Indonesia
Source: geotimes.id

In an era of shifting geopolitical alliances and rising multipolarity, Indonesia’s formal entry into BRICS in January 2025 marks more than just a diplomatic milestone. It signals a new strategic direction for Southeast Asia’s largest economy, particularly in its approach to global norms, alternative development finance, and sectoral cooperation, including civil aviation. After being officially declared a full member in January 2025, Indonesia was immediately accepted as the 10th member of BRICS. BRICS originally consisted of five countries — Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa — but has since expanded to include Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Iran, and Indonesia. This expanded group now represents over 45% of the world’s population and a significant share of global GDP. For Indonesia, its participation opens doors to enhanced economic, technological, and diplomatic networks that go beyond the traditional Western-led institutional framework.

Aviation Diplomacy in the BRICS Context

Aviation has long symbolized and facilitated sovereignty, mobility, and integration. For Indonesia — a vast archipelagic nation with over 17,000 islands — aviation is not a luxury but a lifeline. However, the sector faces persistent challenges: uneven infrastructure, reliance on foreign technology, skill gaps, and vulnerability to external economic shocks. By joining BRICS, Indonesia gains an alternative platform for forming partnerships and technical cooperation in aviation. This includes potential collaborations in areas such as air traffic management, satellite-based navigation systems, airport development, safety oversight, and personnel training. Indonesia’s diplomacy within BRICS can now focus on advocating for more inclusive global aviation governance — particularly within the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), where BRICS countries are increasingly coordinating their positions. With India and China already active in ICAO’s Council and technical panels, Indonesia could now join this emerging bloc to balance the influence of traditional powers.

Technology Transfer and Diversified Aviation Supply Chains

One of the key benefits of increased BRICS involvement is the potential for technology transfer and diversification of the supply chain. Indonesia currently imports much of its aviation technology — from radar systems to ground-based navigational aids — from Europe and the United States. While these systems are technically advanced, they come with restrictions: complex procurement standards, intellectual property limitations, and vendor lock-in, which can limit Indonesia’s independence.

Through BRICS, Indonesia can access collaborative R&D programs with countries like China, India, and Russia, which are actively developing satellite navigation systems (e.g., Beidou, GAGAN, GLONASS), indigenous aircraft manufacturing initiatives, and airport infrastructure technologies suited to emerging markets. These countries are also more open to co-production, local assembly, and licensing agreements. Indonesia’s aerospace industry — led by PT Dirgantara Indonesia — can benefit from exposure to different design approaches and compatible standards. Such cooperation could lessen reliance on a few Western OEMs (original equipment manufacturers) and establish a diverse supply network for both civilian and military aviation needs.

Infrastructure and Alternative Financing Opportunities

One of the persistent bottlenecks in Indonesia’s aviation sector has been infrastructure development, especially in remote and underdeveloped regions known as the 3T (Terdepan, Terpencil, dan Tertinggal).

Traditional financing routes — dominated by Bretton Woods institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank — often impose strict conditionalities related to governance, environmental impact, and fiscal prudence. While these safeguards are important, they can delay or disqualify projects that fail to meet rigid procedural benchmarks.

In contrast, BRICS’ New Development Bank (NDB) provides a more flexible financing mechanism. Although still maintaining safeguards, the NDB emphasizes local ownership, quicker disbursement timelines, and more adaptable terms of credit. This could be a game-changer for Indonesia’s efforts to fund regional airports, satellite-based air navigation systems, weather radar, and search and rescue (SAR) operations.

Moreover, access to NDB financing could allow Indonesia to pilot next-generation air mobility programs, including seaplane bases, unmanned aircraft corridors, and sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) infrastructure — all within frameworks better suited to national development priorities.

Civil-Military Integration and Airspace Sovereignty

Another strategic dimension is the management of Indonesian airspace and Flight Information Regions (FIRs). Indonesia has long aspired to regain full control over several FIRs currently delegated to neighbouring states. Yet progress has been gradual, constrained by technical readiness, diplomatic complexity, and military-civil coordination challenges.

BRICS participation offers new avenues to learn from countries that have achieved FIR sovereignty under contested circumstances, such as India and China. Additionally, joint exercises, simulation training, and technology-sharing initiatives could support Indonesia’s push for integrated air surveillance and radar fusion systems, critical for both safety and national security.

Beyond FIRs, the issue of cybersecurity and data sovereignty in aviation is increasingly important. Partnering with BRICS countries could help Indonesia secure its aviation databases, aircraft tracking infrastructure, and communications networks from foreign interception or unilateral dependencies.

Challenges: Geopolitics, Standards, and Perception

Despite its many potential benefits, Indonesia’s BRICS participation is not without challenges, particularly in the aviation sector.

First, geopolitical alignments within BRICS can complicate consensus-building. For instance, the interests of Russia and China may not always align with those of Brazil, India, or South Africa, let alone Indonesia. In aviation diplomacy, where regulatory alignment is key, diverging priorities could slow progress on standard-setting and interoperability.

Second, while BRICS promotes alternative standards, the global aviation system remains anchored in frameworks defined by ICAO, the International Air Transport Association (IATA), and other legacy institutions. Integrating BRICS-based practices into this system requires careful navigation to avoid misalignment or duplication.

