South Africa
Source: iol.co.za

South Africa has emerged as the only BRICS country that was not asked to join Donald Trump’s newly launched Board of Peace.

Trump formally launched the Board of Peace on Thursday, during a signing ceremony at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

The other major members of the BRICS bloc have yet to confirm whether they will join the board.
The initiative, which Trump chairs, is billed as a global body to help solidify the ceasefire in Gaza and promote broader conflict resolution – with Trump being quoted as saying it could operate “in conjunction” with the United Nations.
At the Davos event, Trump was flanked by representatives of countries that have agreed to join the board, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Bahrain, Morocco, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Hungary, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Uzbekistan, Mongolia and Vietnam.

Major Western powers such as the United Kingdom, France, Norway and Sweden refused to sign on, and countries such as India and China have yet to commit publicly.

Despite invitations going out to at least 50 world leaders, South Africa’s president, Cyril Ramaphosa, said he had not been invited to participate in the Board of Peace and was not present in Davos.

In the post on X by @newslivesa, Ramaphosa said he was focusing on domestic priorities such as the ANC Lekgotla and the State of the Nation. He said he is “not even checking my inbox” for an invitation.

The omission comes amid broader strains in relations between Pretoria and Washington.

South Africa has faced exclusion from the 2026 G20 summit in Miami, with Trump and his administration accusing South Africa of having racist empowerment and land expropriation laws.

Trump has also described violence against white farmers as if it were a systematic, racially motivated campaign to destroy them – a form of “genocide”.

The South African government has rejected these claims as unfounded and punitive.

President Cyril Ramaphosa had not been watching his inbox for an invite to join US President Donald Trump's Board of Peace.

A search of international news items indicates that South Africa is the only BRICS member not to have been invited to join the board:

Brazil
Not confirmed as participating in the Board of Peace at this time. There’s no reliable report showing Brazil has publicly accepted or joined. Most western and emerging powers outside the Middle East/Asia haven’t confirmed participation yet.
Russia
Invited to join Trump’s Board of Peace, but has not publicly confirmed acceptance. Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged receiving the invitation and said it was still under consideration, not that Russia was joining.
India
India received an invitation but did not attend the launch in Davos and has not publicly committed to joining so far.
China
China was formally invited to join the Board of Peace, but has not yet said whether it will accept or decline.

South Africa
Source: iol.co.za

India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi (left) and Brazil's President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (right)) during a plenary session of the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on July 7, 2025. Through its BRICS presidency in 2026, India will seek to set an example of normative leadership based on equality and consensus, one that does not seek self-interest and hegemony but common good, says the writer.


After hosting the 2023 G20 Summit, India has assumed the presidency of another important multilateral grouping, BRICS, starting January 1, 2026, and will host the 18th BRICS Summit later this year.

India’s BRICS presidency comes at an inflection point in global politics – the transition toward multipolarity has become chaotic amid great power rivalries, the spirit of multilateralism is being challenged by unilateral impulses, and BRICS is trying to manage its expansion process without losing its significance.

Multilateralism has been widely seen to be in decline as it has struggled to adapt to changing geopolitical circumstances. Interest-based and selective cooperation is now replacing the earlier universal rules-based multilateral cooperation. It is thus both a challenge and an opportunity for India to steer the BRICS grouping under its presidency this year.

Priorities for India’s presidency

India’s 2026 BRICS presidency seeks to redefine BRICS through ‘Building Resilience and Innovation for Cooperation and Sustainability’. India will carry forward its 2023 G20 agenda with a people-centric approach and a ‘humanity first’ agenda. India will also look to build consensus to oppose unilateral actions to weaponize trade, technology, and critical minerals.

India will continue to make efforts for reform of institutions of global governance instead of rejecting them, as is the case with the current US leadership.

Climate change will figure high in India’s priorities, which will be based on ideas of climate justice, just and fair energy transition, and strengthening climate finance for the Global South. India’s bid to host the COP33 in 2028 has been supported by the BRICS partners. It is also an attempt by India to reframe climate governance away from emission targets alone and toward development-centered climate action.

Another issue that could become prominent during India’s BRICS presidency is terrorism. In the initial years of BRICS, terrorism was a marginal and generic issue. BRICS statements were broad and declaratory in nature. Under its past presidencies, India framed terrorism as a common threat that needs collective action.

Any real benefits from terrorism are unlikely to come India’s way, especially as China shields Pakistan from any Indian attempt to target Pakistan via BRICS on terrorism. At best, BRICS could become a norm-setting and signaling platform against terrorism.

Since 2023, BRICS has been focused on the expansion process. The new members include Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, the UAE, and Indonesia. The expansion process, however, has raised some concerns about efficiency, criteria, internal cohesion, and identity of BRICS.

India supports BRICS expansion based on consensus among members. The expansion, however, should not be used for geopolitical purposes and should not dilute the BRICS core identity of being an economic and Global South platform.

Challenges for the bloc in 2026

The biggest challenge to BRICS comes from the administration of US President Donald Trump in the US, which sees BRICS as a threat to America’s interests. The previous US administrations under Obama and Biden were cautious but not openly hostile toward BRICS. However, Trump has identified BRICS as ‘an attack on the US dollar’. He has even threatened to impose 100% tariffs on the BRICS countries.

The US will hold the G20 presidency in 2026 – a development that could indirectly impact India’s BRICS presidency. After four consecutive G20 summits under Global South countries, there is a concern that the agenda could shift from the priorities of the Global South to America First.

The issues important for the Global South – climate change, sustainability, debt, inequality, and development – are already off the American G20 agenda. In this scenario, there is likely to be a competition between the India-led BRICS and the US-led G20 in terms of agenda and narrative setting. Through its BRICS leadership, India will have to ensure that the Global South agenda is not marginalized. 

BRICS can be a platform through which these countries can coordinate a unified response to Trump’s tariffs against member states. They could also explore ideas like increasing intra-BRICS trade to lessen dependence on the US market, trade in local currencies, reconfiguration of supply chains in favor of BRICS, and lowering barriers to intra-BRICS trade.

BRICS can be a useful platform to mitigate the challenges posed to member states by Trump’s tariffs. For India, the BRICS presidency will be an opportunity to demonstrate support for rules-based trade and multilateralism.

In general, BRICS aligns closely with India’s foreign policy priorities: maintaining strategic autonomy, facilitating the rise of a multipolar world, allowing access to ‘non-Western’ financial institutions, highlighting India as a leading voice of the Global South on issues such as climate change, sustainable development and reform of global governance institutions such as the UN Security Council, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund.

Through its BRICS presidency in 2026, India will seek to set an example of normative leadership based on equality and consensus, one that does not seek self-interest and hegemony but common good.

India will also play a critical role in shaping the post-expansion BRICS agenda. India will have to use its G20 experience to harmonize interests between the old and new members on various issues.

New Delhi is likely to avoid an overtly confrontational approach through BRICS and will focus on developmental issues in order to balance its relations with major powers and to place issues of the Global South at the centre of the BRICS agenda.

* Dr. Raj Kumar Sharma is a Senior Fellow at NatStrat, an independent, not-for-profit centre for research on strategic and security issues based in New Delhi. This article was first published at https://www.rt.com/
** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL, Independent Media, or The African.

India
Source: www.mea.gov.in

Official Spokesperson’s response to media queries regarding comments relating to India’s non-participation in a so-called ‘BRICS Naval Exercise’

In response to media queries on comments relating to India’s non-participation in a so-called ‘BRICS Naval Exercise’, Official Spokesperson Shri Randhir Jaiswal said:

We clarify that the exercise in question was entirely a South African initiative in which some BRICS members took part. It was not a regular or institutionalised BRICS activity, nor did all BRICS members take part in it. India has not participated in previous such activities. The regular exercise that India is a part of in this context is the IBSAMAR maritime exercise that brings together the navies of India, Brazil and South Africa. The last edition of IBSAMAR was held in October 2024.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Colleagues, good morning.

The Foreign Ministry is delighted to welcome you at this traditional press conference. We hold it annually to sum up our performance. This will be an interesting conversation for all of us here, especially considering how many things happened in 2025. The first twenty days of 2026 brought an even more impressive mix of developments, dwarfing what we witnessed throughout 2025.

Let me wish you a Happy New Year and Merry Christmas. From the bottom of my heart, I wish you good health and every success in your professional and personal endeavours.

President Vladimir Putin has recently offered a detailed insight into international politics during his December 19, 2025, press conference. He also spoke about the objectives the Russian Federation pursues at home.

