Information Bulletin of the BRICS Trade Union Forum
Monitoring of the economic, social and labor situation in the BRICS countries
Monitoring of the economic, social and labor situation in the BRICS countries
Issue 25.2026
2026.06.15 — 2026.06.21
International relations
Foreign policy in the context of BRICS
Open letter to leaders of G7, G20, BRICS and all nations on finalizing the WHO Pandemic Agreement’s Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing annex (Открытое письмо лидерам стран G7, G20, БРИКС и всех государств по вопросу завершения работы над приложением ВОЗ о доступе к патогенам и распределении выгод от их использования.) / Switzerland, June, 2026
2026-06-15
Keywords: UN, social_issues
Keywords: UN, social_issues
Switzerland
Source: www.who.int
Dear Leaders of the G7, the G20, BRICS and of all nations,
We write to you together, from Geneva and from Brasília, with one shared conviction: that the world must finish what it started, and that you can help it do so.
We begin not with an institution or an annex, but with a memory the whole world shares. Not so long ago, our hospitals overflowed. Families said goodbye to the people they loved through glass, or by telephone, or not at all. Children lost grandparents. Doctors and nurses, exhausted beyond anything we had a right to ask of them, kept going anyway. Estimates from WHO and others put the lives lost at up to twenty million. Humanity promised itself, in the rawness of that grief, that it would not face such a day again unprepared.
A little over a year ago, the world kept the first part of that promise. After the deadliest pandemic in a century, the nations of the world chose cooperation over division and adopted the WHO Pandemic Agreement to strengthen how countries can work together to prevent, prepare for, and respond to pandemics. In a divided world, that outcome was not to be taken for granted. It was an act of hope, and an act of faith in one another. We write to you now because that hope is not yet fulfilled, and because it lies within your hands to help fulfil it.
One piece remains. To respond to future pandemics in time, countries must be able to quickly identify pathogens with pandemic potential and share their genetic information and material so scientists can develop tools: the tests, the treatments, the vaccines that decide who lives and who does not. The system that makes this possible, fairly and on equal footing, is the Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing annex. It is the last piece of the puzzle, not only for the Pandemic Agreement but for everything WHO and Member States have built from the hard lessons of COVID-19. Until it is finished, the Agreement cannot enter into force. The promise stays unkept.
We will not pretend the road has been easy. When Member States closed their most recent session on the first of May, they had made real progress, but agreed that more time was needed. The hardest questions, including how the benefits of shared pathogens are defined and shared, how the system is governed, and how equity is guaranteed on equal footing, are difficult for a reason. They are the very questions that went unanswered last time, while people who could have been protected were not. The world is wrestling with them now precisely because they matter so much.
Negotiators will meet again from 6 to 17 July. We believe in them, and we have seen their dedication up close. But we also know there are moments when good people, doing their best around a negotiating table, need their leaders to lift their eyes to the horizon. This is one of those moments, and it is yours.
So we come to you, plainly, with three requests.
First, political will at the highest level. The remaining issues will not be solved by technical effort alone. They need the clear signal that only a head of government can give: that finishing this annex is a national priority, and that your negotiators may reach for consensus with courage rather than caution. Solidarity is our best immunity, but solidarity has to be chosen, and it has to be chosen at the top. We know, too, that you may be asked if the Pandemic Agreement compromises state sovereignty. It does not, and the PABS annex, as an integral part of it, will not either. Article 22, paragraph 2 says so plainly: nothing in the Agreement gives WHO any authority to direct or alter a country’s laws or policies, or to require measures such as lockdowns, travel restrictions or vaccination mandates. Those decisions remain with sovereign states. So we ask you, concretely, to instruct your negotiators to come to the July session ready to conclude, and to give them the flexibility to close the remaining gaps and finalize the annex in this round.
Second, a spirit of equity. The PABS system rests on a simple, fair bargain: those who share dangerous pathogens quickly must be able to trust that the vaccines and treatments born from that sharing will reach their own people too. Every one of us has a stake on both sides of it. When Brazil held the G20 presidency in 2024, it led the G20 to recognize, for the first time, inequality as a driver of pandemics. This is not charity, and it is not only conscience. It is also strategy: PABS exists to stop an outbreak at its source, and containing a threat where it begins is far cheaper, in lives and in resources, than fighting a pandemic once it has spread to every continent. A virus left to burn anywhere will, in time, find everyone. There is a further reason equity matters, one that governments and industries everywhere will grasp at once: predictability. Today the rules for accessing a pathogen and sharing what flows from it are improvised case by case, often mid-crisis. PABS replaces that with a single framework known in advance, stable rules that let laboratories and partners across the world move at the speed an outbreak demands. Legal certainty does not compete with equity; it makes equity work. We ask you to ensure the annex carries equity in its operational detail, not only in its preamble, so that access and benefit-sharing are guaranteed in practice.
Third, a sense of urgency. The next pandemic will not wait for us. Scientists estimate there is close to a one in four chance of another pandemic within the coming decade, and the ground beneath our old assumptions is shifting. Climate change, changing land use and evolving agriculture are redrawing the map of where dangerous pathogens emerge; the comfortable belief that outbreaks begin only in distant places is no longer true, and future hotspots may arise in or near your own countries. At the same time, advances in biotechnology, matched unevenly by biosafety, raise the risk of accidental or deliberate release. None of these dangers respect a border. So we ask you to treat 17 July as a deadline, not a milestone, and to say so publicly, sending your negotiators, and the world, the unambiguous signal that this is the round in which the work is finished.
And we already know the price of being unready. The last pandemic took lives on a staggering scale, with estimates from WHO and others putting the toll at up to twenty million, and the International Monetary Fund estimates it cost the world economy over thirteen trillion dollars in lost output, a loss borne in every nation, in shuttered businesses, broken supply chains and a generation of disrupted schooling. Against that, the investment in a system that catches an outbreak early is small. As we write these words, an Ebola outbreak is being fought across two countries, with no approved vaccine and no cure, by responders who are risking their own lives to protect strangers. That is not a distant abstraction. It is happening now. Every month this annex stays unfinished is a month the world is less ready than it could be, and people are less safe than they deserve to be.
The nations of the world, together, have stood at every great turning point in the story of human health. Together we helped wipe smallpox from the earth. We pushed polio to the very edge of history. We turned back the tide of HIV, tuberculosis and malaria, and in doing so helped save more lives than any of us will ever be able to count. Finishing this Agreement is not a departure from that legacy. It is its natural next chapter, and it is within reach.
We made a promise to the millions we lost, and to the families who carry their absence still. Let us be the generation that keeps that promise. Finalizing this Agreement, through a shared commitment to one another, is our collective promise to protect humanity. Let us keep it, together, and in time.
With respect, and in the shared cause of protecting human life,
Source: www.who.int
Dear Leaders of the G7, the G20, BRICS and of all nations,
We write to you together, from Geneva and from Brasília, with one shared conviction: that the world must finish what it started, and that you can help it do so.
We begin not with an institution or an annex, but with a memory the whole world shares. Not so long ago, our hospitals overflowed. Families said goodbye to the people they loved through glass, or by telephone, or not at all. Children lost grandparents. Doctors and nurses, exhausted beyond anything we had a right to ask of them, kept going anyway. Estimates from WHO and others put the lives lost at up to twenty million. Humanity promised itself, in the rawness of that grief, that it would not face such a day again unprepared.
A little over a year ago, the world kept the first part of that promise. After the deadliest pandemic in a century, the nations of the world chose cooperation over division and adopted the WHO Pandemic Agreement to strengthen how countries can work together to prevent, prepare for, and respond to pandemics. In a divided world, that outcome was not to be taken for granted. It was an act of hope, and an act of faith in one another. We write to you now because that hope is not yet fulfilled, and because it lies within your hands to help fulfil it.
One piece remains. To respond to future pandemics in time, countries must be able to quickly identify pathogens with pandemic potential and share their genetic information and material so scientists can develop tools: the tests, the treatments, the vaccines that decide who lives and who does not. The system that makes this possible, fairly and on equal footing, is the Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing annex. It is the last piece of the puzzle, not only for the Pandemic Agreement but for everything WHO and Member States have built from the hard lessons of COVID-19. Until it is finished, the Agreement cannot enter into force. The promise stays unkept.
We will not pretend the road has been easy. When Member States closed their most recent session on the first of May, they had made real progress, but agreed that more time was needed. The hardest questions, including how the benefits of shared pathogens are defined and shared, how the system is governed, and how equity is guaranteed on equal footing, are difficult for a reason. They are the very questions that went unanswered last time, while people who could have been protected were not. The world is wrestling with them now precisely because they matter so much.
Negotiators will meet again from 6 to 17 July. We believe in them, and we have seen their dedication up close. But we also know there are moments when good people, doing their best around a negotiating table, need their leaders to lift their eyes to the horizon. This is one of those moments, and it is yours.
So we come to you, plainly, with three requests.
First, political will at the highest level. The remaining issues will not be solved by technical effort alone. They need the clear signal that only a head of government can give: that finishing this annex is a national priority, and that your negotiators may reach for consensus with courage rather than caution. Solidarity is our best immunity, but solidarity has to be chosen, and it has to be chosen at the top. We know, too, that you may be asked if the Pandemic Agreement compromises state sovereignty. It does not, and the PABS annex, as an integral part of it, will not either. Article 22, paragraph 2 says so plainly: nothing in the Agreement gives WHO any authority to direct or alter a country’s laws or policies, or to require measures such as lockdowns, travel restrictions or vaccination mandates. Those decisions remain with sovereign states. So we ask you, concretely, to instruct your negotiators to come to the July session ready to conclude, and to give them the flexibility to close the remaining gaps and finalize the annex in this round.
Second, a spirit of equity. The PABS system rests on a simple, fair bargain: those who share dangerous pathogens quickly must be able to trust that the vaccines and treatments born from that sharing will reach their own people too. Every one of us has a stake on both sides of it. When Brazil held the G20 presidency in 2024, it led the G20 to recognize, for the first time, inequality as a driver of pandemics. This is not charity, and it is not only conscience. It is also strategy: PABS exists to stop an outbreak at its source, and containing a threat where it begins is far cheaper, in lives and in resources, than fighting a pandemic once it has spread to every continent. A virus left to burn anywhere will, in time, find everyone. There is a further reason equity matters, one that governments and industries everywhere will grasp at once: predictability. Today the rules for accessing a pathogen and sharing what flows from it are improvised case by case, often mid-crisis. PABS replaces that with a single framework known in advance, stable rules that let laboratories and partners across the world move at the speed an outbreak demands. Legal certainty does not compete with equity; it makes equity work. We ask you to ensure the annex carries equity in its operational detail, not only in its preamble, so that access and benefit-sharing are guaranteed in practice.
Third, a sense of urgency. The next pandemic will not wait for us. Scientists estimate there is close to a one in four chance of another pandemic within the coming decade, and the ground beneath our old assumptions is shifting. Climate change, changing land use and evolving agriculture are redrawing the map of where dangerous pathogens emerge; the comfortable belief that outbreaks begin only in distant places is no longer true, and future hotspots may arise in or near your own countries. At the same time, advances in biotechnology, matched unevenly by biosafety, raise the risk of accidental or deliberate release. None of these dangers respect a border. So we ask you to treat 17 July as a deadline, not a milestone, and to say so publicly, sending your negotiators, and the world, the unambiguous signal that this is the round in which the work is finished.
And we already know the price of being unready. The last pandemic took lives on a staggering scale, with estimates from WHO and others putting the toll at up to twenty million, and the International Monetary Fund estimates it cost the world economy over thirteen trillion dollars in lost output, a loss borne in every nation, in shuttered businesses, broken supply chains and a generation of disrupted schooling. Against that, the investment in a system that catches an outbreak early is small. As we write these words, an Ebola outbreak is being fought across two countries, with no approved vaccine and no cure, by responders who are risking their own lives to protect strangers. That is not a distant abstraction. It is happening now. Every month this annex stays unfinished is a month the world is less ready than it could be, and people are less safe than they deserve to be.
The nations of the world, together, have stood at every great turning point in the story of human health. Together we helped wipe smallpox from the earth. We pushed polio to the very edge of history. We turned back the tide of HIV, tuberculosis and malaria, and in doing so helped save more lives than any of us will ever be able to count. Finishing this Agreement is not a departure from that legacy. It is its natural next chapter, and it is within reach.
We made a promise to the millions we lost, and to the families who carry their absence still. Let us be the generation that keeps that promise. Finalizing this Agreement, through a shared commitment to one another, is our collective promise to protect humanity. Let us keep it, together, and in time.
With respect, and in the shared cause of protecting human life,
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva President Federative Republic of Brazil |
| Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus Director-General World Health Organization |
Deputy President Mashatile arrives in the People’s Republic of China on a Working Visit (Вице-президент Машатиле прибыл в Китайскую Народную Республику с рабочим визитом.) / South Africa, June, 2026
2026-06-20
Keywords: South_Africa, China, top_level_meeting
Keywords: South_Africa, China, top_level_meeting
South Africa
Source: dirco.gov.za
Deputy President Paul Mashatile has today, Saturday, 20 June 2026, arrived in the People’s Republic of China on a Working Visit scheduled to take place from 20 to 26 June 2026.
Building on the successful outcomes of the South Africa-China Bi-National Commission held in Cape Town in March 2026, and co-chaired by Deputy President Mashatile and Vice President Han Zheng of the People’s Republic of China, the visit seeks to further advance cooperation between the two countries in areas of mutual interest.
During the Working Visit, the Deputy President will participate in the Fourth China International Supply Chain Expo (CISCE), at the invitation of the Chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), Mr Ren Hongbin.
This will be the Deputy President’s second participation in the Expo, following his attendance at the Third CISCE in July 2025, where he advanced the South Africa-China All-Round Strategic Cooperative Partnership in the New Era and reinforced South Africa’s position as a gateway to Sub-Saharan Africa for trade, investment and industrial cooperation.
The Deputy President will also hold a bilateral meeting with His Excellency Mr Han Zheng, Vice President of the People’s Republic of China.
As part of efforts to strengthen economic ties and explore opportunities for investment and industrial cooperation, the Deputy President will engage with leading Chinese companies, including China Communications Construction Company, Geely Auto, Green Minerals and Metals, Beijing GeoEnviron Engineering, China State Construction Engineering Corporation, Chery and SANY Group. The engagements will focus on infrastructure development, advanced manufacturing, technology innovation, industrialisation and sustainable economic growth.
The Deputy President will thereafter travel to Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, from 25 to 26 June 2026, to build on the outcomes of the 2024 Shenzhen Presidential Business Forum.
During the Shenzhen leg of the visit, the Deputy President will continue engagements with business leaders, to reflect South Africa’s commitment to building sustainable partnerships with Chinese private and state-linked enterprises.
The Deputy President is accompanied by the Deputy Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition, Mr Zuko Godlimpi as well as senior government officials.
Source: dirco.gov.za
Deputy President Paul Mashatile has today, Saturday, 20 June 2026, arrived in the People’s Republic of China on a Working Visit scheduled to take place from 20 to 26 June 2026.
Building on the successful outcomes of the South Africa-China Bi-National Commission held in Cape Town in March 2026, and co-chaired by Deputy President Mashatile and Vice President Han Zheng of the People’s Republic of China, the visit seeks to further advance cooperation between the two countries in areas of mutual interest.
During the Working Visit, the Deputy President will participate in the Fourth China International Supply Chain Expo (CISCE), at the invitation of the Chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), Mr Ren Hongbin.
This will be the Deputy President’s second participation in the Expo, following his attendance at the Third CISCE in July 2025, where he advanced the South Africa-China All-Round Strategic Cooperative Partnership in the New Era and reinforced South Africa’s position as a gateway to Sub-Saharan Africa for trade, investment and industrial cooperation.
The Deputy President will also hold a bilateral meeting with His Excellency Mr Han Zheng, Vice President of the People’s Republic of China.
As part of efforts to strengthen economic ties and explore opportunities for investment and industrial cooperation, the Deputy President will engage with leading Chinese companies, including China Communications Construction Company, Geely Auto, Green Minerals and Metals, Beijing GeoEnviron Engineering, China State Construction Engineering Corporation, Chery and SANY Group. The engagements will focus on infrastructure development, advanced manufacturing, technology innovation, industrialisation and sustainable economic growth.
The Deputy President will thereafter travel to Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, from 25 to 26 June 2026, to build on the outcomes of the 2024 Shenzhen Presidential Business Forum.
During the Shenzhen leg of the visit, the Deputy President will continue engagements with business leaders, to reflect South Africa’s commitment to building sustainable partnerships with Chinese private and state-linked enterprises.
The Deputy President is accompanied by the Deputy Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition, Mr Zuko Godlimpi as well as senior government officials.
Conversation with Prime Minister of Vietnam Le Minh Hung (Беседа с премьер-министром Вьетнама Ле Минь Хунгом) / Russia, June, 2026
2026-06-18
Keywords: Vladimir_Putin, Vietnam, top_level_meeting
Keywords: Vladimir_Putin, Vietnam, top_level_meeting
Russia
Source: en.kremlin.ru
President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Friends,
I am very pleased to welcome you once again, Comrade Le Minh Hung, and to thank you for your active participation in the summit marking the 35th anniversary of Russia-ASEAN relations.
I believe the summit was highly productive. It provided an opportunity not only to underscore the important and constructive role of the strategic partnership between Russia and ASEAN in global affairs, but also to identify practical priorities for our future cooperation.
Vietnam is a longstanding and reliable partner of Russia – and more than that, a true ally. The comprehensive strategic partnership between our two countries is built on strong traditions of friendship, trust, and mutual support.
I warmly recall my meeting with Comrade To Lam in Moscow last May. I received his greetings on the occasion of Russia Day and would be grateful if you convey to him my sincere appreciation.
This year, we have already held meetings with Vietnam’s Foreign Minister Le Hoai Trung and, in March, with your predecessor, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh. We are confident that with your appointment to the position of Prime Minister of Vietnam, the new Cabinet will continue its close and productive cooperation with Russian colleagues.
Last year, trade increased by nearly six percent – 5.7–5.8 percent, exceeding US$6 billion, and this positive trend has continued this year. The Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation is making an important contribution to this progress.
Energy remains one of the key pillars of our partnership. Russian companies, including Rosatom, Gazprom, and Zarubezhneft, are actively operating in Vietnam. Education and science have also held a special place in our relations since Soviet times. Over the years, Russia has trained tens of thousands of Vietnamese specialists, creating a large community of friends of Russia in Vietnam. We deeply value these people-to-people ties and are confident that they will continue to develop.
