American colleagues and say: it is accomplished. Now, as you have indicated, let us examine those plans. Then, they will study the map and remark: listen, gentlemen, everything surrounding you has already been appropriated. Admittedly, Alaska remains, where there appear to be certain joint ventures with our gas companies.

However, one must proceed from the facts on the ground. This is not a matter of us voicing grievances against anyone. I am merely stating the facts. The illustrious Rudyard Kipling, the ideologue of colonialism, remarked: “East is East, and West is West.” Yet even within the West, there is, as it were, “West” and “West.” We are not the West; we are Eurasia, and thus, it appears, Eurasia too has no alternative – it, too, must stand on its own. Nevertheless, we are prepared to engage with all parties.

How may this global crisis be resolved? Sooner or later, we will be compelled to address it. The principal tenet must be reciprocity – a response to an approach, provided it is not couched as an ultimatum, unlike this European incivility. They are contracting this boorishness from Vladimir Zelensky. That is to say, these are not ultimatums; this is how we conduct dialogue with the United States. It is mutually respectful; they do not conceal their intentions. We are always ready to listen, and we articulate our position. Where progress is attainable, we will resolve matters. But, for the present, I reiterate: on no issue – including the particulars of our embassies’ operations and our property – has there been any advancement. Therefore, as the classical authorities once advised, we must proceed not from the general to the particular. I would, rather, proceed from the particular to the general.

At the current juncture, on the overarching agenda, on broad global doctrines, consensus is unattainable. On specific questions, however, agreement is possible. Take, for example, the Iranian situation. Admittedly, it would have been preferable had it never arisen, but now that it has, there is an understanding that all parties stand ready to assist in resolving this crisis.

Regarding Ukraine – we will see. Yet that too is a specific issue that constitutes an obstacle. For now, I would say, after Alaska, the ball is in their court.

There remains the issue of Palestine itself. US President Donald Trump announced his initiative – a Board of Peace for Gaza. President of Russia Vladimir Putin immediately affirmed that we would not participate in the Board of Peace, but that one billion dollars from our billions, which the West has frozen, would be officially allocated to the fund for the reconstruction of Palestinian infrastructure, housing, and the like. Not a single response has been forthcoming.

On July 1 of this year, a Russia-United States football match will take place. Vyacheslav Fetisov will be present, alongside both current and former scientists and musicians. This is precisely the type of occasion that calls for action. Congresswoman Anna Paulina Luna extended an invitation to our parliamentarians. Initially, the intention was to convene on neutral ground, but subsequently, she stated that neutral ground would not suffice. Our representatives made their way with considerable difficulty – visa restrictions had to be lifted. Another small step – minor, yet highly significant. Still, it is preferable to nothing. In order to foster some degree of trust, to establish at least minimal contacts – the broader ones will surely follow in due course.

Therefore, when certain observers of foreign policy, scrutinising our actions, assert that we are entangled in minutiae and cannot see the wood for the trees – well, listen, we must first sort out the trees, and only then will we be able to address the wood.

Russia
Source: valdaiclub.com

The reform of the international monetary system has been a subject of constant debate, reflecting widespread dissatisfaction with the dollar-based and US-controlled arrangements that have prevailed since World War II. The United States is very much attached to its privileged and dominant position, and is unwilling to seriously contemplate any changes to it. The rest of the world is increasingly uneasy with the way the US handles its dominance. Heavy-handed weaponization of finance and, since 2025, of trade policy have weakened confidence in the dollar and US Treasuries. Moreover, the weak spots of the American economy, including severe fiscal and financial fragilities, sow suspicion about the trustworthiness of dollar assets. There is, therefore, an undeniable need for alternatives – a need that may become urgent if a new financial crisis erupts in the United States. This is the background for the present paper.

Most of the alternatives to the dollar system that have been proposed often seem unrealistic and impractical. This appears to be the case of proposals for a global solution, normally SDR-based, and of regressive reforms that seek to establish gold and/or other commodities as the anchor of a non-fiduciary monetary framework. A global solution cannot be seen as feasible, given the current and probably longlasting geopolitical fragmentation of the world. And the assumed safety and neutrality of Keynes’ “barbarous relic” provides at best, as it already does, a volatile international reserve asset.