Quite understandably and for obvious reasons, President Vladimir Putin focused on international affairs in his remarks at the Kremlin during the presentation of letters of credence on January 15, 2025.

I have already said that this year got off to a rocky start. We witnessed unprecedented developments, including a blatant armed intervention by the United States in Venezuela, which left dozens of people killed and wounded, followed by capturing Venezuela’s legitimate President Nicolas Maduro and his wife and taking them out of the country. At the same time, Cuba and other Latin American and Caribbean countries are facing threats too.

External forces have made no secret of their intentional efforts to destabilise Iran, which is a matter of grave concern. In particular, a would-be prominent personality in today’s world, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, has recently said that by supporting these protests, the international community – as represented by the European Union, it seems – is pursuing regime change in this country. I will not even mention the fact that most Western countries are seeking to continue using the Kiev regime in their military confrontation against Russia. There may be less talk about inflicting what they call a strategic defeat on Russia these days, but everything points to the fact that this goal remains on the mind, and in the plans, primarily among European leaders.

Just look at German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s perorations about once again making the German army the strongest force in Europe. It was also he who said that Russia should not be allowed to have its way in Ukraine since this would amount to appeasing Adolf Hitler. What do you think about this statement? Few people paid attention to it, but it should not have gone unnoticed.

We remember well and must never forget what happened several times over the course of history when the German leadership assumed this kind of an arrogant posture. Speaking of World War II – we cannot avoid recalling it, for obvious reasons, I would like to note that discussions on amending the country’s constitution have been gaining traction in Japan. This goes beyond building up the army’s offensive capabilities, but also revising the non-nuclear status. They have been quite open about it.

Of course, the world order is undergoing a deep-running transformation. It is telling that the West has been actively pushing its narrative about a rules-based order by contrasting it with international law in its original meaning for the past decade, while today this term has vanished from public discourse.

All Western European countries are struggling to come to terms with what is happening in the world considering the policy as declared and adopted by President of the United States Donald Trump, and how this policy can be part of their rules-based order. This time, it is not the collective West which writes these rules, but just one of its members. This came as a major shock for Europe. This is what we are witnessing.

Clearly, what is going on and the international actions President of the United States Donald Trump has been talking about are signs of competition. We have discussed the latest global economic trends many times. The US-led West created rules which served as a foundation for the globalisation model. Until recently, it was a world-wide process, and China outcompeted its Western competitors in trade, economics, investment and infrastructure by adopting this playbook. China’s economic performance speaks for itself.

We can see efforts to deal with this situation through sanctions, tariffs and duties. The United States wants to strike deals even if for now there are no common criteria similar to those which shaped the way the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO operated. While supposed to form the bedrock of the world order which suits the West, all these rules have become void.

This game is based on the “might is right” principle. We are watching it. We can hold an interactive dialogue on changes in the conceptual vision and concrete processes in the development of a new world order. But the consequences are not only influencing the Global South and East countries but also the crisis trends within the Western community.
Greenland is a relevant example. It has become a household word, and it was hard to imagine discussions around it before, including prospects for the preservation of NATO as a unified military-political bloc.

Speaking of Greenland, we proceed from the assumption that if Western countries wish to talk the talk, it’s their choice and right to do so. As for us, we will deal with all our partners in the Global Majority countries and in the Western states that are interested in talking with Russia and discussing concrete mutually beneficial projects based on the principles of equality.

It can be said that we would like to apply the universal norms of international law everywhere, but the main principles are equality, mutual respect and a balance of interests. These are the absolutely unwavering principles when it comes to interaction on the international stage, whether you call it rules or international law.

The principle of equality cannot be taken out of the equation. In an equal dialogue, those who have more resources will have greater influence on the outcome, yet it is vital to strive for results that will represent a balance of interests.
Russia will consistently uphold its interests without infringing on the legitimate rights of others or allowing them to take liberties with our legitimate rights. Our foreign policy, which is enshrined in the Foreign Policy Concept approved by President Vladimir Putin in March 2023, stipulates resolute defence of the vital interests of our nation and the creation of favourable conditions for sustainable development within the Russian Federation. It is of crucial importance to take principled actions to further strength our national sovereignty.

I would like to remind you that the amendments made to the Constitution of Russia in 2020 are vital for strengthening our national sovereignty. We are ready to work with all foreign states that will reciprocate and are willing to deal with us honestly on the basis of equality, without blackmail or pressure. This is widely known.

Speaking about the key points which the West used with regard to the Russian Federation in 2025, it is no longer a secret that the so-called isolation of Russia has failed, no matter what our ill-wishers may say. The landmark events of the year were the celebrations of the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War, including the parade in Red Square and the great number of foreign guests who attended it. We appreciate everyone who personally attended these events or sent special delegations to attend them.

Speaking about the Second World War and its outcome, it is worth mentioning similar events held in Beijing on September 3, 2025, to mark the defeat of militarist Japan and the end of World War II. These two events have clearly shown that the overwhelming majority of countries do not wish to forget the memory, lessons and history of World War II. It is an important conclusion from the past year.

I will not delve into the specifics of our relations with individual countries and regions right now, as those details can be addressed in the Q&A session. I would note, however, that comprehensive accounts of our relations with all major powers and every neighbouring state are documented in our annual foreign policy report. This is a substantial document, rich in statistical data and factual detail on nation-specific developments, which I trust interested parties have consulted.

I wish to highlight several policy strands from our 2025 performance that will gain further significance in 2026. Foremost among these is our commitment to fostering a sustained belt of neighbourly relations and cooperation within the CIS, EAEU, CSTO, and SCO frameworks.

We have continued, and will continue, to advance the key flagship initiatives championed by the President. These are, principally, the formation of the Greater Eurasian Partnership and, building upon it, the creation of a pan-continental architecture of equal and indivisible security.

In concert with our Belarusian allies, we are promoting the development of the Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century. We have declared this initiative open to participation by all Eurasian states without exception.

Our relations with China, which I have mentioned, are unprecedented in their depth, level, and alignment on developments across Eurasia and the global stage.

I would like to particularly underscore the privileged strategic character of our partnership with India, which the President visited this past December.

The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty with the DPRK, whose fraternal and allied assistance was instrumental in liberating the Kursk Region from the Ukrainian militants, stands as a practical embodiment of our efforts to bolster Eurasian security.

Regarding BRICS: every member of this association is a valued partner. Our ties with each were strengthened throughout 2025, laying a firm groundwork for enhanced cooperation across all spheres.

We are currently preparing for the third Russia-Africa summit. A key milestone in this process was the Second Ministerial Conference of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum, which included Russia and African Union states, held in Cairo in December.

In the realm of multilateral diplomacy, we note the shared objective of strengthening BRICS and the growing global interest in the association. We provided full support to the Brazilian BRICS chairmanship in 2025, and our Brazilian friends have effectively continued numerous projects initiated at our BRICS summit in Kazan in autumn 2024.
Following our initiative, and with the support of the Group of Friends in Defence of the UN Charter, the General Assembly adopted two landmark resolutions: establishing an International Day against Colonialism in All Its Forms and Manifestations (observed on December 14) and proclaiming an International Day Against Unilateral Coercive Measures (observed annually on December 4).

Furthermore, on our initiative, the UN Convention on Cybercrime was signed in Hanoi in autumn 2025. As the first instrument of its kind in international information security, it sets a precedent. We are hopeful that the ongoing discussions on the regulation of artificial intelligence will yield similarly concrete results.

Turning now to various aspects of the Ukrainian crisis. As the President has consistently emphasised, Russia remains committed to a diplomatic resolution. A review of the conflict’s history, from its origins in 2014 and especially since 2022, reveals no shortage of goodwill from the Russian Federation regarding political settlements. Yet, on each occasion, our Western, primarily European, neighbours have taken deliberate steps to undermine these agreements. They are employing the same tactics towards initiatives put forward by the US Trump administration, seeking to dissuade it from reaching an understanding with Russia.

A reading of statements from European figures – be it Kaja Kallas, Ursula von der Leyen, Friedrich Merz, Keir Starmer, Emmanuel Macron, or Mark Rutte – makes it clear that they are seriously preparing for a war against the Russian Federation, and they make little attempt to conceal it. Our position on Ukraine is that any resolution must address the root causes of this crisis, which the West has deliberately cultivated for years to transform Ukraine into a security threat and a springboard against Russia on our very border.

