Russia
Source: mid.ru

Question: The creation of the International Organisation for the Russian Language (IORL) has been an important step in promoting the Russian language abroad. Its current members include Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, but the organisation is open to other countries. What prospects do you see for promoting the Russian language within BRICS? And is it possible to include media projects aimed at international audiences in the systematic promotion of the Russian language – is their integration into the organisation’s activities being discussed?

Maria Zakharova: Strengthening the position of the Russian language abroad is one of the priorities of Russian foreign policy. And this is not some artificial construct. According to various estimates, between 250 and 300 million people worldwide speak Russian as their native language. Russian is an official language of the UN and other international organisations. However, within BRICS, given the specific nature of the format, this work is carried out in a broader context. We focus on developing cultural cooperation in all its fullness and diversity, and on strengthening an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding between our peoples.

We have achieved considerable success in this area. A great deal was accomplished during Russia’s 2024 BRICS Chairmanship, with dozens of vibrant and meaningful events organised to promote our country’s rich culture and the Russian language. This culminated in the BRICS Culture Festival held in St Petersburg in July 2024. During the Brazilian Chairmanship year, two Russian films were shown at the BRICS Film Festival, further contributing to the promotion of the Russian language and Russian cultural achievements.

As part of the Ministry’s ongoing work, we systematically monitor the status of the Russian language in BRICS countries, drawing on data from Russian missions abroad, expert sociological surveys, and statistical analysis. The results show sustained interest in learning Russian in the target countries.
Russian is both a culture and a modern tool for education and self-fulfilment across a range of fields. There is clear growth in the use of Russian in cultural and educational exchanges, as well as in bilateral economic and research cooperation with our BRICS partners. We see genuine interest in learning it. Russian Houses are expanding their activities, successfully running numerous projects, conferences and arts evenings. More and more young people are choosing to study Russian, because it expands their opportunities for professional self-fulfilment.

For our part, we support and coordinate the systematic work of federal executive bodies to promote the Russian language in BRICS countries, through the implementation of major projects in the educational, scientific, cultural, humanitarian and information spheres. We use a wide range of tools, employ a variety of formats, and take regional context into account.

For example, in 2024, a series of events (lectures, seminars, and concerts featuring Russian groups and soloists) was organised in Brazil as part of a programme aimed at introducing foreign audiences to Russia’s cultural heritage.

In 2025, under the auspices of the International Association of Teachers of Russian Language and Literature, the International Forum of Russian Language Teachers in Latin America, Terra Rusistica, was held in Brazil. It became the largest discussion platform for Russian language specialists in the region, with over 100 scholars from Latin America taking part.

Here is an example of how media projects can help. 2025 saw the production of videos aimed at international audiences, promoting the Russian language, popularising key achievements in Russian education and science, and showcasing the cultural and tourism potential of our country. The videos were filmed at leading Russian universities that train foreign nationals, posted online, and broadcast – including on the TV-BRICS television channel targeting audiences in BRICS countries.

For many years, the Russkiy Mir Foundation has made a significant contribution to educational and outreach activities in all BRICS countries, promoting the work of Russian-language media and implementing useful initiatives to expand and protect the Russian-speaking space. It supports public and non-profit organisations, professional and national teachers’ associations whose activities include popularising the Russian language, developing teaching methods and study programmes, promoting Russian culture, and organising events dedicated to Russia and its history.

The Foreign Ministry supports the Foundation’s activities by creating an institutional framework to strengthen the position of the Russian language in BRICS countries. We recognise that the Russian language is a significant tool for global information exchange and the widespread dissemination of knowledge.

The Foundation has already established fruitful cooperation with TV-BRICS. For example, as part of the Foundation’s flagship event – the 17th Assembly of the Russian World in 2025 – a thematic platform was organised in partnership with TV-BRICS, entitled A New Media Dimension: Expanding Dialogue, Building Trust. Participants from more than 40 countries (including heads of foreign media corporations from Brazil, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Oman, Ethiopia and South Africa) discussed the shaping of the global information landscape and the role of media outlets from the Global South, including BRICS countries, within it. The Assembly’s final resolution emphasised that “the BRICS countries, representing almost half of the human population, possess a unique cultural and historical wealth that should be reflected in global projects through the creation of a unified media space. This space is designed to broaden the spectrum of opinions and promote pluralism.”

It’s excellent that you already have experience in this important and promising initiative.

Russia
Source: en.interaffairs.ru

Iran just offered Europe a Hormuz deal, ‘Citizen Watch Report’ reports.

On the surface: Iran offered the EU transit access through the Strait of Hormuz.

Sounds like a small diplomatic move. Standard geopolitics.

It is not. This is a goddamn financial nuclear bomb.

Let that sink in:

• The Hormuz Strait carries 20% of ALL the world’s oil consumption
• Europe’s energy bill jumped $16.2 BILLION in just 30 days of war
• Natural gas in Europe is up 100%. Oil up 60%. Diesel at $200/barrel
• Dollar reserves have already fallen from 70% to 56.9% in 25 years
• Iran joined BRICS in 2024. Russia banned dollar transactions. Gold hit $5,500/oz
• If Europe takes this deal, they pay in euros — not dollars
• One major non-dollar oil deal is all it takes to show the world it CAN be done

Do you understand the scale of what’s happening?

• The petrodollar is the most powerful financial system ever created. Born in 1974. It forced every nation on Earth to hold dollars just to buy oil. That’s the entire basis of US financial dominance. Not strength. Not trust. OIL.
• If that system cracks — BRICS accelerates, Gulf states reconsider, dollar demand collapses, and America can no longer fund its $34 trillion debt on easy terms. The US doesn’t lose a battle. It loses the WAR — the financial one it’s been winning since 1974.
• ECB board member Panetta said it on April 2: “Even if the Iran war ends, the damage has been done.” Deutsche Bank called the Iran war a “catalyst” for yuan replacing the petrodollar.

They’re showing you a war about nuclear weapons and regional security.

They’re NOT showing you that the REAL war is over who gets to print the world’s reserve currency.

Here’s the logic — follow it carefully:

• Iran blocks Hormuz for the US. Opens it for EU with a deal.
• EU, desperate and bleeding, seriously considers taking the deal.
• Deal gets done in euros or yuan. Not dollars.
• Every country watching — BRICS, Global South, Gulf states — sees it happen.
• “If the EU can bypass the dollar, so can we.”
• Dollar demand falls. Reserve share collapses. US inflation rises.
• You didn’t just lose a trade route. You lost the dollar’s 50-year monopoly on global trust.

If America is so powerful and the dollar is so safe, why is the EU considering a deal with the country America is bombing?

If Western unity is so solid, why did 40 countries meet to reopen Hormuz and achieve absolutely nothing?

Complete silence.

This is no longer just a Middle East war. This is a direct attack on the petrodollar — the system that powers the entire American empire.

Prepare accordingly.

Iran just offered Europe a Hormuz deal.