Our countries share similar approaches to many pressing international issues. We maintain constructive cooperation within multilateral frameworks, including the United Nations and BRICS. Following today’s successful summit with our ASEAN colleagues, we have an excellent opportunity to discuss the key areas of practical cooperation between our countries.
Once again, welcome. We are delighted to see you.
Prime Minister of Vietnam Le Minh Hung (retranslated): Your Excellency, Comrade Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation,
It is a great honour for me to meet with you for the first time and visit Russia as Prime Minister.
Thank you for your substantive and insightful remarks and your kind words regarding Vietnam.
I have been to Moscow and St Petersburg several times, but this is my first time in Kazan.
I would like to convey greetings and best wishes on behalf of the President, along with the invitation by his Excellency the President to visit Vietnam at your convenience. Vietnam is also looking forward to hosting the APEC 2027 meeting in November.
Vietnam has always praised its cooperation with Russia, as well as the fact that you have been treating Vietnam and our cooperation with so much care and attention and focusing on enhancing these ties for multiple years.
Despite the serious changes in the international environment, Russia and Vietnam remain proactive in developing their relations. Since we are holding this meeting with you today, Mr President Putin, I would like to discuss new avenues for cooperation with you so that we can elevate Russia-Vietnam relations to a strategic partnership.
During the latest visit by the General Secretary, we agreed to upgrade our relations, and after General Secretary To Lam’s visit, there was an expression of readiness to take specific steps in this direction by outlining the agenda for this effort. We have agreed to deliver a progress report to our leaders every three months on our work and achievements. We also hope that we will soon be able to fulfil the agenda as set forth by our respective leaders. I would like to learn what you think about this, Mr President.
<…>
Source: en.kremlin.ru
President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Friends,
I am very pleased to welcome you once again, Comrade Le Minh Hung, and to thank you for your active participation in the summit marking the 35th anniversary of Russia-ASEAN relations.
I believe the summit was highly productive. It provided an opportunity not only to underscore the important and constructive role of the strategic partnership between Russia and ASEAN in global affairs, but also to identify practical priorities for our future cooperation.
Vietnam is a longstanding and reliable partner of Russia – and more than that, a true ally. The comprehensive strategic partnership between our two countries is built on strong traditions of friendship, trust, and mutual support.
I warmly recall my meeting with Comrade To Lam in Moscow last May. I received his greetings on the occasion of Russia Day and would be grateful if you convey to him my sincere appreciation.
This year, we have already held meetings with Vietnam’s Foreign Minister Le Hoai Trung and, in March, with your predecessor, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh. We are confident that with your appointment to the position of Prime Minister of Vietnam, the new Cabinet will continue its close and productive cooperation with Russian colleagues.
Last year, trade increased by nearly six percent – 5.7–5.8 percent, exceeding US$6 billion, and this positive trend has continued this year. The Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation is making an important contribution to this progress.
Energy remains one of the key pillars of our partnership. Russian companies, including Rosatom, Gazprom, and Zarubezhneft, are actively operating in Vietnam. Education and science have also held a special place in our relations since Soviet times. Over the years, Russia has trained tens of thousands of Vietnamese specialists, creating a large community of friends of Russia in Vietnam. We deeply value these people-to-people ties and are confident that they will continue to develop.
Our countries share similar approaches to many pressing international issues. We maintain constructive cooperation within multilateral frameworks, including the United Nations and BRICS. Following today’s successful summit with our ASEAN colleagues, we have an excellent opportunity to discuss the key areas of practical cooperation between our countries.
Once again, welcome. We are delighted to see you.
Prime Minister of Vietnam Le Minh Hung (retranslated): Your Excellency, Comrade Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation,
It is a great honour for me to meet with you for the first time and visit Russia as Prime Minister.
Thank you for your substantive and insightful remarks and your kind words regarding Vietnam.
I have been to Moscow and St Petersburg several times, but this is my first time in Kazan.
I would like to convey greetings and best wishes on behalf of the President, along with the invitation by his Excellency the President to visit Vietnam at your convenience. Vietnam is also looking forward to hosting the APEC 2027 meeting in November.
Vietnam has always praised its cooperation with Russia, as well as the fact that you have been treating Vietnam and our cooperation with so much care and attention and focusing on enhancing these ties for multiple years.
Despite the serious changes in the international environment, Russia and Vietnam remain proactive in developing their relations. Since we are holding this meeting with you today, Mr President Putin, I would like to discuss new avenues for cooperation with you so that we can elevate Russia-Vietnam relations to a strategic partnership.
During the latest visit by the General Secretary, we agreed to upgrade our relations, and after General Secretary To Lam’s visit, there was an expression of readiness to take specific steps in this direction by outlining the agenda for this effort. We have agreed to deliver a progress report to our leaders every three months on our work and achievements. We also hope that we will soon be able to fulfil the agenda as set forth by our respective leaders. I would like to learn what you think about this, Mr President.
<…>
Meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkiye Hakan Fidan (Встреча с министром иностранных дел Турции Хаканом Фиданом) / Russia, June, 2026
2026-06-17
Keywords: Vladimir_Putin, Turkiye, top_level_meeting
Keywords: Vladimir_Putin, Turkiye, top_level_meeting
Russia
Source: en.kremlin.ru
Beginning of meeting with Hakan Fidan
President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr Minister, I am delighted to see you. Welcome to Russia.
I know that you had several meetings and made some useful contacts in Moscow not only with your counterpart [Sergei Lavrov], but also with representatives of various government agencies.
Relations between our countries have been following an upward trajectory, which makes us happy. We have long since gone beyond purely formal contacts in our relations, they are indeed genuinely friendly with new substance being added to this relationship. This is largely attributable primarily to the position of President of the Republic of Turkiye Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Please, convey my best wishes to him. We are always looking forward to seeing him in our country.
I am glad to have the opportunity to meet with you on the sidelines of today’s event and discuss current matters of interest for our two countries.
Welcome, Mr Minister.
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkiye Hakan Fidan (retranslated): Mr President, thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to have a meeting with you, considering how busy you are, and your packed schedule.
Mr President [Erdogan] sends you his best wishes.
It is true that there have been a lot of developments recently in our region and on the international agenda. Your experience in this regard means a lot. We have so many issues to discuss.
We have had a very eventful programme over the past two or three days and were able to exchange our views.
Once again, thank you for offering me this opportunity, Mr President.
<…>
Source: en.kremlin.ru
Beginning of meeting with Hakan Fidan
President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr Minister, I am delighted to see you. Welcome to Russia.
I know that you had several meetings and made some useful contacts in Moscow not only with your counterpart [Sergei Lavrov], but also with representatives of various government agencies.
Relations between our countries have been following an upward trajectory, which makes us happy. We have long since gone beyond purely formal contacts in our relations, they are indeed genuinely friendly with new substance being added to this relationship. This is largely attributable primarily to the position of President of the Republic of Turkiye Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Please, convey my best wishes to him. We are always looking forward to seeing him in our country.
I am glad to have the opportunity to meet with you on the sidelines of today’s event and discuss current matters of interest for our two countries.
Welcome, Mr Minister.
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkiye Hakan Fidan (retranslated): Mr President, thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to have a meeting with you, considering how busy you are, and your packed schedule.
Mr President [Erdogan] sends you his best wishes.
It is true that there have been a lot of developments recently in our region and on the international agenda. Your experience in this regard means a lot. We have so many issues to discuss.
We have had a very eventful programme over the past two or three days and were able to exchange our views.
Once again, thank you for offering me this opportunity, Mr President.
<…>
Conversation with Prime Minister of Thailand Anutin Charnvirakul (Беседа с премьер-министром Таиланда Анутином Чарнвиракулом) / Russia, June, 2026
2026-06-18
Keywords: Vladimir_Putin, Thailand, top_level_meeting
Keywords: Vladimir_Putin, Thailand, top_level_meeting
Russia
Source: en.kremlin.ru
President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr Prime Minister,
I would like to once again welcome you on your first visit to Russia to take part in the anniversary events marking 35 years of Russia–ASEAN relations. Thailand plays a key role in this Association as one of its founding states.
I would like to thank you for the warm congratulations on Russia Day from the King of Thailand, and I would like to personally thank you for attending the reception at the Embassy of Russia on the occasion of Russia Day and for taking part in these celebrations.
We are satisfied that cooperation between our two countries is constructive and enjoys positive momentum across various domains, including political, economic and humanitarian cooperation. Ties between Russia and Thailand have a rich history and traditions. During our conversation, you have mentioned that we will be marking 130 years of our diplomatic relations next year, since they were established back in 1897.
Bilateral trade has been stable and demonstrates steady growth. In 2025, trade increased by 2.3 percent to constitute US$1.72 billion, with a surge of 26 percent in the first three months of this year.
There is considerable potential for mutually beneficial cooperation in energy, transport, logistics, agro-industry, and investment. The joint commission for bilateral cooperation has a mission to facilitate progress along these tracks, but, of course, its operation can be made even more effective.
People in our countries also stand to benefit from efforts to expand our cultural and educational ties. Held in 2024 and 2025, the cross years of cultural exchanges and tourism were a success. There were several major events, including a concert tour by the Bolshoi Theatre in Bangkok and the performances by the Royal Symphony Orchestra in Russia. The world-famous Russian Seasons were also a major event, its opening ceremony was hosted by Bangkok in February.
Tourist exchanges have been enjoying positive momentum. In 2025, almost 2 million Russians visited Thailand, whereas since the beginning of this year about 850,000 people have already travelled there.
Today, we have a good opportunity to discuss the latest developments in Russia-Thailand relations and outline new objectives.
Thank you for your attention.
Prime Minister of Thailand Anutin Charnvirakul: Thank you, Mr President.
It is our pleasure. I believe everyone in my delegation is very excited to meet you today, and I would like to extend my heartfelt appreciation for all the arrangement you have given to us, especially for myself, having visited Russia for the first time.
I believe that the meeting between Russia and ASEAN has been very successful. As I talked with many leaders before they left this afternoon, they were very pleased with the outcome of the meeting.
The Thai people fondly recall your official visit to Thailand as guest of his Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej the Great and Her Majesty Queen Sirikit. Sadly, both of them have passed away, but we still remember those moments when you made your visit to Thailand during his reign.
Coming back to the bilateral relations, they have always been special. We are determined to advance our partnership in all dimensions and to celebrate our 130th anniversary of our diplomatic relations, which we will reach next year. We look forward to the convening of the upcoming joint committee in August, which, I am sure, will advance forward our partnership.
You did mention the trade volume of our two countries, but it seems, I would say, to be too little. It is only one US$1.5 billion per year, and it does not really reflect the true potential of our trade relations. So I hope we can do more, and I propose that we work together to enhance trade and investment facilitation and promote regular private sector engagement, particularly in sectors such as science and technology, creative economy, smart agriculture, infrastructure connectivity, space and defence industry.
<…>
Source: en.kremlin.ru
President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr Prime Minister,
I would like to once again welcome you on your first visit to Russia to take part in the anniversary events marking 35 years of Russia–ASEAN relations. Thailand plays a key role in this Association as one of its founding states.
I would like to thank you for the warm congratulations on Russia Day from the King of Thailand, and I would like to personally thank you for attending the reception at the Embassy of Russia on the occasion of Russia Day and for taking part in these celebrations.
We are satisfied that cooperation between our two countries is constructive and enjoys positive momentum across various domains, including political, economic and humanitarian cooperation. Ties between Russia and Thailand have a rich history and traditions. During our conversation, you have mentioned that we will be marking 130 years of our diplomatic relations next year, since they were established back in 1897.
Bilateral trade has been stable and demonstrates steady growth. In 2025, trade increased by 2.3 percent to constitute US$1.72 billion, with a surge of 26 percent in the first three months of this year.
There is considerable potential for mutually beneficial cooperation in energy, transport, logistics, agro-industry, and investment. The joint commission for bilateral cooperation has a mission to facilitate progress along these tracks, but, of course, its operation can be made even more effective.
People in our countries also stand to benefit from efforts to expand our cultural and educational ties. Held in 2024 and 2025, the cross years of cultural exchanges and tourism were a success. There were several major events, including a concert tour by the Bolshoi Theatre in Bangkok and the performances by the Royal Symphony Orchestra in Russia. The world-famous Russian Seasons were also a major event, its opening ceremony was hosted by Bangkok in February.
Tourist exchanges have been enjoying positive momentum. In 2025, almost 2 million Russians visited Thailand, whereas since the beginning of this year about 850,000 people have already travelled there.
Today, we have a good opportunity to discuss the latest developments in Russia-Thailand relations and outline new objectives.
Thank you for your attention.
Prime Minister of Thailand Anutin Charnvirakul: Thank you, Mr President.
It is our pleasure. I believe everyone in my delegation is very excited to meet you today, and I would like to extend my heartfelt appreciation for all the arrangement you have given to us, especially for myself, having visited Russia for the first time.
I believe that the meeting between Russia and ASEAN has been very successful. As I talked with many leaders before they left this afternoon, they were very pleased with the outcome of the meeting.
The Thai people fondly recall your official visit to Thailand as guest of his Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej the Great and Her Majesty Queen Sirikit. Sadly, both of them have passed away, but we still remember those moments when you made your visit to Thailand during his reign.
Coming back to the bilateral relations, they have always been special. We are determined to advance our partnership in all dimensions and to celebrate our 130th anniversary of our diplomatic relations, which we will reach next year. We look forward to the convening of the upcoming joint committee in August, which, I am sure, will advance forward our partnership.
You did mention the trade volume of our two countries, but it seems, I would say, to be too little. It is only one US$1.5 billion per year, and it does not really reflect the true potential of our trade relations. So I hope we can do more, and I propose that we work together to enhance trade and investment facilitation and promote regular private sector engagement, particularly in sectors such as science and technology, creative economy, smart agriculture, infrastructure connectivity, space and defence industry.
<…>
Meeting with Prime Minister of Malaysia Anwar Ibrahim (Встреча с премьер-министром Малайзии Анваром Ибрагимом) / Russia, June, 2026
2026-06-17
Keywords: Vladimir_Putin, Malaysia, top_level_meeting
Keywords: Vladimir_Putin, Malaysia, top_level_meeting
Russia
Source: en.kremlin.ru
The meeting took place at the Galiasgar Kamal Tatar State Academic Theatre in Kazan.
* * *
Beginning of Russian-Malaysian talks
President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr Prime Minister, friends,
It is a pleasure to welcome you to Russia, and I am delighted that you have joined us for the summit marking the 35th anniversary of our country’s relations with ASEAN.
It was in Malaysia that the first meeting between the leaders of our countries in this format was held back in 2005. Last year, your country held the ASEAN chairmanship, and we are truly grateful for Malaysia’s support in advancing Russia’s strategic partnership with the Association.
Our two countries also coordinate closely in other international arenas, including the United Nations, BRICS, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.
Malaysia is a longstanding and trusted partner of Russia in the Asia-Pacific region, and our engagement has always relied on mutual respect and consideration for each other’s interests.
Next year will mark the 60th anniversary of our diplomatic relations. And we approach this milestone with a rich legacy of fruitful cooperation behind us, and considerable scope for further growth ahead.
Political dialogue has visibly gathered pace. We last met during your official visit in May 2025.
In August, His Majesty Sultan Ibrahim, the Supreme Ruler of Malaysia, paid the first state visit to Russia in the entire history of our bilateral ties. He subsequently visited St Petersburg earlier this year, and most recently came to Moscow in May for the celebrations of the 81st anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War. May I take this opportunity to ask you to pass on my warmest regards to His Majesty.
We also maintain regular contact at ministerial, agency, and parliamentary levels. Our practical cooperation is overseen by the Intergovernmental Commission on Economic, Scientific, Technical, and Cultural Cooperation.
Last year, our bilateral trade grew by 12.9 percent – a very encouraging result.
At the same time, we attach great importance to joint initiatives in education, science, technology, and to expanding tourism and people-to-people ties.
Today’s discussion offers us an excellent platform to discuss priority issues across the broad landscape of Russian-Malaysian relations.
Mr Prime Minister, friends, once again, welcome.
Prime Minister of Malaysia Anwar Ibrahim: Thank you, Mr President, President Putin and delegation members.
May I express my profound gratitude to you for your hospitality, and also for the reception here in Kazan, and to the whole team, your team, and also to the Rais and his team. Thank you very much.
You know, the relations in the last few years have been remarkable. We have seen impressive development, and my visit was – you were fantastic. The story about the three thrones became viral throughout the world, thank you. Although I still have one wife till now.
And the King, may I also send respects from the King Ibrahim, who was very impressed and considers you, President Putin, as his friend, and the Russian people as a country that we can foster better relations.
Now, bilateral mechanisms have expanded in all fields, and I think you have seen that. Even our hosting Russia in the Muslim World in Kuala Lumpur last year – it was a fantastic event, very successful, great participation, Rais Rustam was there and we accord all the support necessary to make sure that we embrace the friendship of the Russian people and see the enormous role that Russia can play not only in Malaysia but also in the developing world, ASEAN and the rest.
We are exploring this Halal economy and finance. We are now almost finishing the visa abolition arrangement. The delay is caused by the Foreign Minister, but otherwise things are developing very well. Trade investments – there are issues, Mr President. As you know, energy, you have given fantastic support. Thank you very much. Petronas was here with your counterpart, some of the companies here. We certainly got great admiration for your determination to enhance that collaboration and support during the initial energy crisis and now. And then you have also agreed these flights for tourism, for trade, and connectivity between Malaysia, Moscow, Kazan, and other cities in Russia. I hope you can give the required support to enhance that and facilitate, in fact, accelerate that process. And there are so many issues. I must take this opportunity to thank you for your position vis-à-vis Gaza and now Iran.
You have taken a very consistent, principled position. And I must say, on behalf of the Malaysian people and many others, how we admire your tenacity and conviction. Thank you.
Source: en.kremlin.ru
The meeting took place at the Galiasgar Kamal Tatar State Academic Theatre in Kazan.
* * *
Beginning of Russian-Malaysian talks
President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr Prime Minister, friends,
It is a pleasure to welcome you to Russia, and I am delighted that you have joined us for the summit marking the 35th anniversary of our country’s relations with ASEAN.
It was in Malaysia that the first meeting between the leaders of our countries in this format was held back in 2005. Last year, your country held the ASEAN chairmanship, and we are truly grateful for Malaysia’s support in advancing Russia’s strategic partnership with the Association.