They have actively encouraged the openly Nazi regime that seized power through the 2014 coup, a regime which has embarked on a path of legally and physically suppressing all things Russian – from education and language to culture, media, and the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

We are committed to helping de-escalate tensions across a range of flashpoints I mentioned, from Venezuela to, I must particularly highlight, the Iranian situation. The latter must be resolved on the basis of respect for Tehran’s rightful and peaceful use of nuclear energy. We are also convinced that a lasting settlement in the Middle East requires the final implementation of the UN decisions regarding the creation of a Palestinian state.

I would stress that this criterion remains entirely relevant in light of US President Donald Trump’s current, high-profile initiative to establish a “Board of Peace.”

I am now ready to take your questions.

Question: My question is related to your earlier statement today. Global developments of the past weeks indicate that the very notion of international law is being eroded. Is this international law effective and valid to comply with? Is there a principle of “every man for himself” in place? In the present circumstances, is President Putin’s Eurasian security initiative being fulfilled?

Sergey Lavrov: Regarding the world order, international law and all related matters, as well as the statements promoted and translated into action in certain countries, contrary to our understanding of international law. I have already said that for many years, the UN Charter has remained a universally recognised benchmark for actions across many areas for different states, when it was violated. Everybody was willing to discuss these violations or respective accusations within the UN Security Council. Some heated debates occurred; however, nobody questioned the fact that the council was the central body to discuss all issues pertaining to international peace and security.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there was a period when the conventional application of international law as the foundation for multilateral contacts was replaced with what is known as a unipolar world order. It was then that the United States, leading the Western bloc, including the North Atlantic Alliance, decided that the “end of history” has come, as Francis Fukuyama proclaimed in his prominent book, and that from then on, nobody would stand in the way of Western dominance with all its theories – liberal, neo-liberal, or conservative – on the international stage.
When Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia following the presidential election in 2000, the situation started to change. Prerequisites emerged for revisiting this lop-sided pro-Western approach to the world order.

Under President Putin in the 2000s, Russia began to realise its place in global affairs, restoring its identity while fully respecting its thousand-year-long history, customs, principles, and allies. The West initially assumed that it was just speculation, that Russians would talk a little and calm down. The West did not even respond to President Putin’s Munich speech in 2007, which many serious politicians regret today. They regret not listening carefully; instead, they took it for demagogy, which was not the case.

According to our modern concept of foreign policy, Russia is a civilisational state. We will not abandon our roots. We have no right to do that. We honour our ancestors’ memory and the covenants they passed on to us.

You mentioned Eurasian security. It is noteworthy that in Eurasia – the world’s largest continent – unlike Africa and Latin America, there exists no pan-continental organisation. There are numerous sub-regional structures, including the OSCE, ASEAN, and those within the post-Soviet space – the CSTO, CIS, EAEU, SCO, GCC, and SAARC. Yet, a continent-wide structure remains absent.

Not only is Eurasia the largest continent, but it is also home to several great civilisations, including the one represented today by Russia. Naturally, there are also the Chinese, Iranian, Arab, and Indian civilisations. This is one of the reasons why it is difficult to unite all these trends under a single umbrella.

We are convinced that there is no need to emulate existing models or establish a formal, bureaucratic structure. It is entirely sufficient, as a first step, to establish a pan-continental dialogue so that countries sharing this vast expanse of the Earth may derive geopolitical and geo-economic benefits from their location.

This entails an equitable dialogue among all nations. It is precisely this objective that the Russian-Belarusian initiative aims for – involving not only countries situated on the continent but also the sub-regional organisations that have formed here. Among these, we are already fostering collaboration, both in political engagements and in harmonising projects, particularly in economic, trade, infrastructure, and payment spheres.

The contacts formalised by relevant agreements between the EAEU, SCO, and ASEAN are specifically aimed at creating what President Vladimir Putin has outlined as the Greater Eurasian Partnership – the foundation of a future Eurasian security architecture.

Turning to broader global trends, I would note that after the Russian Federation began consistently and non-aggressively, through explanatory efforts, to defend its rights and secure recognition of its legitimate place in international structures, the process has begun to assume tangible shape.

The first to take note of this was our great predecessor Yevgeny Primakov, who in 1998 remarked that a multipolar world order was gradually but confidently taking form. This coincided with his initiative to launch cooperation within the Russia-India-China (RIC) triangle, which still exists – though it has not convened in some time – but has not been disbanded. We are working to revive its activities. It became the precursor to BRICS. RIC evolved into BRICS following the accession of Brazil and South Africa.

Today, this is a widely recognised structure. It has doubled its membership and boasts numerous dialogue partners. When multipolarity began to assert itself as the dominant trend, many political analysts and journalists argued that nothing good would come of it, as it would equate to chaos in international affairs. Supposedly, when the world was bipolar – the Soviet Union and the United States – everything was clear. There were peripheral conflicts, but they did not affect the core of the bipolar world order. When the world was unipolar, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, everything was also clear – one had to obey and avoid being too active. Later, for some time, even a new variant of bipolarity was entertained – the concept of Chimerica (China–United States).

Today, these are indeed the two largest economies, but the process by which each will further consolidate its position in global affairs remains unclear. We advocate for this process to be orderly, grounded in negotiations, and based on a balance of interests.

Were the predictions that the multipolar world would devolve into chaos justified? Looking at the current situation, one can find many supporters of this assessment, but the process never stalls at one point.

I get the impression that these sufficiently isolated actions, primarily those on the part of the United States, and the problems that have arisen between the United States and Europe, problems that exist between Washington and numerous countries in connection with tariffs, duties, sanctions and other actions reflecting aggravated competition on global markets (primarily by unscrupulous methods) are taking place and will persist for a long time. Multipolarity as an objective trend will not disappear completely. It is impossible to place it under a unipolar or bipolar “tent” because too many centres of economic growth have emerged.

I have mentioned China, India and Brazil. Africa is already beginning to undergo a reawakening. It is comprehending the fact that political independence did not facilitate economic independence, and that Africa is continuously exploited with neo-colonial methods. Former centres of empires that granted political independence to their former colonies continue to live at their expense. This comprehension is now asserting itself on the African continent. We can feel this every day during our numerous contacts with African countries. 

Centres of growth reflect an objective historical process, specifically, the development of the economy, the infrastructure, the use of natural resources and many other things. In the long run, we will have to reach agreement on how these new major national or regional players, members of integration associations, should collaborate with one other.

Today, when we are witnessing turbulent developments in the context of stronger multipolarity, a dialogue on how to streamline it is on the agenda. This will take a lot of time. Some people say (I understand what they mean) that this process will encompass an entire historical era. But this process is inevitable.

US President Donald Trump’s initiative on establishing the Board of Peace for Gaza shows that all the main players comprehend this fact. We have recently received specific proposals and this organisation’s draft charter. This initiative reflects the fact that even the United States with its foreign policy philosophy proceeds from the need to gather a group of countries that will cooperate in a specific direction.

It may be argued that the Board of Peace was conceived and announced in such a way that everyone should obey the United States. Washington would now like to see precisely this situation. But I assure you that, regardless of its actions (that are now widely discussed across the world), the administration of US President Donald Trump is an administration of pragmatics. Its members realise the need to bring together multiple countries under US auspices and to completely heed their legitimate interests.

I would like to note once again that this position and a comprehension of the need to completely take the partner’s interests into account is manifested in approaches towards the Ukrainian settlement by Donald Trump’s administration. This is the only Western country which is ready to address the task of eliminating the root causes of this conflict that was largely created by Donald Trump’s predecessor, the then US President Joe Biden and his administration.

This process is just beginning; it will not be simple and will require the mobilisation of all resources, including centres of growth and centres of influence that I have mentioned. Given goodwill, and we can see indications that such goodwill will assert itself, everything can be achieved.

Question: Russian representatives say that the OSCE needs resuscitating. Is this still currently central in view of Eurasian security? What is your point of view on the modern-day map?

Sergey Lavrov: Where the OSCE is concerned, you said that someone was urging its reform or resuscitation. I don’t know if resuscitation is possible in this case. The OSCE has “fallen” so low as to hit the bottom.

Formerly based on the principles of equality and consensus, this organisation has degenerated to become a tool that the West, taking advantage of its majority position, “hones” daily against the Russian Federation.

Our attitude towards the OSCE boils down to the following. We continue to participate in its work, and do so not because we harbour any hopes or illusions (in the current situation, any hopes are illusory) but because we want to support those OSCE member countries that are still endowed with common sense. There are quite a few of these. Apart from our CIS colleagues, this category includes Hungary and Slovakia. There are sane forces in a number of other Western countries as well.

We will continue to maintain contacts with them and do whatever we can to contain the OSCE from “burying” itself. There is a hope in what it concerns the current OSCE Secretary General, Mr Feridun H. Sinirlioğlu of Türkiye. A long-serving diplomat, he understands the disastrous – without any exaggeration – state of the OSCE executive structure he has inherited.

