Ethiopia
Source: www.ifa.gov.et

In a fragmented international system, power is increasingly measured not by the ability to dominate a single sphere but by the ability to preserve multiple strategic options simultaneously. As geopolitical competition intensifies, supply chains fragment, maritime chokepoints become contested, and traditional alliances become more transactional, states capable of maintaining alternative partnerships, corridors, institutions, and sources of leverage gain a distinct strategic advantage.

This emerging form of power can be called optionality. Optionality is the capacity of a state to avoid dependence on any single route, patron, institution, or geopolitical bloc. It is not neutrality, nor is it strategic ambiguity. Rather, it is the deliberate preservation of alternatives before a crisis narrows available choices. In an era of overlapping geopolitical, economic, and security disruptions, optionality has become a strategic asset in its own right. Few countries illustrate this phenomenon more clearly than Ethiopia.

With a population of approximately 135.9 million, Ethiopia is Africa's second-most populous country and one of the continent's fastest-growing economies. Yet these attributes alone do not explain why the country remains difficult to isolate despite being landlocked, facing internal security pressures, and operating within one of the world's most contested geopolitical regions. Ethiopia's growing influence derives less from its size than from its ability to maintain multiple diplomatic, economic, security, and logistical options simultaneously.

Why Dependency Is the Real Strategic Threat

Conventional discussions of Ethiopian foreign policy often focus on maritime access. Yet access itself is not the central strategic challenge. Dependency is. For a country of Ethiopia's scale, reliance on a single trade corridor, a single external partner, or a single institutional framework creates structural vulnerability. The relevant question is no longer whether Ethiopia can secure access to international markets, but whether that access remains diversified enough to prevent external coercion.

Recent disruptions in the Red Sea illustrate the point. Continued attacks on commercial shipping and recurring threats to maritime traffic have increased transportation costs, disrupted shipping schedules, and contributed to broader uncertainty across global supply chains. The U.S. Maritime Administration has repeatedly warned that attacks on commercial vessels have expanded the risk environment throughout the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. For Ethiopia, such disruptions translate directly into higher import costs, delayed exports, increased fertilizer prices, and pressure on industrial production. The lesson is not simply that maritime instability is dangerous. The deeper lesson is that any state dependent upon a single strategic artery becomes vulnerable to events beyond its control.

This makes corridor diversification a matter of national security rather than transportation policy. Railways, dry ports, alternative trade routes, and diversified commercial partnerships are not merely economic projects; they are instruments for preserving strategic choice. The objective is not to replace one dependency with another but to ensure that no external actor can hold a veto over Ethiopia's economic future.

The Rise of Diplomatic Optionality

The same logic increasingly shapes Ethiopia's diplomacy. For much of the post-Cold War period, smaller and medium-sized states often operated within relatively stable geopolitical alignments. Today, however, the fragmentation of the international order has expanded room for maneuver. States no longer face a binary choice between competing blocs. Instead, they can selectively engage multiple centers of power simultaneously.

Ethiopia's participation in BRICS while maintaining close engagement with the International Monetary Fund illustrates this evolving strategy. Ethiopia formally joined BRICS on 1 January 2024 while simultaneously pursuing an IMF-supported economic reform program. Rather than treating these institutions as mutually exclusive, Ethiopia has used them for different purposes. BRICS broadens diplomatic and financial networks across the Global South, while IMF engagement remains central to macroeconomic stabilization and reform. This is not evidence of ideological inconsistency. It is evidence of strategic optionality.

The same pattern is visible in Ethiopia's relationships with Gulf states, Western partners, African institutions, and emerging powers. Gulf countries have become increasingly important investors in Ethiopian agriculture, logistics, infrastructure, telecommunications, and real-estate sectors over the past decade. Ethiopia's foreign policy increasingly seeks to widen its network of relationships without becoming fully dependent on any single actor.

Security Optionality in a Fused Regional Environment

The Horn of Africa no longer operates as a collection of separate crises. Sudan's war, Somalia's fragility, Red Sea insecurity, Nile Basin politics, and broader Middle Eastern competition increasingly interact within a single strategic environment. This fusion changes the meaning of security. Somalia, for example, cannot be understood solely through the lens of counterterrorism. Ethiopia remains a key stakeholder in the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), which became operational in January 2025.Ethiopia's security engagement there is tied simultaneously to border stability, maritime security, regional legitimacy, and the containment of transnational threats.

Likewise, instability in Sudan is not merely a neighboring conflict. It influences refugee flows, border management, Nile Basin politics, and regional power balances. The significance of these developments lies not in the individual crises themselves but in their cumulative effect on strategic flexibility. States that become trapped within one security theater risk losing room for maneuver elsewhere.
Optionality as a Development Strategy

Optionality is often discussed in military or diplomatic terms, but its economic dimension may be equally important. The International Monetary Fund projects Ethiopia among the fastest-growing economies in Africa and forecasts strong medium-term growth under ongoing reform efforts. Reuters reported in February 2026 that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed projected economic growth exceeding 10 percent while pursuing debt restructuring and IMF-supported reforms.

Yet sustained growth depends not only on economic performance but also on diversification of partnerships, markets, and investment sources. Overreliance on any single source of financing, export destination, or development partner creates vulnerability. Economic resilience emerges when states maintain multiple channels through which capital, technology, and investment can flow. In this regard, Ethiopia's engagement with Gulf investors, multilateral lenders, African institutions, and emerging economic blocs reflects more than a search for financing. It reflects an effort to build a wider architecture of economic optionality capable of absorbing external shocks.

The Future Belongs to States That Preserve Choice

The broader implication extends beyond Ethiopia. The international system is becoming increasingly fragmented. Great-power competition is intensifying. Maritime chokepoints are more vulnerable. Global institutions face growing pressure. Regional conflicts increasingly overlap with one another. Under these conditions, traditional measures of power tell only part of the story. Population size matters. Military capability matters. Economic output matters. Yet an equally important measure of power is the ability to preserve strategic alternatives when circumstances change.

States that anchor themselves exclusively to one corridor, one alliance, one market, or one patron become vulnerable to disruption. States that maintain multiple pathways acquire resilience, bargaining power, and strategic autonomy. What emerges from Ethiopia's experience is therefore a broader lesson about contemporary statecraft. In an era of uncertainty, optionality is no longer simply a diplomatic technique. It is becoming a form of power. For Ethiopia, the challenge is not merely to expand its influence. It is to continue preserving the alternatives that make influence possible in the first place.


Notes
1. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: Navigating Global Divergences (Washington, DC: IMF, 2025).
2. Richard Haass, The Age of Disorder (New York: Penguin Press, 2022), 87–103.
3. World Bank, The World Bank in Ethiopia: Overview (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2025).
4. Reuters, "Houthis Threaten Israeli-Linked Shipping in the Red Sea," June 8, 2026.
5. U.S. Maritime Administration, Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Security Environment Advisory (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, September 2025).
6. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Review of Maritime Transport 2025 (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2025).
7. Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018).
8. BRICS Information Centre, BRICS Expansion and Membership Framework (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2026).
9. International Monetary Fund, Ethiopia Country Profile (Washington, DC: IMF, 2026).
10. Institute of Foreign Affairs, Gulf Investments and Strategic Engagement in Ethiopia (Addis Ababa: Institute of Foreign Affairs, May 2026).
11. African Union, High Representative for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea: Strategic Framework (Addis Ababa: African Union Commission, 2026).
12. African Union, African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM): Mandate and Operational Framework (Addis Ababa: African Union Commission, 2025).
13. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan 2026 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2026).
14. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database (Washington, DC: IMF, April 2026).
15. Reuters, "Ethiopia Projects 10.2 Percent Growth Amid IMF-Backed Reform Program," February 3, 2026.

By Eman Ferid, IFA 

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Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org
Author: Yaroslav Lissovolik

A crucial contribution to ideating the reform of the international monetary system

Despite the generally subdued reaction to the BRICS common currency project coming from the bloc’s official circles, the academic discussions on the subject of a new reserve currency continue and elicit a greater degree of granularity on what needs to be done and importantly how the project could be technically implemented. Such is the crucial contribution coming from Brazil’s leading economist Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr., who presented his latest Valdai club report titled “A path to a new reserve currency” at the end of June 2026. The report in particular argues persuasively that none of the single currencies by themselves can provide a solution to the challenges faced by today’s global economy. What is hence proposed is a collective approach that brings together some of the BRICS and other Global South economies in launching a new reserve currency. And while the difficulties of such an undertaking – whether political or economic – may be substantial, the author sees such an effort as being central to addressing some of the glaring imbalances inherent in the current international monetary system.

Building on the discussions that have taken place in the past several years, including the important contributions of Alexei Mozhin[1] (in whose memory the report is dedicated), the report weighs the merits of creating a new unit of account as one of the initial steps in the launching the new reserve currency. Such a step is not fraught with technical difficulties and could be easily implemented by the BRICS+/Global South economies without the prior preconditions of increasing mutual trade turnover or liberalizing the capital accounts of BRICS members. In order to ensure credibility in the new currency Nogueira Batista Jr. proposes a currency basket mechanism as well as the creation of an issuing bank – the Global South Bank (GSB). The latter would have to commit not to use the new currency as a weapon or sanctions instrument.

Importantly, the report underscores that the new currency would not replace the national currencies of participating economies, but would rather complement them. The author openly acknowledges some of the weaknesses of the proposed monetary architecture, including the lack of confidence in the sponsoring countries, China’s size and possible imbalances in the governance of the GSB as well as risks of a Western backlash. Both the report itself and the Valdai club discussion underscored the importance of China’s stance with respect to the project on the new reserve currency. The views of experts participating in the Valdai discussion suggest that a shift in China’s position on the project could be the single most important factor in rendering it viable in the medium- to long-term. For the time-being the focus in China appears to be directed more towards advancing the yuan internationally, with next year’s chairmanship of China in BRICS likely to further shed light on the international priorities espoused by the bloc’s largest economic heavyweight.

The importance of the latest contribution coming from Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr. is that it addresses the issue of a new reserve currency in an open and comprehensive way that fills the gaps that in the past several years continued to accompany the discussions of the BRICS common currency project. In many ways, it is also a contribution that provides a novel perspective to the debate on the international monetary system – as argued by the report’s author, “the approach suggested here drives at something new in the history of international monetary arrangements, while at the same time remaining grounded on the realities and practicalities of current international monetary arrangements. Hitherto, as mentioned, we have had national currencies (or a regional one, the euro) playing an international role on top of their domestic roles. But what we need is an international currency that plays no domestic role”[2].