A different approach is presented here, one that seems more consistent with contemporary realities. Its main purpose is to provide a comprehensive explanation of a how a new plurilateral BRICS-centric reserve currency could be constructed. This currency would share some basic traits with contemporary currencies that are normally fiduciary, floating, and managed by relatively autonomous monetary authorities.

The paper starts off with a survey of the current monetary landscape, and argues that the lack of acceptable alternatives to the dollar opens the way for a new transnational currency. The only other major alternative, the renminbi, appears not to be a feasible or desirable alternative for reasons that will be set out in some detail. The case is then made for a new reserve currency, restricted to international transactions and reserve holdings and playing no domestic roles. The paper then addresses the main reasons for and the distinctive features of such an initiative. Could the issuance and management of a new currency be entrusted to an existing institution? Or would the creation of a new one be required?

This is a shortened version of a paper concluded in April. The full report you can read here: Nogueira Batista Jr., Paulo (2026). “Geopolitics and International Money—A Path to a New Reserve Currency”, April. URL: https://www.nogueirabatista.com.br/2026/04/16/geopolitics-and-international-money/

Russia
Source: bricscompetition.org

Digital Markets

On June 24, as part of the XIV Saint Petersburg International Legal Forum 2026, a session titled “Antitrust Regulation in an Era of Global Change: From Adaptation to Proactive Leadership” took place. The director of the BRICS Competition Centre, Alexey Ivanov, spoke at the session. The discussion was moderated by Sergey Puzyrevsky, Secretary of State – Deputy Head, Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation (FAS Russia).

Antimonopoly regulation in Russia is evolving alongside the digitalization of the economy and the growth of online commerce, which requires updated approaches to competition policy and regulatory practice, noted the deputy head of FAS. According to him, the volume of e-commerce in Russia reached 11.5 trillion rubles in 2025, and the continued expansion of digital markets makes regulatory issues increasingly relevant. He emphasized the importance of the fifth antimonopoly package, which strengthened oversight of digital platforms, and also pointed to significant changes in judicial practice regarding competition and the powers of antimonopoly authorities. Puzyrevsky also addressed the issue of antimonopoly immunities, noting that an excessive number of exceptions to general regulation can weaken competition and strengthen dominant players.

“If the state does not regulate these relations, they are regulated by the strongest under free-market rules — those with a dominant position begin to use it.”

In his speech, Alexey Ivanov stressed that the introduction of antimonopoly immunities into Russian legislation disrupted the balance between protecting intellectual property rights and maintaining competition. In his view, the very concept of “immunity” creates a misleading impression that antimonopoly law is harmful, whereas in practice competition drives innovation, improves business efficiency, and reduces consumer costs.

Excessive protection of intellectual property has led to monopolization in certain sectors of the economy and the emergence of rent-based business models. Instead of encouraging the creation of new products and technologies, the current system often rewards the extraction of income from existing legal privileges. Ivanov noted that this imbalance is not typical for most of Russia’s partners in Eurasian integration: within the legal framework of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and several member states, including Kazakhstan, similar antimonopoly exemptions do not exist.

As an example of a more balanced approach, Ivanov pointed to China, where both intellectual property protection mechanisms and competition policy tools have been preserved in a more balanced way.

“We urgently need to restore this balance. Right now we have a clear, absolutely anomalous distortion that is not consistent with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which explicitly states that there can be no exemptions from antimonopoly regulation for certain categories of rights. The principle of competition protection, as repeatedly noted by the Constitutional Court, applies to all legal relations. However, we have effectively removed an entire category of economic life from this constitutional principle.”

He added that at the early stages of economic reforms, Chinese authorities refused to introduce special exemptions for IP rights holders despite recommendations from foreign experts. This experience shows that innovation can develop without weakening antimonopoly control, and that competition is not opposed to technological progress.