Our two countries also coordinate closely in other international arenas, including the United Nations, BRICS, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.
Malaysia is a longstanding and trusted partner of Russia in the Asia-Pacific region, and our engagement has always relied on mutual respect and consideration for each other’s interests.
Next year will mark the 60th anniversary of our diplomatic relations. And we approach this milestone with a rich legacy of fruitful cooperation behind us, and considerable scope for further growth ahead.
Political dialogue has visibly gathered pace. We last met during your official visit in May 2025.
In August, His Majesty Sultan Ibrahim, the Supreme Ruler of Malaysia, paid the first state visit to Russia in the entire history of our bilateral ties. He subsequently visited St Petersburg earlier this year, and most recently came to Moscow in May for the celebrations of the 81st anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War. May I take this opportunity to ask you to pass on my warmest regards to His Majesty.
We also maintain regular contact at ministerial, agency, and parliamentary levels. Our practical cooperation is overseen by the Intergovernmental Commission on Economic, Scientific, Technical, and Cultural Cooperation.
Last year, our bilateral trade grew by 12.9 percent – a very encouraging result.
At the same time, we attach great importance to joint initiatives in education, science, technology, and to expanding tourism and people-to-people ties.
Today’s discussion offers us an excellent platform to discuss priority issues across the broad landscape of Russian-Malaysian relations.
Mr Prime Minister, friends, once again, welcome.
Prime Minister of Malaysia Anwar Ibrahim: Thank you, Mr President, President Putin and delegation members.
May I express my profound gratitude to you for your hospitality, and also for the reception here in Kazan, and to the whole team, your team, and also to the Rais and his team. Thank you very much.
You know, the relations in the last few years have been remarkable. We have seen impressive development, and my visit was – you were fantastic. The story about the three thrones became viral throughout the world, thank you. Although I still have one wife till now.
And the King, may I also send respects from the King Ibrahim, who was very impressed and considers you, President Putin, as his friend, and the Russian people as a country that we can foster better relations.
Now, bilateral mechanisms have expanded in all fields, and I think you have seen that. Even our hosting Russia in the Muslim World in Kuala Lumpur last year – it was a fantastic event, very successful, great participation, Rais Rustam was there and we accord all the support necessary to make sure that we embrace the friendship of the Russian people and see the enormous role that Russia can play not only in Malaysia but also in the developing world, ASEAN and the rest.
We are exploring this Halal economy and finance. We are now almost finishing the visa abolition arrangement. The delay is caused by the Foreign Minister, but otherwise things are developing very well. Trade investments – there are issues, Mr President. As you know, energy, you have given fantastic support. Thank you very much. Petronas was here with your counterpart, some of the companies here. We certainly got great admiration for your determination to enhance that collaboration and support during the initial energy crisis and now. And then you have also agreed these flights for tourism, for trade, and connectivity between Malaysia, Moscow, Kazan, and other cities in Russia. I hope you can give the required support to enhance that and facilitate, in fact, accelerate that process. And there are so many issues. I must take this opportunity to thank you for your position vis-à-vis Gaza and now Iran.
You have taken a very consistent, principled position. And I must say, on behalf of the Malaysian people and many others, how we admire your tenacity and conviction. Thank you.
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement and answers to media questions at a joint news conference following talks with Foreign Minister of the Republic of Türkiye Hakan Fidan, Moscow, June 16, 2026 (Заявление министра иностранных дел Сергея Лаврова и ответы на вопросы СМИ на совместной пресс-конференции после переговоров с министром иностранных дел Турецкой Республики Хаканом Фиданом, Москва, 16 июня 2026 года.) / Russia, June, 2026
2026-06-16
Keywords: Sergey_Lavrov, Turkey, quotation
Keywords: Sergey_Lavrov, Turkey, quotation
Russia
Source: mid.ru
Ladies and gentlemen,
We have conducted substantive, concrete, and productive negotiations. We have identified practical steps that must yet be taken to implement the fundamental agreements reached by our Presidents regarding the development of bilateral ties and the strengthening of coordination on regional and international matters. In April this year, we engaged in discussions on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomatic Forum. Our dialogue is ongoing, and we will, of course, meet at the forthcoming UN General Assembly.
June 3, 2026, marked a significant commemorative date – 106 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Soviet Russia and the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye. I take this opportunity to once again extend my congratulations to all on this momentous occasion.
We noted the intensive nature of our dialogue at all levels – at the presidential level, between the heads of parliament, and between our foreign ministries. At the Antalya Diplomatic Forum, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and I signed a further Plan of Consultations between our foreign ministries, which is being successfully implemented.
Turning to trade and economic affairs, we welcomed the dynamic development of cooperation in the energy sector. In particular, the construction of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, as part of the Rosatom State Corporation project, is proceeding on schedule.
There is a shared interest in ensuring due preparation and convening, before the end of the year, of the 20th session of the Joint Intergovernmental Russian-Turkish Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation.
We discussed the need to further develop cooperation in tourism. In 2025, nearly 7 million Russian citizens visited the Republic of Türkiye. We are interested in ensuring that their safety is reliably guaranteed. We have always valued this aspect of our Turkish friends’ approach.
We conducted a constructive review of current global and regional issues, including the situation in the Black Sea region. We are concerned by the Kiev regime’s attempts to orchestrate provocations against vessels transporting grain to the Republic of Türkiye and against tankers, as well as by the persistent threats of terrorist attacks against the TurkStream and Blue Stream gas pipelines. We have agreed to collaborate closely on matters of security in the Black Sea region, the South Caucasus, the Middle East, and North Africa. In these domains, we have established close contacts with our Turkish colleagues. We operate on a mutually complementary basis.
We are concerned by the problems that have arisen in the Middle East in connection with the Iran-Israel conflict. Its effects have already extended beyond the Strait of Hormuz. The issues of Lebanon and Palestine remain unresolved. The Israeli leadership has declared that a Palestinian state would not be established. Such a position constitutes a direct violation of United Nations resolutions. Russia and Türkiye cannot accept this. We will insist on the implementation of what has been repeatedly agreed.
We reaffirmed our interest in stabilising the situation in Syria. Whilst positive developments are underway, many challenges persist.
We will also cooperate in strengthening Libya’s statehood. The challenges there are equally grave. Since the Arab Spring of 2011, Libya has remained a fragmented state. We support, and will contribute to, the UN efforts in every possible manner.
In discussing the situation in the South Caucasus, we noted that the consolidation of peace and beneficial cooperation in this region is fostered by the participation of our countries in the 3+3 Regional Cooperation Platform, which also includes Azerbaijan, Armenia and Iran. We hope that Georgia will join this process in the future – the door remains open.
We value Türkiye’s diplomatic efforts in the context of efforts to resolve the situation around Ukraine. We have reminded our Turkish colleagues that, for any settlement to be sustainable, long-term and reliable, the root causes of the crisis must be addressed, including the drawing of Ukraine into NATO, contrary to all assurances, promises and OSCE decisions. Equally important is the full restoration and observance of the legitimate rights of the Russian and Russian-speaking populations in the territories remaining under the control of the Kiev regime, together with the restoration of the full rights of the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church.
We expect that today’s negotiations will enable us to advance the fundamental agreements reached between our leaders. The outcomes will be duly reported to our Presidents.
I would like to thank my colleague and friend for the fruitful discussion.
Question: How do you explain the West’s apparent unwillingness to comment on terrorist attacks against civilians carried out by the Zelensky government, while continuing to focus so intensely on the events in Bucha despite the lack of evidence?
Sergey Lavrov: The simplest explanation is that the West is once again seeking to reassert a hegemonic role in international affairs, positioning itself as the ultimate arbiter of what is right and wrong.
In this context, the resurgence of Nazi tendencies is particularly alarming, especially in Europe, where discussions about restoring Germany’s military capabilities and strengthening its role as Europe’s leading military power have become increasingly common.
These trends are further exacerbated by the policies of Vladimir Zelensky’s regime, which has openly promoted the rehabilitation of Nazi criminals and nationalist extremism.
When confronted with such actions – including the reburial of war criminals and collaborators convicted by the Nuremberg Tribunal – many European leaders nevertheless continue to praise Vladimir Zelensky and describe him as a defender of European values. Such actions amount to a tacit acknowledgment of what those values have come to represent. They speak for themselves and require no further commentary.
Question: The European Union has recently intensified its efforts to accelerate the accession process for a number of countries, both in the Balkans and in relation to Ukraine. How does Russia view these developments? How do you assess Ukraine’s and the Balkan states’ prospects for joining the European Union?
Sergey Lavrov: The issue of Ukraine was discussed in the context of the consequences of the Crimean referendum. Following the unconstitutional coup in Kiev in February 2014, the people of Crimea voted in a March referendum in favour of reunification with the Russian Federation. Even at that time, during our discussions with the European Union and the US on Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin consistently stressed Russia’s categorical opposition to Ukraine’s accession to NATO, which would run counter to existing commitments. At that stage, the European Union was primarily viewed as an economic integration project focused on peaceful cooperation and initiatives aimed at improving the wellbeing of its citizens. We had no objections to that issue.
The European Union has changed significantly since then. Today, particularly against the backdrop of a reduced willingness on the part of the current US administration to bear the burden of Europe’s security, several trends have emerged within the EU. One of them is the push to transform the European Union into an independent military actor, drawing on the provisions of Articles 45 and 46 of the Treaty on European Union. At the same time, there is a growing recognition among European states that they may be unable to address security challenges on their own. According to available information, the United Kingdom is promoting the idea of establishing a separate military framework involving some of the most strongly anti-Russia countries within the current European landscape, together with London and Ukraine.
All these ideas remain at the stage of discussion, deliberation, and planning. But one point is clear: the European Union is increasingly shaping its security and defence policies to oppose Russia. From the standpoint of protecting Russia’s national interests, Ukraine’s accession to the EU could be used by those seeking to further militarise the EU. Moreover, Vladimir Zelensky has on several occasions made statements indicating his readiness to “head” Europe’s armed forces (at least he said something of this kind).
From the perspective of the European Union’s internal challenges, Ukraine’s accession could be beneficial – then the EU would simply fall apart. There are many contradictory trends. If they choose to dismantle their economic integration structure and transform into a military bloc, they risk creating very serious problems for themselves. If economic considerations are no longer a priority, then they may as well roll out a red carpet for Vladimir Zelensky.
Question: Yesterday, Vladimir Zelensky told Western media that he had invited (as ridiculous as it may sound) Russian President Vladimir Putin to attend the G7 summit in France for discussions. Did Russia receive any such proposal through official channels? If not, how do you explain this kind of messaging through the media?
Sergey Lavrov: Why would any signals be necessary? He has long relied on what is called “megaphone diplomacy,” making all of his announcements in public, just as he recently did with his insolent message to President Vladimir Putin. He performs for an audience – it’s what he’s accustomed to, the same way he plays the piano.
Question: The international community applies different standards to different conflicts. One set of criteria appears to be used in relation to Russia and Ukraine, while another is applied to Israel’s genocide in Gaza and occupation of Palestine. Figures such as Benjamin Netanyahu have not faced the same kind of punishment.
Sergey Lavrov: This is, of course, another example of the double standards for which the West has long been known. These habits have not disappeared. We continue to see the same approach: not international law, but what is called a “rules-based order” – one in which some believe they can act without restraint, while others are expected to seek their permission.
Our position is very straightforward. Having ourselves been subjected to illegal sanctions, we do not wish to see such measures imposed on anyone else. We believe sanctions should be eliminated altogether where they fall outside the framework of international law, and that all states should adhere to the principles of the UN Charter. Only the UN Security Council has the mandate to impose obligations that are binding on all states, including in the economic and trade spheres. We support international law and oppose arbitrary approaches to sanctions policy.
Source: mid.ru
Ladies and gentlemen,
We have conducted substantive, concrete, and productive negotiations. We have identified practical steps that must yet be taken to implement the fundamental agreements reached by our Presidents regarding the development of bilateral ties and the strengthening of coordination on regional and international matters. In April this year, we engaged in discussions on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomatic Forum. Our dialogue is ongoing, and we will, of course, meet at the forthcoming UN General Assembly.
June 3, 2026, marked a significant commemorative date – 106 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Soviet Russia and the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye. I take this opportunity to once again extend my congratulations to all on this momentous occasion.
We noted the intensive nature of our dialogue at all levels – at the presidential level, between the heads of parliament, and between our foreign ministries. At the Antalya Diplomatic Forum, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and I signed a further Plan of Consultations between our foreign ministries, which is being successfully implemented.
Turning to trade and economic affairs, we welcomed the dynamic development of cooperation in the energy sector. In particular, the construction of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, as part of the Rosatom State Corporation project, is proceeding on schedule.
There is a shared interest in ensuring due preparation and convening, before the end of the year, of the 20th session of the Joint Intergovernmental Russian-Turkish Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation.
We discussed the need to further develop cooperation in tourism. In 2025, nearly 7 million Russian citizens visited the Republic of Türkiye. We are interested in ensuring that their safety is reliably guaranteed. We have always valued this aspect of our Turkish friends’ approach.
We conducted a constructive review of current global and regional issues, including the situation in the Black Sea region. We are concerned by the Kiev regime’s attempts to orchestrate provocations against vessels transporting grain to the Republic of Türkiye and against tankers, as well as by the persistent threats of terrorist attacks against the TurkStream and Blue Stream gas pipelines. We have agreed to collaborate closely on matters of security in the Black Sea region, the South Caucasus, the Middle East, and North Africa. In these domains, we have established close contacts with our Turkish colleagues. We operate on a mutually complementary basis.
We are concerned by the problems that have arisen in the Middle East in connection with the Iran-Israel conflict. Its effects have already extended beyond the Strait of Hormuz. The issues of Lebanon and Palestine remain unresolved. The Israeli leadership has declared that a Palestinian state would not be established. Such a position constitutes a direct violation of United Nations resolutions. Russia and Türkiye cannot accept this. We will insist on the implementation of what has been repeatedly agreed.
We reaffirmed our interest in stabilising the situation in Syria. Whilst positive developments are underway, many challenges persist.
We will also cooperate in strengthening Libya’s statehood. The challenges there are equally grave. Since the Arab Spring of 2011, Libya has remained a fragmented state. We support, and will contribute to, the UN efforts in every possible manner.
In discussing the situation in the South Caucasus, we noted that the consolidation of peace and beneficial cooperation in this region is fostered by the participation of our countries in the 3+3 Regional Cooperation Platform, which also includes Azerbaijan, Armenia and Iran. We hope that Georgia will join this process in the future – the door remains open.
We value Türkiye’s diplomatic efforts in the context of efforts to resolve the situation around Ukraine. We have reminded our Turkish colleagues that, for any settlement to be sustainable, long-term and reliable, the root causes of the crisis must be addressed, including the drawing of Ukraine into NATO, contrary to all assurances, promises and OSCE decisions. Equally important is the full restoration and observance of the legitimate rights of the Russian and Russian-speaking populations in the territories remaining under the control of the Kiev regime, together with the restoration of the full rights of the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church.
We expect that today’s negotiations will enable us to advance the fundamental agreements reached between our leaders. The outcomes will be duly reported to our Presidents.
I would like to thank my colleague and friend for the fruitful discussion.
Question: How do you explain the West’s apparent unwillingness to comment on terrorist attacks against civilians carried out by the Zelensky government, while continuing to focus so intensely on the events in Bucha despite the lack of evidence?
Sergey Lavrov: The simplest explanation is that the West is once again seeking to reassert a hegemonic role in international affairs, positioning itself as the ultimate arbiter of what is right and wrong.
In this context, the resurgence of Nazi tendencies is particularly alarming, especially in Europe, where discussions about restoring Germany’s military capabilities and strengthening its role as Europe’s leading military power have become increasingly common.
These trends are further exacerbated by the policies of Vladimir Zelensky’s regime, which has openly promoted the rehabilitation of Nazi criminals and nationalist extremism.
When confronted with such actions – including the reburial of war criminals and collaborators convicted by the Nuremberg Tribunal – many European leaders nevertheless continue to praise Vladimir Zelensky and describe him as a defender of European values. Such actions amount to a tacit acknowledgment of what those values have come to represent. They speak for themselves and require no further commentary.
Question: The European Union has recently intensified its efforts to accelerate the accession process for a number of countries, both in the Balkans and in relation to Ukraine. How does Russia view these developments? How do you assess Ukraine’s and the Balkan states’ prospects for joining the European Union?
Sergey Lavrov: The issue of Ukraine was discussed in the context of the consequences of the Crimean referendum. Following the unconstitutional coup in Kiev in February 2014, the people of Crimea voted in a March referendum in favour of reunification with the Russian Federation. Even at that time, during our discussions with the European Union and the US on Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin consistently stressed Russia’s categorical opposition to Ukraine’s accession to NATO, which would run counter to existing commitments. At that stage, the European Union was primarily viewed as an economic integration project focused on peaceful cooperation and initiatives aimed at improving the wellbeing of its citizens. We had no objections to that issue.
The European Union has changed significantly since then. Today, particularly against the backdrop of a reduced willingness on the part of the current US administration to bear the burden of Europe’s security, several trends have emerged within the EU. One of them is the push to transform the European Union into an independent military actor, drawing on the provisions of Articles 45 and 46 of the Treaty on European Union. At the same time, there is a growing recognition among European states that they may be unable to address security challenges on their own. According to available information, the United Kingdom is promoting the idea of establishing a separate military framework involving some of the most strongly anti-Russia countries within the current European landscape, together with London and Ukraine.
All these ideas remain at the stage of discussion, deliberation, and planning. But one point is clear: the European Union is increasingly shaping its security and defence policies to oppose Russia. From the standpoint of protecting Russia’s national interests, Ukraine’s accession to the EU could be used by those seeking to further militarise the EU. Moreover, Vladimir Zelensky has on several occasions made statements indicating his readiness to “head” Europe’s armed forces (at least he said something of this kind).
From the perspective of the European Union’s internal challenges, Ukraine’s accession could be beneficial – then the EU would simply fall apart. There are many contradictory trends. If they choose to dismantle their economic integration structure and transform into a military bloc, they risk creating very serious problems for themselves. If economic considerations are no longer a priority, then they may as well roll out a red carpet for Vladimir Zelensky.