The link to the report by Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr. can be accessed via the following link:

https://www.nogueirabatista.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/2026-05-27_-REPORT_A-Path-to-a-New-Currency-ENG_%D0%98%D0%A1%D0%9F%D0%A0_05-06-2026.pdf

The link to the Valdai club discussion on the report:

https://valdaiclub.com/events/posts/articles/from-dollar-hegemony-to-a-new-reserve-currency

PS: As an aside and a minor artistic digression, I would also like to briefly touch upon the name and the logo of the common BRICS currency. In terms of the name, the symbolism of all five currencies of the BRICS-5 core economies starting with the letter R should not be cast so lightly aside – such rare if not unique symbolism is something has generated a fascination with the R5 project across the Global South and the broader world economy, making the BRICS common currency the single most sought after issue on BRICS as a bloc by the wider public (judging by internet search and public queries related to BRICS), with the R5 name[3] being the most popular and widely used reference to the BRICS common currency project. Perhaps even more importantly, from a cultural point of view, such symbolism of cross-country commonalities is very much engrained and cherished in the history and the value code of BRICS and its members.  

Furthermore, with the expansion of BRICS, even more members of the club now have currencies starting with the letter R (Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia) – in this case the name of the potential common currency rather than being R5 (a name that will pass into history as the starting point of the BRICS common currency discussion) may be upgraded to R+, something that would symbolize the openness of the BRICS+ and the R+ platforms as well as the evolution path of the bloc.

With respect to the logo of the BRICS currency (which in most cases tends to be confined to one symbol), the letter R becomes an uncontested candidate to reflect past history and the origin of the common BRICS currency project. The revision of the name of the currency to R+ would suggest that the logo would need to reflect the letter and the plus sign in a combined, symbiotic way. The resulting image produced with the help of Grok (see the R+ image/logo to this publication) presents the plus sign as transitioning into an X (multiplication) sign, reflecting how the R+ project and the BRICS+ expansion may advance multiplier effects across the Global South in terms of growth and the monetization of South-South economic cooperation[4].

In the end, symbolism matters for BRICS in multiple areas (the very name “BRICs” is an acronym that was meant to be a symbol) and nowhere is it more powerful than in the case of R5/R+. Currency logos are ultimately symbols that need to encapsulate the goal and the history of the currency project, delivering a value projection from the past into the future. And despite all the current headwinds with respect to the BRICS common currency efforts, the symbolism and the enormous popular appeal across the Global South will make the R5/R+ project one of the landmark legacies of the current efforts of the BRICS+ bloc to transform the global economy.  

[1] https://tass.ru/interviews/17281219
[2] https://www.nogueirabatista.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/2026-05-27_-REPORT_A-Path-to-a-New-Currency-ENG_%D0%98%D0%A1%D0%9F%D0%A0_05-06-2026.pdf
[3] It is also important to note that one of the founders and champions of the R5 project – Alexei Mozhin, Russia’s long-time Executive Director at the IMF – very much supported the R5 name and the symbolism for the common BRICS currency project.
[4] It may also be a way to recognize the contribution of Grok and X in the generation of the R+ logo. For BRICS+ multiplier effects see: https://brics-plus-analytics.org/what-are-the-brics-multipliers/

Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org
Author: Yaroslav Lissovolik

In 2025-2026 the rhetoric with respect to BRICS coming from President Trump has been increasingly negative, with the new US administration contemplating the possibility of applying trade restrictions to BRICS economies that opt to pursue de-dollarization and a common BRICS currency. The response from the BRICS leaders has been to underscore that the bloc is neither “anti-US”, nor “anti-Western”, with the main focus of the BRICS+ platform being the advancement of South-South economic cooperation. What is more, a look at the economic priorities of the current American administration and the development tracks of the BRICS bloc suggests that greater South-South cooperation could dovetail the attainment of US economic goals across a wide range of issues, including those pertaining to re-industrialization. In particular, the BRICS may play a role for the United States in addressing such issues as the rebalancing of trade and migration flows that are likely to be increasingly absorbed by the BRICS+ economies through greater South-South economic cooperation.  

Perhaps the most controversial of all issues in terms of US statements with respect to BRICS has been the theme of the bloc’s common currency. The hardening of the rhetoric from Trump with regard to such plans in 2025 has essentially been already met with statements from Russia, South Africa, India and other members of the bloc about the absence of intentions to launch a common BRICS currency, with India explicitly stating that there were no de-dollarization plans (arguably the absence of such plans has been clearly communicated well before 2025). China has never even officially spoke in favor of the R5 project. Furthermore, in February 2026, Russia’s officials declared the readiness of using the US dollar in transactions with the United States, with “Russia never voluntarily abandoning the US dollar”[1].

At the same time, there may be scope for the BRICS and the US to work on issues of international financial stability, with discussions centering on how the Global South and the rest of the global economy could deliver their fair share of the prospective coordinated stimulus during global economic downturns (rather than the onus falling on the United States and other advanced economies). Another challenge is the drastic reduction in financial assistance to the least developed economies in the past several years – according to the OECD, Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries amounted to USD 174.3 billion in 2025, a 23.1% decrease over 2024 – this is “the largest annual contraction on record and a second consecutive year of decline” [2]. A further rebalancing of quotas in the IMF and the World Bank would serve to shift more of the burden of financing contributions of global institutions towards emerging markets represented by BRICS+ economies, particularly if the ODA and other contributions coming from the developed economies continue to decline drastically.

More generally, across all of the main trajectories of economic development – from migration to trade and investment – BRICS role in boosting South-South economic cooperation can substantially reduce the pressures experienced in these areas by developed economies such as the US[3]. In particular, the US and BRICS could work with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to support the development of infrastructure (including in the financial sector) to allow for more of international migration to be accounted for by South-South flows. At this stage the economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are among the regions of the Global South that serve as the focal points of attracting migrant labor flows from the parts of the developing world with growing populations such as South Asia and Africa. Within the GCC region, Qatar exhibits the highest proportion of migrants that represent 76.7 per cent of the population, followed by the United Arab Emirates (74%) and Kuwait (67.3%), while Bahrain (52.3%), Jordan (45.7%), Oman (43.2%) and Saudi Arabia (40.3%) also demonstrate high shares of international migrants within their total populations[4].

Similarly, in the trade sphere greater South-South trade flows advanced by the BRICS+ platform could attenuate the pressure experienced by the US in the form of persistently high trade deficits with some of the BRICS economies such as China. In fact, this pattern has already been observed in 2025 as the China-led pick-up in South-South trade was accompanied by a decline in the US trade deficit with China[5]. Similarly, in the first quarter of 2026 Brazil recorded a growth in exports to China of 21.7% and a rising trade surplus (nearly 50% YoY growth) along with a decline in exports to the US of nearly 19% YoY[6]. The BRICS economies and the US could also explore potential trade liberalization measures, particularly in such areas as the services sector, where there may be scope for greater US exports accompanied by the much-needed technological advances for the developing economies.   

In the end, the negative rhetoric coming from President Trump with respect to BRICS may be in part due to the lack of information in the West on BRICS as a bloc and the sluggishness on the part of BRICS as well as the developed world in bridging this “information gap”. Greater prioritization of economic cooperation and particularly trade liberalization in BRICS development would serve to reduce the scope for misconceptions about BRICS motives and its positioning vis-à-vis the developed economies. There may of course be valid reasons why within the US domestic economic debate the expediency of containing imports and migration flows or the growing role of South-South trade and investment may be viewed differently across the various parts of the American political spectrum. Nonetheless, from the broader global perspective, the advancement by BRICS of South-South trade, investment and migration could significantly lower the global imbalances in these segments of the world economy, relieve the corresponding pressures experienced by advanced economies such as the United States and create greater scope for building a more sustainable pattern of North-South economic cooperation.

[1] https://tmv.in/article/dollar-usage-not-against-our-policy-russia-clarifies-date=2026-02-15
[2] https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/official-development-assistance-oda.html
[3] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/why-developed-economies-benefit-from-south-south-cooperation/
[4] https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/pub2025-065-r-iom-rom-mena.pdf
[5] https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2026/05/in-what-ways-has-u-s-trade-with-china-changed/
[6] https://www.plataformamedia.com/en/2026/04/08/brazil-q1-2026-trade-surplus-exports/

Yaroslav Lissovolik, Founder, BRICS+ Analytics

Russia
Source: infobrics.org

Russian expert Georgy Toloraya, whose many accolades include serving as the Executive Director of the National Committee for BRICS Research, recently published a thought-provoking piece at the Valdai Club

Pushing through reforms to establish a secretariat and advance geopolitical goals that might at times be at odds with Western interest risks sparking the defection of the group’s Western-friendly members like Bharat, the UAE, and Egypt, et al., thus bringing about the dissolution of this multipolar network.

Russian expert Georgy Toloraya, whose many accolades include serving as the Executive Director of the National Committee for BRICS Research, recently published a thought-provoking piece at the Valdai Club. Titled “Military Stress Test: The War on Iran and BRICS Institutional Reform”, he revealed that his fellow Russian experts want BRICS to become a “central institution of the global majority” in order “to remain relevant”, to which end it “will have to establish permanent structures”.

Toloraya proposed that these concern “mediation, monitoring, and coordination in the field of security. This should occur alongside deeper financial and payment integration.” He then advised that “The central element that the entire structure must be anchored to is ‘soft institutionalisation’ —not in the direction of a unified alliance, but towards a flexible, multi-level structure.” At the very least, it should establish a secretariat, which was advised in a report earlier in the month here that he cited in his article.

Interestingly, in December 2023, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov opined that “BRICS is not an organization, but an association. I don’t think anyone has any interest in turning it into a real organization with a secretariat. This is not necessary, at least at this stage, for a relatively long time.” Even so, Toloraya insisted that “the fulfilment of such functions” is required for BRICS to “pass the stress test of the current crisis” and that eschewing formal obligations should reassure reluctant members.

To his credit, he acknowledged that the most “realistic scenario is a ‘two-speed BRICS’, in which the grouping comprises a core (China, Russia, Iran, and others—an anti-Western front) and a periphery (India, Brazil, the United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia), opportunistically seeking to diversify their policies on a ‘comprador’ basis.” The core would focus on geopolitics, security, and military-technical cooperation while the periphery would focus on economic and humanitarian projects.

For as noble and well-intended as his vision is, and while respecting his role as Russia’s penultimate authority on BRICS behind Putin by dint of his prestigious position, it can compellingly be argued that a new group is required to fulfill BRICS’ new proposed functions instead. The previously cited report that he mentioned candidly described India, the UAE, and Egypt at the bottom of page 14 as “hav[ing] traditionally been oriented toward partnership with the United States and the West in general”.

Since they’ve “been resistant to proposals for implementing a more ambitious agenda and transforming BRICS into a full-fledged global governance institution”, they’re unlikely to accept junior roles in a “two-speed BRICS” in which the US’ Russian, Chinese, and Iranian adversaries strengthen security cooperation. BRICS would therefore probably crumble, thus possibly leading to those three and other Western-leaning countries like Indonesia pivoting to the US, which would divide the world between it and China.