You have no idea what they just triggered.

...If Europe agrees to these Iranian proposals, the global power of the petrodollar will collapse for the first time since the 1970s.

Europe now has a choice: either agree or… stay without oil and gas until the end of April this year. There are no large reserves in EU!

So, Europe could openly challenge Trump's America, and the unity of the “collective West” will be shattered. This is crucial.

What about Russia? Russia will be watching this epic clash between two former allies – the US and Europe!

India
Source: www.mea.gov.in

Shri Randhir Jaiswal, Official Spokesperson: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. Let's begin our conversation. The floor is open. Start from here.

Huma Siddiqui, Strat News Global: Sir, I have two questions. My name is Huma Siddiqui and I am from Strat News Global. Whether India has asked US for a special waiver for getting Russian LNG? And my second question is, will the Foreign Ministers of Quad meet in New Delhi next month?

Shri Randhir Jaiswal, Official Spokesperson: Meet when?

Huma Siddiqui, Strat News Global: Next month.

Yeshi Seli, Business India: This is Yeshi Seli from Business India. My question is on Indian peacekeepers in Lebanon. The exact numbers that are there, and I know that there has been a statement issued where India has urged that their safety becomes a priority. But three peacekeepers from Indonesia are already dead. So, what's the reason that they are there because this is an all-out war? How do you ensure that they stay protected?

And my second question is, the ships that are coming from Strait of Hormuz, are we paying any toll on the ships that are being released or are they just coming gratis?

Ayushi Agarwal, ANI: Sir, this is Ayushi Agarwal from ANI. I have a question related to the upcoming BRICS Foreign Ministers meeting. We are expecting it to take place next month. Has India sent invitations to all the members and if you can let us know how many countries have confirmed so far? Thank you so much.

Sidhant, WION: Hi sir, I am Sidhant from WION. When it comes to the neighborhood, we are providing support in terms of fuel to countries like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. If you can perhaps give an overview.

And my second question is, the Japanese Foreign Ministry has opened a special unit in their department for India economic relationship to firm up economic relationship with India, which is a very novel way of dealing with bilateral relationships. How does India see that?

Keshav Padmanabhan, The Print: Thank you, Spokesperson. Keshav Padmanabhan here from The Print. My first question is with regards to Azerbaijan. Yesterday, the Indian Ambassador met with the Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan. In the past, especially during Op SINDOOR, there have been statements back and forth. So, just wanted to understand here what was specifically discussed, what is going to move forward? Have you agreed to the political office consultations that came out in the Azeri readout?

And secondly, just wanted to add, we are now in the month of April. The US had given a waiver for Chabahar till the end of April. What is sort of the status? Have there been discussions on extending this further? Can you just give us a sense because we are now on the 2nd of April and it should end on the 26th. Thank you.

Shri Randhir Jaiswal, Official Spokesperson: Okay. So, first Huma, to your question. We have seen some speculation on this matter. These reports are ill-informed when it comes to the facts of this particular matter. So, these are speculation and we would caution against such reports.

On Quad Foreign Ministers meeting, you said next month, we are still some distance away. We will keep you informed, well in time as to what we have, what we are planning, so on and so forth.

Yeshi, on the exact number of troops that we have in UNIFIL. We have around 600 Indian troops who are serving in UNIFIL. We have been doing it, our peacekeeping operations go back several decades. We are also the largest troop-contributing country to the UN peacekeeping missions. And the contribution of our peacekeepers has been well-noted, regarded, to global peace and security. We had also issued a statement, which you may have seen, condemning the recent attacks on UNIFIL in which several troops unfortunately lost their lives. We also pay homage to these brave blue helmet soldiers. Once again, we would like to emphasize that the inviolability of UN missions must be ensured, and safety and security of our peacekeepers must be ensured. As one of the largest and longest-serving contributors to peacekeeping, as also in consonance with UN Security Council Resolution 2589, we seek accountability for crimes against peacekeepers.

On your questions regarding payment, etc., we had clarified this issue earlier as well that there has been no discussion of this nature between us and Iran.

Ayushi, again, BRICS Foreign Ministers meeting, we are the chair. We are doing several of these meetings. You would have followed the recent working level meetings that we have done. We will be organizing a series of meetings going into our presidency. We'll keep you updated with the Foreign Ministers level meeting as also other tracks in which we'll have ministerial interaction.

Sidhant, on neighborhood, on Bangladesh as you would have seen, we continue to supply energy requirements to them since 2007 as per the commercial engagement that we have with them. We have also recently supplied fuel to Sri Lanka, 38,000 metric tons of petroleum products based on their request. Also, we have ongoing engagement with Nepal and Bhutan which continue.

The Government of Maldives has also reached out to us for supply of petroleum products, both on short-term and long-term basis. The Maldives request is being examined keeping in mind our own availability, our own needs. We also remain engaged with the Governments of Mauritius and Seychelles on the energy situation in these two countries. We have not received any request from them as yet. So that is how the situation is in our neighborhood.

On Japan, giving a focus to India-Japan economic partnership, this is a welcome move. Our economic partnership is one of the strongest pillars of India-Japan cooperation and we want to strengthen it further. We have a large number of Japanese companies who are active here in India in the manufacturing space, in the innovation space, and we want this number to continue further. We also have a large presence of Indian companies on the services side, on the IT side, on the tech side, and several other fields in Japan, and we want to strengthen our joint work together.

On Azerbaijan, question from Keshav. Azerbaijan, we have our ambassador there, he recently presented credentials. During the presentation of his credentials, he also discussed several issues of bilateral nature. As you know, several of our Indian nationals, 204 to be precise, have been able to leave Iran for Azerbaijan through the land border. And from there, they'll be coming back home. Several of them have returned. Others will be returning in the course of the next few days or so. We are thankful to the government of Azerbaijan for the support that they have rendered for the exit of Indian nationals from Iran through the land border. We have consultations and regular exchange between both sides and hopefully we'll have more details or more developments on this account for you.

There was a question regarding Chabahar. So, our position remains the same what I had conveyed earlier. This particular issue, sanctions waiver that was given to us, is valid till 26th April 2026. Government of India remains engaged with all concerned in order to address the implications of these developments.

Alexander, Russian media: Good evening. Alexander, I am with the Russian media. First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Government, Mr. Manturov, is visiting New Delhi as well as a high-ranking Russian Member of Parliament, Mr. Yakushev. Could you please give us an update on the interactions that they have with their Indian counterparts? Thank you.

Jessica, Doordarshan: Hi sir, this is Jessica for Doordarshan. Bahrain has proposed a resolution in UNSC calling for unimpeded transit through the Strait of Hormuz, which also includes the multinational naval partnership to secure the area. What is India's outlook to the proposed resolution?

Abhimanyu Sharma, CNBC-TV18: Sir, this is Abhimanyu Sharma from CNBC-TV18. Sir, are the news reports true that tankers are being allowed to flow through the Strait of Hormuz subject to the payment made in Yuan?