Third, there is the challenge of international perception. Indonesia must reassure its traditional aviation partners, including the US, EU, and Japan, that BRICS participation complements rather than contradicts existing commitments. Diplomatically, Indonesia must uphold its “independent and active” foreign policy while navigating the optics of deeper ties with Russia or China, especially amid ongoing geopolitical tensions.

Recommendations: Strategic Steps Forward

To maximize the aviation-related gains from BRICS membership, Indonesia should consider the following steps:

1. Establish a BRICS Aviation Cooperation Desk within the Ministry of Transportation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to coordinate sectoral initiatives and track joint programs.
2. Leverage NDB for pilot projects, especially in outer island airports, disaster response aviation systems, and satellite navigation services.
3. Forge technical partnerships with Indian and Chinese air navigation service providers to accelerate domestic capacity-building in air traffic control and aeronautical data services.
4. Promote joint ventures involving PT Dirgantara Indonesia and BRICS aerospace firms for component manufacturing and aircraft retrofitting.
5. Develop a long-term aviation diplomacy roadmap that aligns BRICS priorities with Indonesia’s ICAO and ASEAN obligations.
6. Maintain transparency and multilateral balance to prevent over-dependence on any one bloc or funding source.
7. Champion inclusive aviation governance, using BRICS as a platform to advocate for fairer global rules on carbon markets, passenger rights, and safety oversight.

A Broader Strategic Vision

Indonesia’s entry into BRICS is a reminder that global governance is evolving. For too long, the developing world’s aviation needs have been addressed through a top-down model dominated by the Global North. With BRICS, Indonesia can help rewrite this narrative — not through confrontation, but through constructive collaboration.

In a world where connectivity is currency, aviation becomes both a tool of influence and an index of inclusion. Indonesia must now rise to the challenge of transforming this new diplomatic opportunity into tangible progress for its skies and its citizens.

UK
Source: blogs.lse.ac.uk

Are Turkey and Russia enemies or friends? A. Erdi Öztürk and Eda Ayaydın explain the two countries have a complex relationship that can best be understood as ambivalent and shaped by “adaptive opportunism”.

A century ago, Turkey and Russia stood as adversaries across the Black Sea, their interactions marked by strategic rivalry and mutual distrust. In the present day, the dynamic has shifted significantly, yet paradoxically, remains complex.

The two countries simultaneously engage in high-level defence cooperation, evidenced by arms deals and military coordination, while also backing opposing factions in various regional conflicts.

This multifaceted relationship defies conventional classifications of international alliances or enmity.
Rather than being framed by a coherent ideological alignment or anchored in institutionalised partnerships, the contemporary Turkey–Russia relationship is best understood as one of strategic ambivalence. It is shaped by pragmatic calculations, mutual recognition of regional influence and a shared disposition toward adaptive opportunism.

This opportunism enables both actors to navigate shifting geopolitical landscapes while exploiting short-term advantages without committing to long-term ideological or structural entanglements. Consequently, their relationship oscillates between competition and cooperation, often simultaneously, reflecting a broader trend in twenty-first-century diplomacy where transnationalism increasingly overrides traditional alliance paradigms.

Multidimensional engagement

Russia has always occupied a critical place in Turkey’s foreign policy calculus, historically as both a rival and a necessary neighbour. While the two countries have often stood on opposite sides of geopolitical alignments, recent decades, especially under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Vladimir Putin, have witnessed a marked evolution in their relationship.

In today’s increasingly fractured global order, Turkey and Russia have forged a complex web of interdependencies that transcend their immediate regions. From the Black Sea to the Middle East, and from the South Caucasus to North Africa, their interactions reflect not just bilateral pragmatism but also the broader restructuring of global power relations.

Neither fully aligned nor strictly adversarial, Ankara and Moscow now operate through fluid networks of strategic cooperation and calibrated rivalry. This multidimensional engagement demonstrates how regional powers, amid a weakening liberal order, increasingly rely on transactional ties and flexible diplomacy to navigate instability and assert influence beyond their traditional spheres.

The post-2000 rapprochement

Since the early 2000s, Ankara and Moscow have gradually re-engaged, not as ideological allies, but as pragmatic actors navigating a shifting global order through transactional cooperation. Their rapprochement is driven less by normative alignment and more by converging strategic grievances vis-à-vis the West and a shared interest in exploiting geopolitical openings. Russia offers energy resources, nuclear technology, and advanced defence systems. Turkey, in turn, provides economic access, strategic transit corridors, diplomatic flexibility and a disruptive presence within the NATO framework.

This logic of mutual accommodation is perhaps most visible in conflict zones such as Syria, where the two powers support opposing sides yet maintain robust channels of dialogue through deconfliction mechanisms and parallel diplomatic processes. Similarly, in Libya and the South Caucasus, Ankara and Moscow back rival actors but continue to coordinate tactically to avoid direct confrontation. These patterns do not reflect inconsistencies but rather constitute the underlying architecture of a relationship predicated on managed instability and adaptive resilience – hallmarks of their evolving strategic entente in an increasingly multipolar world.

Turkey and Russia’s relationship has grown even more intricate in recent years through their interactions in critical conflict theatres such as Ukraine, Syria and the broader Black Sea region. Turkey’s vocal support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, its sale of Bayraktar drones to Kyiv, and its non-recognition of Crimea’s annexation place it at odds with Russian strategic priorities. Yet, Ankara has simultaneously resisted joining western sanctions against Moscow, positioning itself as a potential mediator.