This dark scenario that Russia has sought to avoid for years through its careful Sino-Indo balancing act can be averted by founding a new group within which interested BRICS states could jointly work towards fulfilling the noble and well-intended functions that Toloraya proposed. BRICS would consequently remain intact and focused on its founding goal of accelerating economic and financial multipolarity processes while this new group with partially shared membership would focus on geopolitical goals.

Hindu Post

India
Source: www.brics-info.org

Key Points

• PM Modi extended an invitation to Iranian President Pezeshkian to attend the upcoming BRICS summit in India.
• Modi emphasized the importance of peace and stability in the West Asia region during the talks.
• Freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz was highlighted as crucial for India's energy imports.
• The leaders discussed recent developments in West Asia and the need to safeguard commerce.

Russia
Source: bricscompetition.org

The case against Brazil's only major stock exchange could reshape the country's financial market infrastructure.

Brazil's antitrust watchdog has accused the country's largest stock exchange operator of abusing its dominant position, in a case that could lead to sweeping changes in the structure of Brazil's financial markets.

The investigative arm of Brazil's Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) has recommended that the Competition Tribunal find B3 guilty of abusing its dominant position. According to the regulator, B3 used its control over critical market infrastructure to make it difficult for potential competitors to enter the market.

If the tribunal upholds the recommendation, the ruling could reshape the way Brazil's financial market infrastructure operates.

What the case is about

The investigation focuses on the infrastructure for the registration and custody of financial assets — the record-keeping system that confirms ownership of securities after trades are completed.
According to CADE, B3 holds a dominant position in this segment and used commercial practices to prevent new competitors from entering the market. The regulator argues that these practices reinforced barriers to entry in markets that are essential to Brazil's financial system.

The alleged conduct includes tied selling, exclusivity clauses, conditional discounts, and loyalty programs that effectively locked customers into B3's infrastructure.

The investigation began in 2022 following a complaint from CSD BR, a company seeking to compete in the registration and custody business. The complainant alleged that B3's conduct made market entry virtually impossible.

CADE also raised concerns over interoperability — the technical compatibility that allows competing market infrastructures to connect with one another. According to the regulator, B3 created obstacles preventing rival systems from connecting to its own infrastructure, without which competing operators cannot function effectively.

The inquiry extends beyond equities and bonds to the registration of insurance operations, highlighting the extent to which Brazil's financial record-keeping is concentrated within a single company.

Why B3 holds such a powerful position

Even by global standards, B3 occupies an unusual position. The company is effectively Brazil's only major exchange operator, combining trading, clearing, settlement, and custody services under one roof.

While this concentration delivers operational efficiency, it also gives the company significant influence over the terms on which other market participants can access critical financial infrastructure.
CADE has proposed imposing a fine of approximately 100 million reais (about $19 million) and prohibiting practices that it says restrict competition, including tied selling and exclusivity agreements.
Market observers note that the proposed financial penalty is relatively modest for a company of B3's size. The structural remedies, however, could prove far more significant if they require the exchange to provide more open access to its infrastructure.

"The behavioral remedies proposed by CADE could include mandatory interoperability requirements, opening APIs to enable interoperability, and eliminating discounts tied to the use of the exchange's services," 

said Evgeny Ponomarev, an expert at the BRICS Competition Law and Policy Centre.

What comes next

The recommendation issued by CADE's investigative arm is not a final ruling, and B3 has not been found guilty.

The case will now be reviewed by CADE's Competition Tribunal, which may approve, modify, or reject the recommendation. B3 will have an opportunity to present its defense before a binding decision is issued.

The company has already informed investors of the development, noting that the recommendation has no immediate legal effect while the tribunal considers the case.

"The outcome of this case will determine whether Brazil's financial services market remains dependent on a natural monopoly or moves toward greater competition and modernization of its financial infrastructure. If the CADE Tribunal upholds the allegations, B3 could be forced to fundamentally revise its commercial policies and open its clearing infrastructure to ensure interoperability with competing operators," 

Ponomarev said.

Sources:The Rio Times, Valor International (with additional commentary from the BRICS Competition Law and Policy Centre)

Russia
Source: bricscompetition.org

Apple and the CCI are scheduled to meet behind closed doors on July 21, 2026.

Apple has turned the tables on CCI, accusing the antitrust regulator of building its entire case by copying and pasting allegations straight from its rivals. In a fresh submission ahead of a closed-door hearing, the company claims India's three-year investigation was never really an investigation at all—just a recycled stack of complaints from competitors dressed up as official findings. It's a bold gambit in a case where Apple is staring down a potential $38 billion fine.

According to Reuters, Apple told the Competition Commission of India that its investigators "blindly replicated" a consumer spending graphic lifted from an EU ruling. The submission reportedly includes side-by-side tables comparing the CCI's report to filings from Apple's opponents, including rival Indian payment firms. The message is blunt: the regulator didn't do its homework.

A three-year probe with no chance to respond, Apple says

Apple's sharpest jab is that the CCI's Director General "made no effort whatsoever to independently verify or critically assess these statements," instead "parroting them verbatim." The company also claims it was never given a single opportunity across the three-year probe to record statements or offer oral evidence. That, Apple argues, is enough to throw the whole thing out. It points to Google's treatment in a similar case, where the search giant got multiple chances to defend itself.

There's history here. During that earlier case, Google also accused the CCI of copy-pasting from a European ruling. The regulator denied it then—and the accusation didn't dent the final verdict against Google in 2023. That precedent doesn't bode well for Apple's latest move.

Why Apple waited until now to cry foul

The timing is telling. Apple spent years resisting the CCI's demands, refusing to hand over global financial documents before finally agreeing to cooperate in early June 2026. It asked for a "final extension" to prepare local India turnover figures, pushing the deadline to June 25—the very day it filed this copy-paste accusation.

The original case began in 2021, sparked by complaints from Match Group and a coalition of Indian startups over Apple's App Store fees and in-app billing rules. The $38 billion figure stems from a 2024 law letting India calculate fines on global, not just local, turnover—a rule Apple is separately contesting in the Delhi High Court.

Source: The Times of India

Russia
Source: bricscompetition.org

Review №20 of Chinese Antitrust News from the Experts of the BRICS Competition Centre 

- Draft Published: 10 Rules On Subsidies For Food Delivery Platforms
- Lalamove Under SAMR Antitrust Compliance Review
- Regulatory Interview Conducted With Sam's Club
- China And Myanmar Sign MoU On Competition Cooperation
- 11 Platforms Form Alliance To Combat “Involutionary” Competition
- Overseas Antitrust Regulation Series Highlight Chile And France
- 4th And 5th Lectures On Overseas Antitrust Compliance Held
- Campaign Launched To Improve Efficiency Of M&A Review Process

Draft Published: 10 Rules On Subsidies For Food Delivery Platforms

SAMR has released for public consultation a draft of the “Ten Rules on Food Delivery Platform Subsidies.” The consultation period will run until July 17.

Over the past year and a half, the “subsidy war” has become a central focus for both regulators and the public. Excessive subsidies aimed at eliminating competitors have harmed the interests of merchants, restaurants, couriers, and consumers, and have triggered sector investigations.
The proposed document prohibits restricting competition through long-term and large-scale subsidies. It also prevents platforms from coercing merchants and restaurants (including through algorithms or other technologies) into participating in subsidized promotions, bearing subsidy costs, or selling goods below cost.

Leading platforms that initiated the regulator-criticized “subsidy war” (Meituan, JD.com, and Taobao Flash Sale) have immediately expressed strong support for the draft rules.

Sources:SAMR 1, SAMR 2, WeChat

Lalamove Under SAMR Antitrust Compliance Review

SAMR conducted an open regulatory interview with logistics company Lalamove (known in Chinese as Huolala). The authority had previously expressed concerns about its unfair competitive practices and has now held a meeting to assess remediation progress.

The company is currently working to meet the following antitrust compliance requirements:

1. stop using algorithms to unjustifiably underprice freight services; regularly publish pricing rules and explain price changes;
2. remove mandatory exclusive vehicle sticker requirements and reimburse drivers approximately $17.5 million in unjustified fees;
3. reduce platform commissions (already reduced from 11% to 9%, lowering driver burdens by over $190 million annually);
4. protect drivers’ legitimate rights and interests, including annual investments of about $1.5 million in compensation funds for mileage deviations and about $7 million in driver assistance funds.

SAMR stated it will strictly combat “involutionary” competition in the platform economy and closely monitor compliance.

Source: SAMR

Regulatory Interview Conducted With Sam's Club

SAMR summoned the head of Sam’s Club China (a retail chain operated by Walmart) for a regulatory interview due to recently identified violations and multiple media reports concerning food safety issues. The authority required strict compliance with China’s Food Safety Law and newly issued regulations on the responsibility of chain retailers for food safety.

Earlier this year, a similar interview was conducted with Meiyijia’s leadership, and SAMR also fined seven major internet services for food safety violations. The $570 million penalty was the largest imposed on digital platforms since the 2015 revision of China’s Food Safety Law.

Source: SAMR

China And Myanmar Sign MoU On Competition Cooperation

On June 16, SAMR head Luo Wen and Myanmar’s Minister of Commerce Tun Ohn signed a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in competition policy. The agreement provides for exchange of experience and expertise through training programs, seminars, and joint research to foster a fair and competitive market environment for bilateral economic and trade cooperationг.

Source: SAMR

11 Platforms Form Alliance To Combat “Involutionary” Competition

On June 15 in Guangzhou, an Internet Platform Alliance against “involutionary” (neijuan) competition and for high-quality development was officially established.

The alliance aims to improve the quality and efficiency of the platform economy in Guangdong Province. Members pledged to adhere to proper algorithmic ethics and integrate compliance into corporate governance to ensure a healthy ecosystem through standardized competition.

The alliance will also serve as a bridge to help companies strengthen self-discipline, eliminate “involutionary” competition, promote digital transformation of small and micro enterprises, and support fair competition and shared growth across platform ecosystems.

Source: WeChat

Overseas Antitrust Regulation Series Highlight Chile And France

In 2026, SAMR launched an infographic series presenting antitrust laws and regulatory frameworks in other jurisdictions. The latest edition covers Chile and France, explaining key laws, merger notification thresholds, and potential antitrust violations.

Earlier editions covered the United States, the EU, the United Kingdom, South Korea, Japan, Canada, Italy, Germany, and Australia.

Sources: WeChat 1, WeChat 2

4th And 5th Lectures On Overseas Antitrust Compliance Held

SAMR held its fourth and fifth lectures on antitrust compliance for Chinese companies operating abroad. The sessions targeted firms in the Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macao Greater Bay Area and the Yangtze River Delta, improving their ability to identify and manage antitrust risks in foreign jurisdictions.

Organizers presented regional competition policy frameworks, analyzed case studies, provided practical guidance, and answered audience questions.

Source: WeChat

Campaign Launched To Improve Efficiency Of M&A Review Process

SAMR launched a thematic campaign to improve the efficiency of merger control enforcement. Running from June to December, the initiative aims to strengthen regulatory capacity and improve the quality and efficiency of supervision. It also includes plans to further develop and expand delegation mechanisms for merger review filings.