I do not know, whether it will retain its position in future European security arrangements and within the Greater Eurasian Partnership. I am not sure. After all, the OSCE is a Euro-Atlantic organisation. When it was being created, the USSR wanted countries located in the west of the Eurasian continent to join it.

Countries comprising the current collective West were insisting on the accession of the United States and Canada and had their way. This resulted in a Euro-Atlantic configuration modeled on the North Atlantic Alliance. NATO and the OSCE are Euro-Atlantic organisations and as such they are experiencing a profound crisis that has engulfed the Alliance itself to the extent that it is being mooted whether or not it is high time to disband it. Because one NATO country is going to attack another NATO member. But this is a different story.

I just want to emphasise that the Euro-Atlantic security and cooperation concept has discredited itself. It is for this reason that we are in the process of discussing Eurasian security. It cannot be accepted as a given that there is a European structure in place, be it NATO, OSCE, or EU.

As it happens, the EU is also part of the Euro-Atlantic construct, because its latest agreements with NATO have completely stripped it of independence, even though attempts to revive it are underway. Calls are being made to create a European security system that does not include the United States, but includes Ukraine. In other words, once again the narrative focuses on creating a “construct” opposing the Russian Federation. This mindset underpins the positions of most OSCE countries, Western countries, and is deleterious. It will do no good either for the West, or the OSCE itself.

I can go on and on about this. I tried to set the tone. Perhaps, it will make considering many issues easier down the road.

Question: It was reported yesterday that the Hungarian company MOL and Russian Gazprom signed an agreement under which MOL will take over the Serbian company NIS. If we look at this geopolitical issue, you as an experienced Minister who has held this position for 22 years now…

Sergey Lavrov: Not yet.

Question: You will.

Could you share whether the NIS situation presents a geopolitical challenge for Russia? Will Russia stay in the Balkans? Does this mean that the Russian Federation will no longer be present in the Balkans, because Hungary is a member of NATO and the EU? Also, this deal needs to be approved by the United States.

Will this lead to new security architecture ensuring balance between the Russian Federation and the United States in the Balkans?

Sergey Lavrov: Had the Naftna Industrija Srbije deal that was announced yesterday been disadvantageous to Russia, including Gazprom, it wouldn’t have taken place which is absolutely clear. Considering the situation in Serbia, the agreement benefits both sides. President of Serbia Aleksandar Vucic said as much when he was asked about it in Davos.

You want to know whether arrangements involving some form of cooperation between Russia and the United States in the Balkans are possible. We are open to interaction with everyone.

This brings to mind the situation where then EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini stated, specifically with the Balkans in mind, that when the EU engages in something in the Balkans, other countries should stay out, implying that Russia was willing to help its Balkan partners address their issues back then.
More broadly, speaking about Serbia and its interests, I would focus not just on how Russia and the United States might interact or exert influence in the Balkans, but also on how the EU treats Serbia. It has been stated repeatedly that Serbia’s future is in the European Union. In response, the EU says, we will see, but first you need to recognise the independence of Kosovo. That is, you must humiliate yourselves and then fully align with every EU foreign policy move, including sanctions on the Russian Federation. Is that a dignified thing to do from Brussels’ standpoint?

Brussels continues to live in a paradigm and to be guided by the same philosophy that it expressed on the eve of the Ukraine crisis, when things were at the insipient stage ahead of the first Maidan protests in 2004. Back then, Brussels said that the Ukrainian people must choose sides between Russia and the EU. Let me tell you that this “either-or” and “who is not with us is against us” approach is, I believe, a harbinger of the European Union eventually coming to a bad end.

I hope our Serbian friends are fully aware of where they are being dragged in and the price someone is willing to pay in order to expand their influence in the Balkans.

The United States and Russia have more opportunities to engage in the Balkans in matters concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina and other countries in the region. Contacts to this end are in place. So far, no positive or specific results have been achieved, but we remain open to them. As far as I can tell, our American colleagues are prepared to work to achieve them as well.

Question: Given this, in what format does the Russian Foreign Ministry plan to develop further contacts with the United States, including the normalisation of bilateral relations?

Sergey Lavrov: We are not merely planning; we are already engaging. Unlike the administration of President Joe Biden, the administration of President Donald Trump demonstrated an immediate interest in overcoming the utterly abnormal situation where even the embassies of our respective countries in Washington and Moscow could not function properly.

From the very beginning of 2025, we established contacts and formed a dialogue mechanism concerning embassy operations. We emphasised the necessity – and this was supported by the Trump administration – not to limit discussions solely to matters such as the number of visas issued to diplomats, the security arrangements for diplomatic missions, or the movement of diplomats within the host country, which are purely consular issues. We proposed reaching an agreement, first and foremost, on the key problem affecting diplomatic relations: the issue of Russian diplomatic property. This property was seized by the administration of President Barack Obama, “in a fit of pique,” two weeks before vacating the White House, and was subsequently withheld by all successive US administrations, regrettably including that of President Donald Trump.

I must, however, remind you that I spoke of this when the then-US President, Barack Obama, suddenly announced in late December 2016 that he was seizing our diplomatic properties. Mr. Michael Thomas Flynn, who was part of Donald Trump’s team and slated to join his administration, called Russian Ambassador to Washington Sergey Kislyak, urging him not to respond to what I would describe as this utterly counterproductive and illegal gesture by Barack Obama. He assured us that in three weeks, upon Donald Trump’s inauguration in January 2017, everything would be rectified. He asked that we refrain from a sharp reaction. We heeded this advice and postponed our response.

Subsequently, and unfortunately, the Trump administration in 2017 failed to redress this absolute injustice and egregious violation of all diplomatic conventions. At that point, we explained to our colleagues in Washington that we had no choice but to respond. This situation has persisted ever since. We will continue to press for discussions on this matter, though our American counterparts, contrary to earlier understandings, remain unwilling to engage on the topic.

For diplomatic missions to function normally – and indeed for any meaningful contacts to develop, which Washington has expressed support for under President Donald Trump – direct air travel must resume. These issues, too, form part of our negotiating agenda.

Another key area of our dialogue with the United States concerns Ukraine. As I have said, we have noted that under President Donald Trump, the US became the only country not only to express understanding for Russia’s legitimate interests but also to propose solutions addressing the root causes of the current crisis. We support this approach. We consider it entirely justified.

In Anchorage, Alaska, on August 15, 2025 – as Russian President Vladimir Putin has publicly stated on multiple occasions – we accepted the proposals Washington tabled ahead of the meeting. We still hope these understandings remain fully valid, though we observe how hysterically Europe and Vladimir Zelensky, along with his team, are attempting to dissuade the US from this stance and reimpose their own concepts, including, above all, a sixty-day or even “permanent” ceasefire.

It is clear that the Ukrainian side is in dire straits, both on the frontline and politically. In Kiev, corruption scandals have overshadowed all other developments. But we cannot afford the luxury of allowing the Kiev regime to rearm yet again, catch its breath, and once more turn its aggression against the Russian Federation.

Certain meetings have been announced for Davos in the coming days, where we anticipate yet another attempt to push US President Donald Trump back towards approaches that have been thoroughly discredited and have failed in recent years. The central issue is this: when Europe now speaks of resolving the Ukrainian crisis, its rhetoric calls for the war to be stopped as swiftly as possible, while simultaneously insisting on security guarantees for Ukraine – meaning, for the territory that would remain under that name.

What does this signify? I have already noted the discussions in Europe arguing that, since American reliability is in question – a point confirmed by Greenland – a European security architecture must be urgently constructed without the United States, but with Ukraine. In other words, the security guarantees our European colleagues proclaim with such lofty solemnity, touting their contribution to peace, are designed exclusively for the current Nazi Kiev regime. This point must not be overlooked.

Critically, there is no discussion whatsoever on how matters should be arranged in the territories that would remain under Ukrainian control. There is not a word about restoring the rights of Russian speakers and ethnic Russians, lifting the ban on the Russian language in all spheres of public life, or ending the persecution of the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church. These objectives were, however, present in US President Donald Trump’s initial proposal, the so-called “28-point plan,” which explicitly outlined the need to resolve the issues of the Russian language and the UOC.
In the subsequent documents we have seen, presented at the end of 2025 as a “20-point plan” – and we have received no newer texts from the recent rounds of US-Ukraine-Europe negotiations – all mention of restoring these specific rights has vanished. Instead, they speak only of the parties committing to “tolerance” in their relations, and that Ukraine will adhere to EU standards on ethnic minority issues. I believe the term may even be just ‘minority’ rather than ‘ethnic minority’; with the EU as the benchmark, anything is possible.