Question: Yesterday, Vladimir Zelensky told Western media that he had invited (as ridiculous as it may sound) Russian President Vladimir Putin to attend the G7 summit in France for discussions. Did Russia receive any such proposal through official channels? If not, how do you explain this kind of messaging through the media?
Sergey Lavrov: Why would any signals be necessary? He has long relied on what is called “megaphone diplomacy,” making all of his announcements in public, just as he recently did with his insolent message to President Vladimir Putin. He performs for an audience – it’s what he’s accustomed to, the same way he plays the piano.
Question: The international community applies different standards to different conflicts. One set of criteria appears to be used in relation to Russia and Ukraine, while another is applied to Israel’s genocide in Gaza and occupation of Palestine. Figures such as Benjamin Netanyahu have not faced the same kind of punishment.
Sergey Lavrov: This is, of course, another example of the double standards for which the West has long been known. These habits have not disappeared. We continue to see the same approach: not international law, but what is called a “rules-based order” – one in which some believe they can act without restraint, while others are expected to seek their permission.
Our position is very straightforward. Having ourselves been subjected to illegal sanctions, we do not wish to see such measures imposed on anyone else. We believe sanctions should be eliminated altogether where they fall outside the framework of international law, and that all states should adhere to the principles of the UN Charter. Only the UN Security Council has the mandate to impose obligations that are binding on all states, including in the economic and trade spheres. We support international law and oppose arbitrary approaches to sanctions policy.
Press release on Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s telephone conversation with Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (Пресс-релиз о телефонном разговоре министра иностранных дел Сергея Лаврова с министром иностранных дел Ирана Аббасом Арагчи.) / Russia, June, 2026
2026-06-17
Keywords: Sergey_Lavrov, Iran, quotation
Keywords: Sergey_Lavrov, Iran, quotation
Russia
Source: mid.ru
On June 17, Sergey Lavrov held a telephone conversation with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, at the Iranian side’s initiative.
Iran’s Foreign Minister briefed Minister Lavrov on progress in preparing a memorandum of understanding, which is intended to formalise an end to the conflict in the Middle East and pave the way for negotiations on a comprehensive agreement between Iran and the United States.
Minister Lavrov expressed support for the understandings reached through the effective mediation efforts of Pakistan and Qatar aimed at de-escalating tensions in the region. He underscored the importance of compliance by all parties to the armed conflict, including Israel. Russia’s continued readiness to assist in efforts to resolve the Iranian crisis, drawing on its unique experience and expertise, was also reaffirmed.
Source: mid.ru
On June 17, Sergey Lavrov held a telephone conversation with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, at the Iranian side’s initiative.
Iran’s Foreign Minister briefed Minister Lavrov on progress in preparing a memorandum of understanding, which is intended to formalise an end to the conflict in the Middle East and pave the way for negotiations on a comprehensive agreement between Iran and the United States.
Minister Lavrov expressed support for the understandings reached through the effective mediation efforts of Pakistan and Qatar aimed at de-escalating tensions in the region. He underscored the importance of compliance by all parties to the armed conflict, including Israel. Russia’s continued readiness to assist in efforts to resolve the Iranian crisis, drawing on its unique experience and expertise, was also reaffirmed.
Investment and Finance
Investment and finance in BRICS
The BRICS-ILO nexus: advancing South-South cooperation (Взаимосвязь БРИКС-МОТ: развитие сотрудничества Юг-Юг) / Russia, June, 2026
2026-06-15
Keywords: economic_challenges, expert_opinion
Keywords: economic_challenges, expert_opinion
Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org
Author: Yaroslav Lissovolik
Our recent reports highlighted the importance of the analysis of the BRICS economic framework by United Nations (UN) organizations such as the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)[1].
We now proceed to explore BRICS cooperation with another UN entity, namely the International Labor Organization (ILO). We see greater connectivity between BRICS+ and the ILO as being very much to the benefit of the world economy as the former accounts for more than half of the world’s population (after expansion and the creation of the partnership belt), while the ILO’s core mandate is to advance labor standards, develop human capital and improve working conditions on a global scale. In recent periods, the ILO has intensified its cooperation with BRICS along several tracks, including in research, with a recent ILO report produced at the end of 2025 dedicated to the productivity ecosystems for decent work in BRICS[2]. We see further scope to leverage the work undertaken by the ILO in areas such as social entrepreneurship to expand the use of international best practices across the BRICS+ platform.
According to the ILO website, in 2025 the UN organization implemented 220 projects in BRICS economies, with the BRICS members funding 63 ILO development projects in 2021-2024. Among the cooperation projects of the ILO and BRICS is the promotion of the decent work agenda and the provision of technical expertise to BRICS economies via “evidence-based technical inputs to BRICS discussions on policies that promote full, productive, and freely chosen employment and decent work… [as well as] in-depth labour, economic, and social analysis, providing policy recommendations that promote inclusive and sustainable development across member countries”[3].
Overall, the ILO singles out the following tracks of cooperation with BRICS in the labor policy sphere[4]:
One potential area that in our view harbors significant dividends for the ILO-BRICS cooperation is in the sphere of social entrepreneurship. We have already highlighted the importance of this area for BRICS economies, noting in particular the advances made in BRICS core members such as India[9]. The ILO for its part has undertaken a number of studies on the promotion of social entrepreneurship in developing economies, with practical modalities of supporting the social and solidarity economy (SSE) being tested in Africa and other parts of the Global South[10]. In our view, the BRICS+ economic development would greatly benefit from integrating the social entrepreneurship agenda into the BRICS-ILO cooperation framework, with guidelines and roadmaps of advancing the social and solidarity economy for each core member of the BRICS bloc based on ILO’s analysis of international best practices.
There may be further scope to raise the ambition in developing the BRICS-ILO cooperation with the view to providing tailor-made recommendations to BRICS members on labor market policies as well as the broader regulatory and macroeconomic framework (perhaps in coordination with BRICS CRA) geared towards fostering job creation. The ILO could also cooperate with the BRICS group together with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in monitoring intra-BRICS labor migration trends, with the view to matching the excess demand/supply gaps across national labor markets. In countries such as India and China, particular focus may be needed to be accorded to job-creation and ways of reducing youth unemployment. BRICS economies may also work with the ILO to establish near-term and medium-term targets for job-creation based on the full range of potential instruments and policy initiatives (including those pertaining to regional integration)[11]. Other areas of ILO technical support may involve risk/opportunity assessments associated with the expansion in the use of AI across BRICS economies and estimates of the potential implications of automation and AI for employment.
[1] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/unido-report-explores-brics-digital-readiness-for-manufacturing/
[2] https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2026-02/BRICS%20synthesis%20.pdf
[3] https://www.ilo.org/about-ilo/ilo-and-multilateral-system/ilo-and-brics
[4] https://www.ilo.org/about-ilo/ilo-and-multilateral-system/ilo-and-brics
[5] https://www.ilo.org/about-ilo/ilo-and-multilateral-system/ilo-and-brics
[6] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/a-brics-troika-format-for-chairmanship-transition/
[7] https://southsouthpoint.net/2026/05/18/ilo-launches-new-south-south-and-triangular-cooperation-initiatives-to-drive-digitalization-social-protection-gender-mainstreaming-and-decent-work/
[8] https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/tcsgdsinf2025d2_en.pdf
[9] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/social-entrepreneurship-across-em-what-role-for-brics/
[10] https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/wcmsp5/groups/public/@africa/@ro-abidjan/@sro-cairo/documents/publication/wcms_589097.pdf
https://www.ilo.org/resource/news/ilo-reaffirms-support-advancing-social-and-solidarity-economy-africa
[11] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/boosting-job-creation-across-the-global-south/
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org
Author: Yaroslav Lissovolik
Our recent reports highlighted the importance of the analysis of the BRICS economic framework by United Nations (UN) organizations such as the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)[1].
We now proceed to explore BRICS cooperation with another UN entity, namely the International Labor Organization (ILO). We see greater connectivity between BRICS+ and the ILO as being very much to the benefit of the world economy as the former accounts for more than half of the world’s population (after expansion and the creation of the partnership belt), while the ILO’s core mandate is to advance labor standards, develop human capital and improve working conditions on a global scale. In recent periods, the ILO has intensified its cooperation with BRICS along several tracks, including in research, with a recent ILO report produced at the end of 2025 dedicated to the productivity ecosystems for decent work in BRICS[2]. We see further scope to leverage the work undertaken by the ILO in areas such as social entrepreneurship to expand the use of international best practices across the BRICS+ platform.
According to the ILO website, in 2025 the UN organization implemented 220 projects in BRICS economies, with the BRICS members funding 63 ILO development projects in 2021-2024. Among the cooperation projects of the ILO and BRICS is the promotion of the decent work agenda and the provision of technical expertise to BRICS economies via “evidence-based technical inputs to BRICS discussions on policies that promote full, productive, and freely chosen employment and decent work… [as well as] in-depth labour, economic, and social analysis, providing policy recommendations that promote inclusive and sustainable development across member countries”[3].
Overall, the ILO singles out the following tracks of cooperation with BRICS in the labor policy sphere[4]:
- The Employment Working Group (EWG): A formal technical forum where representatives from BRICS economies discuss the labour/employment agenda.
- The Labour and Employment Ministers’ Meeting (LEMM): A political forum where labour ministers adopt joint declarations and endorse shared priorities on employment, social protection, and inclusive development, based on the technical work undertaken by the ILO and the EWG.
- The BRICS Network of Research Institutes: A platform that brings together research institutions from BRICS member countries to exchange knowledge and deliver evidence-based policy inputs, with the ILO providing technical support and advancing collaboration within the Network.
- The BRICS Productive Ecosystems Platform: An initiative to support BRICS members in “developing and implementing inclusive and sustainable policies that enhance productivity, promote decent work, and foster productive employment”[5]. This platform is supported by the ILO via the Regular Budget Technical Cooperation-South-South Triangular Cooperation (RBTC-SSTC) project, with productivity ecosystem studies conducted in South Africa, Brazil and China.
One potential area that in our view harbors significant dividends for the ILO-BRICS cooperation is in the sphere of social entrepreneurship. We have already highlighted the importance of this area for BRICS economies, noting in particular the advances made in BRICS core members such as India[9]. The ILO for its part has undertaken a number of studies on the promotion of social entrepreneurship in developing economies, with practical modalities of supporting the social and solidarity economy (SSE) being tested in Africa and other parts of the Global South[10]. In our view, the BRICS+ economic development would greatly benefit from integrating the social entrepreneurship agenda into the BRICS-ILO cooperation framework, with guidelines and roadmaps of advancing the social and solidarity economy for each core member of the BRICS bloc based on ILO’s analysis of international best practices.
There may be further scope to raise the ambition in developing the BRICS-ILO cooperation with the view to providing tailor-made recommendations to BRICS members on labor market policies as well as the broader regulatory and macroeconomic framework (perhaps in coordination with BRICS CRA) geared towards fostering job creation. The ILO could also cooperate with the BRICS group together with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in monitoring intra-BRICS labor migration trends, with the view to matching the excess demand/supply gaps across national labor markets. In countries such as India and China, particular focus may be needed to be accorded to job-creation and ways of reducing youth unemployment. BRICS economies may also work with the ILO to establish near-term and medium-term targets for job-creation based on the full range of potential instruments and policy initiatives (including those pertaining to regional integration)[11]. Other areas of ILO technical support may involve risk/opportunity assessments associated with the expansion in the use of AI across BRICS economies and estimates of the potential implications of automation and AI for employment.
[1] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/unido-report-explores-brics-digital-readiness-for-manufacturing/
[2] https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2026-02/BRICS%20synthesis%20.pdf
[3] https://www.ilo.org/about-ilo/ilo-and-multilateral-system/ilo-and-brics
[4] https://www.ilo.org/about-ilo/ilo-and-multilateral-system/ilo-and-brics
[5] https://www.ilo.org/about-ilo/ilo-and-multilateral-system/ilo-and-brics
[6] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/a-brics-troika-format-for-chairmanship-transition/
[7] https://southsouthpoint.net/2026/05/18/ilo-launches-new-south-south-and-triangular-cooperation-initiatives-to-drive-digitalization-social-protection-gender-mainstreaming-and-decent-work/
[8] https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/tcsgdsinf2025d2_en.pdf
[9] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/social-entrepreneurship-across-em-what-role-for-brics/
[10] https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/wcmsp5/groups/public/@africa/@ro-abidjan/@sro-cairo/documents/publication/wcms_589097.pdf
https://www.ilo.org/resource/news/ilo-reaffirms-support-advancing-social-and-solidarity-economy-africa
[11] https://brics-plus-analytics.org/boosting-job-creation-across-the-global-south/
Uzbekistan Officially Joins New Development Bank as New Member Country (Узбекистан официально присоединился к новому банку развития в качестве страны-члена.) / China, June, 2026
2026-06-18
Keywords: NDB, Uzbekistan
Keywords: NDB, Uzbekistan
China
Source: www.ndb.int
The New Development Bank (NDB) welcomes the Republic of Uzbekistan as its newest member country and the first country from Central Asia to join the Bank. With Uzbekistan’s accession, the total number of NDB member countries has reached ten.
On June 5, 2026, Uzbekistan deposited its instrument of accession, in line with the provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the NDB.
On behalf of the New Development Bank, H.E. Mrs. Dilma Rousseff, NDB President, warmly congratulated Uzbekistan on joining the Bank.
“The New Development Bank warmly welcomes Uzbekistan to the growing family of NDB member countries,” said President Dilma Rousseff. “Uzbekistan has demonstrated truly remarkable economic performance. It brings to the Bank a vibrant and dynamic economy, supported by the country’s strong commitment to sustainable development and international cooperation.”
“NDB is fully determined to support Uzbekistan’s sustainable development agenda, including projects in such areas as clean energy, water resource management, transportation and other strategic areas. We look forward to working closely with our partners in Uzbekistan to identify and finance impactful projects that support the country’s development agenda in line with its national priorities and goals,” highlighted Mrs. Dilma Rousseff.
The New Development Bank’s membership expansion is in line with the Bank’s strategy to become a leading provider of solutions for infrastructure and sustainable development for emerging market economies and developing countries (EMDCs).
NDB will continue to pursue gradual, balanced membership expansion and strengthen its role as a knowledge sharing and collaboration platform for EMDCs, facilitating cooperation and mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects, in line with its mandate, said Mrs. Dilma Rousseff.
Background Information
The New Development Bank is a multilateral development bank established by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) with the purpose of mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in emerging markets and developing countries. In 2021, NDB welcomed its first non-founding members and continues to expand, positioning itself as a platform for wider collaboration among EMDCs.
Source: www.ndb.int
The New Development Bank (NDB) welcomes the Republic of Uzbekistan as its newest member country and the first country from Central Asia to join the Bank. With Uzbekistan’s accession, the total number of NDB member countries has reached ten.
On June 5, 2026, Uzbekistan deposited its instrument of accession, in line with the provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the NDB.
On behalf of the New Development Bank, H.E. Mrs. Dilma Rousseff, NDB President, warmly congratulated Uzbekistan on joining the Bank.
“The New Development Bank warmly welcomes Uzbekistan to the growing family of NDB member countries,” said President Dilma Rousseff. “Uzbekistan has demonstrated truly remarkable economic performance. It brings to the Bank a vibrant and dynamic economy, supported by the country’s strong commitment to sustainable development and international cooperation.”
“NDB is fully determined to support Uzbekistan’s sustainable development agenda, including projects in such areas as clean energy, water resource management, transportation and other strategic areas. We look forward to working closely with our partners in Uzbekistan to identify and finance impactful projects that support the country’s development agenda in line with its national priorities and goals,” highlighted Mrs. Dilma Rousseff.
The New Development Bank’s membership expansion is in line with the Bank’s strategy to become a leading provider of solutions for infrastructure and sustainable development for emerging market economies and developing countries (EMDCs).
NDB will continue to pursue gradual, balanced membership expansion and strengthen its role as a knowledge sharing and collaboration platform for EMDCs, facilitating cooperation and mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects, in line with its mandate, said Mrs. Dilma Rousseff.
Background Information
The New Development Bank is a multilateral development bank established by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) with the purpose of mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in emerging markets and developing countries. In 2021, NDB welcomed its first non-founding members and continues to expand, positioning itself as a platform for wider collaboration among EMDCs.
NDB Board of Directors Convened its 51st Meeting in Shanghai (Совет директоров НБР провел свое 51-е заседание в Шанхае.) / China, June, 2026
2026-06-15
Keywords: NDB, top_level_meeting
Keywords: NDB, top_level_meeting
China
Source: www.ndb.int
On June 9 and 10, 2026, the Board of Directors (Board) of the New Development Bank (NDB) convened its 51st Meeting at the Bank’s Headquarters in Shanghai, China.
Program for Upgrade of Infrastructure for Metropolitan Municipal Services
The Board approved a loan of up to USD 1 billion to the Republic of South Africa for the implementation of the Program for Upgrade of Infrastructure for Metropolitan Municipal Services. The Program aims to boost investments in the provision of essential urban services, including water supply and sanitation, electricity and solid waste management in eight South Africa’s metropolitan municipalities – Buffalo City, Cape Town, Ekurhuleni, eThekwini, Johannesburg, Mangaung, Nelson Mandela Bay and Tshwane. It is expected to enhance living conditions for residents and improve the business climate in the eight municipalities, contributing to socio-economic development, as envisaged in the National Development Plan 2030.
The Program supports achievement of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), primarily SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities), while also contributing to SDG 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation) and SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy).
Advanced Procurement from Non-member Countries for the Lucknow Metro Rail (Phase-1B) Project in India
The Board approved advanced procurement action from non-member countries for the Lucknow Metro Rail (Phase-1B) Project. The Project will expand the existing metro rail network in Lucknow, the state capital city of Uttar Pradesh, by constructing a new metro line of 11.2 km in length, including 12 metro stations, providing connectivity between the eastern and the western part of the city.
The Board approved the revised Opex calculation formula and ZARONIA-based pricing, both that apply to sovereign and non-sovereign loans.
The Board was updated on the Bank’s project pipeline for 2026.
The Board discussed the progress on membership expansion and welcomed Uzbekistan as a new member country of the Bank.
The Board provided its guidance in relation to the formulation of the General Strategy of the New Development Bank for the next five-year period (2027-2031).
The Board discussed the Evaluation Report of the Delhi-Ghaziabad-Meerut Regional Rapid Transit System Project in India and the Evaluation Report of the Country Portfolio Evaluation for China.