Source: SAMR, WeChat

Russia
Source: bricscompetition.org

Review №21 of Chinese Antitrust News from the Experts of the BRICS Competition Centre
 
- Qiushi: Responsibility for Building a Healthy Ecosystem Lies with Platforms Themselves
- NetEase v. Tencent Court Case
- Meituan Discusses Algorithm Optimization to Protect Delivery Riders’ Rights
- Chinese Developers File Antitrust Complaint Against Apple
- 2026–2028 Plan to Promote the Development of Platform Economy Enterprises
- Regulatory Meeting with Automakers Over Irrational Competition
- Second Fair Competition Seminar

Qiushi: Responsibility for Building a Healthy Ecosystem Lies with Platforms Themselves

Qiushi, the Chinese Communist Party's flagship ideological journal, has published an article on the development of the platform economy, arguing that the primary responsibility for building a healthy ecosystem rests with the platforms themselves.

According to the article, the development of the platform economy has long been overshadowed by problems such as big data- and algorithm-driven price discrimination, involutionary competition, the reassignment of orders to anonymous and unverified service providers, resistance to law enforcement authorities, and other misconduct.

The article argues that the root cause of these recurring problems is that some platform companies have lost sight of their original development objectives. The larger a platform becomes, the greater the level of self-discipline it is expected to demonstrate. Platforms connect tens of millions of merchants, gig workers, and consumers, shaping the direction of entire industries. As such, they should bear the primary responsibility for maintaining a healthy industry ecosystem. The more platforms strengthen self-regulation and prioritize the provision of high-quality goods and services, the faster they will earn consumers' trust and recognition, ultimately creating a win-win outcome for all stakeholders. Only in this way can the platform economy ecosystem continuously improve and create a virtuous cycle that enables platform companies to achieve sustainable growth and long-term prosperity.

Source: Qiushi

NetEase v. Tencent Court Case

Litigation between NetEase and Tencent over alleged abuse of market dominance remains ongoing. The dispute stems from a twelve-year conflict between the two companies over digital music copyrights.

Between 2014 and 2015, the companies repeatedly sued one another for music copyright infringement, and WeChat (owned by Tencent) even blocked NetEase Cloud Music's music-sharing feature. Tencent subsequently secured exclusive licensing rights from three major international record labels and acquired China Music Corporation.

In 2021, China's market regulator concluded that the acquisition constituted an unlawful concentration of market power and ordered Tencent to terminate all exclusive music copyright licensing agreements. The dispute, however, did not end there. In 2022, NetEase accused Tencent of engaging in unfair competition, including unauthorized distribution of songs, large-scale copying and plagiarism of musical works, and imitation of innovative products

The current proceedings are expected to focus on whether Tencent established a de facto monopoly through its music content and imposed unfair licensing terms on competing platforms.

Source: WeChat

Meituan Discusses Algorithm Optimization to Protect Delivery Riders’ Rights

At the end of April this year, China issued guidelines regulating working conditions for workers engaged in new forms of employment—the country's first formal policy document aimed at protecting the rights and interests of delivery riders, ride-hailing drivers, and other platform workers.

Two months after the guidelines were released, Meituan reported on the progress of their implementation:

• An Algorithm Advisory Committee composed of external experts and academics has been established to provide diverse perspectives on algorithm optimization.
• The company regularly organizes a "Party Members on the Frontline" initiative, under which senior executives, algorithm management directors, and Party committee members wear delivery uniforms and complete deliveries themselves to experience the realities of last-mile delivery.
• Late-delivery penalties have been abolished and replaced with a cumulative scoring system covering safety, punctuality, and service quality.
• New features allowing riders and customers to share real-time location information, as well as intelligent user prompts, are being tested.
• Measures have been introduced to combat the reassignment of orders to unverified third-party providers ("ghost deliveries»).
• Anti-fatigue protections for riders have been implemented, including pop-up reminders and mandatory log-off mechanisms.
• Delivery times are now automatically extended when riders experience prolonged waits at traffic lights.
• Dedicated online pages explaining algorithmic rules and collecting user feedback on algorithm optimization have been launched.
• A pilot program has been introduced to rate and restrict problematic customers, including a "I will no longer accept orders from this customer" option for riders

Source: WeChat

Chinese Developers File Antitrust Complaint Against Apple

A group of 48 small and medium-sized iOS developers in China has jointly filed an antitrust complaint against Apple, accusing the company of abusing its dominant market position. China's State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) has confirmed receipt of the complaint.

Previously, Apple reduced its commission on in-app purchases in China to the lowest level worldwide. Developers are now demanding that Apple permit third-party in-app payment services, allow external payment links, and enable app distribution through alternative channels outside the official App Store.
According to the complaint, the developers are asking SAMR to establish an automated monitoring mechanism to enforce Apple's commitment to offer its lowest global pricing in China. Specifically, whenever Apple lowers prices or opens additional distribution channels in any overseas market, it should be required to introduce the same—or more favorable — pricing and distribution terms in China on the same day, without transition periods or differentiated treatment.

One of the complainants stated that the group expects regulators to decide within 60 days whether to launch a formal investigation into Apple. If no meaningful progress is made, the developers may pursue civil litigation.

Sources: WeChat 1, WeChat 2

2026–2028 Plan to Promote the Development of Platform Economy Enterprises

Several government agencies, including SAMR, have jointly issued the 2026–2028 Action Plan for Promoting the Coordinated Development of Large, Medium-sized and Small Enterprises in the Platform Economy.

According to the accompanying policy explanation, the Plan aims to foster systematic, innovation-driven, ecosystem-based, and open collaboration among platform enterprises of different sizes, thereby fully unleashing the innovative potential and competitiveness of the platform economy while promoting its deeper integration with the real economy.

By 2028, the Plan envisions the establishment of a number of replicable and scalable collaborative innovation models, the creation of at least ten service platforms, and the implementation of no fewer than sixty intelligent service application scenarios.

Source: Gov.cn

Regulatory Meeting with Automakers Over Irrational Competition

On 11 June 2026, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), together with SAMR, held a regulatory meeting with automobile manufacturers suspected of engaging in irrational competitive practices.

The authorities reminded participants of their obligation to comply strictly with applicable laws and regulations, including the PRC Price Law, the Provisions on Preventing Predatory Pricing, and the Guidelines on Price Compliance in the Automotive Industry

The companies were instructed to strengthen pricing governance, improve product quality, and better protect consumers' lawful rights and interests in order to jointly maintain a market environment characterized by fair pricing and healthy.

Source: MIIT

Second Fair Competition Seminar

SAMR held its second Fair Competition Seminar of 2026 for businesses.

Representatives from seven companies operating in the manufacturing, artificial intelligence, pharmaceutical, and construction sectors exchanged views on removing barriers and bottlenecks to maintaining fair market competition.

During the seminar, SAMR stated that it would address both the "symptoms" and the "root causes" of competition-related problems, while further improving enforcement and supervisory standards and adopting more practical, results-oriented regulatory measures.

Source: SAMR

India
Source: www.brics-info.org

Key Points

• Russian Energy Agency Director Aleksei Kulapin advocates for a 'rational technological choice' scenario, maintaining hydrocarbons as key while expanding renewables.
• A global 'net zero' by 2050 is deemed unfeasible by the agency due to prohibitive annual costs of $7-8 trillion and immature technologies.
• BRICS members support a 'just energy transition' principle, allowing each country to determine its own path and timeline to climate neutrality.
• The BRICS Energy Research Platform, coordinated by Russia, involves over 100 experts and publishes annual energy panoramas for member states.
• Cooperation includes joint infrastructure projects with India and China, and standardization agreements with the United Arab Emirates.
• New initiatives focus on young specialists through the BRICS International Young Energy Agency and female leadership development proposed by South Africa.

India
Source: www.brics-info.org

Key Points

• BRICS CCI is transitioning from high-level dialogue to practical economic implementation through three strategic pillars: institutional connectivity, harmonized cross-border trade protocols, and knowledge infrastructure.
• BRICS bloc expansion is expected to benefit sectors including Digital Public Infrastructure, FinTech, AgriTech, energy transition, sustainable mobility, and advanced manufacturing.
• 2026 roadmap includes establishing global trade and innovation corridors, knowledge partnerships with research institutions, and high-level roundtables linking Indian corporations with international trade chambers.
• BRICS CCI offers Indian firms single-window access to regulatory compliance information, tariff structures, and local business laws in target BRICS nations.
• The Chamber provides strategic matchmaking services to connect Indian businesses with vetted local partners, distribution channels, and joint-venture opportunities across BRICS markets.
• BRICS CCI aims to position itself as the definitive execution partner for the Global South by fostering seamless cross-border flow of capital, technology, and talent.

India
Source: www.brics-info.org

Key Points

• Senator Flávio Bolsonaro submitted a document to the US Trade Representative (USTR) regarding Brazil's payment system.
• The proposal advocates for legislation to prevent Pix from connecting to non-Western cross-border compensation mechanisms.
• The document cites BRICS initiatives to reduce dollar dependence as a key factor in the recommendation.
• Flávio argues that Pix is sovereign public infrastructure and not a commercial competitor to US financial firms.
• The submission was made in the context of a US commercial investigation into Brazilian digital trade practices.

India
Source: www.brics-info.org

Key Points

• A study published in Energies analyzes the impact of energy transition on energy poverty across the expanded BRICS grouping from 2000 to 2023.
• Baseline models indicate a 1% increase in energy transition variables is linked to a 0.63% decrease in electricity access within BRICS economies.
• Researchers warn that clean energy expansion risks becoming less inclusive if not supported by grid upgrades, affordability measures, and social protection.
• Urbanization and economic growth were found negatively associated with electricity access in baseline results, suggesting infrastructure development is lagging behind demand.
• Policy recommendations include targeted subsidies, lifeline tariffs, and investment in smart grids to protect vulnerable consumers during decarbonization.
• The study uses electricity access as a proxy for energy poverty, noting limitations regarding multidimensional factors like affordability and clean cooking.

Russia
Source: eng.globalaffairs.ru
Author: Georgy D. Toloraya, Doctor of Economics, Professor

The unprovoked U.S.-Israeli aggression against Iran, which has undermined the foundations of international law and the established world order, is the first serious stress test for the newly expanded BRICS. The organization’s 2024–2025 enlargement (Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia) has been widely recognized as a historic success in building a platform for the World Majority, but has also shown that BRICS institutions are unprepared for conflict situations. The war has placed Iran and the UAE on opposite sides, while BRICS as a whole has no unified position.