In other words, the reference is not to universal international standards, first and foremost the UN Charter, which mandates upholding human rights without distinction as to race, language, or religion, but to the European Union’s own adopted norms. There is little doubt that these EU norms would be interpreted and applied in a manner tailored to the preferences of Zelensky-led Ukraine. Consequently, any settlement proposal founded on the primary goal of preserving the current Nazi regime in what remains of the Ukrainian state is, naturally, completely unacceptable to us.

Question: Moscow stated that US President Donald Trump had decided to set free two Russian citizens, who were members of the Marinera tanker crew. Have they been released? If yes, have they returned to Russia? Where are they? Do you think the seizure of the tanker sailing under Russian flag by the US military impaired the prospects of normalising relations between Russia and the United States?

Sergey Lavrov: As soon as we learnt that the tanker had been seized, we sent an earnest request to the US side. The main thing for us was to have our citizens released. There are two of them alongside with citizens of Ukraine, Georgia and India.

They assured us that, in fact, the decision on setting them free was taken at the highest level on the same day or the following morning. However, unfortunately, the subsequent days have shown that this decision is not fulfilled.
We expect our American colleagues to fulfil their promise, which, as I have just said, was conveyed to us.

This story of the tanker seizure in breach of international law on the high seas on suspicions that are not on the list of criteria for detaining vessels provided in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea evokes concern. This is also an incident among other actions that puts international law to the test.

We do not say that the provisions contained in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea are eternal. Of course, life has changed, more than 40 years have passed. Still, if so, we need to sit down and agree on how to behave on the high seas and in special economic zones. We are ready for this. We hope for awareness to come that this is necessary.

Question (retranslated): You have repeatedly spoken positively about US President Donald Trump’s understanding of Russia’s interests. However, you have also criticised recent US decisions and actions directed against Russia’s allies, such as Venezuela and Cuba. To what extent do this inconsistency, unpredictability, and the apparent willingness to employ unlimited force on the part of President Donald Trump pose a threat to Russia?

Sergey Lavrov: I have spoken about Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran, because we can clearly see the inconsistency of the Trump administration’s actions in matters of international security and its attitude toward international law.
President Trump, responding to a related question just a few days ago, stated that he has no interest in international law and that norms of behavior in the international arena are determined by his own moral judgment. This is a noteworthy statement.

We have never expected to achieve one hundred percent alignment with any country, including our closest neighbours. Such complete alignment is simply impossible, especially between the world’s two largest nuclear powers, the Russian Federation and the United States.

It is worth recalling what The New York Times reported on December 30, 2025, in an article entitled “The Separation: Inside the Unraveling U.S.-Ukraine Partnership.” According to the newspaper, during the talks with me and our delegation in Riyadh in February 2025, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio briefly shifted into what was described as a “movie buff” mode and quoted The Godfather. He recalled the scene in which Vito Corleone tells his son: “I spent my life trying not to be careless. Women and children can be careless, but not men.” The message was clear: nuclear powers must maintain dialogue with one another.

Such a conversation did indeed take place. Since Mr Rubio deemed it appropriate to mention it publicly, I see no reason not to add a few clarifying details. At the very beginning of our meeting in Riyadh, Mr Rubio stated – while I cannot quote him verbatim, I recall the substance quite clearly – that US foreign policy under President Donald Trump is guided by national interests and common sense. He emphasized that this approach implies recognition of the national interests of the United States’ leading partners. He did not say all countries, but other major powers.
He went on to note that the national interests of countries such as the United States and Russia will not always coincide. In most cases, they will not, but, when they do align, it would be a grave mistake not to take advantage of that by pursuing mutually beneficial initiatives in areas such as the economy, trade, and investment. Conversely, when national interests diverge, he stressed that it would be a crime to allow such differences to escalate into confrontation, particularly into a dangerous or military one.

I responded that I fully share this philosophy and logic. We proceed from the assumption that the United States understands the validity of this approach, as articulated by Mr Rubio.

Question: How does the EU view the development of the EAEU?
Within the EAEU, there is a union, a single state – Russia and Belarus. Are there any plans to develop warmer, closer relations with the countries of Central Asia? After all, Central Asia was a strong backbone during Soviet times.
Sergey Lavrov: The heart of the world.

Regarding the European Union’s attitude towards Eurasian economic integration – if I understood the first part of the question correctly – I am not directly aware of its stance. The EU has never commented on these processes. It has only sought to undermine them under the pretext of its asserted right to develop relations with any partners.

This began long ago, even before the EAEU was established, when, largely disregarding the existence of the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, they pursued their own strategy for the Black Sea region. At that time, we still had contact with them. We asked whether it was not somewhat incongruous that an organisation existed which geographically represented a gathering of Black Sea littoral states, while they, lacking full coverage of the Black Sea, were advancing their own concept. No, this did not trouble them.

In the same way, they advanced their concept for the Arctic region. That is to say, they have a tendency to assert their right to interfere in any part of the world where they either wish to gain something or to harm someone, primarily the Russian Federation.

The same is happening with their relations with Central Asia. Incidentally, Central Asia attracts a great many partners as a principle. The Central Asia Five Plus One format exists for a dozen countries and structures, including the EU.
But alongside Central Asia Plus the EU, there are formats such as Central Asia Plus France, Central Asia Plus Germany, and so on. There are Central Asian formats involving Japan, South Korea, the United States, China, and Turkiye.
For some time, we proceeded on the assumption that, since we cooperate with our Central Asian friends within the frameworks of the CIS, the CSTO, the SCO, and with some of them within the EAEU, it might not be necessary to create a formal Five Plus One structure. But several years ago, we decided it was essential. Last autumn, the second Russia Plus Central Asia summit took place.

A joint action plan was approved – a comprehensive document covering all areas of our collaboration. Therefore, I can assure you that we do not pay insufficient attention to Central Asia. Far from it. If you have formed such an impression, I would be grateful if you could share it with us, perhaps even providing a paper explaining the basis for this perception.

The European Union does not engage with the EAEU but seeks to undermine the Union in every possible way, including by declaring to all that participation in the EU should be a priority for anyone who wishes to develop normally and thinks of their people. Now, as you know, they are also courting Armenia. There are many other examples.
Our initiative, together with Belarusian friends, on Eurasian security and the Greater Eurasian Partnership envisages the participation of all countries on the continent, so the door is open even to EU members.

I would mention that at the annual Minsk Conferences on Eurasian Security – there have been three so far (1, 2, 3) – Hungary’s Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó and representatives of Slovakia have regularly participated. I have no doubt that at this year’s conference in Minsk, the representation of European countries will increase.

Question: I have a question that covers three aspects of Armenia-Russia relations. What can you say about the persecution of the Armenian Apostolic Church, in particular the fact that these actions are openly justified by the authorities, both domestically and in the West, as a way to counter Russian influence? The Mayor of Gyumri faced criminal charges for allegedly giving up sovereignty merely because he mentioned the Union State of Russia and Belarus, at a time when a law has been adopted on starting the process of EU accession. Overall, what is your assessment of Prime Minister Pashinyan’s approach to the EAEU membership amid rhetoric about him aiming to join the EU and the law On Launching the Process of Accession to the EU adopted by the governing party which can be interpreted as we will remain part of the EAEU for as long as we need?

Sergey Lavrov: I have more than once discussed EU and EAEU membership with my counterpart Ararat Mirzoyan and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan when I last visited Yerevan in May 2025. Anyone familiar with the principles governing the functioning of the EAEU and the EU knows that it is impossible to adopt the EU standards and keep the EAEU membership at the same time. Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk made that clear repeatedly during his contacts with his Armenian counterpart.

This is technically impossible. They are incompatible not only because different rules apply in trade and investment, but also because Brussels persistently promotes the idea of transforming Armenia’s regulatory and legal framework in order to bring it line with the EU standards. I am not even mentioning the fact that, in Serbia’s case, these standards imply full alignment with the EU foreign policy, which also means joining anti-Russia sanctions and rhetoric.

A new Armenia-EU Partnership Strategic Agenda was signed in December 2025. It says Armenia and the EU must coordinate their foreign policies, as well as policies in trade and the economy. Armenians are being offered liberalised visa regulations, but it comes with a condition that the EU will have a say in addressing in law enforcement- and border protection-related issues.