Ivanov also focused on the challenges of the digital economy, noting that platforms and ecosystems are becoming increasingly complex while regulators often struggle to keep pace. He therefore proposed expanding mechanisms for private enforcement, particularly through the development of class actions. In his view, consumers and businesses are often better positioned to understand the effects of anticompetitive behavior and should have easier and more effective access to judicial protection, complementing traditional antimonopoly enforcement tools.

“We need class actions with a fully functioning opt-out mechanism. By aggregating consumer initiative, we can rebalance the situation. Antimonopoly cases should become real economic disputes between a class of affected parties — consumers or small businesses — and large companies such as digital platforms. Our Chinese colleagues have already implemented this in their financial market.”

Maksim Ermolovich, Member of the Board (Minister) for Competition and Antimonopoly Regulation, Eurasian Economic Commission, addressed the monopolization of global digital markets and the growing role of states such as the U.S., China, and India in supporting their national tech companies. He noted that leading economies seek to protect domestic players, control strategic sectors, and reduce dependence on foreign platforms. As a response, he proposed developing supranational regulation of the platform economy and addressing the dominance of major tech companies over data.

Market economy principles and fair competition are fundamental to the functioning of the EAEU and directly linked to building a common market for goods, services, capital, and labor, recalled Alexey Dronov, Chairman, Court of the Eurasian Economic Union. He noted the Court’s position that violations affecting both cross-border and national markets of member states should be treated as a single infringement in the cross-border market and fall under the jurisdiction of the Eurasian Economic Commission.

Measures to promote innovation and protect competition in China were presented by Quanlong Zhao, Leading Researcher of Competition Policy and Assessment Center, State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR). To address violations, the regulator has implemented the “Three Letters and One Notice” system, which includes a risk warning, a requirement to rectify violations, an administrative recommendation, and the possibility of launching an investigation with subsequent enforcement measures. He also emphasized that despite the development of intellectual property protection, Chinese regulators adhere to the principle that “innovation should not serve as a cover for eliminating competition.”

Chief Executive Officer of the Association of European Businesses (АЕВ)Tadzio Schilling supported maintaining the current balance regarding antimonopoly immunities, stating that further restrictions are unnecessary, as existing regulation and FAS practice already allow for the suppression of unfair practices. He also noted that the draft “Bolar rule” for the Russian pharmaceutical sector does not clearly distinguish between permissible preparatory actions by generic manufacturers before patent expiry and potential infringements, creating legal uncertainty.

Denis Gavrilov, Partner, Denuo Law Firm, noted that antimonopoly immunities in intellectual property may hinder innovation in digital markets.

He explained that when platform technologies are protected by intellectual property rights, they effectively become goods traded through licensing agreements. However, he raised the question of what limits can be imposed on access requirements when a company holds a dominant position. Without such access, innovation may be hindered, as developers of third-party applications that depend on operating systems or related services would be unable to operate.

In the photo: Denis Gavrilov © Roscongress

He also noted that the fifth antimonopoly package requires FAS approval for transactions worth 7 billion rubles (approx. $91 million) or more. However, for digital platforms this threshold should be lowered, since even relatively small transactions can significantly increase market power through control over data and users, requiring earlier regulatory intervention.

The XIV Saint Petersburg International Legal Forum 2026 runs from June 24 to 26 under the motto “Time to Be in the Law.” More than 5,000 participants from over 80 countries are attending.

The Forum serves as a major platform for dialogue among members of the legal, business, and law-enforcement communities. It addresses a wide range of issues focusing on how law can better serve the interests of people and businesses. It also addresses improvements to law-enforcement practices, the promotion of legislative initiatives to strengthen the legal culture, and socioeconomic-related regulation in today’s world.

Russia
Source: bricscompetition.org

The regulator aims to curb subsidies and put an end to price wars in the food delivery market.
China's State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) has drafted the "Ten Rules on Regulating Subsidy Practices of Food Delivery Platforms, which is open for soliciting public comments until July 17.

The release of the draft rules is timely, reflecting the industry's need for more orderly development, a Chinese industry analyst said, noting the market regulators will continue to strengthen oversight of food delivery platforms, crack down on excessive low-price competition and steer the sector toward sustainable growth.