BRICS members were divided in voting on anti-Iranian UN Resolution 2817. Russia and China abstained, while India and the UAE coauthored the resolution. Brazil adopted a moderate stance, although it condemned the strikes on Iran, as did South Africa. Egypt, conversely, condemned strikes against “brotherly Arab nations.” Ethiopia expressed concern primarily over its own energy security. BRICS consultations in New Delhi (24 April 2026) could not produce a joint statement, and instead ended with a brief summary from the Chairman acknowledging an internal split. The BRICS Foreign Ministers’ meeting (the organization’s second-most-important annual gathering), held in mid-May in New Delhi, also failed to overcome these divisions, ending with a non-consensus Chairman’s Statement noting disagreement, on a number of points, of certain (publicly known) members.[1]
In effect, three camps have emerged within BRICS. The ‘sovereign-legal’ group (Russia, China, Brazil, and South Africa) condemns the U.S.-Israeli attack. The ‘regional-strategic’ group (India, Egypt, and Ethiopia) is primarily concerned with its own security and energy supplies. Iran, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia (as a ‘half-member’) are themselves parties to the conflict.

There are also other smoldering conflicts, e.g., between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Nile.

This situation is unprecedented: previous clashes, e.g., between China and India, were kept contained, unable to interfere with long-term BRICS projects.

This has prompted a degree of schadenfreude in the West. As a Singaporean-based expert notes, BRICS is able to agree more on reformist language than on “a common posture when conflict threatens to impact concrete national interests.” (Hussein, 2026) The core principles of BRICS—consensus, respect for sovereignty, and pragmatism—function in peacetime, but paralyze decision-making during disorder and confrontation. A fundamental flaw has been exposed in the “minimalist institutionalism” of which BRICS has been so proud—for it grants rights and benefits without obligations, flexibility without diktat, which is precisely what attracts so many new applicants and aspiring members.

A secondary consequence of the war for BRICS has been an energy and financial split: disruptions in energy markets benefit some members (including Russia), but are detrimental to the majority. Furthermore, the tightening sanctions against Iran and its supporters have forced BRICS members to choose between risking secondary sanctions or distancing themselves from Tehran. These frictions notwithstanding, the war may accelerate de-dollarization and promote the creation of independent payment and settlement systems within BRICS—one of its key objectives.

Possible Trajectories for BRICS

In Russia, some experts insist on BRICS’s development based on the ‘lowest common denominator,’ while others argue that BRICS must become a fully-fledged institution of global governance, or the world will become increasingly chaotic, many World Majority countries will become less stable and secure, and BRICS itself will lose its attractiveness and influence (Karaganov et al., 2026).

In some Russian publications, the baseline scenario is one of ambition and reform, in which BRICS becomes a “central institution of the World Majority,” capable of filling the vacuum in global governance (Karaganov et al., 2026). Achieving this demands progress in seven areas: financial settlements (the prototype Mariana system); disaster response (BRICS Rescue); a new climate agenda (BRICS Nature); an analogue to the IEA (BRICS Power); food security (BRICS Feed); dialogue on military AI; and normative and educational cooperation. Further expansion of the agenda is probably undesirable.

However, although these issues are well-chosen and merit vigorous effort, the war may badly injure BRICS’s developing organism.

Hastily expanded on the eve of a global storm, BRICS and its new partners have encountered challenges of a magnitude that they cannot ignore. Nor can they discount more pessimistic scenarios.

The first of those is BRICS’s fragmentation (‘G20-ization’): degradation into yet another geopolitically lightweight forum containing several opposing factions. Political and security issues would be displaced by economic, climate, trade, and humanitarian ones, as in the early stages of BRICS’s formation. Two wings could emerge within BRICS—a pro-Western one and an “irreconcilable” one.

The second option is BRICS’s ‘Sinicization,’ discussed in the West. If Russia weakens, or India and others become more dependent upon the West given deepening geopolitical rifts, then collapse may threaten BRICS, and China may be compelled to become arbiter and security guarantor, offering technological and diplomatic support to BRICS members. The influence of Russia and other members would then decline, BRICS would become an instrument of Chinese foreign policy, and some members might withdraw or maintain only a formal association.

A more realistic scenario is a ‘two-speed BRICS,’ comprising an anti-Western core (China, Russia, and Iran) and an opportunistically hedging periphery (India, Brazil, the UAE, South Africa, Egypt, and Ethiopia). This would entail differing directions and levels of integration: the core would deepen geopolitical, security, and even military cooperation, while the periphery would participate only in economic and humanitarian projects. Developments such as India’s ‘Special Strategic Partnership’ with Israel (February 2026), and the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC, point in this direction.

Naturally, any of these scenarios would also affect the BRICS partner countries, which would also choose varying models and factions.

How Can the Situation Be Remedied?

The Gulf crisis may be a moment of truth, not a death sentence. The U.S.’s behavior under Donald Trump—including aggression against Iran and Venezuela, threats against Cuba, tariff wars, and pressure on South Africa to leave BRICS—may temporarily paralyze BRICS, but it also incentivizes BRICS consolidation. Yet BRICS should not and cannot become an anti-Western bloc, as this would diminish its attractiveness for many World Majority countries that do not wish to choose between the U.S. and China.

BRICS now faces a choice: to remain a talk-shop and gradually lose relevance or evolve into a conflict-response mechanism. If the bloc fails to propose an alternative security model (not necessarily a military alliance, but a diplomatic platform for conflict prevention), then its less influential members and partners will seek guarantees directly from the U.S. or China. BRICS would then become a declarative club, while real influence would shift to bilateral alliances—especially if the West, driven to prolong its dominance and exploitation, overcomes its internal contradictions as it did in the past.

Thus, in order to remain relevant, BRICS must establish permanent structures for mediation, monitoring, and coordination of security issues. This should be done together with deeper financial and payment integration (central banks’ digital currencies and BRICS Pay may gain momentum precisely as a means of insulating against dollar-based sanctions). The energy dimension may also play a role: the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC could trigger a domino effect and a restructuring of the global energy market. BRICS, encompassing both energy producers and consumers, could become a new platform for coordination in this sphere. AI and cybersecurity, developed independently of the West, may likewise serve as instruments of consolidation.

A Bureaucratic Remedy

BRICS must be based on ‘soft institutionalization,’ seeking not a unified alliance, but a flexible multi-level structure.

For years, I have argued for BRICS’s urgent evolutionary institutionalization, beginning with the creation of bureaucratic mechanisms for coordination, monitoring, and preservation of institutional memory (Toloraya and Nikonov, 2013; Toloraya, 2015; Toloraya and Chukov, 2016).

Previously, ‘minimalist institutionalism’ provided flexibility and lowered the barrier to entry for new members. But the enduring rejection of bureaucracy is now causing a lack of continuity. Each chair country shapes the agenda according to its own priorities; previous decisions often remain unimplemented; and what institutional memory there is depends on the enthusiasm of individual states (namely Russia). With the addition of four/five members plus partners, the problem has become critical. New members are unfamiliar with the history of the BRICS agenda, and some lack the bureaucratic resources needed to manage chairmanships involving hundreds of events (Karaganov et al, 2026).

How could ‘soft institutionalization’ be realized? Proposals for a secretariat, divided between members, are detached from the reality of international organizations’ bureaucratic functioning. A BRICS Secretary-General, with few meaningful powers and a geographically dispersed staff, would be little more than a façade.

There is no need to reinvent the wheel. A compact secretariat is needed, composed of one D-2 (per UN classification) official from each member, plus one D-1 or P-5 official from each partner. Some administrators (P-2 to P-4) would also be needed, with national quotas (like budgetary contributions) determined by a formula based on population size and GDP per capita. There should also be a technical staff recruited without quotas (G1–G7). The head of the secretariat would be appointed for a one-year term from the chair country and would, inter alia, be responsible for liaison with the chair’s government. The budget for 50–60 staff can be easily estimated.

A physical headquarters would be most effective, preferably located in a relatively neutral setting. Potential examples include Macau or Goa, which are distant from national capitals and (thanks to Portuguese) feature two BRICS languages. Of course, the secretariat may also have branches in national capitals, staffed, inter alia, by locals, if the host country is willing to finance them.

The technical secretariat would perform a limited set of functions, including:

• monitor the implementation of decisions, maintain documentation, and prepare reports and recommendations for leaders and governments;
• in cooperation with the chair country, prepare meeting agendas and the accompanying briefing and analytical materials;
• coordinate the work of the various sectoral tracks;
• maintain contacts with global and regional international organizations;
• organize training and capacity-building for partners, new members, and the ‘Friends of BRICS Club.’

This would still leave BRICS far short of a classical international organization with binding obligations and supranational bodies, and its members should not fear the emergence of diktat like in the EU. But such a mechanism may be sufficient for BRICS to pass the stress test of the current crisis, develop its own governance system, establish a crisis-response mechanism, pursue a common strategy—and even aspire to the role of global arbiter.

This article is an edited version of the paper written for the Valdai Discussion Club, https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/military-stress-test-the-war-on-iran-and-brics/
The CSTO Parliamentary Assembly in Search of Normative Consensus
Roman S. Vykhodets
In order to strengthen cooperation within the CSTO, its agenda must be expanded, and conceptual disagreements over collective security must be overcome.
More

References
Hussein, N., 2026. BRICS and the Persian Gulf Crisis: Lessons for ASEAN’s Strategic Coherence? RSIS, 22 April. https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/brics-and-the-persian-gulf-crisis-lessons-for-aseans-strategic-coherence/
Karaganov, S., Panova, V., Suslov, D., Tebin, P., and Morozkina, A., 2026. A Renewed BRICS for a Polycentric World: From Global Chaos to Orderly Multipolarity. BRICS Expert Council-Russia. https://bricscouncil.ru/en/analytics/doklad-noviy-briks-dlya-politsentrichnogo-mira-ot-mirovogo-khaosa-k-uporyadochennoy-mnogopolyarnosti
Toloraya, G. and Nikonov, V. (eds), 2013. Стратегия России в БРИКС: цели и инструменты [Russia’s Strategy in BRICS: Aims and Instruments]. Moscow: ID KDU.
Toloraya, G., 2015. Why Does Russia Need BRICS? Russia in Global Affairs, 13(1). https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/why-does-russia-need-brics/
Toloraya, G. and Chukov, R.,https://d2jiw2zrmmyqt8.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/15173225/BRICS_Chairs_Statement_May15_2026.pdf 2016. BRICS to Be Considered? International Organizations Research Journal, 11(2), pp. 97-112.
[1]  Chair’s Statement and Outcome Document at BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, New Delhi (May 15, 2026). https://d2jiw2zrmmyqt8.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/15173225/BRICS_Chairs_Statement_May15_2026.pdf

Russia
Source: eng.globalaffairs.ru
Author: Yevgeny I. Diskin, PhD in Law

Abstract

This article examines whether digital sovereignty can be sustained through domestic policy alone. Drawing on securitization theory, geoeconomics, the concept of weaponized interdependence, and regime complex theory, the article analyzes four cases: the U.S., the EU, China, and Russia. These actors confront different limitations on their control over the digital environment: insufficient regulation in the EU, counterproductivity of restrictions in Russia, limits on the foreign operations of Chinese companies, and the weakening of extraterritorial U.S. regulations. Direct-to-Cell satellite connectivity is unbundling territoriality and deepening the ineffectiveness of national gatekeeping. The article argues that Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept does not adequately respond to these challenges, and it calls for a proactive foreign policy on digital sovereignty, including a more active negotiating position vis-à-vis the U.S., cooperation within BRICS+ and the SCO, and the formation of an alternative regulatory regime.