In the Black Sea, Turkey balances its commitments under the Montreux Convention with efforts to preserve regional stability, often coordinating with Russia to avoid direct escalation. Meanwhile, in Syria, their ongoing cooperation, despite supporting rival factions, illustrates a model of conflict management rooted in tactical pragmatism rather than strategic convergence. These layered and at times contradictory interactions underscore a relationship defined not by binary alignment, but by situational cooperation and calibrated competition across multiple overlapping theatres of influence.

Turkey, Russia and the Arctic

Perhaps, the most revealing stage for exploiting geopolitical openings lies not in the Middle East or the Black Sea, but further north, in the Arctic. Though seemingly distant from their traditional zones of influence, the Arctic has so far been primarily pursued by Turkey through its relationship with Russia, which projects their evolving foreign policy identities.

For Russia, the Arctic represents a core pillar of national security and economic development, as melting ice caps open new shipping lanes and energy extraction opportunities. Russia has heavily militarised its Arctic frontier and frames it as an extension of its great power status. While Turkey has no direct Arctic presence, it has shown growing interest in polar research and adopted a Polar Science Strategy extending to 2035, which includes the goal of obtaining observer status at the Arctic Council.

More recently, Turkey acceded to the Svalbard Treaty in 2024, an archipelago under Norwegian sovereignty where Russia is a historical actor and maintains a presence in two settlements on Spitsbergen. That same year, Russia expressed interest in establishing a scientific station in partnership with BRICS countries and Turkey.

Notably, the Turkish company Kuzey Star built a floating dock for Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy company, which now services icebreakers in Murmansk. Rosatom and Russian officials have also engaged in discussions with their Turkish counterparts on the development of infrastructure along the Northern Sea Route.

Moreover, since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, bilateral trade between Ankara and Moscow has more than doubled, peaking at just over $68 billion in 2022 before stabilising at $46 billion in 2024. Turkish refineries, notably STAR and Tüpraş, have processed billions of euros’ worth of Russian crude oil, re-exporting refined products to countries currently imposing sanctions on Russia.

Thus, Turkey’s transactional diplomacy in the Arctic with Russia manifests through economic activities such as shipping and infrastructure construction, as well as prospective scientific collaboration. This signals Ankara’s broader ambition to be perceived as a global, not merely regional, actor. The Arctic can be viewed as a testing ground for Turkey’s diplomatic agility and Russia’s strategic assertiveness.
It also highlights how both states engage beyond their immediate neighbourhoods, seeking influence in emerging geopolitical theatres, often through quiet diplomacy, scientific engagement or multilateral participation, without necessarily provoking direct confrontation. In this sense, the Arctic exemplifies the broader pattern of managed competition and selective cooperation that defines the Turkey-Russia relationship in the twenty-first century.

Turkey and Russia represent a deliberate form of strategic insertion, whereby Ankara leverages its relationship with Moscow to gain visibility and relevance in geopolitical theatres traditionally dominated by great powers. This quiet expansion into the Arctic is reflective of Turkey’s broader foreign policy strategy: navigating global disorder not through formal alliances or structural commitments, but through agile, transactional alignments that amplify its perceived status as an emerging power.

Militarised prestige and economic fragility

These manoeuvres are particularly notable when contrasted with the domestic economic realities in both countries. Turkey and Russia are grappling with severe inflation, currency devaluation and widespread socioeconomic grievances. Yet despite their fragile macroeconomic conditions, both regimes continue to invest disproportionately in military modernisation, energy geopolitics and symbolic displays of strategic capacity abroad.

This paradox points to a broader pattern: a form of prestige-driven power projection in which external activism is pursued to compensate for internal fragilities. Rather than reflecting genuine economic strength, these performances are mechanisms of regime survival and international signalling. Indeed, both countries exhibit characteristics of what may be termed militarised developmentalism, where the state’s resources are disproportionately funnelled into defence industries and geopolitical theatre rather than sustainable economic development.

In this context, claims of “emerging economic power” status are not rooted in structural economic transformation, but in state-led narratives of technological autonomy, defence export capacity and global assertiveness. The militarisation of foreign policy, especially under conditions of economic duress, functions as both a domestic legitimacy strategy and a diplomatic currency.

Turkey’s selective involvement in Russia’s Arctic ambitions is therefore emblematic of a wider phenomenon: the use of opportunistic, transactional diplomacy to carve out a seat at strategic tables from which it was historically excluded. It also underscores how both Ankara and Moscow have adapted to the erosion of liberal international norms by embracing flexible, multi-vector foreign policies, predicated less on economic fundamentals and more on the instrumentalisation of strategic geography, defence capability and symbolic capital.

Authoritarian chemistry

Growing authoritarianism in Turkey and autocracy in Russia facilitate a form of cooperation that often proves easier than Ankara’s alignment with western liberal states. At the personal level, Putin is strategically focused and militarily driven, whereas Erdoğan tends to adopt a bargaining posture, constantly seeking leverage and waiting for the right moments to negotiate. In 2022, by delaying Finland and Sweden’s NATO accession, Turkey inserted itself into Arctic security dynamics, highlighting how it uses moments of geopolitical friction to assert influence.

Ultimately, Turkey’s relationship with Russia is best understood not as part of a coherent grand strategy, but as a practice of adaptive opportunism, a readiness to exploit shifting geopolitical openings, forge temporary alignments and manoeuvre between rival camps without permanent allegiance. From the Black Sea to the Arctic, Ankara plays a long game built on short-term gains.
In this context, Turkey’s Arctic activity functions as a form of peripheral diplomacy. It is a symbolic gesture of loyalty to Russia, a subtle challenge to western coherence and a strategic attempt to stake a claim to great-power status without provoking direct confrontation. Its Arctic presence is not defined by geography, but by association.