Our border guards are stationed in Armenia which raises the issue of whether this aligns with Yerevan’s current obligations. Clearly, the purported movement towards EU membership and applicable laws to that end preclude EAEU membership. If Armenia decides accordingly, as Prime Minister Pashinyan has said, and goes along with the will of the Armenian people, then we will accept this as the inalienable right of Armenia and the Armenian people.

It’s hard to overlook the Armenian economic metrics over the past ten years. Armenia became a full-fledged EAEU member in 2015, when its GDP stood at $10.5 billion as opposed to current $26 billion, a more than twofold increase during its EAEU membership. The EAEU provides Armenian-made goods with free access to the markets of other member states, which is why Armenia’s foreign trade, primarily with the Russian Federation, has reached record levels and now stands at $14 billion, an unprecedented figure.

I cite these statistics because you asked how the push to be part of the EU correlates with maintaining relations with the EAEU. Once again, the decision is in the hands of the Armenian people and the Armenian leadership, but combining memberships is out of the question.

We are aware of the unfortunate dynamics regarding the Armenian Apostolic Church. National Assembly of Armenia Speaker Alen Simonyan and, in a recent interview, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan did not deny hybrid threats against Armenia emanating from the Russian Federation due to the developments surrounding the Armenian Apostolic Church. We find this baffling. Getting closer to the European Union has clearly taken its toll. I’m saying this because the EU never stops talking about “hybrid threats” supposedly coming from the Russian Federation, and these efforts are properly funded.

Not long ago, Armenia obtained a tranche of 15 million euros. I have no doubt that the Brussels bureaucracy will force our Armenian friends to account for every cent of this 15-million-euro tranche.

When Armenia is being talked into distancing itself from Russia, none other than EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas stated that Moscow would replicate the “Moldovan scenario” in Yerevan.
As you may recall, the “Moldovan scenario” had elections rigged in the most unconscionable manner. The Maia Sandu-led ruling regime lost this election in Moldova with only 44 percent of the vote going its way. It managed to declare victory only by grossly manipulating bulletins at over 200 polling stations in Europe at a time when Russia, which has the largest Moldovan diaspora, had only two polling stations, and Transnistria had about ten, but Transnistrian residents were in effect not allowed to vote.

So, if Kaja Kallas openly admits that the “Moldovan scenario” will be used during the forthcoming elections in Armenia, I would give it a serious thought if I were part of Armenian society.

You have correctly noted that Vardan Gukasyan is accused of calling to consider the possibility of Armenia joining the Union of Russia and Belarus. Arresting someone for expressing political views which in no way aim to undermine Armenia’s sovereignty or territorial integrity, but are instead aimed at maximising the opportunities offered by external ties in the interest of its own development has made the people wonder and caused concern among them. He has been released from custody, but remains under house arrest. We expect political figures in Armenia who advocate for expanding and deepening cooperation with Russia not to be persecuted.

Question: No offence taken. You said that there is no proof that Russia or China would seize Greenland. But that’s not answering the question posed by Donald Trump. He says that Russia is a threat to Greenland. So, my question is, is Russia a threat? Do you have designs on Greenland? And if not, how do you respond to his designs to acquire it? Do you support it or oppose it?

And on the issue of colonialism: how is what Russia is doing in Ukraine different to the colonialism you have railed here? Russia has annexed Crimea and is now trying to take four eastern territories by force. How is that different to colonialism?
Sergey Lavrov: Regarding Greenland, I have already said everything. We have nothing to do with plans to seize Greenland. I have no doubts whatsoever that Washington knows that neither Russia nor the People’s Republic of China have such designs. It is not a matter of our concern.

Our concern is primarily establishing an open and free Arctic cooperation within the Arctic Council, where the interests of the security, the economy, the environment and the indigenous people of all the participants of Arctic cooperation would be taken into account. It was not us who ceased cooperation in the Arctic Council or broke off contacts. By the way, the United States has shown interest in resuming the discussion within the Arctic Council, unlike some Europeans, although technically, these contacts are maintained.

Many of our citizens did not even know about Greenland before it suddenly made it to the front pages.
Please, address this matter within the North Atlantic Alliance. Once again, we will see how this issue will be resolved.
Regarding colonialism, we have many proverbs in Russia that apply to your question.

When US President Joe Biden met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in June 2021, the meeting began in a limited-attendance format, with only US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and myself present. Without any notes prepared, Joe Biden delivered opening remarks and literally stated the following: the United States and Russia are two great powers. They are not better nor worse than us – they are simply different. The United States was formed as a result of semi-criminal elements migrating from England. They settled on their land and addressed the “Indian problem.” That was followed by issues like slavery and further migration. Everybody who arrived in the United States, starting with English settlers, ended up in a “melting pot” and were reforged, regardless of their ethnic or other origin, into Americans. They emerged from that melting pot with the words “human rights” inscribed on their foreheads.

Russia, and I quote President Joe Biden, was created differently. We developed the lands adjacent to the original Moscovia not by oppressing or grinding up peoples but by integrating with them, preserving their languages, customs, religion, culture, etc. Today, we have an enormous country, with the largest territory in the world and perhaps the most diverse population on the planet, where this multi-ethnicity is preserved and maintained by the state.

Therefore, Joe Biden said, it is not easy for us to preserve the unity of this country, especially since it also has nuclear weapons. And he respects President Putin for being able to do that. President Biden added that he can’t imagine Russia falling apart. It was the moment when Joe Biden spoke without any notes, teleprompters or an autopen.
I simply want to draw your attention to the fact that colonialism has become implanted in international law with regard to the countries that used to have colonies – the colonies that did not want to be with their metropoles.

It was no coincidence that, when the process of decolonisation happened in 1960 – and as I have already noted, it remains incomplete, as Britain unlawfully retains a number of overseas territories, including control over the Chagos Archipelago, it was no coincidence that in 1970, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States by consensus. Britain voted in favour, the United States voted in favour, and the others, including European states, supported the declaration.

In the context of comparing the principles of the UN Charter, primarily the principle of territorial integrity and the principle of self-determination, the following statement was made in the declaration: all states must recognise the sovereignty and territorial integrity of those states whose governments respect the right to self-determination and represent the entire population residing on the relevant territory.

In the 1960s, the people of Africa unanimously declared that the metropoles such as London, Paris, Madrid or Lisbon did not represent the interests of the populations of the respective colonial territories, hence the decolonization process.

In 2014 and the subsequent years after the state coup in Ukraine, the people of Crimea, and later the people of Novorossiya and Donbass, decided, through referendums and open expression of will, that the Kiev authorities, who had seized power in the state coup, did not represent the interests of the population of those territories.
Therefore, with all due respect, this is not colonialism nor annexation but rather the fulfillment of the principles that the UN General Assembly approved by consensus, with complete agreement by our Western colleagues, including Britain.

Question: The Cross Years of Culture of Russia and China were successfully concluded in 2025. How do you assess the achievements of China and Russia in cultural exchange in recent years? What positive role can cultural exchanges between Chinese and Russian young people play in ensuring the sustainable and stable development of relations between our countries?

Sergey Lavrov: Relations with the People’s Republic of China occupy a special place among Russia’s foreign policy priorities. The same is true in China’s foreign policy. Russian-Chinese relations have reached an unprecedented level, as has been repeatedly stated by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping. The two leaders maintain regular contacts.

Culture, in its broadest sense, naturally encompasses both historical memory and the readiness to uphold one’s values internationally. Last year was particularly significant in this sense. The leaders of Russia and China jointly took part as principal guests in the events held in Moscow on May 9, 2025, marking the defeat of Nazi Germany, as well as in Beijing on September 3, 2025, commemorating the defeat of militarist Japan and Victory in World War II.

During these top-level meetings, our leaders held further rounds of talks that mapped out new goals and targets for the development of our strategic interaction and partnership.

I will not even touch upon the economy, although it constitutes the material foundation of relations between states. For several consecutive years, we have been reaching record-breaking figures in this area. At the same time, cooperation between our countries in humanitarian fields has been strengthening day by day.

You mentioned the Cross Years of Culture of Russia and China. Within their framework, several hundred events were held in both Russia and China. In their reciprocal New Year messages, President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin announced a new initiative: the Years of Education of Russia and China will be held in 2026–2027. This is also a vital component of cultural exchanges, primarily involving young people. Therefore, the new year will be rich in such events.
In addition to youth exchanges, cooperation is developing in the fields of sports and archive services, which is also important for preserving national cultures, traditions and identities.  