Keywords
Digital sovereignty, securitization, geoeconomics, weaponized interdependence, regime complex, unbundling of territoriality, digital platforms, Russian foreign policy, Starlink’s Direct-to-Cell.

In 2025, President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia had achieved full digital sovereignty, claiming that only three countries in the world were truly digitally sovereign: the U.S., China, and Russia (Kommersant, 2025). Earlier, in September 2025, First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Sergei Kiriyenko also noted that the number of fully digitally sovereign countries was significantly smaller than the number of nuclear-armed states (Interfax, 2025). By claiming digital sovereignty, these ‘securitization moves’ (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998, p. 29) also imply the need to protect that sovereignty, permitting the state to take extraordinary measures for that purpose, given society’s recognition of the state’s responsibility for security.

Yet the present measures and level of control are apparently insufficient to counter external threats: foreign countries’ development of Direct-to-Cell technologies, extraterritorial pressure on digital platforms, and coercive exploitation of control over infrastructure all threaten digital sovereignty,[1] and can be countered only with foreign policy instruments.

The official statement regarding “cyber superpowers”[2] raises two major questions: 1) To what extent can control over digital technologies influence the structure of international relations? and 2) What does the status of a ‘digital superpower’ really mean, if defined formally? This article employs and develops Dmitry Anikin’s concept of multiple sovereignty (2025), while also utilizing structural realism, constructivism, securitization theory, and international regimes theory. This should unveil the nature and development of digital conflicts and outline the foreign policy decisions demanded by those conflicts.

To what extent do the ongoing political, economic, and technological conflicts,[3] between the leading digital powers, indicate the insufficiency of state instruments of control over the digital environment? What theoretical and practical factors demand the issue’s transfer into the foreign policy domain?

This study compares four country cases (the U.S., the EU, China, and Russia) featuring those factors. It also analyzes regulation of the digital sphere. Russia’s 2023 Foreign Policy Concept defines its foreign policy priorities but does not sufficiently address protection of the country’s interests in the digital sphere, as demanded by other countries’ intensive development and use of digital technologies. Keeping digital technological development solely within the realm of domestic policy may hinder Russia’s efforts to build a fair multipolar world, as its main geopolitical rivals (above all the U.S.) maintain a threatening lead in digital technologies.

This article posits that Russia’s official claim of “full digital sovereignty”—merely discursive and stated in normative acts only implicitly—disregards threats emerging at the intersection of technology and social relations on the meso and macro levels. Foreign policy instruments are needed to parry such threats.

Sovereignty and the Digital Dimension

Understanding digital sovereignty requires understanding the main approaches to defining state sovereignty. Stephen Krasner identifies four types of sovereignty: domestic sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, and Westphalian sovereignty (Krasner, 1999, pp. 3-5). It is interdependence sovereignty, i.e., a state’s ability to control cross-border flows, that has come under the greatest pressure amid the digital transformation, since digital flows are inherently transboundary and difficult to control.

Scholarship on digital sovereignty is developing rapidly: Stefano Fratini et al. (2024) have systematized four competing models of its understanding; and Julia Pohle and Mauro Santaniello (2024) have recorded a shift in the discussion from descriptive to normative approaches. Digital sovereignty is being operationalized and becoming part of practical state policy rather than only an academic subject. This article continues in the same vein, suggesting consideration of digital sovereignty not as a state’s static characteristic, but as a process whose dynamics are determined by the interaction of domestic and foreign policy instruments.

John Agnew (1994) warned of the ‘territorial trap’: automatic equation of state sovereignty with territorial control. Cyberspace is the most vivid example of a mismatch between jurisdiction over digital platforms and territorial borders, and attempts to restore territorial control by blocking digital resources create serious risks (discussed below). John J. Ruggie described an ‘unbundling of territoriality’ in which political power and social interaction cease to be rigidly tied to physical borders, and states have to deal with forces and factors that cannot be reduced to ‘territorial solutions’ (Ruggie, 1993, pp. 149-151, 171-172). Ruggie suggested not a ‘disappearance of sovereignty,’ but the emergence of ‘multiperspective institutional forms’ in which authority is separated from exclusive territoriality (Ibid, p. 172). Digital sovereignty is a clear example of ‘unbundling’: the state seeks to restore control of an environment that cannot be reduced to physical space, and hence it is forced to create new, extraterritorial regulatory instruments (i.e., establish jurisdiction based on the number of users operating in the state’s territory). This approach has been adopted in the EU, Russia, the UK, and other countries.

Digital Securitization of Sovereignty

Securitization legitimizes extraordinary measures beyond the usual political process (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998). Securitization targets various aspects of state sovereignty, and securitizing actors are heads of state and senior officials. Specific speech acts range from Putin’s statements about “three fully digitally sovereign countries,” to Macron’s remarks about the inadmissibility of “digital vassalage” (Le Monde, 2025a), to the Trump administration’s announcement that foreign regulation of American digital platforms threatens U.S. sovereignty (USDS, 2025).

All four digital powers securitize their digital sovereignty, but with varying reference objects, reflecting their varying normative approaches and strategic interests. The U.S. securitizes the freedom of its platforms from foreign regulation, i.e., defines control over the global digital infrastructure as an element of sovereignty. The EU securitizes technological independence and the integrity of users’ information. China securitizes ideological stability, declaring foreign platforms a source of destabilization. Russia securitizes the integrity of the national communication space.

The fruits of securitization—legitimized extraordinary measures—thus also differ: e.g., blocking, personal sanctions against foreign officials, forced division of companies, and creation of alternative technological ecosystems.

Geoeconomics and ‘Weaponized Interdependence’

Edward Luttwak (1990) introduced ‘geoeconomics’ into scientific use to denote a shift from military-political to economic rivalry between states, even as the underlying logic of conflict remained in place. Digital platforms are the most effective tools of geoeconomic competition: they generate huge financial flows, control the global information space, and provide access to data increasingly viewed as a strategic resource. Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris (2016) proposed the concept of economic statecraft. By handling huge financial flows and exercising monopoly control over access to infrastructure (operating systems, application stores, cloud services), platforms become tools of control, while remaining objects of state regulation. It is the economic importance of platforms that makes them one of the central elements of geoeconomic competition in the modern world.

The concept of ‘weaponized interdependence’ proposed by Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman (2019) describes the mechanism by which global network structures—financial, informational, and infrastructural—asymmetrically advantage states that control these networks’ chokepoints. The U.S., through its technology companies, controls the global Internet infrastructure, search engines, mobile device operating systems, cloud services, and digital payment systems. It has thereby amassed an unprecedented arsenal of tools to employ the ‘panopticon effect’ (monitoring of transnational flows) and the ‘chokepoint effect’ (disconnection of other actors from networks). However, this power operates within a ‘regime complex’ (Nye, 2014, p. 7), and awareness of the threat has propelled others to seek digital sovereignty by sometimes radical means (see the next section).

The states challenging U.S. digital hegemony long sought to avoid direct confrontation, relying on domestic regulation such as legal restrictions, data localization requirements, and access-blocking. But the mounting pressure is forcing them to turn to foreign policy.

Susan Strange’s ‘power structures’—environments in which other actors must act (Strange, 1994, pp. 34, 165)—seem applicable to the role of multinational digital corporations such as Apple, Google (Alphabet), Microsoft, X, Telegram, or Palantir. These corporations largely determine the architecture of digital interaction, content moderation rules, information dissemination algorithms, and data processing standards (de Bustos and Izquierdo-Castillo, 2019). Strange predicted “the retreat of the state” in the face of market forces (Strange, 1996, p. 141), but the opposite has occurred: states seek to establish control over the digital environment, which was initially formed outside of state regulation, using the entire arsenal of domestic and foreign policy instruments.

Securitization, geoeconomic competition, and control over key nodes are subject to regulation. Joseph Nye Jr. described global cyberspace governance as a ‘regime complex,’ a set of overlapping and often conflicting regimes regulating various aspects of the digital environment (Nye, 2014). This explains why states cannot achieve digital sovereignty alone, using only domestic policy: such efforts inevitably affect other states’ regimes. This is true of the U.S.’s power projection as well. The normative and functional confrontation between respective regimes, or ‘regime interdependence,’ calls for foreign policy instruments.

The Constructivist Dimension

According to the constructivist approach (see Wendt, 1999, p. 4; Katzenstein, 1996, p. 6), conflicts over digital sovereignty unfold not only in the material, but also in the normative[4] and discursive realms. Every actor constructs his own normative position, appealing to different values. The U.S. refers to freedom of speech and of entrepreneurship; the EU seeks to protect personal data and “counter disinformation and hatred” (EU Code, 2016); China upholds “cyber sovereignty” as an element of public administration; Russia prioritizes the “protection of the national information space from external interference.” The clash of these narratives creates a situation where all parties appeal to sovereignty but construe it differently. This indirectly bears out the thesis of Julia Pohle and Torsten Thiel (2020), that digital sovereignty is not so much a regulatory or organizational tool, but a discursive instrument of political argumentation, which is filled with different normative content dependent on the actor’s position and interests.

Digital Sovereignty and Conflicts Related to Its Protection

The Trump administration’s unrestrained and unilateral behavior is forcing the U.S.’s traditional allies—such as the EU, the UK, and even Canada—to speak of the “end of the rules-based order,” to discuss enhancing “strategic autonomy” (Carney, 2026), and to reconsider their attitudes to the 20-year-long dominance of American digital platforms, which all actors now see as tools of control and coercion. Escaping ‘surveillance and strangulation’ is becoming an urgent task. However, its implementation is encountering numerous legal and technological difficulties, primarily the need to build relationships with the technology giants, which operate as transnational actors despite being registered in specific jurisdictions (mainly in the U.S.) (de Bustos and Izquierdo-Castillo, 2019). These corporations are unprecedentedly important to the global technological infrastructure (Diskin, 2025a), and interaction with them requires both political will and certain national technological capabilities.

The EU AND the U.S.: Regulatory Sovereignty vs. Structural Dependence

On 18 November 2025, Berlin hosted a special EU summit on digital sovereignty, where French President Emmanuel Macron said: “We do not want to be digital vassals of the U.S. or China” (Le Monde, 2025a). In fact, Macron defined dependence on foreign platforms as an existential threat, which can be treated as an attempt at securitization. However, statements alone are not enough to escape strangulation and the panopticon, and accrued dependence cannot be overcome overnight, especially absent the political will and resources for a major leap forward. Miguel De Bruycker, Managing Director General of the Centre of Cybersecurity for Belgium, maintains that “Europe has lost the Internet,” and the EU’s attempts to restrict leading American digital platforms are irrelevant; the bloc needs its own competitive products (RBC, 2026a). “Instead of putting that focus on how we can stop the U.S. ‘hyperscalers,’ maybe we put our energy in…building up something by ourselves?” (The Brussels Times, 2026).