As the liberal international order fragments and middle powers assert new ambitions, Turkey’s evolving approach to Russia offers a revealing case of how flexibility, ambiguity and symbolic entanglement can serve as powerful diplomatic tools, even in regions where a state lacks historical presence or territorial proximity.

Note: This article gives the views of the authors, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: quetions123 / Shutterstock.com

Russia
Source: mid.ru

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to questions at 11th Terra Scientia National Educational Youth Forum, Solnechnogorsk, July 28, 2025

Colleagues,
It’s a pleasure to be back at the Terra Scientia forum. I enjoy engaging with young people who are the future of our country, the future that is taking shape, as we speak, on the battlefields of the special military operation, and elsewhere. I appreciate the opportunity to speak with the people who are doing their job there. Not long ago, I presented diplomas to graduates of a career development programme, Urban Infrastructure and Regional Development Management, run by MGIMO. Nineteen participants of the special military operation were among its graduates. I had the chance to talk with them.

I also took part in the events held as part of the Time of Heroes programme initiated by President Vladimir Putin. I can see how well our youth understand the importance of international engagement and the international dimensions of our country’s development in the current era.

Since the Soviet Union went into oblivion, new Russia’s foreign policy has always been based exclusively on its national interests. No lecturing, and no forcing ideologically-driven approaches on our neighbours or partners, either. We operate in strict compliance with our conceptual documents, the Constitution and the Foreign Policy Concept. The primary goal of our foreign policy is to ensure safe conditions for the country’s development and to raise the well-being of our citizens.

Many political scientists, academics, and experts seriously argue that a third world war is not just unavoidable, but is already underway in new forms, beginning with the West’s aggression against Yugoslavia in 1999 followed by aggression against Iraq, the destruction of Libya, and the attack on Syria. All these Middle Eastern countries are now in a state of turmoil. The territorial integrity of Iraq, Syria, and Libya - something the West seems to care about only in the case of Ukraine - was gravely undermined during the Arab Spring in 2011. These countries remain in a pretty bad shape.

Now, the West has turned to a neighbouring region, namely, the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian territories, more broadly. There has been an act of aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In Europe, the Ukraine issue represents the West’s policy of aiming to inflict a “strategic defeat” on Russia. They don’t hide the fact that they had been preparing for this for quite some time. With no shame, they are openly saying that the Minsk Agreements, which were designed to resolve all problems, were never meant to be implemented. President Putin, then-Chancellor Angela Merkel, then-French President François Hollande, and then-Ukrainian President Petr Poroshenko put in 17 hours without sleep working on those agreements. But afterwards, those very people who sat at one table with him admitted they never intended to implement anything. They just needed to “put something on paper” to buy Ukraine time for it to prepare for war with Russia, and to flood it with weapons. Those same people are now demanding that we immediately cease fire and leave things the way they are now, just so they can again buy time for their clients in Kiev and pump more weapons into Ukraine. The fact that Europeans genuinely seek to “defeat us” is confirmed daily. New German Chancellor Friedrich Merz recently stated (I’m not sure he understood what he was saying) that Germany must once again become the strongest military power in Europe. It was the strongest military power before World War I and before World War II and started both. Now, he wants Germany to become “Europe’s top military force” again. German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius stated that if necessary, Germans would not hesitate to kill Russian soldiers. European elites are taking this rhetoric as a given. This reflects, above all, the fact that the West cannot accept the fact of becoming just another strong region in a multipolar world. It cannot give up the hegemony it enjoyed for half a millennium. This is visible especially clearly in Europe today which wants to impose its will on everyone and ignore pragmatic concerns.

The other day, President Donald Trump met with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Afterwards, she proudly and gleefully announced that they had reached an agreement under which European goods would be exported to the United States with a 15-percent tariff, while US goods would go to Europe duty-free. On top of that, Europe would spend $750 billion on buying American energy, primarily liquefied natural gas and nuclear fuel, completely abandoning Russian energy. Furthermore, as President Trump stated, there would be $600 billion in new investment. No doubt, US energy will be much more expensive than Russian. This approach will further de-industrialise Europe and re-direct investment from Europe to the United States. Sure enough, this decision packs a serious blow especially in terms of energy prices and capital flight affecting European industry and agriculture. But figures like Ursula von der Leyen are flaunting their decision to follow this course. They admit they’ll have to spend more, and that they’ll probably have fewer resources to address social issues, but claim they must defeat Russia.

As Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva recently said, former US President Joe Biden once said in a conversation with him that Russia must be “destroyed.” Not just strategically defeated, but destroyed. It’s about a war of annihilation. President Trump, though, holds a different view. As he’s repeatedly stated, he is guided by common sense, primarily business and policies that benefit the United States. I’m sure you are following his moves in international trade. The deal with Europe is clearly lopsided, and Europe got the short end of the stick. There’s no need to dive deep into that. President Trump is a pragmatist. He does not want wars. Unlike his predecessor Joe Biden and current European elites (von der Leyen, Starmer, Macron, and their ilk), he is open to dialogue.