The Board approved the Condensed Financial Statements of NDB for the three months ended March 31, 2026, and the Condensed Financial Statements of the Project Preparation Fund for the three months ended March 31, 2026.
The Board also approved the revised Liquidity Risk Management Policy, Exchange Rate Risk Management Policy and Interest Rate Risk Management Policy.
Committee Meetings
The 39th Meeting of the Audit, Risk and Compliance Committee (ARC) and the 35th Meeting of the Budget, Human Resources and Compensation Committee (BHRC) of the Board were held in the Bank’s Headquarters on June 8, 2026, and June 9, 2026, respectively. The 39th ARC Meeting took note of Risk Management Report for Q1 2026 and the 35th BHRC Meeting took note of the Budget Utilisation Report for Q1 2026 and the Update on Human Resources.
Background Information
The New Development Bank (NDB) is a multilateral development bank established by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) with the purpose of mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs). In 2021, NDB welcomed its first non-founding members and continues to expand, positioning itself as a platform for wider collaboration among EMDCs.
Source: www.ndb.int
On June 9 and 10, 2026, the Board of Directors (Board) of the New Development Bank (NDB) convened its 51st Meeting at the Bank’s Headquarters in Shanghai, China.
Program for Upgrade of Infrastructure for Metropolitan Municipal Services
The Board approved a loan of up to USD 1 billion to the Republic of South Africa for the implementation of the Program for Upgrade of Infrastructure for Metropolitan Municipal Services. The Program aims to boost investments in the provision of essential urban services, including water supply and sanitation, electricity and solid waste management in eight South Africa’s metropolitan municipalities – Buffalo City, Cape Town, Ekurhuleni, eThekwini, Johannesburg, Mangaung, Nelson Mandela Bay and Tshwane. It is expected to enhance living conditions for residents and improve the business climate in the eight municipalities, contributing to socio-economic development, as envisaged in the National Development Plan 2030.
The Program supports achievement of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), primarily SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities), while also contributing to SDG 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation) and SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy).
Advanced Procurement from Non-member Countries for the Lucknow Metro Rail (Phase-1B) Project in India
The Board approved advanced procurement action from non-member countries for the Lucknow Metro Rail (Phase-1B) Project. The Project will expand the existing metro rail network in Lucknow, the state capital city of Uttar Pradesh, by constructing a new metro line of 11.2 km in length, including 12 metro stations, providing connectivity between the eastern and the western part of the city.
The Board approved the revised Opex calculation formula and ZARONIA-based pricing, both that apply to sovereign and non-sovereign loans.
The Board was updated on the Bank’s project pipeline for 2026.
The Board discussed the progress on membership expansion and welcomed Uzbekistan as a new member country of the Bank.
The Board provided its guidance in relation to the formulation of the General Strategy of the New Development Bank for the next five-year period (2027-2031).
The Board discussed the Evaluation Report of the Delhi-Ghaziabad-Meerut Regional Rapid Transit System Project in India and the Evaluation Report of the Country Portfolio Evaluation for China.
The Board approved the Condensed Financial Statements of NDB for the three months ended March 31, 2026, and the Condensed Financial Statements of the Project Preparation Fund for the three months ended March 31, 2026.
The Board also approved the revised Liquidity Risk Management Policy, Exchange Rate Risk Management Policy and Interest Rate Risk Management Policy.
Committee Meetings
The 39th Meeting of the Audit, Risk and Compliance Committee (ARC) and the 35th Meeting of the Budget, Human Resources and Compensation Committee (BHRC) of the Board were held in the Bank’s Headquarters on June 8, 2026, and June 9, 2026, respectively. The 39th ARC Meeting took note of Risk Management Report for Q1 2026 and the 35th BHRC Meeting took note of the Budget Utilisation Report for Q1 2026 and the Update on Human Resources.
Background Information
The New Development Bank (NDB) is a multilateral development bank established by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) with the purpose of mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs). In 2021, NDB welcomed its first non-founding members and continues to expand, positioning itself as a platform for wider collaboration among EMDCs.
World of Work
SOCIAL POLICY, TRADE UNIONS, ACTIONS
Russia — Latin America: Cooperation for Building Sustainable Energy Systems (Россия — Латинская Америка: сотрудничество в создании устойчивых энергетических систем) / Russia, June, 2026
2026-06-19
Keywords: sustainable_development, cooperation
Keywords: sustainable_development, cooperation
Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru
On 20 May 2026, in Moscow, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and the Center for Integration and Cooperation between Russia and Latin America (CICRAL) held the international conference “Russia – Latin America: Cooperation for Building Sustainable Energy Systems.”
The global energy sector is undergoing a period of profound transformation. New industrial leaders are emerging, supply chains are being reconfigured, and issues of technological sovereignty are assuming an increasingly prominent place in the discourse of policymakers and experts. This trend is particularly significant in the context of geopolitical turbulence in Latin America and the Middle East.
Russia and several Latin American countries possess unique competitive advantages: substantial hydrocarbon reserves, significant expertise in nuclear energy and bioenergy, complementary technological capabilities, and, most importantly, a shared interest in developing a multipolar model of energy cooperation. However, growing mutual interest must be translated into practical action. Regular expert platforms are needed to facilitate the development of concrete mechanisms for cooperation among companies, industry associations, and government authorities.
Today, despite considerable experience in implementing joint projects, the potential for cooperation remains far from fully realized. Persistent barriers include a lack of up-to-date industry analysis, insufficient alignment of regulatory frameworks, and the absence of a systematic dialogue among companies. The international conference “Russia–Latin America: Cooperation for Building Sustainable Energy Systems” served as a platform for the exchange of views and expert assessments.
The conference was organized around three thematic sessions, preceded by a plenary session.
The plenary session served as an introductory forum and focused on the key areas of energy cooperation between Russia and Latin American countries under the new international conditions. Discussions addressed priorities for cooperation in the energy sector, trade in energy resources and emerging challenges to strengthening trade relations, as well as priorities for scientific and technological collaboration.
Plenary Session Participants:
The first session focused on nuclear energy as a source of clean power for growing economies. Participants discussed the construction of large-scale and small modular nuclear power plants, workforce development and training for the nuclear industries of Latin American countries, as well as nuclear technologies and solutions for healthcare and agriculture.
Session I Participants:
The second session focused on the oil and gas sector, from exploration to logistics. Participants discussed joint geological exploration projects, the potential for cooperation across different regions and extraction conditions, as well as the development of logistics networks and tanker fleets.
Session II Participants:
The third session focused on renewable energy sources and hydrogen. Participants discussed joint projects in hydropower, wind energy, and solar energy, the potential for green hydrogen production, as well as hybrid energy systems based on renewable energy sources.
Session III Participants:
RIAC expresses its gratitude to CICRAL and all conference participants. These proceedings have been prepared on the basis of presentations and comments delivered during the conference.
Key Points Raised During the Plenary SessionThe Role of Energy in International Relations
Energy should be viewed not merely as a sector of the economy but as the foundation of all productive activity, education, healthcare, and transportation infrastructure. Access to energy is not a luxury but a fundamental requirement for human development. Restricting state access to energy resources through sanctions or other limitations should be regarded as a serious violation of development rights, as it directly diminishes people's quality of life and undermines national sovereignty. At the same time, significant disparities in per capita energy consumption persist: the gap between developed and developing countries can reach three- to fourfold, highlighting not only a technological challenge but also a moral question concerning equitable access to development.
Geopolitical Context and Market Fragmentation
The global energy sector is undergoing profound transformation. Geopolitical instability, including developments in the Strait of Hormuz, has disrupted traditional logistics and supply chains. Under these circumstances, Russia, Mexico, and Venezuela were identified as key suppliers helping to prevent sharp increases in energy prices. The United States seeks to strengthen its position as a dominant producer and supplier across the entire energy value chain—from extraction and transportation to trading—and views Russian and Iranian energy exports as significant competitive challenges. Addressing global energy poverty remains one of humanity’s central tasks; however, doing so will require a fundamental restructuring of the international framework governing energy markets, which many participants argued has become increasingly fragmented and ineffective.
One of the most pressing issues discussed was the situation in Cuba. Participants noted that U.S. sanctions have contributed to a severe energy crisis with significant humanitarian consequences. Cuba maintains domestic production of heavy, hard-to-extract crude oil that covers approximately 40% of its energy needs, but the poor quality of this fuel accelerates the deterioration of thermal power plants. The share of solar energy in the country’s energy mix has increased from approximately 3% to 10%, yet energy storage remains a major unresolved challenge. At the same time, biomass resources remain largely underutilized. The situation is further complicated by structural characteristics inherited from the Soviet-era economic model, while sanctions continue to exert pressure on the country’s most vulnerable sectors.
The State of Energy Cooperation Between Russia and Latin America
Energy cooperation between Russia and Latin America has deep historical roots. In the twentieth century, Soviet technologies won tenders to supply equipment for hydroelectric power plants in Argentina and were involved in the construction of gas pipelines in Brazil. Successful barter arrangements were also implemented. For example, in 1976, the Soviet Union supplied oil to Spain for Venezuelan customers, while Venezuela supplied oil to Cuba for Soviet customers, allowing both sides to reduce transportation costs. Today, cooperation encompasses oil and petroleum product supplies, hydropower development, collaboration in nuclear energy, and work involving lithium and uranium resources, including uranium exports to Brazil.
Obstacles to Cooperation
Several factors continue to hinder the development of energy cooperation. First, sanctions and the associated banking and logistical challenges create significant barriers. Although many of these issues can be addressed through third countries and alternative logistics arrangements, they inevitably slow project implementation and increase transaction costs. Second, Russia remains dependent on Western technologies in certain areas, particularly oil extraction in jungle environments, where Russian technologies currently lag behind Western and Chinese alternatives, despite Russia’s substantial achievements in onshore production. Third, the political environment in Latin America creates additional risks. The election of governments aligned with Washington may lead to the suspension or cancellation of joint projects. The region is also subject to considerable geopolitical pressure. According to participants, the latest U.S. security doctrine designates countries up to the equator as the first “security belt,” while the remaining countries of the region constitute a second concentric circle of strategic interest.
Russia’s Interests
Russia views Latin America as an independent and promising foreign policy direction. Relations are built on the principles of equality, mutual respect, and pragmatism. The primary objective extends beyond the trade of natural resources to encompass technological development, industrial cooperation, workforce training, and the creation of a comprehensive energy security architecture. Energy cooperation establishes long-term economic ties that can last for decades—the lifecycle of nuclear energy projects, for example, can extend up to 100 years—making this area a strategic priority. Participants noted that while Russian energy companies previously operated under the assumption that universally accepted global rules governed international markets, current realities require the development of new frameworks and rules. Without such mechanisms, discussions of the global energy transition are unlikely to move beyond aspirational goals.
Brazil’s Interests
Brazil possesses one of the world’s cleanest electricity generation matrices, with a high share of hydropower, wind, solar, and bioenergy (ethanol). Russian fertilizer supplies are critically important for maintaining Brazil’s position as the world’s largest fertilizer importer. The production of nitrogen fertilizers is directly dependent on access to natural gas. In addition, trade in petroleum products—particularly diesel fuel—plays a significant role in the country’s energy security. Although Brazil has become a net exporter of crude oil, its refining capacity remains limited.
Brasília sees substantial potential in nuclear cooperation with Moscow. Key areas of interest include large-scale and small modular reactors, the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear medicine (including radioisotope production), the application of nuclear technologies in agriculture and industry, as well as workforce training and scientific collaboration.
BRICS is viewed as an important platform for dialogue. Brazil emphasizes the importance of strengthening engagement with countries of the Global South on energy-related issues, including bilateral initiatives that can promote technology transfer, investment, workforce development, and new opportunities for industrial cooperation.
Mexico’s Interests
Mexico has set a goal of increasing the share of clean energy in its energy mix from 27% to 45% by 2035. At the same time, the country faces significant disparities in energy consumption. Per capita electricity consumption stands at approximately 15,900 kWh, compared with 54,800 kWh in Russia and 61,300 kWh in the United States. Mexico advocates a comprehensive approach that combines international cooperation to develop more efficient and less resource-intensive technologies with the promotion of a responsible and sustainable culture of energy consumption, particularly in high-income countries.
Argentina’s Interests
Argentina has a 75-year history of nuclear energy development and possesses significant expertise in research reactors, including their export. The country operates three nuclear power plants, which generate approximately 7% of its electricity, maintains a complete nuclear fuel cycle, and has uranium reserves estimated at around 40,000 metric tons. However, uranium mining is currently inactive, and the heavy water production facility requires recommissioning. The CAREM small modular reactor project (a 28 MW prototype, with a planned 100 MW commercial version and 300 MW modular units), as well as plans to construct fourth and fifth nuclear power units, have been suspended by the current government. Construction of the RA-10 multipurpose research reactor is nearing completion and is expected to increase radioisotope production tenfold. At the same time, participants noted U.S. interest in the privatization of Argentina’s nuclear assets, including the CAREM project and the RA-10 reactor.
Natural gas occupies a significant share of Argentina’s energy mix, while low-carbon energy sources account for less than 50% of total generation, compared with more than 80% in Brazil. Argentina is becoming an exporter of hydrocarbons and emphasizes the importance of adding value to natural gas through the production of urea, ammonia, and hydrogen rather than relying solely on raw exports. The country also possesses vast areas suitable for wind and solar power development and does not utilize coal-fired power generation.
Argentina is interested in expanding cooperation with Russia in the areas of small modular reactors, the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear medicine, and workforce training.
Colombia’s Interests
Colombia is highly vulnerable to climate change. It ranks second in the world in biodiversity, and approximately 10% of its territory lies within the Amazon region. At the same time, the country accounts for only 0.6% of global greenhouse gas emissions but has undertaken ambitious commitments: reducing emissions by 50% by 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality by 2050. The government’s objective is to implement a just energy transition and gradually move away from an economic model heavily dependent on fossil fuel extraction, which is associated with approximately 80% of global CO₂ emissions. In Colombia’s energy mix, 60% comes from conventional renewable energy sources, primarily hydropower, while 17.9% is generated from nonconventional renewable energy sources.
Green hydrogen and offshore wind power are viewed as the most promising areas for cooperation with Russia. The offshore wind sector alone has an estimated potential exceeding 50 GW in the Caribbean basin. Bogotá has also officially joined the BRICS New Development Bank to gain access to additional sources of financing for its energy transition initiatives.
Bolivia’s Interests
Bolivia entered the nuclear era in partnership with Russia through the establishment of the Center for Nuclear Research and Technology, developed with Russian assistance. The center includes a cyclotron-radiopharmaceutical complex, a multipurpose irradiation center, and a research reactor. By the second year of the project’s implementation, more than 100,000 people had received diagnostic and medical treatment services using nuclear technologies, with women accounting for approximately 70% of beneficiaries.
Participants identified two key factors behind the project’s success: the political commitment of national leaders—Presidents Evo Morales, Luis Arce, and Vladimir Putin—and the training of Bolivian specialists in Russia. This cooperation made it possible to create an entirely new scientific and technological sector in Bolivia from the ground up.
The Role of Rosatom and Nuclear Technologies in the Region
Rosatom is a global leader in the nuclear industry. In 2025, the state corporation reported revenues of $34.5 billion, while its international project portfolio exceeded $200 billion. The company’s portfolio includes 41 large-scale and small modular reactor units across 11 countries. Of the 25 nuclear power units currently under construction outside their countries of design origin, 22 are being built using Russian technology, representing approximately 90% of the market. Rosatom’s principal competitive advantage lies in its comprehensive offering, which covers the entire lifecycle of a nuclear power plant, including fuel supply, workforce training, waste management, and decommissioning.
Its product portfolio includes nuclear energy technologies such as large-scale and small modular nuclear power plants, as well as floating nuclear power plants. It also encompasses non-energy applications, including research reactors and nuclear medicine, alongside related sectors such as energy storage systems, smart grids, composite materials, lithium, and rare earth metals.
Latin America has a long history of engagement with nuclear technologies. Three countries in the region—Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico—operate nuclear power plants, while 16 research reactors are currently in operation. Argentina and Brazil have also developed complete nuclear fuel cycle capabilities.
Renewable Energy and Hydrogen
Latin America possesses enormous potential for the development of renewable energy. Hydropower forms the backbone of the energy mix in many countries across the region, while solar and wind generation are expanding rapidly. Colombia offers particularly favorable conditions for green hydrogen production, including consistent wind resources, high solar irradiation, abundant water resources, and a strategic geographic location for exports.
Brazil is home to the world’s largest association of green hydrogen producers. The country has many prerequisites for competitive hydrogen production, including a stable political and regulatory environment, abundant natural resources (sun, wind, and water), a well-developed power grid, and the ability to utilize surplus clean electricity. Up to 3 GW of clean power generation is curtailed each month due to insufficient demand. Brazil also benefits from decades of experience implementing successful energy transition programs.
At the same time, the development of renewable energy faces significant constraints. Large hydroelectric projects require extensive land use and substantial water resources. The production of solar panels depends on rare earth materials and generates hazardous waste, while end-of-life solar panels present additional disposal challenges. Electricity transmission infrastructure has not kept pace with the rapid growth of generation capacity.
Another unresolved issue is the creation of reliable demand for green hydrogen. Participants emphasized the need for government mandates requiring hydrogen consumption, similar to policies supporting sustainable aviation fuels. More broadly, it was argued that merely switching from one energy source to another does not address the central environmental challenge. The primary concern is not the type of energy consumed but the overall level of energy consumption, particularly in high-income countries.
Financing the Energy Transition and Nuclear Projects
The energy transition and nuclear energy projects require access to affordable financing that does not create excessive debt burdens. Colombia has promoted innovative financing mechanisms, including debt-for-nature swaps, reductions in the cost of capital, and measures designed to expand fiscal space for sustainable development investments.
An important shift has occurred in the approach of international development banks toward nuclear energy projects. In June 2025, the World Bank lifted its prohibition on financing nuclear energy projects, while the BRICS New Development Bank announced its willingness to support investments in the sector. These developments create new opportunities for the implementation of nuclear energy projects throughout the region.
At the same time, the high cost of capital remains a major challenge for countries in the Global South. Participants emphasized the need for reform of the international financial architecture to provide long-term, low-cost financing for sustainable development projects.