Vishal Pandey, ABP News: Sir, main Vishal Pandey hoon ABP News se. Ek mahine se zyada waqt beet chuka hai is yuddh ka. Jo yuddhgrast desh hain, wahan par Bhartiyon ki sthiti kaisi hai aur kitne Bhartiyon ki maut is yuddh ke dauran hui hai? Aur iske sath hi sath, Rashtrapati Trump ne aaj kaha hai ki Hormuz ki jo khadi hai, wahan par un deshon ko khulwane par vichar karna chahiye jo wahan se tel lete hain, America ka koi lena dena nahi. Is par Bharat ki kya pratikriya hai?

[Approximate Translation: Question in Hindi] Sir, I am Vishal Pandey from ABP News. It has been more than a month since this conflict began. What is the current situation of Indians in the war-affected countries, and how many Indian citizens have lost their lives during this conflict?

Along with this, President Trump has said today that countries which take oil through the Strait of Hormuz should think about opening it, as the United States has no direct stake in it. What is India’s response to this?

Neeraj, News18 India: Sir, Neeraj News18 India se. ICT ko Sheikh Hasina ki taraf se patra likha gaya hai, jo unke khilaf saza di gayi hai, us saza ko hatane ke liye aur faisle ko gair kanooni bataya gaya. Bharat Sarkar ka kya paksh hai ispe?

[Approximate Translation: Question in Hindi] Sir, I am Neeraj from News18 India. A letter has been written to the ICT by Sheikh Hasina, in which she has called the sentence given against her illegal and has requested that it be revoked. What is the Government of India’s position on this?

Shri Randhir Jaiswal, Official Spokesperson: Okay, so first, Alexander, coming to your question. We have the First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, His Excellency Mr. Denis Manturov in Delhi. He arrived today and he will be there till tomorrow. He has several meetings lined up. We will keep you informed of those meetings. This visit is a bilateral visit for consultations, to follow up on the annual summit that we had recently. At the same time, we also have the First Deputy Chairperson of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, His Excellency Vladimir Yakushev. He is also in the city. He called on the Speaker of Lok Sabha a little while ago at the Parliament House and they exchanged as to how we can strengthen our parliament-to-parliament links. It looks very well for a relationship which is deep-rooted and time-tested in terms of its strategic content. So, more on these as we go into the evening, we will get more details, and also a press release for you giving the details of the meetings that the First Deputy Prime Minister will be having with dignitaries here in India.

Jessica, your question was regarding the Bahraini resolution. This particular resolution is under consideration in the UN Security Council. We are aware of the resolution. We also know that relevant parties, which means the members of the Security Council, are currently negotiating this particular text. As far as India is concerned, you very well know what we stand for. We stand for free and open commercial shipping and for maritime security in keeping with international law. We continue to call for ensuring safe and free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz as a matter of priority. And also, we are closely following all developments in regard to this West Asian conflict. So, that is how we look at the Bahraini resolution. Given to understand that it may come up for discussion or consideration today or tomorrow.

Abhimanyu, your question, again, I answered that question that there has been no discussion between India and Iran on the question of payment.

Vishal, Khadi ke deshon mein, GCC ke deshon mein, kareeban ek crore, yaani ki 10 million Bharatiya nagrik wahan rehte hain. Sabhi surakshit hain. Hamare dutawas sabhi deshon mein unse lagatar sampark mein hain, unse baat-cheet hoti rehti hai, taaki jo bhi unki samasyayein hon, jis prakar ki unko zaroorat ho, usko hum log poora kar sakein. Khed yeh hai ki is yuddh mein abhi tak aath Bharatiya nagrik hataahat hue hain aur ek abhi bhi gayab ya missing bataya ja raha hai. Toh yeh hai mota-mota aaklan hamare Bharatiya nagrikon ke baare mein. Lekin saath hi saath main yeh kehna chahta hoon ki hum log tatpar hain, yahan par Videsh Mantralaya mein, hamare Shipping Mantralaya, Jahaz Mantralaya, aur jitne hamare Bharatiya dutawas wahan par hain, hamare nagrikon ki suraksha ke liye aur unke hit ke liye.

Jahan Hormuz ki khadi ki baat aapne kahi, dekhiye jitni bhi gatividhiyan hain khadi ko leke, is yuddh ko leke, is conflict ko leke aur Hormuz ko leke, is saari gatividhiyan ko leker hum apni nazar banaye hue hain.

[Approximate Translation: Answer in Hindi] Vishal, in the Gulf countries, in the GCC nations, around one crore—that is, about 10 million—Indian nationals reside there. All of them are safe. Our embassies in all these countries are in constant contact with them, regularly communicating so that any issues they face or any needs they have can be addressed. It is unfortunate that, so far, eight Indian nationals have been injured in this conflict, and one is still reported missing. So, this is a broad assessment regarding our citizens. At the same time, I would like to say that we remain fully prepared—here at the Ministry of External Affairs, along with our Shipping Ministry and all our embassies there—to ensure the safety and welfare of our citizens.

As for the Strait of Hormuz, we are closely monitoring all developments related to the Gulf, the ongoing conflict, and the situation concerning the Strait of Hormuz.

Neeraj, aapka sawal tha ki abhi jo bhootpurva Pradhan Mantri Bangladesh ke hain, unhone kuch chitthi likha hai. Toh is chitthi par hamari kuch tippani nahi hai.

[Approximate Translation: Answer in Hindi] Neeraj, your question was about the letter written by the former Prime Minister of Bangladesh. We have no comments to offer on this letter.

Kadambini Sharma, Independent Journalist: Kadambini Sharma, Independent Journalist. Sir, kal UK ke PM ne ek bayan diya hai, usme unhone ye bhi kaha hai ki 35 deshon ka ek coalition banakar, usme agle hafte Strait of Hormuz se freedom of navigation aur maritime security par woh baat karenge, toh kya Bharat iska hissa hoga?

[Approximate Translation: Question in Hindi] Kadambini Sharma, Independent Journalist. Sir, yesterday the UK Prime Minister made a statement in which he said that a coalition of 35 countries will be formed, and next week they will discuss freedom of navigation and maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz. Will India be a part of this?

Vineeta Pandey, Asian Age Deccan Chronicle: This is Vineeta Pandey from the Asian Age Deccan Chronicle. Roughly 10 foreign-flagged vessels and 18 Indian-flagged vessels carrying crude oil and LPG are stranded in the Persian Gulf. Is the Indian Government in talks with the Iranian Government and other nations for quick … or to expedite the movement of the ships to India?

Suhasini Haidar, The Hindu: This is Suhasini Haidar from The Hindu. In addition to Kadambini's question about the idea that there is this 35-nation grouping that the UK Prime Minister is going to host virtually, there is also, we have seen a process with Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan and China have five initiatives. The Gulf as well is apparently looking at ways of circumventing the Hormuz Straits through pipelines. I just wanted to get a broader sense of, is India involved in any multinational, any kind of peace initiatives when it comes to the war in West Asia?