Even during the Cold War, dialogue was there and helped opposing camps better understand each other’s intentions, first and foremost, to prevent a major war. Europe has lost that instinct, and the vaccine against Nazism has worn off. The same forces that once sought to destroy Russia are now re-emerging in Europe and have chosen Ukraine as a battering ram that they use against us. They welcome everything it is doing.

European Commissioner for EU Enlargement Marta Kos affirmed a month ago that Ukraine had satisfied all prerequisites to commence accession negotiations with the European Union. Has anyone heard even a whisper of criticism from Europe concerning Ukraine’s commitment to its human rights obligations? Language, education, media, culture – Russian has been legislatively proscribed across all these domains. Furthermore, these laws began to be enacted long before the special military operation. Europe maintains that Ukraine is fighting for “European values.” French President Emmanuel Macron recently asserted that, unlike Russia, Ukraine is waging war for “our” interests, for “our European values.” This is an admission that they are all Nazis. Nazism is being resuscitated in Ukrainian society including through legislation. Obstacles are being dismantled to glorify Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevich, who are equated with Adolf Hitler, Joseph Goebbels, and other war criminals, yet are now exalted as symbols of freedom.
We have consistently championed dialogue, even during the most challenging times. During the Cold War, dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States was never severed.

It is also imperative to acknowledge that mutual respect existed during the Cold War. Today, it is absent. Europe has simply gone berserk (I can think of no other word). Much of this is, understandably, a struggle to retain power. They realise they have invested hundreds of billions of euros into Ukraine solely to strike Russia, kill our soldiers, orchestrate terrorist attacks against civilian infrastructure, and dispatch assassins to eliminate our politicians and journalists.
Europe pursues this with one objective – to use Ukrainians as cannon fodder to eliminate Russia as a competitor. Even better – to provoke centrifugal tendencies within our society. They actively engage in this despite measures taken by our leadership to curb the activities of foreign NGOs and dubious media outlets promoting not the values of dialogue between our nations’ youth or civil societies, but unequivocally a Western agenda.

The dialogue we maintain with Donald Trump’s administration demonstrates that reasonable voices still exist in the West. They command significant support, as evidenced by recent developments in the United States.

President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly affirmed our openness to dialogue with any nation, including European ones. When President Emmanuel Macron called our President, he responded immediately. I do not want to divulge confidential details, but the conversation yielded little. Particularly because President Macron later publicly declared that pressure must be applied to Russia “to accept the immediate and unconditional ceasefire.” He has long espoused this view. When first questioned, he was asked whether arms supplies to Ukraine would then cease. He replied no, insisting any ceasefire must be unconditional. Therein lies the objective – just as the Minsk Agreements were meant to shake up the Nazi regime of Petr Poroshenko. Now, they seek a respite.

As I said, the West cannot accept the loss of its hegemony and continues to pursue purely neocolonial policies. Their sanctions regime exists to suppress competitors, fearing their unimpeded development, because emerging power centres have already outpaced them. Remove obstacles, and they will leave the West far behind. Yes, the West retains strength in military affairs, technology, biotech, and cyber domains. Yet it cannot merely be a significant player – it insists on supremacy. At the very least, this is the mentality of its current elites.

At the same time, a multipolar world is emerging – an objective and unstoppable process. No sanctions, trade wars, or provocations of open conflict can reverse it. Despite this, the West continues to pursue such tactics, following its actions in the Middle East, Ukraine, and Iran. Now, similar operations are being planned in the Far East, including the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and across Southeast and Northeast Asia, even the Korean Peninsula. All of this aligns with their broader goal: to preserve global dominance and maintain their status as the hegemon.

The rise of a multipolar world will ultimately prevail, despite efforts to delay the natural course of history. We are supported by a wide network of partners, allies, and like-minded nations. Among our closest allies in the West is the Republic of Belarus, while in the East, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea stands out, bound to us by decades of fraternal and military ties. We supported our Korean neighbours in their struggle for independence, and in turn, they assisted us in liberating the Kursk Region from Ukrainian neo-Nazis. India also stands as a major and respected partner on the global stage.

India, China, Russia, Türkiye, and Iran are all ancient civilizations with deep historical roots spanning centuries. They have endured and evolved as cohesive civilizational communities – something rarely seen elsewhere in the world. However, on the Eurasian continent, this continuity remains a defining feature. Today, these great civilisations are playing a central role in shaping the emerging multipolar international order. In practice, this shift is being advanced through organisations like the SCO, BRICS, and in collaboration with partners from the African Union and CELAC, all of whom are actively contributing to this global transformation.

Interest in cooperation with BRICS and the SCO – already demonstrated by dozens of countries – continues to grow, contributing to the establishment of sustainable frameworks for the development of the Global Majority.

In contrast, the West still relies on institutions created after World War II, such as the IMF and the World Bank, often using them to reinforce its dominance. This includes exploiting the role of reserve currencies, especially the US dollar, and violating fundamental principles like fair competition and the presumption of innocence. In response, the Global Majority has, over the past several years, been working through platforms like BRICS, the SCO, and others to build alternative systems for financial transactions and banking settlements. New logistical routes are also being developed, independent of the outdated Western-centric rules established in the postwar period, when such systems were not yet so heavily abused. These emerging alternatives are widely welcomed.

Western counterparts are now creating conditions that are driving more and more countries to distance themselves from the systems under their control.