For some time, the platforms have resorted to irregular subsidies and pricing wars to win customers. These practices harm the interests of platform operators, food delivery riders, and consumers, squeezing the real economy, said the SAMR.

The anti-monopoly and anti-unfair competition commission under SAMR conducted an investigation and assessment of market competition conditions in the food delivery sector, and found many platforms engaged in leveraging their capital advantages to capture market share, pressuring merchants to participate in subsidy programs and driving irrational competition in the industry, said the SAMR.

The market regulator said it is necessary to regulate subsidy practices by food delivery platforms, guide them to operate in compliance with relevant laws and regulations, and promote healthy and orderly competition.

The draft rules stipulate that massive subsidies should not be used to restrict market competition and disrupt market order. The rules prohibit food delivery platforms from forcing merchants to participate in subsidy programs or engage in other unfair competitive practices, and outlawing the sale of goods below cost.

The release of the draft rules is timely and reflects the industry's broader need for more orderly development, Liu Dingding, a veteran industry analyst, told the Global Times on Wednesday, noting the rules will help curb low-price competition among the platforms. 

Liu said that, in the past, platforms relied heavily on subsidies to gain market share, often squeezing smaller competitors. 

"The new rules will ban over-sized subsidies and below-cost dumping, helping prevent price wars and protecting smaller players," 

Liu said.

More importantly, the drafted rules will encourage a shift from price competition to quality competition, and inspire more investment in delivery services, food safety, and riders' welfare, Liu noted. 
The release of the draft rules on Wednesday came about two months after SAMR imposed administrative penalties of 3.597 billion yuan ($532.3 million) on seven e-commerce platforms, including PDD, Meituan, JD.com, Ele.me, ByteDance's Douyin, Alibaba's Taobao and Tmall.com, for involvement in illegal "ghost shop" operations in the food-delivery sector.

According to Xinhua News Agency, April's fine was the heaviest penalty imposed on platforms since the Food Safety Law was amended in 2015. The move sends a clear signal that oversight of online food safety will be tightened in China.

Source: The Global Times

Russia
Source: bricscompetition.org

Review №19 of Chinese Antitrust News from the Experts of the BRICS Competition Centre 

- Antitrust Regulation Report
- Regulatory Interview with Retail Chain Meiyijia
- Regulator Meets with Railway Ticket Resale Platforms
- Couriers Become Quality Inspectors
- Advanced Training for Antitrust Experts
- Overseas Antitrust Regulation Series, Episode 9: Australia

2025 Antitrust Regulation Report

SAMR has released its 2025 Antitrust Regulation Report, summarizing the agency's work over the past year. The report reviews achievements in enforcement and regulatory oversight, legal framework development, implementation of the fair competition review system, competition advocacy, and international cooperation.

During the year, SAMR opened 20 antitrust cases, with total fines and confiscations amounting to approximately US$96 million. It also reviewed 706 merger filings, representing a 9.8% year-on-year increase. In addition, market regulation authorities at all levels examined around 60,000 regulations and normative documents for provisions that could restrict competition, resulting in 12,300 documents being amended.

In 2025, China held bilateral exchanges with the competition authorities of Italy, Russia, Australia, Singapore, and South Africa. It also participated in the 9th BRICS International Competition Conference and hosted the 11th China International Fair Competition Policy Forum.

As part of the Belt and Road Initiative, SAMR organized an antitrust training program for participating countries, introducing competition officials from 13 countries across Asia, Europe, and Africa to China's regulatory practices.

Sources: SAMR 1, SAMR 2

Regulatory Interview with Retail Chain Meiyijia

SAMR conducted a regulatory interview with the head of Chinese retail giant Meiyijia regarding food safety compliance. The meeting followed the regulator's discovery of expired food products being sold at several stores in the chain, an issue that received extensive media coverage. SAMR instructed the company to strictly comply with China's Food Safety Law as well as recently introduced food safety requirements applicable to chain retailers.