Scientific and Technological Cooperation and Latin American Innovations
Workforce training is a critical prerequisite for the development of energy cooperation. Rosatom implements educational programs, including the training of Latin American students at Russian universities and professional development programs for specialists. The example of Bolivia demonstrates that the creation of a national talent pool makes it possible to build an entire scientific sector from scratch. Horizontal ties are also developing: a visit by young energy professionals from six Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico, El Salvador, and Chile) to St. Petersburg, as well as joint educational programs between universities (for example, between IPEN and MEPhI). Importantly, dialogue at the academic and scientific levels continues without political obstacles—ideological differences (right-wing/left-wing) do not affect cooperation in this field.
Latin American innovations and scientists are of direct interest to Russia. These include new vibration detection systems for nuclear power plants (Uruguay), power grid analytics for systems with a high share of renewable energy sources (Uruguay), and catalysts that do not require precious metals (Chile). In the 2026 Global Energy Prize competition, two of the fifteen shortlisted scientists represent Latin America, while the 2025 prize was awarded to a Puerto Rican scientist. In February 2026, a conference was held in Ecuador with the participation of seven Latin American teams. The International Award Committee welcomed its first representative from the region—Hortensia Jiménez, Director of Bolivia’s Electricity Agency.
Key Points Raised During Session I “Nuclear Energy: Clean Energy for a Growing Economy”Global Trends
In recent years, nuclear energy has experienced a “renaissance.” It is increasingly viewed not merely as a low-carbon energy source but also as a tool for overcoming energy poverty and supporting the growth of new energy-intensive sectors, including data centers, cryptocurrencies, and electric vehicles. At COP28 in December 2023, 20 countries signed a declaration calling for a tripling of global nuclear power capacity by 2050. Several Latin American countries joined the declaration, including Jamaica and El Salvador, with Brazil joining later at COP29 in Paris. However, according to estimates from most research centers, actual global growth in nuclear power generation by 2050 is expected to reach 30–35% under the baseline scenario.
Russian Nuclear Technologies and Financing Mechanisms
Under Russia’s Energy Strategy through 2050 (baseline scenario), the share of nuclear power generation is expected to increase from the current 12% to 25%. Achieving this goal will require the construction of 30–38 new power units, including facilities in the Arctic and other new regions. The key qualitative shift is the transition to a two-component system: alongside traditional VVER reactors, advanced fast-neutron reactors with a closed fuel cycle will be deployed.
The development of small- and medium-capacity reactors continues, including the serially produced RITM reactors (55 MW). Work on fast-neutron reactor technologies is also progressing, with the launch of the BREST pilot demonstration power unit expected in 2029. Digital technologies are being introduced as well, an area in which Rosatom is considered one of the industry leaders, improving the efficiency of energy infrastructure.
The standard financing model for international nuclear projects provides that a Russian state loan covers approximately 85% of construction costs, while the remaining 15% is financed by the host country through the involvement of private investors. Long-term power purchase agreements with fixed electricity prices provide stable guarantees for all participants. Rosatom’s projects also include localization requirements, with 30–40% participation by local companies, as well as workforce development through educational quotas for study in Russia.
The principal competitors in the Latin American nuclear market are the United States and China. The United States has traditionally maintained an active presence in the region and employs robust competitive strategies. China, in turn, relies on soft power, supported by substantial financial backing at both the corporate and state levels, as Chinese state-owned corporations can consistently rely on support from the central government.
Brazil’s Energy Matrix
Brazil possesses significant strategic potential in nuclear science and engineering. In 2023, renewable energy sources accounted for 49.1% of the country’s total energy mix. Hydropower remains the foundation of the energy matrix, but its further expansion faces limitations, including vulnerability to climate events, environmental and social constraints, and impacts on local communities. Wind and solar generation are growing rapidly, creating a need for modernization of transmission networks and energy storage systems.
Brazil operates two nuclear power plants—Angra 1 (640 MW, PWR) and Angra 2 (1,350 MW, PWR)—while a third unit, Angra 3 (1,405 MW, PWR), is under construction. Key challenges for the development of nuclear energy include public perception, project costs, the need to improve the regulatory framework, and the development of workforce capabilities and supply chains.
The establishment of the National Nuclear Safety Authority (ANSN) in 2021 marked an important step toward strengthening independent regulation, licensing small modular reactors (SMRs) and microreactors, and harmonizing national practices with international standards. The institutions of CNEN (the National Nuclear Energy Commission) possess key experimental facilities and technical expertise. Federal universities with nuclear programs are also active, including UFMG, UFRJ, USP, UFPE, and IME.
Russia–Brazil Cooperation in Nuclear Energy
The Institute for Energy and Nuclear Research of Brazil (IPEN) and the National Research Nuclear University MEPhI signed a memorandum of understanding in 2019 and renewed it in 2024. The cooperation covers education, scientific research, academic exchange, and international collaboration. Since 2021, MEPhI faculty members have delivered more than 20 courses at IPEN in the following areas: nuclear engineering, nuclear physics, reactor safety, and advanced nuclear technologies.
As part of academic mobility programs, five Brazilian students have been enrolled in master’s degree programs in Russia. A joint dual-degree program is expected to be launched in September 2026.
Together with MEPhI and Rosatom, IPEN organizes the international scientific competition HackAtom, a hackathon dedicated to real-world challenges in the nuclear sector. Three competitions have been held in Brazil, and Brazilian teams have qualified for the international stages. These activities contribute to strengthening IPEN’s reputation as a center of innovation, education, and scientific excellence.
Prospects for Cooperation
For Brazil, Rosatom offers alternatives to traditional PWR reactors within the framework of the national energy program. In 2025, Brazil’s Ministry of Agriculture expressed interest in small modular reactors. Conceptual studies are being conducted with Petrobras, including a microreactor (8–12 MW) for powering FPSO equipment at depths of 1,500–3,000 meters, and a floating SMR for supplying electricity to offshore platforms in order to reduce emissions and support gas reinjection technology with a 45% CO₂ content (HISEP). A project demonstrating critical microreactor technologies is being implemented with investments of 50 million reais.
Similar projects utilizing Russian technologies could also be developed in Peru and Paraguay.
Key Points Raised During Session II “The Oil and Gas Sector: From Exploration to Logistics”Global Context and Market Development Scenarios
In March 2026, global oil markets experienced an unprecedented shock: oil supplies declined by 10.1 million barrels per day (approximately 10% of the market), exports from the Persian Gulf countries virtually ceased, and 20% of global LNG supply disappeared from the market. Traditional logistics chains were paralyzed, and the previous “rules of the game” were effectively dismantled.
Under these conditions, experts considered three principal development scenarios. The first scenario (low probability) envisages a return to the conditions of early 2026, with Brent crude prices at $65–70 per barrel, under which Brazil and Guyana would remain the primary beneficiaries. The second scenario (baseline) assumes relative stabilization following the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, while high geopolitical risks persist and prices remain at $80–90 per barrel, creating favorable conditions for the monetization of Venezuela’s reserves. The third scenario (medium probability) involves the weakening of OPEC+, the emergence of price wars, and a decline in prices to $40–60 per barrel. Such a development would threaten new projects but could partially displace U.S. shale oil due to its higher production costs.
The breakdown of traditional “rules of the game” creates new opportunities for Latin American countries. Priority is shifting toward direct bilateral agreements between importers and exporters, bypassing market-based pricing mechanisms.
Resource Base and Export Potential of the Region
Latin America possesses enormous hydrocarbon potential. South and Central America account for 18.7% of global oil reserves, and the region’s reserve-to-production ratio reaches 151 years at current production levels, compared with a global average of 53.5 years. However, this export potential remains underutilized: the region accounts for just over 6% of global oil exports and only 1.7% of global gas exports.
One of the main constraining factors is inefficient domestic consumption. Oil accounts for 49% of Latin America’s energy mix, significantly higher than in the Asia-Pacific region (27%), Europe (40%), and the United States (39%). At the same time, the region has lower levels of motorization, and a substantial share of oil is used for electricity generation (6% of total generation, compared with 1.34% in Europe and less than 0.4% in the United States).
At the same time, Latin America remains one of the few regions in the world capable of delivering significant production growth outside OPEC+, despite the global decarbonization trend. According to estimates, the region could increase global oil supply by 3–4 million barrels per day by the early 2030s.
The Role of Venezuela as an Energy Hub
Venezuela possesses the world’s largest proven oil reserves—303.2 billion barrels, representing 17.8% of global reserves. Its reserve-to-production ratio stands at 920 years, compared with 66 years for Saudi Arabia and nine years for the United States. The country also ranks seventh in the world in natural gas reserves, with 221 trillion cubic feet.
Its geographic location positions Venezuela to become an energy hub for the Caribbean Basin. The development of offshore projects, particularly in the natural gas sector, would create opportunities to supply liquefied natural gas to markets in the eastern Caribbean and Central America. Potential supply volumes are estimated at 100,000 barrels per day.
Of particular interest is the proposed project to connect the Orinoco Oil Belt with the Colombian port of Tumaco. The project would extend approximately 1,200 km and have a potential capacity of 600,000–880,000 barrels per day. It would provide an independent outlet to the Pacific Ocean, bypassing the Panama Canal, and create direct access to Asian markets. The Antonio Ricaurte gas pipeline (224 km) already connects western Venezuela with northern Colombia.
Logistics and Infrastructure
The logistics chain in the oil and gas industry largely determines the economic viability of projects. Weak logistics can render a profitable field uneconomic, while efficient infrastructure can significantly increase the value of the entire supply chain.
Infrastructure constraints in Latin America include the deterioration of pipeline systems (Venezuela alone requires the reconstruction of 25,000 kilometers of pipeline networks), insufficient port infrastructure (only a limited number of terminals can accommodate VLCC-class vessels), the absence of a significant tanker fleet operating under national flags, and bottlenecks in refining capacity.
Russian capabilities in this area include Sovcomflot’s fleet of more than 140 vessels, Transneft’s experience as the largest operator of pipeline systems, natural gas liquefaction technologies developed by NOVATEK and Gazprom, and the shipbuilding capacity of the Zvezda Shipbuilding Complex for the construction of large-capacity tankers.
Competition and New Players
Latin America’s oil and gas resources are direct competitors to U.S. energy exports. Brazilian crude oil (the Lula grade) is comparable in quality to U.S. WTI crude but has a lower production cost ($35 per barrel compared with $45–55 per barrel) and is less susceptible to rapid depletion. Brazil has already become one of China’s largest oil suppliers, often displacing U.S. crude grades in that market.
China actively employs a financing model based on “loans for oil” through its state-owned banks. Venezuela has received more than $60 billion from Beijing in exchange for future oil deliveries, enabling the country to withstand the effects of sanctions. Under these lending arrangements, contracts are often awarded to Chinese companies.
Prospects for Cooperation Between Russia and Latin America
Russia possesses technologies and expertise that can be applied in Latin American conditions. These include 3D and 4D seismic technologies, drilling at depths exceeding 3,000 meters, geomechanical modeling, and enhanced oil recovery technologies.
Documented examples of successful cooperation include Rosneft’s operations in Venezuela’s Orinoco Belt, Gazprom’s activities in Bolivia, and Zarubezhneft’s projects on Cuba’s Gulf of Mexico shelf. The proposed institutional frameworks include production-sharing agreements, joint ventures, intergovernmental agreements, and technology transfer programs that incorporate personnel training.
Artificial intelligence is viewed as a catalyst for the industry. According to estimates, investment in AI projects in the oil and gas sector will increase from $3.54 billion in 2025 to $6.4 billion in 2030. The application of AI makes it possible to accelerate the interpretation of seismic data (+70% efficiency), optimize drilling operations (+30% speed), and increase oil recovery rates (from 8–12% to 20–45% when combined with enhanced oil recovery methods).
Proposals for Cooperation
In the area of exploration and production, it is proposed to establish a multilateral mechanism for launching at least five pilot exploration projects in priority basins by 2027, with joint financing and guaranteed technology transfer. Institutional frameworks may include production-sharing agreements, joint ventures, intergovernmental agreements, and personnel training programs.
In the area of logistics and transportation, it is proposed to create a Russia–Latin America maritime transport consortium with an initial fleet of 10–15 tankers serving strategic routes, including the Venezuela–Brazil–South Africa–Asia corridor. Such a structure would reduce dependence on intermediaries from third countries and lower transportation costs.
In the area of port infrastructure, joint investments are proposed for the modernization of ports in Venezuela, Brazil, and Chile to enable the handling of VLCC-class tankers and LNG carriers. Russia could contribute technologies, equipment, and management expertise, as well as shipbuilding capacity (for example, the Zvezda shipyard) for the construction of large-capacity tankers commissioned by Latin American partners.
In the institutional sphere, it is proposed to transform the dialogue platform into an annual technical forum with working groups specializing in exploration, production, logistics, and workforce development.
Key Points Raised During Session III “Renewable Energy Sources and Hydrogen”Global Context and the Region’s Potential
In recent years, the cost of solar power generation and energy storage systems has declined significantly, making it possible to address the intermittency challenges associated with renewable energy sources. Tariff restrictions imposed by the United States on China played a major role in this process: Chinese manufacturers redirected supplies to countries of the Global South, including Latin America, accelerating the adoption of solar technologies.
Latin America is a global leader in the share of renewable energy in its energy mix. However, renewable energy is generally part of integrated energy solutions and cannot provide baseload power without additional capacity in the form of energy storage systems or nuclear power. Moscow has potential for cooperation with countries in the region in this area, as well as in the field of critical minerals (lithium, nickel, and cobalt), where both Russia and Latin American countries face common challenges: retaining value added within their economies and overcoming weak domestic demand.
Brazil and Green Hydrogen
Brazil possesses all the prerequisites for competitive green hydrogen production. These include a stable democracy with a predictable legal environment, high solar irradiation, significant wind power potential (both onshore and offshore), and a strong hydropower-based energy matrix. The existence of a nationally interconnected power system makes it possible to transmit electricity between regions, while major ports provide export opportunities.
The largest green hydrogen producers’ association, ABIHV, brings together 35 companies and actively influences the development of public policy. In 2024, a package of laws was adopted establishing the legal framework for low-carbon hydrogen, including the PHBC program with a fund totaling $3 billion.
The key challenges for 2026 are the finalization of the regulatory framework, the development of electricity transmission infrastructure (which is lagging behind the growth of generation capacity), and the creation of guaranteed demand for green hydrogen through government mandates.
Colombia: Regulatory Framework and Target Indicators
Colombia has developed an extensive regulatory framework for hydrogen energy: Law No. 1715 (2014), Law No. 2099 (2021), which includes a roadmap and targets for 2030, and Decree No. 1597 (2024) on the creation of a hydrogen ecosystem. In 2024, significant occurrences of geological (“white”) hydrogen were discovered in two regions of the country.
The state-owned company Ecopetrol operates a 50 kW electrolyzer in Cartagena, while the private company Promigas has implemented a pilot project involving the blending of green hydrogen with natural gas. By 2030, Colombia plans to achieve a green hydrogen production cost of $1.70 per kilogram, install 1–3 GW of electrolyzer capacity, and develop a hydrogen transportation fleet consisting of 1,500–2,000 passenger vehicles, 1,000–1,500 trucks, and 50–100 refueling stations.
Potential areas for cooperation with Russia include isolated regions not connected to the national grid (where diesel fuel remains the primary energy source), geological hydrogen (through the exchange of expertise in exploration and production), and pink hydrogen (the use of nuclear energy for hydrogen production).
Argentina: Experience in Hydropower Cooperation
Argentina has 40 years of successful experience using Russian technologies in the hydropower sector. Twenty percent of the country’s installed hydropower capacity is based on Russian-made equipment. A key example is the binational Salto Grande Hydroelectric Power Plant between Argentina and Uruguay (14 turbines, installed capacity of 1,890 MW). The project was completed on schedule, and after 40 years the equipment continues to operate and generate above its design capacity, unlike equipment from other manufacturers that requires modernization.
Russian equipment is also installed at the Agua del Toro Hydroelectric Power Plant (1982) and the Los Reyunos Hydroelectric Power Plant (1984), a pumped-storage facility used to accumulate energy during peak demand periods. Financing was provided through a clearing arrangement involving the exchange of Argentine grain and meat for Russian turbines. In 2009 and 2016, two additional facilities equipped with Russian technology were commissioned.
The potential for new hydropower capacity in Argentina is estimated at 5 GW at binational hydroelectric facilities and an additional 10 GW at national projects, as well as 1.5 GW at small hydropower plants (up to 50 MW). Argentina has legally recognized hydropower as a renewable energy source, providing access to green financing. The key condition for project implementation remains the availability of financing.
Challenges and Prospects
The main challenges for the development of renewable energy and hydrogen in the region include the need to modernize electricity transmission infrastructure, which is lagging behind the growth of generation capacity; the challenge of creating guaranteed demand for green hydrogen, which requires government mandates for mandatory consumption (similar to those used for sustainable aviation fuel); the high cost of capital for green projects; and the need to improve the regulatory framework in most countries of the region.
At the same time, hydropower continues to play a key role in the energy mix of many countries, and the successful experience of Argentine-Russian cooperation in this field can be expanded. Brazil and Colombia are actively advancing the hydrogen agenda by developing regulatory frameworks and attracting investment. Russia can contribute through its technologies, including nuclear technologies for pink hydrogen production, as well as through cooperation in the field of critical minerals.
Conference Conclusions
Conference Recommendations
Source: russiancouncil.ru
On 20 May 2026, in Moscow, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and the Center for Integration and Cooperation between Russia and Latin America (CICRAL) held the international conference “Russia – Latin America: Cooperation for Building Sustainable Energy Systems.”
The global energy sector is undergoing a period of profound transformation. New industrial leaders are emerging, supply chains are being reconfigured, and issues of technological sovereignty are assuming an increasingly prominent place in the discourse of policymakers and experts. This trend is particularly significant in the context of geopolitical turbulence in Latin America and the Middle East.
Russia and several Latin American countries possess unique competitive advantages: substantial hydrocarbon reserves, significant expertise in nuclear energy and bioenergy, complementary technological capabilities, and, most importantly, a shared interest in developing a multipolar model of energy cooperation. However, growing mutual interest must be translated into practical action. Regular expert platforms are needed to facilitate the development of concrete mechanisms for cooperation among companies, industry associations, and government authorities.
Today, despite considerable experience in implementing joint projects, the potential for cooperation remains far from fully realized. Persistent barriers include a lack of up-to-date industry analysis, insufficient alignment of regulatory frameworks, and the absence of a systematic dialogue among companies. The international conference “Russia–Latin America: Cooperation for Building Sustainable Energy Systems” served as a platform for the exchange of views and expert assessments.