I cannot fail to mention our closest circle of partners. Our allies, like-minded states, and strategic partners from the CSTO, the CIS, and the EAEU – these are all major frameworks whose activities align with the formation of the Greater Eurasian Partnership. This includes structures across the post-Soviet space, the SCO, ASEAN, and many other promising actors. Incidentally, Eurasia is the only continent without a pan-continental organisation. Africa, despite its numerous sub-regional structures, has the African Union. Latin America, with its many integration blocs, has the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. But Eurasia lacks such a mechanism.

When President Vladimir Putin proposed back in 2015 at the Russia-ASEAN summit that these sub-regional integration processes be harmonised – ensuring mutual reinforcement, eliminating redundancies, and ultimately shaping this Greater Eurasian Partnership – the idea emerged organically. This was no artificial initiative imposed from above. It is an objective necessity, one that meets the demands of mutual benefit, optimal resource efficiency, and maximising the advantages generated by these integrative processes.

In broader terms, this will form a solid material foundation for constructing a Eurasian security architecture. The current security frameworks – primarily those established in Europe after World War II, namely the OSCE and NATO – are rooted in the concept of Euro-Atlantic security. That is, they inherently require transatlantic colleagues. Of course, those wishing to cooperate with the United States or Canada remain free to do so. Yet why should there not be a pan-continental structure open to all continental nations? Especially now, when President Donald Trump shows little enthusiasm for maintaining America’s special role in Europe. He believes the continent should address its own challenges – whether security or economic development – on terms dictated by Washington to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Thus, the Eurasian security architecture is knocking at the door. For the third consecutive year, Minsk hosted the International Conference on Eurasian Security (2023, 2024) where the Draft Charter on Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century was reviewed. This document was prepared jointly with our Belarusian friends. Participation in the first two conferences demonstrated genuine interest, including from certain European Union states. I expect their numbers will grow. Therefore, we have much work ahead. The paramount task is to defeat the enemy. For the first time in history, Russia stands alone against the entire West. In World War I and World War II, we had allies. Today, we have none on the battlefield. Thus, we must rely on ourselves. There is no room for weakness or wavering.

President Vladimir Putin has delineated the objectives we are pursuing on the international stage – primarily in terms of combat engagement. These objectives will be realised. We underscore our legitimate demand: the assurance of our security. Firstly, there must be no inclusion of Ukraine in NATO – indeed, no further expansion of the alliance whatsoever (it has already, in defiance of all promises and agreed documents, expanded right up to our borders). Secondly, there persists the refrain: “Russia must return to the 1991 borders.” Yet, in 1991, when Ukraine was recognised as an independent state, its foundational principle was enshrined in its Declaration of Independence, which explicitly stated: “A non-aligned, nuclear-free, neutral state.” It was precisely on this basis that Ukraine’s territorial integrity was acknowledged. When they commenced the obliteration and eradication of everything Russian, we could not remain indifferent. We attempted persuasion and negotiations – it yielded nothing. Hence, there was no alternative but to initiate the special military operation.

Territory is not our priority. Some assert: “They seized land; it must be liberated.” These territories are not our concern – we already possess the largest country on earth. What is paramount is the populace who have dwelled there for centuries – custodians of Russian culture, language, and education – who aspire to nurture their children within that heritage. They must not be obliterated; their rights must be safeguarded. This is an entirely lawful demand. Recognising the realities codified in our Constitution is an absolute, non-negotiable imperative. We have much work ahead.

I trust that the meetings held here – both those we conduct and those you hold with my colleagues – will enhance your comprehension of the work undertaken by the foreign policy institutions of the Russian Federation. I hope the ranks of our diplomats will be bolstered, including by graduates of this Forum.

Question: I would like to revisit something you said in your 2018 remarks here at the Terra Scientia forum: that the formation of a multipolar world is a “positive” trend which “will bring more democracy and justice to international affairs.” True, the world has changed dramatically over the past seven years. With that in mind, my question is: do you still stand by your statement from seven years ago, or would you like to add – or perhaps correct – anything, given the real signs of an emerging multipolar world today?

Sergey Lavrov: Of course, I agree with my statement from seven years ago – though not, as you might assume, out of sheer self-centredness.

The multipolar world has indeed taken shape even more actively since then, and it is genuinely bringing more democracy and justice to international affairs – as opposed to the dictatorship and hegemony the West is striving to preserve. That said, the multipolar world’s formation faces enormous resistance. But, as you would know from your school physics class, the stronger the resistance, the steadier the motion. And that’s exactly what’s happening.
US President Donald Trump recently commented on BRICS’ activities in his typical disdainful manner, dismissing the group’s push for alternative currencies and warning them against creating a new BRICS currency or backing any other currency “to replace the mighty US dollar.” Yet this is not what he said during his election campaign – back then, Trump argued that Biden and his administration had severely damaged US interests by undermining global trust in the dollar, admitting that its decline was inevitable. Now, however, he is trying to halt that very process through threats and blackmail, common sense telling him how crucial the dollar’s dominance is for US financial stability.

I remember discussions on international monetary cooperation from years ago, when the US administration declared to the entire international community that the dollar was not America’s property, but humanity’s shared asset. It was hailed as the “lubricant” ensuring the global economy’s smooth operation, resilient in all weather conditions. Times have changed. Of course, other factors drive multipolarity too: the old system no longer serves the Global Majority’s interests. Initially, when the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation were established after WWII, most were willing to accept their rules – some reluctantly, recognising there was no alternative but to move forward collectively. China adopted those rules as well. Yet later, playing by those same rules written by the Americans, the Chinese began outperforming them on their home field. Why the anxiety? Because China has risen to undisputed leadership even within this very financial and monetary framework, within this trading system, and its growth across the economy and other spheres will only accelerate.