And another is just a follow-up. I saw your statement on UNIFIL and condemning all the attacks on UNIFIL peacekeepers. I wondered, has India raised this directly with Israel? Because it is the IDF that is targeting the peacekeepers, and Israel has publicly announced that it intends to occupy parts of South Lebanon now, this side of the Littani river. This is all part of the UNIFIL's mandate and is going to make it even more dangerous for Indian peacekeepers over there.

Neeraj Dubey, Prabhasakshi: Sir, namaskar. Main Neeraj Dubey Prabhasakshi se. Sir, Cheen aur Bhutan ne seema muddon ko suljhane ke liye baat-cheet ki hai. 15th Expert Group Meeting ke baad bayan bhi dono pakshon ki or se jaari hue hain. Is par kya pratikriya hai?

[Approximate Translation: Question in Hindi] Sir, greetings. I am Neeraj Dubey from Prabhasakshi. Sir, China and Bhutan have held talks to resolve their boundary issues, and statements have been issued by both sides after the 15th Expert Group Meeting. What is your response to this?

Ayanangsha Maitra: Sir, this is Ayanangsha Maitra. Sir, what are expected to be on table during the maiden visit of Bangladesh Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman?

Raghavendra Verma, ZDF German Television: This is Raghavendra Verma from ZDF German Television. Sir, Defense Minister Rajnath Singh made a statement today regarding a possible misadventure by a neighbor. Is there anything specific, something to worry that in the current situation from Pakistan or any other neighbor, there could be disturbance for peace on border or something?

Shailesh: Sir, our Defense Minister Rajnath Singh has also said along with this Pakistan issue that the Indian Navy is escorting the ships through the Gulf, through the Strait of Hormuz. Can you please elaborate, sir, how many ships have been escorted by the Indian Navy and who are the nations they are helping, or what is the current situation as of now, sir?

Shri Randhir Jaiswal, Official Spokesperson: So, Kadambini, first to your question. The UK side has invited several countries, which also includes India, for talks on the Strait of Hormuz. From our side, the Foreign Secretary is attending the meeting this evening. It may have started, or it will be starting shortly.

Vineeta, your questions, we are in touch with Iran and other countries there to see how best we can get unimpeded transit and safe transit for our ships which are carrying products including LPG, LNG, and other products. Through this conversation that we've had over the last several days, we've had six Indian ships which have been able to safely cross Hormuz, and we continue to be in touch with relevant parties on this matter.

Suhasini, yes, UK, I just said the Foreign Secretary is attending the meeting. I don't know the number of countries who are attending it; perhaps post-meeting we'll get a sense of how many countries have joined. But the Foreign Secretary will be or is participating in this conversation. As far as all the conversations that are happening, we are following all the developments that are linked to this particular conflict. Several conversations are actually happening on this particular subject, and we are keeping track of all those.

On your question regarding UNIFIL, these are matters that the United Nations is looking into for the time being. We are in constant touch with relevant agencies of the United Nations as to how best we can address these issues. So, that is where we are.

Neeraj, Bharat aur aapne Bhutan ki baat ki. Bhutan aur Cheen ke beech mein, ya koi anya desh ke beech mein, hamare padosi aur padosiyon ke beech mein jab baatcheet hoti hai, toh hum log un saari gatividhiyon ko apni nazar mein rakhte hain. Aur jis prakar ka koi agar uthana ho kadam, toh hum log uchit kadam uthate hain.

[Approximate Translation: Answer in Hindi] Neeraj, you mentioned India and Bhutan. Whenever there are talks between Bhutan and China, or between any of our neighboring countries, we keep a close watch on all such developments. And if any action needs to be taken, we take appropriate steps accordingly.

Ayangsha, Bangladesh Foreign Minister, as I told you last time also … once the visit is announced, we will keep you informed of the visit, the agenda, and also share more details of this bilateral visit.

Raghvendra, the Defense Minister of India has spoken, so I need not elaborate anything more. He has spoken on this particular matter.

Shailesh, to your question on Indian ships. I understand that as part of Operation Sankalp, which has been going on since 2019, if my memory serves me right, they are there in that area of the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden to secure shipping lines. This is in our interest, as well as the interest of several of our partners. They have been there to provide and secure maritime commerce, and they have also been supporting ships that are passing from that area.

So, that is where we are. Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. Take care.

New Delhi
April 02, 2026

India
Source: www.mea.gov.in

QUESTION NO. 4415 COOPERATION THROUGH BRICS
 April 02, 2026
RAJYA SABHA
UNSTARRED QUESTION NO. 4415
ANSWERED ON - 02/04/2026
COOPERATION THROUGH BRICS

4415. SHRI BABUBHAI JESANGBHAI DESAI

Will the Minister of EXTERNAL AFFAIRS be pleased to state:-

(a) the major initiatives proposed by India during its BRICS Chairship in 2026;
(b) whether the Government proposes to promote trade, investment and technology partnerships through BRICS that may benefit states such as Gujarat & Maharashtra;
(c) whether any conferences, cultural events or business forums related to BRICS are proposed to be organised in Indian cities including Ahmedabad, Surat, Mumbai, Pune, etc; and
(d) the steps being taken to strengthen people-to-people exchanges and economic cooperation through BRICS?

ANSWER

THE MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
(SHRI KIRTI VARDHAN SINGH)

(a to d) India assumed the BRICS Chairship on 1 January, 2026 under the theme, "Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability”. Priorities aligned with this overarching theme have been identified across all thematic tracks, including in the areas of trade, investment, and technology. The BRICS Contact Group on Economic and Trade Issues (CGETI) and the Partnership on New Industrial Revolution (PartNIR) alongwith the various thematic tracks on Finance are taking forward discussion among members. The BRICS meetings are being conducted both virtually and in-person. The in-person meetings have been planned in several cities, including in Maharashtra and Gujarat. India’s BRICS Chairship has a people-centric and humanity first approach. In addition to the thematic meetings, it is proposed to host engagements such as the BRICS Youth Summit, BRICS Film Festival, BRICS Culture Festival, BRICS Network University Conference, BRICS Think Tanks Council meetings, BRICS Academic Forum, BRICS Civil Forum, BRICS Business Council, BRICS Women’s Business Alliance, which would foster people-to-people exchanges during our Chairship. Economic cooperation among BRICS member countries would be pursued through the meetings of the BRICS Finance Track, including meetings of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (FMCBG) and the BRICS CGETI.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

ASEAN as the political and economic linchpin of Southeast Asia

“And, reading my message line by line,
You will uncover my foremost decree:
To share a common fate with your land divine,
Remember, no homeland is better than the one bestowed upon thee.”
Tariganu, Indonesia[12]