Food safety remains one of SAMR's top priorities, including in its regulation of online food delivery platforms. Earlier, the regulator imposed fines on seven major food delivery platforms for violations of food safety requirements. The total penalty of approximately US$570 million was the largest ever imposed on digital platforms since the revision of China's Food Safety Law in 2015.

Source: SAMR

Regulator Meets with Railway Ticket Resale Platforms

On 11 June, SAMR, together with the Cyberspace Administration of China and the National Railway Administration, held a regulatory meeting with representatives of seven railway ticket intermediary platforms, including Ctrip, Tongcheng, Qunar, Fliggy, and Meituan.

The discussions focused on misleading advertising of paid services, encouraging users to manipulate travel itineraries, and the improper collection and use of personal data. The authorities urged the platforms to strictly comply with China's Anti-Unfair Competition Law, Consumer Rights Protection Law, E-commerce Law, and Personal Information Protection Law, while comprehensively strengthening oversight of ticket sales practices to maintain orderly market conditions.

Earlier this year, ahead of the Lunar New Year travel season, SAMR held a similar meeting, requiring platforms to remove misleading advertisements and any false claims suggesting affiliation with 12306, China's official railway ticketing service.

Source: SAMR

Couriers Become Quality Inspectors

SAMR has launched a nationwide initiative to strengthen food safety oversight on online food delivery platforms by recruiting top-performing delivery riders as quality inspectors.

The initiative aims to:

• establish a nationwide community of courier volunteers and encourage broader participation in food safety supervision;
• develop admission and removal mechanisms for quality inspection teams;
• promote digital supervision tools and establish an information-sharing platform;
• incentivize participation through a combination of financial rewards, non-monetary recognition, and legal protections;
• develop a governance model based on vertical cooperation between government authorities and merchants.

"In well-managed restaurants, food ingredients are stored in plain sight, tableware is properly sanitized, kitchens are bright and spacious, and fire safety equipment meets regulatory standards. Less responsible establishments often fail to comply with licensing requirements, while hygiene conditions require significant improvement," explained Zhao Mingyang, one of the courier quality inspectors.

Couriers report identified violations through a dedicated digital platform, where reports are categorized by subject, including food safety, emergency incidents, and fire safety.

Sources: SAMR, WeChat

Advanced Training for Antitrust Experts

The SAMR Administrative Academy organized a six-day training program for officials from antitrust divisions of market regulation authorities across China. The course was attended by 74 key enforcement personnel.

The program focused on strengthening participants' professional expertise and practical skills, covering complex and emerging issues in antitrust compliance and enforcement. The curriculum included lectures, case studies, group discussions, and experience-sharing sessions. Speakers included senior officials from SAMR's First Antimonopoly Department, judicial experts, and university professors.

Source: WeChat

Overseas Antitrust Regulation Series, Episode 9: Australia

SAMR has launched an infographic series introducing the antitrust laws and competition enforcement systems of foreign jurisdictions. The ninth installment focuses on Australia, outlining the country's key competition laws, merger notification thresholds, and major categories of anticompetitive conduct.
Previous installments have covered the competition regimes of the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, South Korea, Japan, Canada, Italy, and Germany.

China
Source: www.chinadaily.com.cn

Security: Improving governance in emerging areas highlighted

The more than 100-day conflict involving the United States, Israel and Iran underscored the importance of upholding international rules, respecting state sovereignty, embracing a new vision of security and understanding the changing nature of warfare, China's top diplomat Wang Yi said on Tuesday.

The Chinese foreign minister made the remarks in New Delhi, the capital of India, at the 16th Meeting of BRICS National Security Advisors and High Representatives on National Security, following the recent first-phase memorandum of understanding reached by the US and Iran.

The BRICS cooperation mechanism was formally launched in 2009, and now has 11 formal members after its latest expansion.

Addressing the meeting, Wang said that any settlement of international or regional hotspot issues must comply with international rules, adding that the law of the jungle may prevail for a time, but cannot be sustained.

Territorial integrity must not be violated, and no country's internal affairs should be subject to interference, he said, calling this the most basic moral baseline in international relations.