This is precisely why IMF reform has stalled. Given their actual economic weight, BRICS nations would have long since increased their voting shares, and the US would have lost its veto power. Yet reform is being artificially constrained to preserve America’s controlling stake, allowing it to unilaterally block moves toward democratisation of these institutions. The same pattern holds at the WTO. Washington simply paralysed the Appellate Body. Though China has filed thousands of complaints, the US prevents quorum formation, effectively disabling this crucial dispute mechanism.
Artificial constraints may delay development temporarily, but never permanently. It might take longer. A multipolar world’s formation might span an entire era. Yet the trend remains objectively inevitable.

Question: What crises of the global security system do you envision on the horizon of 10 years?

Sergey Lavrov: I have partly touched on this issue in my earlier remarks. There are real security problems, not just threats, around Ukraine. We are fighting for our security, for our legitimate security interests, and we will attain our objectives. Elsewhere, crises persist in neighbouring regions: the Middle East, Palestine, and Iran; the conflict in Syria is far from over yet, nor in Libya or Iraq.

There are security problems in the West as well. First, the Americans make no secret of their desire to extend their forceful influence to the Asia-Pacific region – one they deliberately rebrand as the “Indo-Pacific” region, hoping to draw in our Indian friends and keep them content. In reality, however, all these “Indo-Pacific” strategies aim to contain China, isolate Russia, and dismantle open, universal formats of cooperation – such as ASEAN-centric frameworks in Southeast Asia – while advancing NATO’s military infrastructure toward the Far East: the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, the
Korean Peninsula.

They have created various “quartets” and “trios.” The US-Japan-South Korea trio, for instance, is already planning increasingly large-scale military exercises around the Korean Peninsula, targeting the DPRK. These drills now even include nuclear weapons scenarios between US and South Korean forces – an alarming development. The same goes for AUKUS (the US-UK-Australia trio), effectively formed to build nuclear submarines for Australia and also enabling the transfer of nuclear technology. Serious doubts remain about whether these actions comply with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Many problems are surfacing – including NATO’s efforts to penetrate this region (Japan, for instance, is reportedly poised to open a representative office for the alliance). Tellingly, when then-NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg was asked at a news conference how the North Atlantic Alliance – a bloc initially created and subsequently presented as a defensive organisation, with its core mission being the physical protection of member states’ territory – ended up expanding eastward, well beyond its borders, he replied without hesitation that they remain focused exclusively on protecting member states’ territories. However, he argued that in current conditions, threats to these territories were coming from the “Indo-Pacific” region (the South China Sea, etc.).

That was an indicative statement, reflecting the alliance’s evolving mentality – one that seeks new purpose and meaning for its continued existence. We have found purpose and meaning in this territory, while they are still trying to justify why the North Atlantic Alliance should continue to exist. There are many threats ahead, and this decade will not be an easy one.

Question: Mr Lavrov, may I shake your hand and take a photo with you? It’s my dream. Moreover, it’s the dream of my grandmother, who told me not to come home without a photo with you.

Sergey Lavrov: I wish I had the chance to meet your grandmother when we were young. You’re welcome if your colleagues let you do so - not now, but when we’re finished.

Question: Which programmes, do you think, are most effective for promoting Russian values and traditions abroad?

Sergey Lavrov: Participating in universal sports and cultural events has always been our preferred choice. Unfortunately, we’re facing wholly unacceptable discrimination – I’m at a loss to find a good word to describe it - against our athletes and our culture.

A tour by Valery Gergiev with soloists from the Mariinsky Theatre was cancelled not long ago in Italy. It’s outrageous. Italy, the cradle of culture, has also come under the influence of Ukrainian neo-Nazis. There are still people in the Italian leadership and at the UN who, like Germany, vote against the resolution, Combatting glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance. Germany, Italy, and Japan vote against it.

We are absolutely doing the right thing when we insist on returning to the roots of the original international Olympic movement, and to the principles of developing cultural, educational, and academic cooperation enshrined in the foundational documents of UNESCO, which are being grossly violated. The fact that our fencers are winning gold and other medals in Georgia is already a sign of recovery among the officials who manage international sports.
We are developing alternative platforms as well. In 2024, we held the BRICS Games. Of course, we are promoting our innovation - Games of the Future and the phygital movement, a mix of physical and digital sport. That is, a team plays basketball on the court, and then the same players play basketball on a computer. This will be an annual event.
We weren’t too upset about being excluded from Eurovision, which has become a promotional platform for non-traditional values that we find unacceptable. This September, near Moscow, in Live Arena, we’ll be holding the first international Intervision song contest. Almost all BRICS countries and their partners - about 20 countries in all - have confirmed their participation.

We never shun universal forms of cooperation. However, we won’t just sit back and do nothing when someone is denying us access on fair and generally acceptable terms. Just like sanctions, this reveals the West’s underlying desire - and that of those involved in such actions - to suppress competition in trade, investment, energy markets, sports, and arts. This obsession with preserving and maintaining hegemony manifests itself in all of the above. To reiterate, we are building frameworks that support the development of our sports and arts in all forms.