The region’s intellectual elites constructed a pan-regional identity consciously, taking into account existing differences and aiming to create a foundation for joint development and resistance to external challenges.
This latter aspect resonates with the thesis of Arnold Toynbee, a pioneer of the civilisational approach to historical study, who posited that civilisations emerge in response to historical challenges.[13] Indeed, the events of the Cold War provided impetus for the political and economic consolidation of Southeast Asia. Unwilling to be drawn into the rivalry of superpowers, Indonesia and Burma (now Myanmar) were among the initiators of the 1955 Bandung Conference, which paved the way for the Non-Aligned Movement. The necessity of survival in a bipolar confrontation spurred the realisation of the importance of pooling resources within a regional framework. Thus, the idea of establishing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded in 1967, was born.[14]
The philosophical foundation of cooperation within the Association was the concept of Asian values. These values include the rejection of extreme individualism, respect for leadership, the elevated role of the family, thrift, diligence, and teamwork.[15] The state’s key function is to ensure stability, while the primary goal of economic modernisation is to improve the welfare of the population. These non-confrontational approaches align closely with Russian political and societal mentality.
After the Cold War, the ruling circles of ASEAN nations faced the challenge of preserving their geopolitical identity. This served as a catalyst for enhancing the community’s resilience, which was impossible without establishing common principles of interaction within ASEAN. Over time, the Association’s hallmark became its rules of coexistence, which include decision-making by consensus, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, the use of informal dialogue channels to resolve disputes, and shared responsibility for regional issues. A distinctive format of discussions emerged – the ASEAN Way – devoid of protocol formalities and binding decisions, instead fostering gradual alignment on a wide range of developmental and security issues. Terms such as the “ASEAN Spirit” and the “ASEAN Path” entered the lexicon. Local experts argue that this pragmatic approach has been instrumental in overcoming challenges and achieving solidarity.[16]
In a year’s time, the Association will celebrate its 60th anniversary. To be clear, this article does not aim to provide a comprehensive analysis of ASEAN’s activities. Yet even a cursory review reveals it as a political phenomenon, an established international player with a unique decision-making philosophy, its own vision of the future, and a distinct understanding of global processes.
The Association’s institutional progress has laid a solid foundation for the future. It has expanded its activities to include the ASEAN Regional Forum (a multilateral platform for regional political dialogue, which includes our country), the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus – a forum for defence and security cooperation involving ASEAN nations, Russia, China, India, the United States, and others), and the mechanisms of the East Asia Summit (also involving Russia, China, the United States, India, and other states). Abstracting somewhat from regional specifics, one might say that this trajectory of developing alternative platforms with elements of universal legitimacy could serve as a model for other geopolitical communities seeking optimal paths for self-organisation and advancing collective interests in a multipolar world.
In their strategic planning, ASEAN leaders prioritise the consolidation of the Association and the enhancement of its political clout. In their May 2025 statement on bolstering the bloc’s role amid global instability, ASEAN leaders underscored the importance of strengthening the Association’s unity as the key to regional peace and stability.[17] At the same time, ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn of Cambodia highlighted the indispensable role of the organisation in fostering regional cooperation and ensuring shared economic resilience against rising geopolitical tensions.[18] Despite the nuances in expert assessments following the 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur in October 2025, local analysts unanimously agreed that the Association must remain the master of its own destiny, actively shaping its future while steadily amplifying its role on the global stage.[19]
It is pertinent to address the related question of how regional strategists envision the emerging world order. Looking ahead, some Southeast Asian experts lean towards a triumvirate model – a tri-polar construct where Russia, China, and the United States would serve as the central powers. This scenario is met with apprehension by regional political analysts, who warn that such an arrangement of interstate relations could be inherently confrontational, potentially spurring the formation of competing alliances.[20]
Expanding on this theme, analysts conclude that in a context where major powers fail to agree on how to uphold the stability of the international system, “middle powers – those with sufficient economic and financial firepower – may be candidates to take over the role of great powers. And middle powers that are not on the front lines of great rivalries.” It is posited that these middle states will create a safety net of cooperation to shield the world from geopolitical upheavals.[21] This thesis resonates at the official level as well. Reflecting on the transition to a “post-American multipolar world order,” Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong emphasised the growing significance of small and medium-sized states and implied that the aggressive tariff policies of the United States under Donald Trump had spurred ASEAN leaders to reinforce the Association’s unity more vigorously.[22]
Allow us to express the view that, in a multipolar world, the most effective way for small and medium-sized states to advance their external interests is through a unified centre of power. In this regard, Southeast Asian nations can rely on ASEAN. The Association exemplifies a geopolitical community of countries and peoples coexisting in a shared space and united by developmental interests. Despite the inevitable disagreements within this “big family,” it strives to act as a subject of world politics on the international stage, recognising the imperative of consolidation to counter both external and internal challenges.
From past problems to new challenges
ASEAN is once again facing serious challenges, many of which stem from long-term trends that we had long forecast. The multipolar world order that is taking shape right before our eyes is being rejected by countries accustomed to thinking in terms of global dominance and neocolonialism, and they are making deliberate attempts to contain their geopolitical competitors and limit their growth opportunities by pushing them out of global and regional markets and exerting pressure on them.
Such behaviour has become systemic and echoes in developments across the world, including Southeast Asia. We can see how certain external forces are now trying to reshape the region to serve their own interests, with the aim of weakening China and sideline Russia.
In practice, this policy is being implemented through attempts to divide ASEAN and fragment it militarily and politically. Efforts are being made to draw some member states into limited-format arrangements to work on the agenda of deterrence rather than regional security. In place of ASEAN’s established inclusive mechanisms, selective alliances such as AUKUS, the Quad, and various groups of three or four countries are being promoted. All of this creates risks for ASEAN’s role as the geopolitical backbone of the region and, in the longer term and under unfavourable developments, could even threaten the emergence of Southeast Asia as a centre of power in the new global system.
The deployment of US intermediate-range missile systems and large-scale military exercises in the region are a serious destabilising factor. Additional tensions are fuelled by NATO’s claims to a leading role far beyond its area of responsibility. The NATO summit in Madrid in 2022 declared “cooperative security” in the Euro-Atlantic and in what they refer to as the Indo-Pacific region. The alliance is using this disingenuous slogan to expand into Southeast and Northeast Asia thus increasing the potential for conflict in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the East China Sea, as well as on the Korean Peninsula.
ASEAN also remains under significant political pressure from the West over the Ukraine crisis. Since 2022, persistent efforts have been made to persuade it to take a side on this issue. The West has only partially succeeded, however, with Singapore, which, in an effort to maintain its alignment with the broader Anglo-Saxon network, has provided political and diplomatic support to the hostile actions of the United States and Europe against Russia. Most ASEAN members, however, have maintained friendly or neutral positions and do not participate in anti-Russia geopolitical gamesmanship.
Unscrupulous external actors view Southeast Asia as a strategic region that, if properly controlled, could provide significant advantages amid intensifying competition for global economic and technological leadership. Instead, all parties should be working to build equal and mutually beneficial partnerships with ASEAN countries, which is precisely the approach pursued by Russian diplomacy.
After all, Southeast Asia represents not only a vast common market but also a space of dynamic economic growth, technological development, and demographic potential. In 2024, the combined GDP of ASEAN countries amounted to $3.95 trillion, making the bloc the world’s fifth largest economy and the third largest in Greater Asia after China and India.
Annual growth rates over the past 15 years have been strong, averaging 5 to 6 percent. As an integration bloc, ASEAN’s external trade exceeds $3.5 trillion, with a stable positive balance of around $100 billion per year.[23] The region also boasts a vast and deep labour market, and it is therefore not surprising that Western multinational corporations and governments seek to secure privileged access to Southeast Asia’s resources and large consumer markets, as well as to obtain leverage over its transport and logistics routes, which are used by up to a quarter of global maritime trade.
In addition to external challenges, ASEAN faces internal ones as well. The domestic political situation in Myanmar is one such challenge that attracts attention. The Association has established the position of Special Envoy for Myanmar. There is also ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus[24] of 2021. Much has been done to address the issue during Malaysia’s 2025 ASEAN chairmanship. Some local analysts caution against excessive reliance on the region’s own efforts to resolve conflicts, suggesting instead that such matters be referred to the United Nations.[25]
We cannot agree with such an approach, because the role of the UN in addressing domestic political issues is, at the very least, highly questionable. Moreover, the posts of the relevant UN Secretary-General’s special representatives are, as a rule, taken by Western nationals or individuals with dual citizenship (one of which is Western). In an era of regionalisation of world politics, civilisational communities must be capable of independently finding workable solutions to conflicts within their respective spheres. In this regard, we can only welcome ASEAN’s desire to address the crisis around Myanmar without external diktat on the basis of constructive dialogue with that country’s authorities.
Another necessary attribute of a civilisation aspiring to the status of a pole in a multipolar world is the ability to maintain inter-civilisational contacts. ASEAN has mastered this instrument well. A system of dialogue formats has formed around the Association, with the East Asia summits serving as its core. Direct contacts with influential regional organisations are expanding. Relations have been established with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. For us, it is important that ASEAN-SCO cooperation[26] is viewed by Southeast Asian experts through the prism of building bridges between ASEAN and the integration associations from continental Eurasia.[27]
ASEAN places great emphasis on strengthening ties with BRICS. One member of the Association − Indonesia − is a full participant, while Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia hold partner status. Analysts in Southeast Asia note that, as intensifying US-China differences narrow ASEAN’s room for neutrality[28], BRICS helps it avoid being caught between a rock and a hard place.[29] Strengthening the fabric of inter-civilisational contacts is undoubtedly a key element in the process of building a polycentric world.

Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

On March 26, 2026, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), in partnership with the Russia–Latin America Observatory (RUSLAT) at the Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais (PUC Minas), held a roundtable titled "Triangle of Russia, Brazil and China in Latin America. Cooperation or competition?"

Welcoming remarks were delivered by Alexandra Terzi, Program Coordinator, RIAC, and Daniela Vieira Secches, Coordinator, Co-Founder, Russia-Latin America Observatory (RUSLAT); Professor, Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais (PUC Minas).

Presentations were given by Li Yonghui, Senior Research Fellow, Director, Department of Multilateral and Regional Cooperation at the Institute of Russian, Eastern European and Central Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS); Javier Vadell, Professor, Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais (PUC Minas); Viktor Kheifets, Editor-in-Chief, Latin America Journal; Professor, St. Petersburg State University; Chief Researcher, Institute of Latin American Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences; Zhou Zhiwei, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Latin American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS); Daniela Vieira Secches, Coordinator, Co-Founder, Russia-Latin America Observatory (Ruslat); Professor, Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais (PUC Minas); and Ana Lívia Araújo Esteves, Lecturer, Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, HSE University. The session was moderated by Alexandra Terzi, RIAC Program Coordinator.

During the event, experts explored the compatibility of Russian, Chinese, and Brazilian interests in Latin America, the impact of global crises and the policies of the Trump administration, the potential areas and mechanisms for trilateral cooperation, the prospects for institutionalizing the "triangle," and the role of BRICS in this context.
Key TakeawaysAlexandra Terzi

• Global trends are bringing the potential for Russia–China–Brazil cooperation in Latin America into sharper focus. The war in the Middle East is deepening the energy crisis for many countries and contributing to the fragmentation of the global economy. The Trump administration continues to exert political pressure on Western Hemisphere nations, aiming primarily to counter Chinese influence and, in some cases, Russian influence as well. The situation surrounding the Brazilian port of Santos is a telling example. Added to this are the circumstances in Venezuela and the deepening crisis in Cuba.
• Significant changes are underway within the region itself: the recent wave of right-wing parties coming to power raises questions about how these shifts will affect their foreign policy approaches. Brazil faces a tense electoral campaign this fall. In this context, trilateral cooperation could offer pathways to mitigate the impact of these turbulent developments.

Li Yonghui

• Latin America is growing in importance as a major resource supplier and as part of the expanding Global South, particularly amid growing uncertainty in U.S. foreign policy. There are both convergences and divergences between Chinese and Russian interests in the region. While both countries share the goal of promoting a multipolar world, they rely on fundamentally different tools: China focuses on trade and infrastructure, while Russia emphasizes defense and energy projects. This configuration gives rise to both functional complementarity and partial competition.
• China's approach in Latin America is primarily development-oriented and market-driven, focusing on securing resources and food supplies, expanding markets, fostering cooperation on production capacity, broadening global sales channels, and strengthening its discursive influence. At the same time, Beijing maintains a relatively restrained security presence in the region.
• For China, Latin America is critically important for imports of energy, minerals, and agricultural products—including soybeans, meat, copper, and lithium—which support China's food security and industrial upgrading. The region also offers new markets for Chinese electric vehicles, infrastructure projects, telecommunications equipment, and other high-tech goods. Furthermore, China's cooperation with Latin American countries is aimed at securing political support and cultivating an image as a responsible partner.
• Russia, by contrast, orients its presence in Latin America primarily around political and security issues, viewing the region as an opportunity to strengthen its foothold in terms of traditionally strong U.S. influence. Moscow engages in military-technical cooperation with regional countries and participates in information projects. On the economic front, Russia pursues projects in oil, gas, nuclear energy, and mining, while also providing significant support to a few key partners.
• The first major challenge to cooperation stems from differing risk perceptions regarding U.S. reactions. Russian-American relations are going through a difficult period, making Moscow less sensitive to additional sanctions or political costs, whereas Beijing seeks to maintain balanced ties with Washington and exercises greater caution in Latin America.
• The second challenge is commercial: companies from the two countries sometimes compete directly for contracts in arms, nuclear energy, or mining, which can undermine their bargaining power and weaken the perception of their coordination.
• The third challenge comes from Latin American states themselves, which pursue multi-alignment strategies. Many governments seek to maximize flexibility by striking economic deals with China, receiving certain forms of support from Russia, while simultaneously maintaining ties with the U.S. and Europe. This limits the scope for a unified China-Russia regional strategy.
• Tensions could be reduced and the effectiveness of Russian-Chinese engagement in the region improved through more active information sharing on sensitive projects, coordination in less sensitive areas, and the implementation of small-scale joint initiatives in fields such as health, education, and disaster relief. This would help build trust and foster a more positive image in the region.