The conflict also highlighted the importance of adopting a new vision of security, Wang noted. As countries become increasingly interconnected, seeking absolute security for oneself at the expense of others' security will only backfire, he warned.

Wang also pointed to the need to recognize new forms of warfare. In a number of recent conflicts, nontraditional forms of warfare, including information warfare and cyber warfare, have become more open and visible.

With traditional and nontraditional security threats increasingly intertwined, it is timely and necessary for BRICS countries to strengthen dialogue and cooperation on security affairs, he added.

Against this backdrop, Wang called on BRICS countries to shoulder their responsibilities in safeguarding the international order by upholding multilateralism, firmly defending the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and opposing unilateralism and protectionism.

He urged BRICS countries to build greater consensus when addressing security dilemmas, push for the political settlement of hotspot issues, and explore effective ways to resolve disputes through dialogue and consultation.

Wang also stressed the need to combat terrorism in all forms, oppose the militarization of outer space, respond effectively to global energy and food security challenges, strengthen cooperation on strategic mineral resources, and work together in response to the Ebola outbreak in Africa.
He urged BRICS countries to contribute their wisdom to improving governance in emerging areas by guarding against artificial intelligence risks, guiding the sound development of AI, and supporting the UN as the main channel for advancing global governance of cyberspace and digital affairs.
The meeting reviewed the outcomes of BRICS working group meetings on counterterrorism and cybersecurity.

Wang said that BRICS countries are all victims of terrorism and should strengthen counterterrorism cooperation, make full use of the working group mechanism, deepen intelligence sharing, operational coordination and exchanges of experience, and promote the full implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

On cybersecurity, Wang called on BRICS countries to jointly uphold international rules in cyberspace, oppose the creation of artificial divisions and confrontation, encourage countries to sign and ratify the UN Convention against Cybercrime as soon as possible, and actively participate in the international alliance against telecom and online fraud.

The vitality of BRICS lies in equality and mutual benefit, and its strength lies in solidarity and mutual support, Wang said, adding that China, which will assume the BRICS rotating presidency next year, is ready to work with BRICS partners to implement the four China-proposed global initiatives and jointly open up a future of peace and prosperity.

Participants said that amid the impact of unilateralism and rising global uncertainty, BRICS countries should uphold mutual respect, work together to address traditional and nontraditional security challenges, and firmly safeguard the common interests of the Global South.
zhaojia@chinadaily.com.cn

China
Source: www.chinadaily.com.cn

Digital Silk Road offers the Global South an alternative to the ecosystem dominated by the big Western tech firms
Global South countries are confronted with the dual challenges of securing their digital transition and integration on the one hand, and defending digital sovereignty, cybersecurity and technological independence on the other.

As the most digitally developed Global South country, China is offering a major platform for its partners in the BRICS and beyond through the Digital Silk Road. As other Global South countries take major steps toward digital sovereignty, the combined capabilities of these nations will help build a fairer and more inclusive global digital governance framework in the next decade.

The digital infrastructure of the BRICS is a large but uneven ecosystem shaped by rapid expansion and structural disparities. Collectively, these countries host a substantial share of global internet users and are investing heavily in digital systems as foundations for economic growth and technological autonomy. However, quantitative indicators reveal wide differences in the maturity of their digital ecosystems: Internet penetration ranges from roughly 70 percent in India to over 80 percent in China and some 90 percent in Russia. Data center capacity is even more uneven. While China is hosting hundreds of large-scale data centers (with more edge facilities) and is approaching 40 gigawatts of capacity, the markets of India and Brazil remain in the 1 to 2 GW range — an order-of-magnitude gap that underscores China's lead in artificial intelligence-era infrastructure build-out.

These disparities are not merely developmental gaps; they reflect strategic vulnerabilities. The vast differences in infrastructure maturity create an internal dependency chain, where the less-equipped members inevitably rely on external, often Western-controlled, digital corridors and cloud services for global data transit. This digital capacity reliance of the BRICS member states effectively undermines the collective goal of digital sovereignty.

The huge growth potential of the BRICS digital landscape hinges not on isolated national upgrades, but on coordinated integration — building direct fiber links and shared cloud facilities among member states to bypass external choke points and turn internal diversity into complementarity advantages.