The conference was organized around three thematic sessions, preceded by a plenary session.
The plenary session served as an introductory forum and focused on the key areas of energy cooperation between Russia and Latin American countries under the new international conditions. Discussions addressed priorities for cooperation in the energy sector, trade in energy resources and emerging challenges to strengthening trade relations, as well as priorities for scientific and technological collaboration.
Plenary Session Participants:
- Ivan Timofeev, Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC)
- Esteban Perrier, President of CICRAL
- Dmitry Belov, Deputy Director of the Latin American Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia
- Sergio Rodrigues dos Santos, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Federative Republic of Brazil to the Russian Federation
- Adriana Serquis, Member of the Argentine Congress
- Eduardo Villegas Mejías, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United Mexican States to the Russian Federation
- Jorge Ignacio Zorro Sánchez, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Colombia to the Russian Federation
- María Luisa Ramos Urzagaste, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Plurinational State of Bolivia to the Russian Federation (2009–2015, 2021–2024)
- Dmitry Rozental, Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences
- Sergey Brilev, President of the Global Energy Association
- Konstantin Simonov, Founder and Director of the National Energy Security Fund, First Vice Rector for External Communications, and Chair of the Department of Applied Political Science at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation
- Ilya Platonov, Director of Marketing, Rosatom International Network
- Lucas Adrián García, Vice President of CICRAL
- Alexandra Terzi, Program Coordinator at RIAC.
The first session focused on nuclear energy as a source of clean power for growing economies. Participants discussed the construction of large-scale and small modular nuclear power plants, workforce development and training for the nuclear industries of Latin American countries, as well as nuclear technologies and solutions for healthcare and agriculture.
Session I Participants:
- Julian Marco Barbosa Shorto (Brazil), Research, Development, and Innovation Manager at the Nuclear Engineering Center of IPEN and President of the IPEN/USP Graduate Program in Nuclear Engineering
- Vladimir Likhachev (Russia), Director of the Center for Sustainable Development of Infrastructure Industries at the Institute for Economics and Regulation of Infrastructure Industries, Higher School of Economics (HSE University)
- Nicolás Malinowski (Argentina), Nuclear Engineering Specialist at Nucleoeléctrica Argentina S.A.; Instructor at the National University of José C. Paz (UNPAZ); and Researcher with the Energy Geopolitics and International Political Economy Study Group (GEPIE, UFABC), the Geopolitics and International Political Economy of Energy Working Group of the Brazilian Observatory of Foreign Policy (OPEB), and the Technological Sovereignty Research Group (UFABC)
- Ilya Platonov (Russia), Director of Marketing, Rosatom International Network.
The second session focused on the oil and gas sector, from exploration to logistics. Participants discussed joint geological exploration projects, the potential for cooperation across different regions and extraction conditions, as well as the development of logistics networks and tanker fleets.
Session II Participants:
- Ricardo León (Venezuela), Director of Research at the Hydrocarbons University of Venezuela
- Valery Andrianov (Russia), Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Faculty of Social Sciences and Mass Communications, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences
- Arcadio Penagos (Mexico), Director of the Department of Scientific, Technological, and Sustainable Processes at the Polytechnic University of Chiapas and Petrochemical Engineer
- Vladimir Likhachev (Russia), Director of the Center for Sustainable Development of Infrastructure Industries at the Institute for Economics and Regulation of Infrastructure Industries, HSE University
The third session focused on renewable energy sources and hydrogen. Participants discussed joint projects in hydropower, wind energy, and solar energy, the potential for green hydrogen production, as well as hybrid energy systems based on renewable energy sources.
Session III Participants:
- Igor Makarov (Russia), Director of the Institute for Natural Resources and Climate Change Economics, Head of the Department of World Economy, HSE University
- Emanuel Sánchez (Argentina), Former Director of Hydropower Generation at Argentina’s Secretariat of Energy
- Anderson Luis Dias (Brazil), Political Scientist and Government Affairs Manager at the Brazilian Association of Green Hydrogen Producers (ABIHV)
- Omar Camilo López (Colombia), Electrical Engineer and Acting Superintendent for Energy and Fuel Gas
- Liliana Proskuryakova (Russia), Head of the Laboratory for Science and Technology Studies at the Institute for Statistical Studies and Economics of Knowledge, HSE University.
RIAC expresses its gratitude to CICRAL and all conference participants. These proceedings have been prepared on the basis of presentations and comments delivered during the conference.
Key Points Raised During the Plenary SessionThe Role of Energy in International Relations
Energy should be viewed not merely as a sector of the economy but as the foundation of all productive activity, education, healthcare, and transportation infrastructure. Access to energy is not a luxury but a fundamental requirement for human development. Restricting state access to energy resources through sanctions or other limitations should be regarded as a serious violation of development rights, as it directly diminishes people's quality of life and undermines national sovereignty. At the same time, significant disparities in per capita energy consumption persist: the gap between developed and developing countries can reach three- to fourfold, highlighting not only a technological challenge but also a moral question concerning equitable access to development.
Geopolitical Context and Market Fragmentation
The global energy sector is undergoing profound transformation. Geopolitical instability, including developments in the Strait of Hormuz, has disrupted traditional logistics and supply chains. Under these circumstances, Russia, Mexico, and Venezuela were identified as key suppliers helping to prevent sharp increases in energy prices. The United States seeks to strengthen its position as a dominant producer and supplier across the entire energy value chain—from extraction and transportation to trading—and views Russian and Iranian energy exports as significant competitive challenges. Addressing global energy poverty remains one of humanity’s central tasks; however, doing so will require a fundamental restructuring of the international framework governing energy markets, which many participants argued has become increasingly fragmented and ineffective.
One of the most pressing issues discussed was the situation in Cuba. Participants noted that U.S. sanctions have contributed to a severe energy crisis with significant humanitarian consequences. Cuba maintains domestic production of heavy, hard-to-extract crude oil that covers approximately 40% of its energy needs, but the poor quality of this fuel accelerates the deterioration of thermal power plants. The share of solar energy in the country’s energy mix has increased from approximately 3% to 10%, yet energy storage remains a major unresolved challenge. At the same time, biomass resources remain largely underutilized. The situation is further complicated by structural characteristics inherited from the Soviet-era economic model, while sanctions continue to exert pressure on the country’s most vulnerable sectors.
The State of Energy Cooperation Between Russia and Latin America
Energy cooperation between Russia and Latin America has deep historical roots. In the twentieth century, Soviet technologies won tenders to supply equipment for hydroelectric power plants in Argentina and were involved in the construction of gas pipelines in Brazil. Successful barter arrangements were also implemented. For example, in 1976, the Soviet Union supplied oil to Spain for Venezuelan customers, while Venezuela supplied oil to Cuba for Soviet customers, allowing both sides to reduce transportation costs. Today, cooperation encompasses oil and petroleum product supplies, hydropower development, collaboration in nuclear energy, and work involving lithium and uranium resources, including uranium exports to Brazil.
Obstacles to Cooperation
Several factors continue to hinder the development of energy cooperation. First, sanctions and the associated banking and logistical challenges create significant barriers. Although many of these issues can be addressed through third countries and alternative logistics arrangements, they inevitably slow project implementation and increase transaction costs. Second, Russia remains dependent on Western technologies in certain areas, particularly oil extraction in jungle environments, where Russian technologies currently lag behind Western and Chinese alternatives, despite Russia’s substantial achievements in onshore production. Third, the political environment in Latin America creates additional risks. The election of governments aligned with Washington may lead to the suspension or cancellation of joint projects. The region is also subject to considerable geopolitical pressure. According to participants, the latest U.S. security doctrine designates countries up to the equator as the first “security belt,” while the remaining countries of the region constitute a second concentric circle of strategic interest.
Russia’s Interests
Russia views Latin America as an independent and promising foreign policy direction. Relations are built on the principles of equality, mutual respect, and pragmatism. The primary objective extends beyond the trade of natural resources to encompass technological development, industrial cooperation, workforce training, and the creation of a comprehensive energy security architecture. Energy cooperation establishes long-term economic ties that can last for decades—the lifecycle of nuclear energy projects, for example, can extend up to 100 years—making this area a strategic priority. Participants noted that while Russian energy companies previously operated under the assumption that universally accepted global rules governed international markets, current realities require the development of new frameworks and rules. Without such mechanisms, discussions of the global energy transition are unlikely to move beyond aspirational goals.
Brazil’s Interests
Brazil possesses one of the world’s cleanest electricity generation matrices, with a high share of hydropower, wind, solar, and bioenergy (ethanol). Russian fertilizer supplies are critically important for maintaining Brazil’s position as the world’s largest fertilizer importer. The production of nitrogen fertilizers is directly dependent on access to natural gas. In addition, trade in petroleum products—particularly diesel fuel—plays a significant role in the country’s energy security. Although Brazil has become a net exporter of crude oil, its refining capacity remains limited.
Brasília sees substantial potential in nuclear cooperation with Moscow. Key areas of interest include large-scale and small modular reactors, the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear medicine (including radioisotope production), the application of nuclear technologies in agriculture and industry, as well as workforce training and scientific collaboration.
BRICS is viewed as an important platform for dialogue. Brazil emphasizes the importance of strengthening engagement with countries of the Global South on energy-related issues, including bilateral initiatives that can promote technology transfer, investment, workforce development, and new opportunities for industrial cooperation.
Mexico’s Interests
Mexico has set a goal of increasing the share of clean energy in its energy mix from 27% to 45% by 2035. At the same time, the country faces significant disparities in energy consumption. Per capita electricity consumption stands at approximately 15,900 kWh, compared with 54,800 kWh in Russia and 61,300 kWh in the United States. Mexico advocates a comprehensive approach that combines international cooperation to develop more efficient and less resource-intensive technologies with the promotion of a responsible and sustainable culture of energy consumption, particularly in high-income countries.
Argentina’s Interests
Argentina has a 75-year history of nuclear energy development and possesses significant expertise in research reactors, including their export. The country operates three nuclear power plants, which generate approximately 7% of its electricity, maintains a complete nuclear fuel cycle, and has uranium reserves estimated at around 40,000 metric tons. However, uranium mining is currently inactive, and the heavy water production facility requires recommissioning. The CAREM small modular reactor project (a 28 MW prototype, with a planned 100 MW commercial version and 300 MW modular units), as well as plans to construct fourth and fifth nuclear power units, have been suspended by the current government. Construction of the RA-10 multipurpose research reactor is nearing completion and is expected to increase radioisotope production tenfold. At the same time, participants noted U.S. interest in the privatization of Argentina’s nuclear assets, including the CAREM project and the RA-10 reactor.
Natural gas occupies a significant share of Argentina’s energy mix, while low-carbon energy sources account for less than 50% of total generation, compared with more than 80% in Brazil. Argentina is becoming an exporter of hydrocarbons and emphasizes the importance of adding value to natural gas through the production of urea, ammonia, and hydrogen rather than relying solely on raw exports. The country also possesses vast areas suitable for wind and solar power development and does not utilize coal-fired power generation.
Argentina is interested in expanding cooperation with Russia in the areas of small modular reactors, the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear medicine, and workforce training.
Colombia’s Interests
Colombia is highly vulnerable to climate change. It ranks second in the world in biodiversity, and approximately 10% of its territory lies within the Amazon region. At the same time, the country accounts for only 0.6% of global greenhouse gas emissions but has undertaken ambitious commitments: reducing emissions by 50% by 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality by 2050. The government’s objective is to implement a just energy transition and gradually move away from an economic model heavily dependent on fossil fuel extraction, which is associated with approximately 80% of global CO₂ emissions. In Colombia’s energy mix, 60% comes from conventional renewable energy sources, primarily hydropower, while 17.9% is generated from nonconventional renewable energy sources.
Green hydrogen and offshore wind power are viewed as the most promising areas for cooperation with Russia. The offshore wind sector alone has an estimated potential exceeding 50 GW in the Caribbean basin. Bogotá has also officially joined the BRICS New Development Bank to gain access to additional sources of financing for its energy transition initiatives.
Bolivia’s Interests
Bolivia entered the nuclear era in partnership with Russia through the establishment of the Center for Nuclear Research and Technology, developed with Russian assistance. The center includes a cyclotron-radiopharmaceutical complex, a multipurpose irradiation center, and a research reactor. By the second year of the project’s implementation, more than 100,000 people had received diagnostic and medical treatment services using nuclear technologies, with women accounting for approximately 70% of beneficiaries.
Participants identified two key factors behind the project’s success: the political commitment of national leaders—Presidents Evo Morales, Luis Arce, and Vladimir Putin—and the training of Bolivian specialists in Russia. This cooperation made it possible to create an entirely new scientific and technological sector in Bolivia from the ground up.
The Role of Rosatom and Nuclear Technologies in the Region
Rosatom is a global leader in the nuclear industry. In 2025, the state corporation reported revenues of $34.5 billion, while its international project portfolio exceeded $200 billion. The company’s portfolio includes 41 large-scale and small modular reactor units across 11 countries. Of the 25 nuclear power units currently under construction outside their countries of design origin, 22 are being built using Russian technology, representing approximately 90% of the market. Rosatom’s principal competitive advantage lies in its comprehensive offering, which covers the entire lifecycle of a nuclear power plant, including fuel supply, workforce training, waste management, and decommissioning.
Its product portfolio includes nuclear energy technologies such as large-scale and small modular nuclear power plants, as well as floating nuclear power plants. It also encompasses non-energy applications, including research reactors and nuclear medicine, alongside related sectors such as energy storage systems, smart grids, composite materials, lithium, and rare earth metals.
Latin America has a long history of engagement with nuclear technologies. Three countries in the region—Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico—operate nuclear power plants, while 16 research reactors are currently in operation. Argentina and Brazil have also developed complete nuclear fuel cycle capabilities.
Renewable Energy and Hydrogen
Latin America possesses enormous potential for the development of renewable energy. Hydropower forms the backbone of the energy mix in many countries across the region, while solar and wind generation are expanding rapidly. Colombia offers particularly favorable conditions for green hydrogen production, including consistent wind resources, high solar irradiation, abundant water resources, and a strategic geographic location for exports.
Brazil is home to the world’s largest association of green hydrogen producers. The country has many prerequisites for competitive hydrogen production, including a stable political and regulatory environment, abundant natural resources (sun, wind, and water), a well-developed power grid, and the ability to utilize surplus clean electricity. Up to 3 GW of clean power generation is curtailed each month due to insufficient demand. Brazil also benefits from decades of experience implementing successful energy transition programs.
At the same time, the development of renewable energy faces significant constraints. Large hydroelectric projects require extensive land use and substantial water resources. The production of solar panels depends on rare earth materials and generates hazardous waste, while end-of-life solar panels present additional disposal challenges. Electricity transmission infrastructure has not kept pace with the rapid growth of generation capacity.
Another unresolved issue is the creation of reliable demand for green hydrogen. Participants emphasized the need for government mandates requiring hydrogen consumption, similar to policies supporting sustainable aviation fuels. More broadly, it was argued that merely switching from one energy source to another does not address the central environmental challenge. The primary concern is not the type of energy consumed but the overall level of energy consumption, particularly in high-income countries.
Financing the Energy Transition and Nuclear Projects
The energy transition and nuclear energy projects require access to affordable financing that does not create excessive debt burdens. Colombia has promoted innovative financing mechanisms, including debt-for-nature swaps, reductions in the cost of capital, and measures designed to expand fiscal space for sustainable development investments.
An important shift has occurred in the approach of international development banks toward nuclear energy projects. In June 2025, the World Bank lifted its prohibition on financing nuclear energy projects, while the BRICS New Development Bank announced its willingness to support investments in the sector. These developments create new opportunities for the implementation of nuclear energy projects throughout the region.
At the same time, the high cost of capital remains a major challenge for countries in the Global South. Participants emphasized the need for reform of the international financial architecture to provide long-term, low-cost financing for sustainable development projects.
Scientific and Technological Cooperation and Latin American Innovations
Workforce training is a critical prerequisite for the development of energy cooperation. Rosatom implements educational programs, including the training of Latin American students at Russian universities and professional development programs for specialists. The example of Bolivia demonstrates that the creation of a national talent pool makes it possible to build an entire scientific sector from scratch. Horizontal ties are also developing: a visit by young energy professionals from six Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico, El Salvador, and Chile) to St. Petersburg, as well as joint educational programs between universities (for example, between IPEN and MEPhI). Importantly, dialogue at the academic and scientific levels continues without political obstacles—ideological differences (right-wing/left-wing) do not affect cooperation in this field.
Latin American innovations and scientists are of direct interest to Russia. These include new vibration detection systems for nuclear power plants (Uruguay), power grid analytics for systems with a high share of renewable energy sources (Uruguay), and catalysts that do not require precious metals (Chile). In the 2026 Global Energy Prize competition, two of the fifteen shortlisted scientists represent Latin America, while the 2025 prize was awarded to a Puerto Rican scientist. In February 2026, a conference was held in Ecuador with the participation of seven Latin American teams. The International Award Committee welcomed its first representative from the region—Hortensia Jiménez, Director of Bolivia’s Electricity Agency.
Key Points Raised During Session I “Nuclear Energy: Clean Energy for a Growing Economy”Global Trends
In recent years, nuclear energy has experienced a “renaissance.” It is increasingly viewed not merely as a low-carbon energy source but also as a tool for overcoming energy poverty and supporting the growth of new energy-intensive sectors, including data centers, cryptocurrencies, and electric vehicles. At COP28 in December 2023, 20 countries signed a declaration calling for a tripling of global nuclear power capacity by 2050. Several Latin American countries joined the declaration, including Jamaica and El Salvador, with Brazil joining later at COP29 in Paris. However, according to estimates from most research centers, actual global growth in nuclear power generation by 2050 is expected to reach 30–35% under the baseline scenario.
Russian Nuclear Technologies and Financing Mechanisms
Under Russia’s Energy Strategy through 2050 (baseline scenario), the share of nuclear power generation is expected to increase from the current 12% to 25%. Achieving this goal will require the construction of 30–38 new power units, including facilities in the Arctic and other new regions. The key qualitative shift is the transition to a two-component system: alongside traditional VVER reactors, advanced fast-neutron reactors with a closed fuel cycle will be deployed.