Nevertheless, the EU’s recent measures have noticeably affected its relations with U.S. tech corporations, which are estimated to have lost $97.6 billion from European regulations and special taxation (Schramm, 2025). When the EU uses ‘economic statecraft,’ such as regulatory pressure on foreign actors (Baldwin, 2020, pp. 28-29), the U.S. responds with ‘digital mercantilism’ (Wheeler, 2025), i.e., Luttwak’s geoeconomics.

The EU has established a legal system covering almost all areas of digitalization: the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), and the complementary Digital Services Act (DSA).[5]

Extraterritorial application of European norms has the ‘Brussels effect’ (Bradford, p. 25): global corporations align their practices with EU norms even beyond the EU’s borders. Establishing jurisdiction over foreign platforms based on the number of users in the EU is essentially an attempt to escape the ‘territorial trap’: the state asserts control not over the territory hosting servers with user data, but over the audience physically located within the state’s borders.

But, while this mechanism is effective in pressuring industry, it is reaching the limit of impact on U.S. behavior, as borne out by Macron’s words about the inadmissibility of digital vassalage and by the adoption of the Declaration for European Digital Sovereignty (Declaration, 2025).

The EU has realized, albeit quite late, that digital sovereignty cannot be achieved solely by improving regulatory mechanisms, and that it needs its own digital platforms, cloud data services, AI, and other technological infrastructure.

According to a report to the European Parliament, 80 percent of digital products, services, infrastructure, and intellectual property used in the EU have been created outside it (Report, 2025). In fact, the EU does not have major messengers, social networks, or marketplaces. Its most successful social network is France’s BeReal with 40 million monthly users (Silberling, 2025), which pales even compared to Russia’s VK, with 92 million monthly users (VK, 2025). Thus, any online discourse significant to the EU will be conducted overwhelmingly on platforms created outside its borders, within the U.S.’s panopticon. Also, Apple and Google, as the owners of mobile operating systems,[6] have structural power (in Strange’s terminology) over all digital market participants: any national application, messenger, or service operates only insofar as it has access to their ecosystems.[7] In other words, dependence on the U.S. in this field is just as great as it is in the field of armaments, even though the European Commission has its own executive vice-president for tech sovereignty (Henna Virkkunen). Nevertheless, the Europeans remain committed to determining their own regulatory frameworks and are even planning to ban digital platforms close to Trump if he moves to seize Greenland (Gutteridge and Barnes, 2026).

The EU’s public statements, regulatory measures, and fines against American companies have frustrated many officials in the U.S., not only in the Trump administration but also in some think tanks, in particular the right-libertarian Cato Institute (Inserra, 2025). The incumbent American administration’s actions clearly show that the digital track is one of its priorities. U.S. sanctions against European Commissioner Thierry Breton, and against four NGO functionaries associated with the EU’s digital policy, strongly signify a transformation of U.S.-EU relations in this area. The U.S. Secretary of State has emphasized the inadmissibility of violating U.S. sovereignty in cyberspace (Rubio, 2025). This is a manifestation of ‘weaponized interdependence’ (Farrell and Newman, 2019): the U.S. uses control over key global digital infrastructure nodes to coerce partners and uses sanctions to retain that control.

The explicit clash of narratives is an important point: the sanctioned heads of the Centre for Countering Digital Hate, the Global Disinformation Index, and Hate Aid play a major role in the implementation of the EU policy of “countering disinformation” (Diskin, 2025b, pp. 417-419). The White House has blasted their activities as “radical activism of the global censorship-industrial complex” (Rubio, 2025). This narrative is also supported by Telegram founder Pavel Durov, who has accused Macron and Breton of building a “digital Gulag” (Durov, 2025). This is essentially a clash of two incompatible narratives and regulatory orders: the U.S.’s freedom of speech, legitimizing personal sanctions, versus the EU’s fight against hatred and disinformation (EU Code, 2016), which has been ratified by EU Parliament laws (Le Monde, 2025b) and which legitimizes fines and regulatory directives.

Note that this study aims to identify the parties’ points of conflict, narratives, and tools, not to adjudge their correctness.

China and the U.S.: TikTok and Geoeconomic Coercion

China has long pursued digital autonomy, having built a system of control over its internal information space.

But prioritization of the manufacturing sector, and the sustainment of domestic demand for it, has shifted government and corporate attention to the development of online shopping. China has the world’s largest online shopping market (Xinhua, 2026) and is rapidly conquering those of other countries (Haleem, 2026).

Meanwhile, Chinese social networks such as Weibo, QQ, Xiaohongshu, and Bilibili are virtually nonexistent outside of China, due to regulatory costs and cultural and language barriers. A major exception is TikTok, with a global audience of 1.59 billion users as of the beginning of 2025 (Statista, 2025).

The conflict over TikTok, the international “mirror” of China’s Douyin platform, is particularly significant. Of the platform’s 1.59 billion users, 135 million are in the U.S.. Trump threatened to block TikTok even during his first term (AP News, 2020), but his order was blocked by a district court[8] and overturned by the Biden administration. After returning to the White House in 2025, Trump forced TikTok to split its U.S. branch into an independent legal entity under U.S. control. Such a forced separation should be considered an instrument of state policy.

It seems that Beijing made concessions on TikTok because it needed to maintain access to the U.S. digital advertising and consumer content market.

But it is unlikely to do the same regarding marketplaces, as they have strategic economic importance to China, providing it with economic leverage (Drezner, 2021) and other benefits described by Farrell and Newman (2019).

Control over the external information space is still of secondary importance for China, but pressure on Chinese companies abroad (e.g., TikTok) is forcing Beijing to make foreign policy decisions. The isolation of its internal information space has not eliminated the need for foreign policy tools.

Russia: Technological Autarky and the Dilemma of Control

Long before the EU did, Russia faced the issue of dependence on foreign digital platforms, and began developing its own replacements.

Unlike in the EU, Russian platforms’ market share was quite significant even before the mass blocking of foreign resources. In 2022-2023, the search engine Yandex controlled 49% of the market, versus Google’s 47%, notwithstanding the far greater resources and unrestricted status of the latter (AdIndex, 2023; Blunt, 2025). VKontakte remains the flagship Russian social network (VK, 2022). Russian marketplaces accounted for 62% of e-commerce in 2021 (Bakharev, 2022). Putin’s description of digital sovereignty, as a pool of national competitive platforms, is therefore accurate.

But digital sovereignty should also be understood as requiring emancipation from the aforementioned ‘strangulating control’ and ‘panopticon effect,’ which continue to plague Russia and Russians’ communication with one another.

Russia remains in an unprecedentedly intense conflict with the U.S. and the EU over control of Russia’s own cyberspace. Western countries censor Russian official resources and state-owned media by blocking them on their platforms and in EU jurisdictions in 2022-2023 (AiF, 2022; TASS, 2024), a process that began long before the Special Military Operation (TASS, 2019). The normalization of Russia’s relations with U.S. tech giants remains conceivable, but this would likely require a comprehensive peace process,[9] and it is unclear what to do with a company that has been designated as extremist, or with fines that have exceeded the entire global money supply (e.g., for not complying with court orders to restore Russian TV channels on YouTube (Zvezda, Channel One, VGTRK, NTV, RT, and others)(RBC, 2024).

There has emerged a tendency towards ‘technological autarchy.’[10] LinkedIn, Telegram, Twitter (X), Facebook, Instagram,[11] YouTube, Signal, Discord, Viber, WhatsApp, Roblox, FaceTime, and Snapchat have all been slowed or blocked in Russia since 2016. Government officials affirm that the current approach is the right way to enforce legislation (Gorelkin, 2025), but there have been no significant signs of foreign platforms’ behavior changing since February 2022. Even when the authorities indicated success in negotiations with Roblox, with a (mainly child) audience in Russia of 18 million (Lantsov, 2025), the service remained blocked as of May 2026 (RIA, 2026a). This provoked discontent: the head of the Safe Internet League, Yekaterina Mizulina, received 63,000 complaints from children and their parents about Roblox alone, which she forwarded to the Roskomnadzor agency (Mizulina, 2025). Many more are concerned by Telegram’s blocking (Gudoshnikov, 2026).

This exposes the growing gap between the securitization of sovereignty and the effectiveness of extraordinary measures taken to ensure it: with the threat to sovereignty defined as existential, emergency measures (blocking) are formally legitimized, but uncontrollable side effects—emigration of specialists, growing discontent, and technological lag—limit that legitimation and create new security threats. Thus, measures to strengthen security in one area (communication) impair security in other areas (technological development, social stability). Alternative tools, including in foreign policy, must be considered. The current approach is increasingly ineffective and even counterproductive, leading to paradoxical results, like the purchase of VPNs by some regional administrations (Okhotnikova, 2026).

The Exhaustion of Tools for State Control

The most intense conflicts over digital sovereignty illustrate that domestic policy tools, alone, are increasingly incapable of resolving such disputes. For the EU, such tools have proven to be too weak, failing to facilitate the emergence of its own platforms. For Russia, such tools have been counterproductive: blocking has uncontrollable side effects. For China, such tools have proven sufficient to protect its domestic market, but unable to protect its companies abroad. And, for the U.S., such tools cannot overcome the increasing resistance to its extraterritorial imposition of norms. In fact, all four parties are in an intense conflict—between West and East, and also between the U.S. (under Trump) and the EU.

Regarding Russia in particular, comparison with the U.S. is telling. The U.S.’s mandatory division of TikTok was legitimized as an emergency measure to protect 135 million Americans from the control of a foreign power. TikTok was already operating under U.S. jurisdiction,[12] but now it will be managed by U.S. investors, giving the U.S. real control (Khushboo and Han, 2025). Russia blocked Meta platforms (Instagram and Facebook) for similar reasons,[13] but with diametrically opposite results: while the U.S. acquired control over TikTok within its borders, Russia lost access to audiences beyond its borders, as there is no Russian alternative with similar global reach.[14] Telegram’s blocking also raised a wave of criticism among military bloggers, officials, and entrepreneurs (RBC, 2026a). The asymmetry of results is explained by the difference in negotiating power: the U.S. controls key infrastructure nodes, which allows it to impose its conditions, while Russia can only isolate itself.