The domestic fiber-optic backbone and international connectivity layer represent a strategic shift in the BRICS digital infrastructure. Rather than reducing dependence on global internet routes — a practical impossibility given the nature of cross-border data flows — these investments enhance digital sovereignty by diversifying pathways and reducing reliance on third-party-controlled infrastructure. By building and controlling their own submarine cables and terrestrial links, BRICS countries gain greater routing autonomy, improved resilience against geopolitical disruptions, and the capacity to handle their vast internal data flows without being subject to the latency and surveillance risks of traditional transit hubs.

In this context, the Digital Silk Road, officially launched by China in 2017, can play a crucial role in bridging the gaps. Compared to the rent-seeking Western models, which are many times more expensive and thus not affordable to the majority of the population and companies in the Global South, the Digital Silk Road is contributing to the liberalization of digital services so that the whole population can get access to digital services at an affordable price. It can create a seamless, cross-border digital ecosystem linking China with Southeast Asia, Central Asia, West Asia, Africa and Europe. This can reduce trade costs, expand e-commerce and spread advanced tech.

Equally important, for many nations, the Digital Silk Road is a chance to bypass a digital landscape dominated by the big Western tech companies and their leverage in global tech governance, breaking monopolies by providing alternatives to the United States' cloud giants, which control nearly two-thirds of the market. The Digital Silk Road focuses on building key digital infrastructure, including submarine and land-based fiber-optic cables such as the Pakistan and East Africa Connecting Europe, 5G networks where Chinese companies such as Huawei and ZTE are world leaders, data centers and cloud services led by Alibaba Cloud and Tencent, e-commerce and digital payment systems such as Alipay, smart city technologies, and AI and satellite navigation as in a Beidou-supported alternative to GPS.

The Digital Silk Road is more than a concept; it is already shaping global tech, trade and internet governance. Members of the BRICS have already benefited from it, and many nations in Africa are leapfrogging in terms of telecom and internet coverage and digital services, such as digital payment systems in the continent where access to banking services is very limited. At the governance level, the Digital Silk Road promotes a state-centric, shared model of internet governance and cyber sovereignty, which contrasts sharply with Western private and proprietary approaches.

The Digital Silk Road represents an alternative model of international cooperation on global digital infrastructure development. Under this framework of cooperation, nations are equipped to negotiate the terms of technical training, capacity building and joint innovation that reflect a balanced, long-term commitment. Ultimately, the vision of the Digital Silk Road aligns closely with the broader aspirations of the Global South and multilateral forums such as the BRICS to cultivate a more equitable and inclusive digital order. By facilitating the co-development of secure, interconnected and sovereign digital infrastructure, the initiative supports a future where technological progress and governance are equally shared, contributing to a more balanced and resilient global digital ecosystem.

The author is the vice-dean of the Belt and Road Institute in Sweden.
The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.

China
Source: www.chinadaily.com.cn
Author: Ronnie Lins

The next task for the BRICS is transforming international cooperation into visible societal gains

The BRICS has transitioned into a new phase of institutional consolidation and strategic relevance following its latest expansion. Over the past two decades, member states have strengthened economic coordination mechanisms, expanded trade relations and deepened cooperation in finance and infrastructure. The New Development Bank has increased its role in financing projects across emerging economies, while new connectivity initiatives continue to reshape trade and investment flows throughout the Global South.

China has played a particularly important role in this transformation through infrastructure investment, technology partnerships and economic integration initiatives directed toward developing markets. These efforts have helped turn the BRICS into a more structured platform for international cooperation.

Today, the bloc represents more than 48 percent of the world's population and roughly 39 percent of global GDP measured in purchasing power parity. Yet the current international environment presents a different kind of challenge. Building institutions is no longer enough by itself. The BRICS cooperation must increasingly translate into pragmatic benefits that ordinary citizens can actually perceive.

Institutional architecture remains essential, but the long-term legitimacy of any multilateral arrangement also depends on its ability to improve daily economic life. Small businesses, students, tourists, farmers and workers need to see concrete advantages associated with cross-border cooperation.