The development of small- and medium-capacity reactors continues, including the serially produced RITM reactors (55 MW). Work on fast-neutron reactor technologies is also progressing, with the launch of the BREST pilot demonstration power unit expected in 2029. Digital technologies are being introduced as well, an area in which Rosatom is considered one of the industry leaders, improving the efficiency of energy infrastructure.
The standard financing model for international nuclear projects provides that a Russian state loan covers approximately 85% of construction costs, while the remaining 15% is financed by the host country through the involvement of private investors. Long-term power purchase agreements with fixed electricity prices provide stable guarantees for all participants. Rosatom’s projects also include localization requirements, with 30–40% participation by local companies, as well as workforce development through educational quotas for study in Russia.
The principal competitors in the Latin American nuclear market are the United States and China. The United States has traditionally maintained an active presence in the region and employs robust competitive strategies. China, in turn, relies on soft power, supported by substantial financial backing at both the corporate and state levels, as Chinese state-owned corporations can consistently rely on support from the central government.
Brazil’s Energy Matrix
Brazil possesses significant strategic potential in nuclear science and engineering. In 2023, renewable energy sources accounted for 49.1% of the country’s total energy mix. Hydropower remains the foundation of the energy matrix, but its further expansion faces limitations, including vulnerability to climate events, environmental and social constraints, and impacts on local communities. Wind and solar generation are growing rapidly, creating a need for modernization of transmission networks and energy storage systems.
Brazil operates two nuclear power plants—Angra 1 (640 MW, PWR) and Angra 2 (1,350 MW, PWR)—while a third unit, Angra 3 (1,405 MW, PWR), is under construction. Key challenges for the development of nuclear energy include public perception, project costs, the need to improve the regulatory framework, and the development of workforce capabilities and supply chains.
The establishment of the National Nuclear Safety Authority (ANSN) in 2021 marked an important step toward strengthening independent regulation, licensing small modular reactors (SMRs) and microreactors, and harmonizing national practices with international standards. The institutions of CNEN (the National Nuclear Energy Commission) possess key experimental facilities and technical expertise. Federal universities with nuclear programs are also active, including UFMG, UFRJ, USP, UFPE, and IME.
Russia–Brazil Cooperation in Nuclear Energy
The Institute for Energy and Nuclear Research of Brazil (IPEN) and the National Research Nuclear University MEPhI signed a memorandum of understanding in 2019 and renewed it in 2024. The cooperation covers education, scientific research, academic exchange, and international collaboration. Since 2021, MEPhI faculty members have delivered more than 20 courses at IPEN in the following areas: nuclear engineering, nuclear physics, reactor safety, and advanced nuclear technologies.
As part of academic mobility programs, five Brazilian students have been enrolled in master’s degree programs in Russia. A joint dual-degree program is expected to be launched in September 2026.
Together with MEPhI and Rosatom, IPEN organizes the international scientific competition HackAtom, a hackathon dedicated to real-world challenges in the nuclear sector. Three competitions have been held in Brazil, and Brazilian teams have qualified for the international stages. These activities contribute to strengthening IPEN’s reputation as a center of innovation, education, and scientific excellence.
Prospects for Cooperation
For Brazil, Rosatom offers alternatives to traditional PWR reactors within the framework of the national energy program. In 2025, Brazil’s Ministry of Agriculture expressed interest in small modular reactors. Conceptual studies are being conducted with Petrobras, including a microreactor (8–12 MW) for powering FPSO equipment at depths of 1,500–3,000 meters, and a floating SMR for supplying electricity to offshore platforms in order to reduce emissions and support gas reinjection technology with a 45% CO₂ content (HISEP). A project demonstrating critical microreactor technologies is being implemented with investments of 50 million reais.
Similar projects utilizing Russian technologies could also be developed in Peru and Paraguay.
Key Points Raised During Session II “The Oil and Gas Sector: From Exploration to Logistics”Global Context and Market Development Scenarios
In March 2026, global oil markets experienced an unprecedented shock: oil supplies declined by 10.1 million barrels per day (approximately 10% of the market), exports from the Persian Gulf countries virtually ceased, and 20% of global LNG supply disappeared from the market. Traditional logistics chains were paralyzed, and the previous “rules of the game” were effectively dismantled.
Under these conditions, experts considered three principal development scenarios. The first scenario (low probability) envisages a return to the conditions of early 2026, with Brent crude prices at $65–70 per barrel, under which Brazil and Guyana would remain the primary beneficiaries. The second scenario (baseline) assumes relative stabilization following the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, while high geopolitical risks persist and prices remain at $80–90 per barrel, creating favorable conditions for the monetization of Venezuela’s reserves. The third scenario (medium probability) involves the weakening of OPEC+, the emergence of price wars, and a decline in prices to $40–60 per barrel. Such a development would threaten new projects but could partially displace U.S. shale oil due to its higher production costs.
The breakdown of traditional “rules of the game” creates new opportunities for Latin American countries. Priority is shifting toward direct bilateral agreements between importers and exporters, bypassing market-based pricing mechanisms.
Resource Base and Export Potential of the Region
Latin America possesses enormous hydrocarbon potential. South and Central America account for 18.7% of global oil reserves, and the region’s reserve-to-production ratio reaches 151 years at current production levels, compared with a global average of 53.5 years. However, this export potential remains underutilized: the region accounts for just over 6% of global oil exports and only 1.7% of global gas exports.
One of the main constraining factors is inefficient domestic consumption. Oil accounts for 49% of Latin America’s energy mix, significantly higher than in the Asia-Pacific region (27%), Europe (40%), and the United States (39%). At the same time, the region has lower levels of motorization, and a substantial share of oil is used for electricity generation (6% of total generation, compared with 1.34% in Europe and less than 0.4% in the United States).
At the same time, Latin America remains one of the few regions in the world capable of delivering significant production growth outside OPEC+, despite the global decarbonization trend. According to estimates, the region could increase global oil supply by 3–4 million barrels per day by the early 2030s.
The Role of Venezuela as an Energy Hub
Venezuela possesses the world’s largest proven oil reserves—303.2 billion barrels, representing 17.8% of global reserves. Its reserve-to-production ratio stands at 920 years, compared with 66 years for Saudi Arabia and nine years for the United States. The country also ranks seventh in the world in natural gas reserves, with 221 trillion cubic feet.
Its geographic location positions Venezuela to become an energy hub for the Caribbean Basin. The development of offshore projects, particularly in the natural gas sector, would create opportunities to supply liquefied natural gas to markets in the eastern Caribbean and Central America. Potential supply volumes are estimated at 100,000 barrels per day.
Of particular interest is the proposed project to connect the Orinoco Oil Belt with the Colombian port of Tumaco. The project would extend approximately 1,200 km and have a potential capacity of 600,000–880,000 barrels per day. It would provide an independent outlet to the Pacific Ocean, bypassing the Panama Canal, and create direct access to Asian markets. The Antonio Ricaurte gas pipeline (224 km) already connects western Venezuela with northern Colombia.
Logistics and Infrastructure
The logistics chain in the oil and gas industry largely determines the economic viability of projects. Weak logistics can render a profitable field uneconomic, while efficient infrastructure can significantly increase the value of the entire supply chain.
Infrastructure constraints in Latin America include the deterioration of pipeline systems (Venezuela alone requires the reconstruction of 25,000 kilometers of pipeline networks), insufficient port infrastructure (only a limited number of terminals can accommodate VLCC-class vessels), the absence of a significant tanker fleet operating under national flags, and bottlenecks in refining capacity.
Russian capabilities in this area include Sovcomflot’s fleet of more than 140 vessels, Transneft’s experience as the largest operator of pipeline systems, natural gas liquefaction technologies developed by NOVATEK and Gazprom, and the shipbuilding capacity of the Zvezda Shipbuilding Complex for the construction of large-capacity tankers.
Competition and New Players
Latin America’s oil and gas resources are direct competitors to U.S. energy exports. Brazilian crude oil (the Lula grade) is comparable in quality to U.S. WTI crude but has a lower production cost ($35 per barrel compared with $45–55 per barrel) and is less susceptible to rapid depletion. Brazil has already become one of China’s largest oil suppliers, often displacing U.S. crude grades in that market.
China actively employs a financing model based on “loans for oil” through its state-owned banks. Venezuela has received more than $60 billion from Beijing in exchange for future oil deliveries, enabling the country to withstand the effects of sanctions. Under these lending arrangements, contracts are often awarded to Chinese companies.
Prospects for Cooperation Between Russia and Latin America
Russia possesses technologies and expertise that can be applied in Latin American conditions. These include 3D and 4D seismic technologies, drilling at depths exceeding 3,000 meters, geomechanical modeling, and enhanced oil recovery technologies.
Documented examples of successful cooperation include Rosneft’s operations in Venezuela’s Orinoco Belt, Gazprom’s activities in Bolivia, and Zarubezhneft’s projects on Cuba’s Gulf of Mexico shelf. The proposed institutional frameworks include production-sharing agreements, joint ventures, intergovernmental agreements, and technology transfer programs that incorporate personnel training.
Artificial intelligence is viewed as a catalyst for the industry. According to estimates, investment in AI projects in the oil and gas sector will increase from $3.54 billion in 2025 to $6.4 billion in 2030. The application of AI makes it possible to accelerate the interpretation of seismic data (+70% efficiency), optimize drilling operations (+30% speed), and increase oil recovery rates (from 8–12% to 20–45% when combined with enhanced oil recovery methods).
Proposals for Cooperation
In the area of exploration and production, it is proposed to establish a multilateral mechanism for launching at least five pilot exploration projects in priority basins by 2027, with joint financing and guaranteed technology transfer. Institutional frameworks may include production-sharing agreements, joint ventures, intergovernmental agreements, and personnel training programs.
In the area of logistics and transportation, it is proposed to create a Russia–Latin America maritime transport consortium with an initial fleet of 10–15 tankers serving strategic routes, including the Venezuela–Brazil–South Africa–Asia corridor. Such a structure would reduce dependence on intermediaries from third countries and lower transportation costs.
In the area of port infrastructure, joint investments are proposed for the modernization of ports in Venezuela, Brazil, and Chile to enable the handling of VLCC-class tankers and LNG carriers. Russia could contribute technologies, equipment, and management expertise, as well as shipbuilding capacity (for example, the Zvezda shipyard) for the construction of large-capacity tankers commissioned by Latin American partners.
In the institutional sphere, it is proposed to transform the dialogue platform into an annual technical forum with working groups specializing in exploration, production, logistics, and workforce development.
Key Points Raised During Session III “Renewable Energy Sources and Hydrogen”Global Context and the Region’s Potential
In recent years, the cost of solar power generation and energy storage systems has declined significantly, making it possible to address the intermittency challenges associated with renewable energy sources. Tariff restrictions imposed by the United States on China played a major role in this process: Chinese manufacturers redirected supplies to countries of the Global South, including Latin America, accelerating the adoption of solar technologies.
Latin America is a global leader in the share of renewable energy in its energy mix. However, renewable energy is generally part of integrated energy solutions and cannot provide baseload power without additional capacity in the form of energy storage systems or nuclear power. Moscow has potential for cooperation with countries in the region in this area, as well as in the field of critical minerals (lithium, nickel, and cobalt), where both Russia and Latin American countries face common challenges: retaining value added within their economies and overcoming weak domestic demand.
Brazil and Green Hydrogen
Brazil possesses all the prerequisites for competitive green hydrogen production. These include a stable democracy with a predictable legal environment, high solar irradiation, significant wind power potential (both onshore and offshore), and a strong hydropower-based energy matrix. The existence of a nationally interconnected power system makes it possible to transmit electricity between regions, while major ports provide export opportunities.
The largest green hydrogen producers’ association, ABIHV, brings together 35 companies and actively influences the development of public policy. In 2024, a package of laws was adopted establishing the legal framework for low-carbon hydrogen, including the PHBC program with a fund totaling $3 billion.
The key challenges for 2026 are the finalization of the regulatory framework, the development of electricity transmission infrastructure (which is lagging behind the growth of generation capacity), and the creation of guaranteed demand for green hydrogen through government mandates.
Colombia: Regulatory Framework and Target Indicators
Colombia has developed an extensive regulatory framework for hydrogen energy: Law No. 1715 (2014), Law No. 2099 (2021), which includes a roadmap and targets for 2030, and Decree No. 1597 (2024) on the creation of a hydrogen ecosystem. In 2024, significant occurrences of geological (“white”) hydrogen were discovered in two regions of the country.
The state-owned company Ecopetrol operates a 50 kW electrolyzer in Cartagena, while the private company Promigas has implemented a pilot project involving the blending of green hydrogen with natural gas. By 2030, Colombia plans to achieve a green hydrogen production cost of $1.70 per kilogram, install 1–3 GW of electrolyzer capacity, and develop a hydrogen transportation fleet consisting of 1,500–2,000 passenger vehicles, 1,000–1,500 trucks, and 50–100 refueling stations.
Potential areas for cooperation with Russia include isolated regions not connected to the national grid (where diesel fuel remains the primary energy source), geological hydrogen (through the exchange of expertise in exploration and production), and pink hydrogen (the use of nuclear energy for hydrogen production).
Argentina: Experience in Hydropower Cooperation
Argentina has 40 years of successful experience using Russian technologies in the hydropower sector. Twenty percent of the country’s installed hydropower capacity is based on Russian-made equipment. A key example is the binational Salto Grande Hydroelectric Power Plant between Argentina and Uruguay (14 turbines, installed capacity of 1,890 MW). The project was completed on schedule, and after 40 years the equipment continues to operate and generate above its design capacity, unlike equipment from other manufacturers that requires modernization.
Russian equipment is also installed at the Agua del Toro Hydroelectric Power Plant (1982) and the Los Reyunos Hydroelectric Power Plant (1984), a pumped-storage facility used to accumulate energy during peak demand periods. Financing was provided through a clearing arrangement involving the exchange of Argentine grain and meat for Russian turbines. In 2009 and 2016, two additional facilities equipped with Russian technology were commissioned.
The potential for new hydropower capacity in Argentina is estimated at 5 GW at binational hydroelectric facilities and an additional 10 GW at national projects, as well as 1.5 GW at small hydropower plants (up to 50 MW). Argentina has legally recognized hydropower as a renewable energy source, providing access to green financing. The key condition for project implementation remains the availability of financing.
Challenges and Prospects
The main challenges for the development of renewable energy and hydrogen in the region include the need to modernize electricity transmission infrastructure, which is lagging behind the growth of generation capacity; the challenge of creating guaranteed demand for green hydrogen, which requires government mandates for mandatory consumption (similar to those used for sustainable aviation fuel); the high cost of capital for green projects; and the need to improve the regulatory framework in most countries of the region.
At the same time, hydropower continues to play a key role in the energy mix of many countries, and the successful experience of Argentine-Russian cooperation in this field can be expanded. Brazil and Colombia are actively advancing the hydrogen agenda by developing regulatory frameworks and attracting investment. Russia can contribute through its technologies, including nuclear technologies for pink hydrogen production, as well as through cooperation in the field of critical minerals.
Conference Conclusions
- Energy is becoming a field of struggle for equity and development. The problem of unequal access to energy resources extends beyond technological discussions. Even green energy does not solve the problem of excessive consumption in wealthy countries. Therefore, energy cooperation between Russia and Latin America, in addition to its commercial and technological dimensions, also carries a value-based dimension: the creation of a more equitable, multipolar model in which access to energy is not a privilege but a basic right.
- Energy sovereignty is becoming more important than global market liberalization. Market fragmentation and geopolitical shocks have demonstrated that reliance on global markets and uniform “rules of the game” is unreliable. Latin American countries are increasingly focusing on diversifying partnerships, developing their own technological capabilities, and strengthening regional energy infrastructure. This is also changing Russia’s approach—from the assumption of a global market to the development of long-term bilateral technological partnerships.
- Latin America is expanding its role in the global energy market. With Venezuela’s vast hydrocarbon reserves, Brazil’s position as one of the countries with the cleanest energy matrices in the world, and Colombia’s ambitious hydrogen programs, countries in the region are beginning to shape their own energy agenda. However, achieving this objective requires a qualitative shift in relations with external partners—from resource trade toward technological and industrial alliances.
- The primary constraint on the development of Latin American energy remains a lack of financing. The region possesses all the necessary conditions for the development of both conventional and low-carbon energy. However, the high cost of capital, debt burdens, and the shortage of long-term financing remain major barriers to most projects. The shift in the positions of the World Bank and the BRICS New Development Bank in favor of nuclear energy is an important signal, but it does not resolve the underlying structural problem. Without reform of the international financial architecture, the region’s energy transition will remain fragmented and slow.
- Successful examples of Russia–Latin America cooperation exist, but they have not yet been scaled up. Argentine hydroelectric facilities equipped with Russian technology and Bolivia’s nuclear research center demonstrate that Russia can be an effective and reliable partner. However, each subsequent project encounters unique political, financial, or regulatory barriers. Transforming successful cases into a model of systematic cooperation requires institutional solutions, including sector-specific agreements, joint ventures, and project financing mechanisms.
- Amid competition between the United States and China for access to Latin American resources, Russia is emphasizing technological advantages and long-term financing mechanisms. Russia’s approach focuses on technological strengths—including comprehensive nuclear solutions, small modular reactors, and hydropower equipment—as well as long-term financial mechanisms such as credit financing, localization requirements, and fixed-price arrangements.
Conference Recommendations
- Institutionalize the Russia–Latin America Energy Dialogue. A regular technical forum with specialized working groups on exploration, nuclear energy, logistics, and workforce development would help transform occasional contacts into systematic cooperation focused on specific projects.
- Launch Pilot Exploration Projects in Priority Basins. A multilateral mechanism with joint financing and guaranteed technology transfer could support the launch of pilot exploration projects in priority basins.
- Establish a Russia–Latin America Tanker Consortium. A joint shipping company with an initial fleet of 10–15 tankers could serve strategic routes, reducing dependence on intermediaries and lowering transportation costs.
- Integrate Educational, Scientific, and Technological Programs into Energy Projects. Major projects could incorporate quotas for Latin American specialists to study in Russia, professional development programs, and joint research initiatives, following the example of cooperation between IPEN and MEPhI. Scientific and technological collaboration should serve as the foundation for long-term partnerships.
- Leverage New Financing Opportunities for Nuclear Projects. The World Bank’s decision to lift its restriction on financing nuclear energy projects, together with the BRICS New Development Bank’s willingness to support the sector, creates an opportunity to expand negotiations on long-term financing for Russian nuclear initiatives in the region, including small modular reactors, research centers, and nuclear medicine projects.