Contacts in the cultural sphere, as well as in all other areas, are facilitated by the mutual visa-free regime currently in place. Travel figures have already reached record levels, and I believe this trend will continue. Thus, in the humanitarian sphere we have extensive cooperation, which organically complements economic interaction and strategic cooperation on the international stage, where China and Russia serve as a key stabilising factor in global affairs – a role whose importance is only growing in the present-day environment. 

Question: Russia and Iran are long-time partners. US President Donald Trump has recently announced a 25 percent tariff on countries trading with Iran. How can this affect Russian-Iranian trade, which is growing every year?

Sergey Lavrov: We are trading with you, Iran. It is a bilateral matter. Our trade will develop as we deem necessary. We have good plans with the Islamic Republic of Iran not only in trade but also in investment. The Bushehr nuclear power plant is actively growing. We are working on the vital section of the North-South International Transport Corridor linking Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran. There are many other projects on the table. I don’t see any reason why we or our Iranian friends should stop them.

It is true that President Trump is using tariffs as a political instrument. But when unilateral coercive measures are used in trade and economic relations, this means that those who initiate such measures are not confident about their competitiveness in the global markets. So, time will put everything in its place.

President of France Emmanuel Macron has said that France won’t join the Board of Peace proposed by President Trump. When Trump heard this, he threatened a 200 percent tariff on the French president and economy. Life is much more complex than any individual situation.

UAE
Source: mof.gov.ae

Our Participation in BRICS

Commitment to Diversity and Dialogue

The UAE’s accession to the BRICS group highlights its commitment to multilateral cooperation, constructive international dialogue, and the promotion of global partnerships that drive sustainable development, prosperity, and collective well-being. Today, BRICS represents approximately 45% of the world’s population, 25% of global exports, and accounts for 29% of global GDP, reflecting its growing influence in shaping global economic and geopolitical dynamics.
In 2024, the UAE formally joined the BRICS group following a successful application ratified by the five founding members: the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India, the People’s Republic of China, and the Republic of South Africa. This strategic move further strengthens the UAE’s role in shaping inclusive and multipolar global governance.

Strategic Significance for the UAE

• Reinforcing the UAE’s standing as a globally integrated economic hub through strengthened partnerships and diversified international economic cooperation.
• Enhancing the strategic alignment between foreign policy and long-term economic development objectives.
• Promoting balanced and sustainable economic relations that underpin the continued resilience and diversification of the national economy.
• Deepening collaboration with BRICS member states on transformative development initiatives and economic projects.
• Contributing to global prosperity by supporting inclusive and balanced economic growth at the regional and international levels.
• Enabling the UAE to play a key role in global discussions on urgent economic challenges.
• Enhancing Arab and Emirati representation in international financial institutions, as in the case of the appointment of Thuraiya Hamid Al Hashmi as the first Emirati and Arab woman to the Board of Directors of the New Development Bank.

Economic and Financial Impact

Strengthening economic cooperation with BRICS member countries by identifying and leveraging new opportunities for trade, investment, and strategic partnerships.

Promoting financial stability and enhancing cooperation frameworks to support the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), while fostering a diversified, knowledge-based economy driven by scientific and technological progress.

Leading key economic initiatives within BRICS to solidify the UAE’s role as a strong advocate for multilateralism and inclusive global economic governance.

Balancing global policy priorities with the developmental needs of Global South countries, ensuring that international economic agendas reflect the realities and aspirations of emerging markets.

Advocating for inclusiveness and fairness in the global economy by promoting policies that consider the interests of developing nations and reduce inequality across borders.

Supporting the development agenda of the BRICS New Development Bank to maximize its impact in advancing infrastructure, innovation, and sustainable growth across emerging economies.

Related links

• BRICS website
• WAM – Press Release: UAE-BRICS partnerships set to foster global development, prosperity

Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org

As the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos debates this week the pathways to re-building connectivity in an increasingly fragmented world economy, regionalism appears to be singled out increasingly as both a trend and a key instrument to address such challenges[1]. So if the world economy is indeed becoming increasingly regionalized, then what are the mechanisms of bringing the economies of these regions and continents closer together? Throughout our research forays of the past several years we tended to underscore the centrality of building cooperative platforms among the regional integration arrangements (RIAs/RTAs) as a way to forge greater connectivity in the evolving international environment[2]. We now look at another possible route by exploring the modalities of economic cooperation among the trans-continental economies of the globe. The goal within such a regionalized paradigm then is: an interconnected regionalized world, where connectivity lines run not only country-to-country, but also region-to-region (R2R).

The case for a common platform among the trans-continental economies with crucial roles for regional integration and inter-regional connectivity seems almost too obvious in the current conditions of mounting fragmentation. A key focus area for such a platform would be supply chain resilience and the mitigation of supply-side risks. Greater inter-connectedness across regions may allow for more alternatives and back-up options in global supply routes, while also creating mechanisms for connecting regional and global supply chains. In the sphere of infrastructural connectivity such a platform may target the operation of “corridors of corridors”, linking existing initiatives such as the BRI with regional connectivity projects. Such a platform may also advance a different mode of globalization that is built on the inter-connectedness across regions and continents rather than top-down impulses from global institutions.
As it turns out there are not that many economies that fit the strictest of definitions of a trans-continental country. Such transcontinental economies that lie at the junctures of main regions/continents of the world (with a significant presence in both continents) include Egypt (Africa/Asia), Turkey (Europe/Asia), Russia (Europe/Asia), Indonesia (Asia/Oceania), Kazakhstan (Europe/Asia). While there are a number of other economies that technically could be considered as trans-continental – the Denmark-Greenland connection being one of the more discussed these days – the above list of five economies largely exhausts the core of those sizeable trans-continental countries that have significant economic presence in both continents.

There is one part of the world, however, that is missing in this global equation and that is the Western Hemisphere of the Americas. In this respect, Panama is strictly speaking a trans-continental economy connecting North and South America as well as the Pacific and Atlantic oceans through the Panama Canal. My choice, however, of a Latin American economy that plays a key connectivity role between North America and South America, with a gateway to the Caribbean and the potential for expanding its bi-oceanic connectivity via new corridors is Colombia.

Together as a group these trans-regional and trans-continental economies may be denoted as TICKERs (Turkey, Indonesia, Colombia, Kazakhstan, Egypt and Russia) or more simply as Trans-continental emerging markets (TCEMs) – if they work together seamlessly on building connectivity in their respective juncture areas of the globe, the world economy could then be more in a position to operate as a well-ticking clock. Panama (North America/South America), Chile (the South America/Oceania connection) and a number of other trans-regional/trans-continental economies may form a broader TICKER+ circle of such “juncture economies” that play a crucial connectivity role in their respective geographies. Almost all TICKER economies are among the leaders in their respective regional integration arrangements – Indonesia in ASEAN, Russia and Kazakhstan in the Eurasian Economic Union, Egypt in the AfCFTA. Also, all trans-continental/trans-regional TICKERs are emerging market economies, the majority of them being what many experts would currently call “middle powers”.

Furthermore, all of these economies in varying degrees are related to the BRICS+ platform: Russia is the founding core member of BRICs, Egypt and Indonesia are recent core BRICS members, Kazakhstan is a BRICS partner economy, Turkey has actively participated in BRICS+ meetings and has expressed its interest in joining the bloc on several occasions, while Colombia joined the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) in mid-2025. In view of such a significant role that some of the BRICS economies play in the geographic linkages across the globe, there may be a case for a greater focus within BRICS+ accorded to inter-regional/trans-continental economic connectivity – indeed, this may be one of the BRICS+ economic cooperation tracks with active Turkish participation. On a related note, all TICKERs apart from Colombia are part of the emerging SCO-EAEU-ASEAN network – Kazakhstan and Russia are core members of the SCO as well as members of the Eurasian Economic Union, Egypt and Turkey are SCO’s dialogue partners, while Indonesia is the largest member of the ASEAN bloc.

In the end, the emergence of a platform that brings together emerging economies that are geographically positioned at key cross-continental juncture points may serve to upgrade global economic connectivity. It may also incentivize these bridge economies to prioritize and foster their inter-regional connectivity potential by undertaking common connectivity initiatives that may be regional or global in scope. This is then one of the ways to stitch the global economy together as its evolves in the direction of an increasingly regionalized economic landscape. Another important route is the “integration of integrations” that brings the regional economic blocs closer – in this respect one may observe that just like at the country level there are also trans-continental regional integration arrangements such as the Eurasian Economic Union, CPTPP or RCEP. All these approaches to regional and continental connectivity may be just some of the venues to be explored in an increasingly regionalized world. And contrary to the disappointment observed in Davos these days over the risks of fragmentation of the world economy, such regional trends may in fact prove to be the much-needed re-configuration for the globalization to advance forward in a more sustainable and balanced mode. 