This discussion becomes even more relevant as the BRICS grows larger and more heterogeneous. The group now includes economies with different production structures, regional priorities and geopolitical interests that do not always align perfectly. Under these conditions, achieving full diplomatic convergence on every international issue naturally becomes more difficult.

That does not necessarily indicate institutional weakness. Instead, it may point to the emergence of a different integration model. Rather than relying on complete political alignment, BRICS countries can strengthen cohesion through pragmatic initiatives capable of generating visible economic and technological gains for their societies. For many citizens, discussions about multilateralism still feel distant from everyday concerns. That is precisely why practical cooperation matters.

Two areas illustrate this potential particularly well: digital payment interoperability and AI cooperation applied to the real economy.

In recent years, several BRICS member states have built sophisticated digital payment infrastructures. Brazil consolidated PIX, a central bank-operated instant payment system connecting more than 170 million users. India has scaled the Unified Payments Interface into one of the world's largest digital payment ecosystems. China developed an advanced digital payments environment through platforms such as Alipay and WeChat Pay while continuing to expand the digital yuan and cross-border settlement experiments.

Although these systems emerged under different institutional architectures, they share important characteristics: large-scale digital adoption, rapid settlement capacity, strong mobile integration and deep incorporation into daily economic activity. This creates a concrete foundation for interoperability initiatives linking existing national systems.

The most realistic path for the BRICS may not involve creating a common currency in the near term. A more pragmatic approach would be the gradual construction of interoperable payment corridors connecting existing national infrastructures while preserving monetary sovereignty and regulatory autonomy.

Initially, these mechanisms could focus on lower-risk, high-impact activities such as tourism payments, remittances, student transfers and transactions involving small and medium-sized businesses. A Brazilian tourist, for example, could pay in reais through PIX while a merchant in another BRICS country automatically receives settlement in its local currency.

The importance of this goes beyond technical efficiency.

Faster transactions, lower operational costs and simpler cross-border payments are changes that businesses and consumers immediately recognize. When international cooperation produces visible improvements in daily economic routines, public support for multilateral initiatives tends to deepen.
The second major area involves AI and emerging technologies.

Too often, discussions about AI are framed exclusively through geopolitical rivalry among major powers. For developing economies, however, AI also represents a practical instrument for productive modernization, competitiveness and technological upgrading. Shanghai's Xuhui district alone hosts more than 1,500 AI companies alongside specialized universities and research centers. This kind of ecosystem demonstrates how technological cooperation can move beyond diplomatic rhetoric and generate direct connections between companies, academic institutions and productive sectors.
For emerging economies, the potential effects are significant. AI tools applied to agriculture, logistics, manufacturing and energy management can increase productivity, reduce operational costs and improve competitiveness. Small and medium-sized enterprises, in particular, may gain access to technologies that today remain concentrated in a limited number of global innovation hubs.
At the same time, the pace of technological transformation means BRICS countries will need to continuously adapt. AI, quantum computing, advanced cybersecurity and next-generation data infrastructure are likely to reshape economic competitiveness over the coming decades. More important than following isolated technological trends will be the ability to create lasting mechanisms for joint research, talent development and technological absorption.

Once again, the central issue returns to social perception.

International cooperation acquires more practical results when farmers improve productivity using digital forecasting tools, when small businesses reduce logistics costs, and when universities expand collaborative research and innovation programs.

This may become the defining challenge of the next BRICS phase.

The bloc has already demonstrated diplomatic relevance and institutional resilience. The next step is transforming international cooperation into visible societal gains. A realistic road map could include pilot interoperable payment corridors, joint technology training programs and open cooperation networks focused on AI applications for productive sectors. Visible public results can make the bloc more attractive to future partners.

In the long run, the relevance of the BRICS will likely depend more on their ability to generate tangible economic opportunities across the Global South. By bringing international cooperation closer to daily life, the bloc may help redefine what multilateralism means in the 21st century.

The author is the director of the China-Brazil Center for Research and Business. 
The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.