Javier Vadell

• The systemic chaos resulting from the breakdown of the old-world order is characterized by multifaceted confrontation initiated by Washington. Under the Trump administration, the U.S. intends to advance on all fronts with the aggressiveness characteristic of an imperial power, exhibiting a paradox: acknowledging multipolarity while acting in ways typical of a unipolar approach.
• A key area of pressure has been BRICS, with Brazil as a specific target. After the last BRICS summit in Brasília, the Trump administration opposed the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, lent support to former president Jair Bolsonaro (who is on trial for attempting a coup d'état), and also criticized Brazil's Supreme Court. At the same time, Brazil was hit by a new wave of unilateral U.S. tariffs, raising average tariff levels to their highest since the post-war period. This signals the dismantling of the multilateral economic order.
• Amid this systemic chaos, the Western Hemisphere is viewed by the Trump administration as a space for recolonization. Any cooperation with China, Russia, or other BRICS members is likely to be perceived as a threat to U.S. interests. Brazil emerges as the largest target in Latin America, being the region's only full BRICS member and its largest economy.
• Contradictions are evident in the positions of some BRICS members, notably the UAE and India. The UAE, functioning as a hub of neoliberal globalization, also plays a significant role in the Sudanese conflict while hosting U.S. military bases on its territory, creating a complex dynamic. An even more delicate situation involves India, which maintains historic partnership ties with Russia, yet the Modi government has strong ties with Israel and the United States.
• Amid these contradictions and multifaceted confrontation, the Russia-China partnership takes on special significance. Their cooperation is crucial for consolidating an alternative model of international relations, not only in the Eurasian geopolitical complex but also globally. Iran plays a key role for both Russia and China in strengthening Eurasia's geopolitical future.
• The exhausted model of neoliberal globalization must be overcome, not through unilateral imperial policies, but through the formation of a new order based on sovereignty, inclusiveness, and genuine multilateral cooperation among civilizations. The way forward lies in a new model of sovereign and inclusive globalization guided by humanism, cosmopolitanism, and authentic multilateral coexistence.

Viktor Kheifets

• The arrest of Nicolás Maduro in Caracas raises questions about how a new Monroe Doctrine might shape the engagement of other countries primarily China and Russia in this contested region. Although both China and Russia took strong stands in the UN Security Council, refusing to support anti-Venezuelan sanctions, China's position was noticeably softer. Existing strategies are likely to lose much of their effectiveness.
• Over the years, Russia has shifted its approach to Latin America, moving from ideologically driven engagement to developing ties through diplomatic, strategic, and economic instruments. Today, Russia maintains economic cooperation with Brazil, Mexico, and Ecuador, and to a lesser extent with Argentina, while its military and geopolitical ties have traditionally been stronger with Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. Bilateral trade volume has reached $16–18 billion, exceeding Soviet-era figures, though Latin America accounts for no more than 2% of Russia's total foreign trade, and Russia accounts for less than 1% of Latin America's foreign trade.
• Russia's economic activity includes Rosneft deals with Argentina and Brazil, Rostec deliveries of aircraft, helicopters, and air defense systems, as well as civilian nuclear cooperation with Brazil, Argentina, and Ecuador. The bulk of Russian cooperation with South American countries is concentrated in the primary sector.
• Venezuela was long Russia's largest arms market after India, but this market has effectively disappeared amid the country's severe economic crisis. Russia was also a major partner in Venezuela's oil industry, including alliances between national companies and Rosneft, but this cooperation too appears to be a thing of the past. Similar uncertainty surrounds Cuba.
• Russian and Chinese strategic interests in the region are not fundamentally at odds, though competition exists on specific projects. Over the past decade, traditional Russian exports to Latin America, including agricultural machinery and fertilizers, have faced stiff competition from China's lower prices. In Argentina, Rosatom competed with Chinese and U.S. firms in a tender for nuclear plant construction, losing to the China National Nuclear Corporation for the Atucha III project, which was backed by long-term Chinese financing.
• The approaches of China and Russia share certain common features, such as deepening economic and strategic engagement. Differences lie in the level of involvement: China's engagement is primarily economic in nature, whereas Russia brings a more strategic and geopolitical dimension to its relations with Latin America. Russia is currently seeking to diversify its exports and imports, paying increased attention to the region.
• Over time, China's presence has acquired strategic dimensions, serving to some extent as a counterbalance to the U.S. China actively invests in infrastructure and logistics: over $1.5 billion has been invested in the construction of Chancay Port in Peru, the largest port in the region and China's first logistics hub in South America. Chinese investment in Brazil's mining sector particularly in iron ore, copper, nickel, and other minerals critical to industry and the energy transition holds strategic importance. Of particular note are investments in rare earth elements in Brazil, an area of explosive growth and high geopolitical priority, given that Brazil possesses the world's second-largest rare earth reserves.
• Unlike Moscow, Beijing does not seek to expand political ties and adheres to the principle of avoiding provocation toward the U.S., which underpins its quiet economic expansion. Russia, by contrast, often prioritizes geopolitics, sidelining or weakening economic instruments. With few exceptions (oil and gas fields in Venezuela, bauxite mining in Guyana, nuclear projects in Bolivia and Argentina), Moscow does not make major investments in infrastructure projects in the region.
• The prospect of confrontation between China and Russia in Latin America seems unlikely, as confrontation presupposes parties with comparable potential, whereas China's economic presence in the region is on an entirely different scale. As long as the economy does not become a priority in Russia's Latin America strategy, talk of confrontation is moot. The Russian leadership faces the difficult task of competing economically for contracts in nuclear power plant construction, railways, subways, satellite launches, and other projects.
• The prospects for trilateral cooperation between Russia, China, and Brazil remain limited. Potential exists in the nuclear sector, but here China and Russia are competitors. Another possible area is offshore oil development in Brazil, where China could provide capital in exchange for a share of production and Russia could contribute technology and qualified personnel.
• U.S. pressure is unlikely to constrain trilateral cooperation in the region, for the simple reason that such cooperation does not yet exist, nor are there clearly articulated plans to develop it. Russia, Brazil, and China have established bilateral relationships and see no need to change this format. The largest economic player China will not take decisive steps unless it perceives a direct threat to its economic interests and presence in Latin America.
• BRICS, at least in its Latin American dimension, does not yet serve as a platform for such trilateral cooperation and adds little to existing capabilities. Should the group succeed in creating additional mechanisms for transactions in national currencies, as well as interbank and investment cooperation, the potential for this format of cooperation could be discussed.