For Russia, this is a major conflict, whose outcome will greatly affect Russia’s digital market and technologies. In the worst case, serious political instability may be generated if successive bans on foreign services eliminate the ability to project national content and narratives, deprive Russians of personal digital communication with the outside world, and exclude them from the global digital agenda and discourse. This risk has not yet been adequately reflected in strategic documents.
Russia’s current digital foreign policy is defined in Para 30 of the Foreign Policy Concept, which declares the goal of the “safe and stable functioning and development of the Internet, based on the equal participation of states in its governance and…preventing the establishment of foreign control over [the Internet’s] national segments.” This is vague and somewhat outdated. It repeats the logic of Federal Law 90-FZ of 1 May 2019 (known as the Sovereign Runet Law) (Zhukov and Shugunov, 2020), but the risk of Russia being cut off from the global Internet is less than it was in 2019, thanks to technical measures taken since then.
The Foundations of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of International Information Security considers many threats, mainly criminal ones (Presidential Decree, 2021). But the document was written so as to motivate certain UN convention that was indeed passed in December 2024 (Convention, 2024), and has little relevance beyond that.

The threats facing Russia are not limited to crime or an externally imposed Internet cutoff. One of the greatest threats is that escalating internal blocking could partly disconnect the Russian and foreign segments of the Internet. Moreover, even a complete disconnection would have limited utility, given almost nondisruptable Direct-to-Cell technology. The January 2026 unrest in Iran, fueled by Starlink’s provision of ‘pirate’ Internet, shows the U.S.’s ability to overcome blocking in any state—even the UK (GB News, 2026).

Meanwhile the Americans are upgrading their capabilities: Starlink is actively developing the Direct-to-Cell space communication technology, which does not require any terminals or satellite dishes—an LTE-enabled smartphone gets connected directly to a satellite (Starlink, 2025). The last smartphones lacking LTE support were sold more than 15 years ago, and LTE occupies 96-97% of Russia’s mobile network (Kotov, 2024). Suppressing such access would require either jamming all LTE/5G[15] cellular bands, or manually examining all mobile devices, which seems impossible (3side, 2025). Starlink’s Direct-to-Cell technology is essentially a new ‘weapon of interdependence’ that significantly enhances the ‘panopticon’ and creates a fundamentally new mechanism for ‘penetration.’ Although Russia is developing its own satellite communication systems, it still lacks comparable capabilities (RBC, 2026b).

Starlink’s Direct-to-Cell technology vividly illustrates the ‘unbundling of territoriality’: the state loses control as access ceases to be routed solely through ground infrastructure.

In Russia’s reincorporated regions, a response is needed to Starlink’s plans to activate Direct-to-Cell in what it considers to be Ukrainian territory (Reuters, 2025). The subject must be included in any negotiations on Ukraine. In December 2025, Russia called an informal meeting of the UN Security Council, demanding that satellite communication services respect the sovereignty of other states (Vedomosti, 2026). This was an attempt to work out basic principles for the international regulation of satellite communications, but its success will require broad international support along with pressure on SpaceX.

Possibilities for Institutionalization

The above-described conflicts over digital sovereignty cannot be resolved by the U.S., the EU, Russia, or China by solely domestic means.

The aforementioned ‘regime complex’ determines which institutional forms are available to foreign policy (Nye, 2014). Forming an integrated regime is hampered by contradictions between the (Russia- and China-supported) multilateral model of Internet governance, and the (U.S.- and to a lesser extent EU-supported)
multistakeholder model, which entails the participation of all stakeholders, including non-state actors (see: Mueller, 2010; Zinovieva and Shitkov, 2024). The evolution of the regime complex, currently halfway between complete fragmentation and a single coherent legal structure, may be the most likely scenario (Nye, 2014, p. 16). But the current trajectory is clearly towards fragmentation, partly due to states’ reliance on domestic political instruments to ensure digital sovereignty (RBC, 2026c).

Our theoretical analysis suggests several foreign policy options for the Foreign Ministry, the Security Council, expert groups, and negotiation platforms.

First, in negotiations with the U.S., Russia should raise the issue of U.S. digital platforms’ future operation in Russia. The U.S. may raise this issue itself, but its negotiating position should be understood in advance. Russia’s blocking of foreign platforms limits the benefits, derived by the U.S. from its technological advantage, and emphasizing U.S. companies’ losses may strengthen Russia’s negotiating position.

Second, Russia should strengthen practical cooperation with BRICS+ and the SCO, and internationally discuss threats to Internet governance and the risks of pursuing digital sovereignty through blocking alone. Russia and China could promote their digital platforms as alternatives to American ones, provide them to BRICS+ countries, and exchange experience and competencies. The purpose is to form an alternative (regional, not universal) regime complex that ensures a minimum level of cooperation and harmonization of standards.

Third, when attempts are made on foreign platforms to discredit Russian culture, language, and history, or to persecute Russian users, such attempts must be opposed. But this is possible only through effective international cooperation on digital regulation, a task that has not yet been properly articulated. Foreign digital platforms may be influenced through administrative pressure in reputationally sensitive areas, prosecution for campaigns that violate Russians’ rights, and mass lawsuits by affected users in foreign courts. Other measures should include cooperation with BRICS+ and SCO members in digital regulation, public campaigns to disclose illegal activities of individuals and organizations affiliated with foreign platforms, and the pursuit of modifications to international law by promoting joint legal positions in relevant intergovernmental organizations.

Fourth, the areas of legal cooperation should be expanded: the CIS, SCO, and BRICS+ platforms should be employed to pursue amendment of the UN Convention against Cybercrime, so that it includes provisions on mutual assistance in prosecuting information warfare, terrorist propaganda, and the incitement of interethnic and interreligious hatred.

Finally, a permanent BRICS+/SCO mechanism for cyberspace governance should be created. It may serve as the prototype for a new international regime. Internet access beyond the state’s control threatens not only Russia: the aforementioned forays against the UK and Iran (Times of India, 2026) may indicate that the U.S. is preparing such campaigns against any country seen as threatening American digital platforms.

The above analysis yields several general conclusions.

First. Conflicts over digital sovereignty between the leading digital powers—the U.S., EU, China, and Russia—are not isolated episodes, but the products of a structural shift in international relations. Theories of securitization (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998), geoeconomics (Luttwak, 1990; Blackwill and Harris, 2016), of interdependence-weaponization (Farrell and Newman, 2019), and of international regimes (Krasner, 1983; NYE, 2014) reveal the patterns underlying these conflicts and predict their development.

Second. All four considered great powers are approaching the limits of their tools’ effectiveness, and now face insufficiency (the EU), counterproductivity (Russia), ‘defensive’ ineffectiveness abroad (China), and ‘offensive’ ineffectiveness abroad (the U.S.). No actor can rely solely on domestic policy tools, and all must adopt some foreign policy instruments.

Third. Russia’s current strategic documents—the Foreign Policy Concept and The Foundations of State Policy in the Field of International Information Security—do not fully reflect the described dynamics. Their focus on countering cybercrime, and on external disconnection of the Runet, needs to be significantly expanded to account for new technologies like Starlink’s Direct-to-Cell.

Fourth. Digital issues should be institutionalized as an independent area of Russia’s foreign policy. Priorities should be defined in strategic documents, negotiating positions should be formulated, and mechanisms for international cooperation (bilateral and within BRICS+ and the SCO) should be developed.
The global Internet’s increasing fragmentation—contrary to the integration that prevailed at the beginning of the 21st century—is dragging the contours of digital space out of alignment with national development. To avoid becoming one of the losers in this process, Russia must transition from reactive domestic policy to a proactive foreign policy strategy.

India
Source: www.brics-info.org

Key Points

• The Ministry of Women and Child Development organized the third preparatory meeting of the BRICS Women Working Group digitally under India's presidency.
• The meeting was chaired by Anil Malik, Secretary of the Ministry of Women and Child Development.
• Discussions focused on priority areas and key outcomes under the theme 'Building Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainable Development'.
• Member countries congratulated India on its BRICS presidency and expressed support for strengthening cooperation in women's empowerment.
• The meeting served as a precursor to the BRICS Women Working Group meeting and Ministerial Meeting scheduled in Kochi from July 6 to 9.
• India reiterated its commitment to promoting practical partnerships for women-led development in BRICS nations.

India
Source: www.brics-info.org

Key Points

• The Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS) outlined the BRICS Trade Union Forum's AI task force work programme focusing on labour protections.
• Key issues identified include workplace surveillance, automation-led job displacement, and rights for platform workers.
• India will host the 15th BRICS Trade Union Forum in Hyderabad from 14 to 16 July under BMS presidency.
• The task force aims to produce a common position paper and practical frameworks for BRICS trade unions on technology governance.
• Priority areas include reskilling, equitable sharing of productivity gains, and strengthening social security for gig workers.
• The task force will consist of representatives from BRICS trade union centres and subject experts operating by consensus.

India
Source: www.brics-info.org

Key Points

• A study published in Energies analyzes the asymmetric effect of renewable and non-renewable energy on CO2 emissions in BRICS countries from 1991 to 2022.
• BRICS nations are responsible for 43.3% of global carbon emissions and consume 40% of the world's energy, making them central to the global climate fight.
• Renewable energy consumption reduces emissions, but fossil fuel dependence remains deeply embedded and can overwhelm green gains.
• Reducing fossil fuel use delivers stronger environmental gains than simply increasing renewables, especially in high-emission contexts.
• Policy stability, infrastructure investment, and workforce development are identified as crucial for a successful energy transition in BRICS economies.
• Trade openness is currently associated with higher emissions in BRICS, suggesting a need for climate-aware trade policies.
• The transition requires cleaner capital, skilled workers, and credible fossil fuel phase-down strategies tailored to country-specific conditions.

India
Source: www.brics-info.org

Key Points

• The GO-BRICS India-Russia Energy-o-thon 2026 launched as the world's first BRICS nations hackathon with over 17,000 engineering student registrations from India and Russia.
• The competition challenges teams to use AI to manage a 90 MW power deficit in hybrid industrial energy systems while meeting sustainability constraints.
• The three-stage contest includes online qualifying, offline semi-finals in India, and a grand finale in Russia planned to coincide with the BRICS Heads of State Summit.
• The initiative is led by the BRICS International Forum with institutional support from India's Rajiv Gandhi Institute of Petroleum Technology (RGIPT).
• More than 40 percent of participants are women, noted as a significant share for an energy and technology competition.
• Organizers plan to extend the hackathon model to other BRICS nations in future editions.
• Solutions are evaluated by a panel from India's technology and startup community on technical merit, feasibility, and real-world applicability.

India
Source: www.brics-info.org

Key Points

• Iran is expanding scientific cooperation with five BRICS countries through a new program focused on strategic projects in science, technology and innovation
• Research projects will involve institutions from Brazil, China, Egypt, Russia, and South Africa, requiring cooperation networks between universities and research centers
• Three strategic axes: development of a BRICS smart telescope, integrated Earth data network, and psychomolecular tools research
• Selected projects receive funding for a minimum of three years with possibility of extension
• BRICS maintains regular calls for projects involving teams from at least three member countries covering water resources, energy, health, biotechnology, AI, and high-performance computing
• Iranian authorities highlighted the program as an opportunity to strengthen international cooperation and researcher participation in large-scale projects