[1] https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/global-trade-globalization-resilience-adaption/
https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/12/regional-cooperation-better-global-expert-survey
[2] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/re-imagining-the-world-economy-through-the-lens-of-regionalism/

Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org

Back in 2018 an article authored by myself for the Valdai club advanced the concept of PEAKS/InPEAKs as the next generation of BRICS economies – Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt, Argentina and Kazakhstan[1]. In the beginning of 2023 this PEAKS concept was extended to include Saudi Arabia in expectation of the BRICS enlargement that was to be discussed at the BRICS summit in South Africa in August 2023. The main idea behind the concept of InPEAKS was to include the second-largest or the largest economies from the regions of the first generation of BRICS members – Latin America (Brazil), Africa (South Africa), South Asia (India), Central Asia/EAEU (Russia), East Asia (China). The resulting InPEAKS group of emerging markets delineated the contours of BRICS enlargement for the coming years, a process that was meant to combine the economic and regional weight of invited economies with the need for them to represent the key regions of the Global South[2].

As things stand today after the expansion in BRICS membership in 2023-2025, this idea of the regional derivatives of core BRICS economies becoming the next wave of EMs to join the bloc appears to have largely come to pass – 4 out of 6 InPEAKS were invited to join the core: Indonesia and Egypt are now core BRICS members, Kazakhstan that opted not to apply for full core membership is a member of the BRICS partnership belt, Saudi Arabia and Argentina have the status of invited countries, with Saudi Arabia actively participating in the key BRICS/BRICS+ meetings and Argentina opting to stay outside of BRICS after the presidential elections of 2023[3]. Pakistan, while not a member of the BRICS core or the partnership belt has applied for NDB membership and is contemplating further steps to develop its cooperation with the BRICS group[4]. 

In advancing the InPEAKS/PEAKS concept, the expectation was that with greater incorporation of this second generation of BRICS into the BRICS+ circle, there would accordingly be closer ties forged by BRICS not only with individual economies, but also the regions and the regional integration arrangements that these economies represent. This appears to have transpired most notably with respect to the region of Southeast Asia and the ASEAN regional bloc as after the accession of Indonesia as a full-fledged member in the beginning of 2025, some of the most dynamic ASEAN economies such as Vietnam joined its regional counterparts – Thailand and Malaysia – in the BRICS partnership belt. 

Apart from attempting to forecast the next wave/generation of BRICS members, we have also sought to discern the next generation of EM growth outperformers in the coming decades. In 2023 we advanced the concept of VIBEs – Vietnam, India, Brazil and Emirates (UAE) – as the likely group of outperformers across EM in terms of GDP growth rates[5]. While it may be too early to make sweeping conclusions on the quality of our EM top-picks, it may be instructive to look at the record of the past several years as a possible sign of things to come.

In 2024 Brazil posted one of the highest growth rates in South America with GDP expanding by 3.4%, while Vietnam was among the global leaders and a top performer in ASEAN, with GDP surging by more than 7%[6]. The economy of UAE grew at a respectable (though not stratospheric) rate of 4% in 2024 and India (6.5%) had one of the highest growth rates globally and the highest in South Asia. Preliminary data for 2025 suggests that the VIBEs continued to outperform globally, though Brazil slowed down to a GDP growth rate of 2.2-2.4%. At the same time, India’s growth notably accelerated to 7.4% in FY 2025-26[7], while Vietnam recorded one of the highest growth rates globally (and one of the highest in its recent history) of more than 8%[8]. UAE’s growth also accelerated from 4% to around 5%, with global projections not excluding a further acceleration in growth in the coming years.

The IMF’s growth projections for 2026 suggest that these trends across VIBEs are likely to largely persist, with Brazil facing the most significant headwinds to higher growth due to the combination of high public debt, fiscal gaps and elevated interest rate levels. We continue to observe a rising number of landlocked economies outperforming global growth – in 2026 the Fund projects that 6 such economies will be on the top-10 list of the fastest growing countries in the world[9]. We note in particular the consistently strong performance of landlocked economies that are positioned between the largest BRICS economies of China and India (Bhutan (7.4% growth in 2026) and Nepal (5.2%)) as well as between China and Russia (Kyrgyzstan (5.3%), Uzbekistan (6%), Tajikistan (5.5%)). With the economic cooperation within the BRICS troika of China, Russia and India on the rise, the landlocked Central Asia region is emerging as one of the most dynamic parts of the global economy – perhaps even yet another candidate to emulate the admirable growth performance of ASEAN/Southeast Asia[10].

PS: perhaps one omission in the PEAKs and the VIBEs concepts was the economic phenomenon of Bangladesh – one of the most dynamic economies in South Asia that is expected to rival India’s growth rates in the coming years. It is currently positioned to further expand its cooperation with BRICS – in 2021 it became the first economy from outside of the BRICS core to join the BRICS NDB Bank. Its strategic positioning close to India, China and ASEAN creates a favorable environment for sustaining high growth rates via trade and investment alliances in the region.

[1] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/a-look-at-brics-derivatives-and-alter-egos/
[2] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/the-brics-expansion-dilemma-size-vs-representation/
[3] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/brics-minus-argentina/
[4] https://tass.com/world/1709779
[5] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/the-new-breakout-nations-what-role-for-brics/
[6] https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD
[7] https://www.mospi.gov.in/uploads/latestReleases/latest_release_1767781372753_1380ce82-f5a5-440d-99e6-e6b35af0deb5_GDP_Press_Note_on_FAE_2025-26.pdf
[8] https://www.mospi.gov.in/uploads/latestReleases/latest_release_1767781372753_1380ce82-f5a5-440d-99e6-e6b35af0deb5_GDP_Press_Note_on_FAE_2025-26.pdf
[9] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/unlocking-global-growth-the-case-for-landlocked-economies/
[10] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/is-latin-america-the-next-southeast-asia/

South Africa
Source: iol.co.za

Artificial intelligence is accelerating long-term shifts in the global labour market. Automation is reshaping existing roles while creating new tasks and occupations that demand different skill sets. Recent labour market data shows that demand for new skills is rising across both advanced and emerging economies, with professional, technical, and managerial roles most affected. Information technology dominates this shift, but sector-specific skills are also growing in importance, particularly in healthcare, education, marketing, and digital public services.

Across BRICS countries, AI adoption is advancing rapidly. China has embedded AI into manufacturing, logistics, and state administration. India is integrating AI into digital services, multilingual communication, and governance platforms. Brazil, South Africa, and Russia are applying AI to healthcare delivery, public administration, and infrastructure management. In each case, technology alone is not decisive workforce readiness is the critical factor.

Wages Rise, Jobs Become Uneven

Workers who acquire new or hybrid skills tend to earn higher wages, generating positive spillover effects for local economies. Increased earnings boost consumption, which in turn supports job creation in related sectors. However, these benefits are unevenly distributed. High-skill workers gain from advanced roles, while low-skill service jobs often remain resilient. Middle-skill occupations, especially routine office and clerical roles, face the greatest pressure from automation.

AI-specific skills add another layer of complexity. While they command wage premiums, they have not yet driven broad employment growth. Regions with high demand for AI skills often see lower employment in AI-exposed occupations, particularly affecting young workers and entry-level roles. This raises concerns about career pathways, social mobility, and long-term inclusion in AI-driven economies.

Skills Gaps and Policy Choices

The impact of AI on work is not predetermined. Countries differ widely in their ability to supply the skills demanded by new technologies. Some economies experience strong demand for emerging skills but lack trained workers, while others possess talent that remains underutilised due to weak innovation ecosystems or limited business absorption capacity.

For BRICS and other emerging economies, policy responses must be comprehensive. Education systems need to emphasise cognitive, creative, and problem-solving skills that complement AI rather than compete with it. Lifelong learning, reskilling, and mobility support are essential to help workers adapt as tasks evolve. Social protection systems must also be strengthened to support workers through transitions and prevent long-term exclusion from the labour market.

The Case for BRICS Cooperation
BRICS countries face shared structural challenges: large and diverse populations, multilingual societies, pressure on healthcare and education systems, and uneven regional development. These common conditions create strong incentives for cooperation on AI skills development, ethical standards, and workforce transition policies.
While competition will continue in commercial AI applications, cooperation on foundational issues; such as training frameworks, governance principles, and public-sector use cases; can reduce risks and costs for all members. If aligned with inclusive labour policies, AI can become a strategic tool for strengthening the Global South, reducing inequality, and supporting a more balanced multipolar economy.