Zhou Zhiwei

• Brazil, China, and Russia have three potential areas for economic cooperation. The first is the agricultural sector. China and Brazil are priority partners in agricultural products: China is the largest market for Brazil's agribusiness, while Brazil is China's leading trading partner in this sector. Russia and Brazil also maintain close agricultural cooperation, particularly in Brazilian fertilizer supplies, and bilateral trade in this area has grown quite dynamically in recent years.
• The second area is energy. Brazil and Russia are important energy partners for China, with Brazil possessing significant potential in renewable energy. Amid growing global geopolitical risks, the three countries can deepen their engagement in the energy sector.
• The third area is finance. As BRICS members, Brazil, China, and Russia can strengthen cooperation on transactions in national currencies, especially given U.S. abuses of financial sanctions. In recent years, initiatives such as a common BRICS currency and a BRICS payment system have been actively discussed.
• There are certain complementarities between China and Russia in several areas. Both countries support Latin American states in defending national sovereignty, advancing regional integration, and enhancing their role in international multilateral mechanisms. They also demonstrate effective coordination on multilateral platforms, particularly within the UN.
• Today, the U.S. perceives Chinese and Russian economic cooperation in Latin America as a security threat. In the short term, engagement between China and Russia in the region will face growing difficulties. However, as a regional power, Brazil remains firmly committed to safeguarding its national autonomy, and U.S. hegemonic policies only reinforce Brazil's determination to diversify its international partners by expanding cooperation with extra-regional actors, including China and Russia. The Lula administration has shown sustained interest in Asia: the Brazilian president has visited more Asian countries than any of his predecessors. In the long term, strengthening ties with China, Russia, and other emerging powers will become an important way for Brazil to counter U.S. hegemony in the region.
• U.S. pressure remains significant, and Brazil must exercise caution to avoid potential political interference and economic sanctions. The U.S. now views the Western Hemisphere as its geopolitical sphere of influence and seeks to control all processes in the region while excluding extra-regional actors. Unlike the situation 20 years ago, when the U.S. was relatively open to China's presence in Latin America and even saw China as a positive factor for the region's development, the conditions today have changed dramatically.
• BRICS is a priority mechanism for all three countries: an important platform for deepening economic and trade cooperation, as well as for coordinating diplomatic positions on international issues. However, establishing a trilateral dialogue mechanism on Latin America, while an interesting idea, is unlikely in the short term. Such an initiative would carry strong political connotations, which does not align with Brazil's preference for diplomatic neutrality.

Daniela Vieira Secches

• Latin American foreign policies in the new millennium are shaped by several key factors. U.S. influence remains inescapable, creating challenges for building engagement with other powers such as Russia and China. The region is highly diverse, encompassing different domestic political scenarios, economic conditions, sharp ideological shifts in recent periods, and reliance on commodity exports. Furthermore, the fragmentation of regional integration processes pushes countries toward bilateral arrangements, limiting opportunities for a unified regional policy.
• Latin America finds itself between the "bear and the dragon," but a clash of interests between China and Russia in the region appears unlikely. Bilateral ties between the two powers have strengthened significantly, and this partnership has a positive impact on the continent, where both are expanding their presence through investment, trade agreements, and military cooperation.
• A key point of convergence is the Latin American call for global governance reform, which aligns with Russia's position. Within the UN, a combination of non-alignment, legalism, and pragmatic balancing can be observed, reflecting the region's tradition especially that of Brazil.
• Latin American countries approach relations with Russia through a lens of pragmatism and diversification, seeking to expand their autonomy beyond traditional partners such as the U.S. and Europe. Exceptions are Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, where deeper political ties and security cooperation have developed as a counterbalance to U.S. influence. However, the situation in Venezuela is changing, which is already affecting its relations with Russia.
• In Brazil, there is cross-party consensus on the rhetoric of multipolarity, which is important for Russia. Left-leaning governments frame multipolarity in terms of benign multipolarity, while right-leaning governments approach it through a civilizational lens. Regardless of the outcome of the upcoming elections, this point will remain a rhetorical point of convergence.
• In defense and international security, cooperation is selective and based on strategic asymmetry, with Russia acting as a supplier of equipment and know-how. Challenges include U.S. external pressure, technological sensitivity in technology transfer, and differing security priorities between Brazil and Russia. Nonetheless, opportunities exist for sectoral cooperation and engagement within BRICS.
• Opportunities for deepening cooperation exist in energy and natural resources, infrastructure and logistics projects (where China could promote projects that also benefit Russia), as well as in multilateral and diplomatic coordination, as both regional countries and the two powers share similar rhetoric regarding the desired international order.
• Challenges persist, including asymmetries and divergent economic roles, geopolitical pressure and external constraints (particularly from the U.S. with its new security doctrine, as well as the current situation in Iran), along with regional fragmentation and domestic instability in Latin America, including ideological shifts. Under these conditions, the prospects for trilateral cooperation remain limited, while deepening bilateral ties with individual states in the region appears more realistic.

Ana Lívia Araújo Esteves

• The discussion on Chinese and Russian strategies in Latin America should challenge the notion that Russia is guided solely by geopolitical or political interests. Geopolitical interests exist for all actors, and a distinction can be made between Russia's relations with Cuba and Nicaragua on the one hand, and with major players such as Brazil on the other. In Brazil's case, convergence is driven primarily by shared views on the international order and the desire to reform the multilateral system.
• Russia has numerous interests in Brazil and Latin America that are unrelated to great power rivalries or the U.S. position. While Brazil-Russia trade is concentrated in a limited number of products, these are strategic for both sides: Brazilian soybeans support Russia's high level of pork and beef production, while Russian fertilizers are critical to Brazil's agribusiness and its trade balance. Brazil is the world's largest fertilizer buyer and Russia's main client in this sector. This is an example of strategic trade in which both sides act as equal partners.
• Another example is Russian nuclear cooperation with Bolivia, often interpreted as a purely political gesture. However, the research reactors Rosatom is building in Bolivia also provide Russia with access to Bolivia's lithium sector. This demonstrates that the relationship is built on a combination of economic and political interests.
• Thanks to this pragmatic dimension of Russian-Latin American relations, ideological shifts in the region no longer decisively shape Russia's position. As the cases of Bolivia and Brazil during the Bolsonaro administration show, Russia—like China—has learned to engage with right-wing governments in the region. If relations continue to develop along pragmatic lines, ideological shifts will likely lose some of their significance in the near future.
• Trilateral cooperation is a concept familiar to Brazil from the Lula administration's early mandates (e.g., the IBSA format with India, Brazil, and South Africa). The idea is that one party provides financing, another provides technology, and the third generates demand, with roles shifting depending on the agenda. Full-fledged cooperation of this kind between China, Russia, and Latin America has not yet materialized, but this could change if U.S. pressure on China in the region intensifies.
• Already, coordination on the use of the yuan can be observed in fertilizer trade between Brazil, China, and Russia. This is perhaps the only current example of trilateral engagement, but it appears quite promising.