Question: Where does the line between the trend for globalisation and the preservation of national sovereignty run? How do you avoid going from one extreme to another? How do you maintain the balance?

Sergey Lavrov: I believe a truly multipolar world is only possible when the countries, first, respect their own sovereignty and, second, ensure that others respect it as well. I see no contradiction here.

Take BRICS, for example. Not one member country has compromised its sovereignty. All decisions are made exclusively by consensus. Indeed, forming a consensus is much harder than simply holding a vote, as the European Union is trying to do now. Instead of taking into account the interests of Hungary, Slovakia, and a number of other countries that disagree with many actions of the Eurocrats who, unlike national governments, are not elected officials, the European Commission came up with the idea of the qualified majority voting. In other words, they’ll vote, and those willing to uphold their national interests and sovereignty will simply have decisions forced on them.

Rest assured that nothing like that will ever happen in associations like BRICS, the SCO, or the EAEU, the CIS, the CSTO, or in any other association with our participation. In fact, I see that the preservation, strengthening, and mutual respect for sovereignty by the country and its partners as the most important unifying factor for a multipolar world.

Question: At the autumn Znanie. The First marathon, Sports Minister Mikhail Degtyarev talked about strong pressure coming hard on Russian sports. He shared that Hungary has a whole department of sports diplomacy, aimed precisely at building relations with other countries through sport. History has many examples of how sports aka ping-pong diplomacy and many others help foster international relations. Are there any plans to create such a department in Russia?

Sergey Lavrov: Within the Ministry of Sport?

Question: No, within the Foreign Ministry.

Sergey Lavrov: The Ministry already has a division headed by an Ambassador-at-Large - the Minister’s Special Representative for International Sports Cooperation. The Foreign Ministry has engaged in this area for decades.
I’ve discussed this with Mikhail Degtyarev. The Ministry of Sport has extensive international ties. The current minister enjoys international engagement. They have people working on this. We work in close coordination and are ready to support them and align our efforts.

Question: What was the motivating factor in your challenging journey in the Foreign Ministry and prior to that? What advice would you impart to young people today who aspire to pursue a career in international relations?

Sergey Lavrov: You should enrol at MGIMO.
In reality, our recruits are not exclusively from MGIMO. Each year, we enlist young men and women from Lomonosov Moscow State University, St Petersburg State University, the Far Eastern Federal University, and the Higher School of Economics.

However, the overwhelming majority are MGIMO graduates. After all, its programmes are specifically designed to prepare personnel for the Ministry. When applying for a position, candidates must undergo assessments.
What influenced my career choice? I have spoken about this previously – it is no great secret. Upon finishing school, I received a silver medal. Though, to be candid, I had to retake biology to achieve it. Initially, I received a “C” in biology. My teachers and the school principal wanted me to have the medal, so I retook it and secured a “B.” That was sufficient for the silver medal.

We had an exceptional form instructor, Sergey Kuznetsov, who taught physics and mathematics. He took us on hiking trips and long journeys during holidays. We were very fond of him. I suppose it was partly due to the affection he inspired that he influenced me.

I intended to enrol at MEPhI. My late mother worked at the Ministry of Foreign Trade and said to me, “Well, MEPhI and other universities commence their entrance exams on August 1, but MGIMO begins on July 1. Why not give it a try?” I knew English – I had studied it. With my medal, I only had to sit two exams – history and English – on July 1 and 3. I scored two “A”s. I genuinely still intended to take MEPhI’s exams. But when I returned to my school to collect some documents and saw my classmates, all stressed and running around, I thought, “Fine.” Thus, in a way, it was almost accidental. But I have no regrets.

Question: What opportunities in international relations do you consider most promising for young people today?

Sergey Lavrov: The world is their oyster. There are endless possibilities. The question is, how should aspiring individuals seeking to make their mark on the international stage proceed, correct?

Question: What path would you advise them to take, and what should they avoid altogether?

Sergey Lavrov: They must endeavour. It is difficult to prescribe. Every individual is unique. The methods of self-education and self-improvement that work perfectly for one may not suit another.

There are international faculties – not solely at MGIMO, naturally, but at most universities. If someone is interested in foreign policy or international collaboration (which is not confined to foreign policy – it could mean economic or trade cooperation), they should enrol in relevant faculties and review each programme’s curriculum. I cannot offer anything more specific than that.

Question: Our President once said that, unfortunately, there was no one to talk to on the international arena after the passing of Mahatma Gandhi. This became a catch-phrase. Is there any person in the world today, with whom you could speak and engage in dialogue?

Sergey Lavrov: What do you mean, contrary to the fact that we have, kind of, been isolated or …

Question: Yes, rational dialogue.

Sergey Lavrov: Do you want to say that reasonable people are still exist?

Indeed, the President uttered this phrase at a time when it had already become clear what global strategic goals the West was pursuing in relations with the Russian Federation.

Of course, the President has many interlocutors. He maintains international contacts virtually every day. I have already mentioned Belarus, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and China. We have unprecedentedly profound, broad, trust-based and strategic relations with the People’s Republic of China.

President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping visited Russia and took part in festivities marking the 80th anniversary of Victory. In early September, President Vladimir Putin will go to China, at the invitation of President Xi Jinping, to celebrate the 80th anniversary of defeating Japanese militarism. These important events have major significance in the context of preserving historical memory and preventing the West and Japan from successfully erasing the memory of those years.  

I can go on forever listing leaders who regularly work with President Vladimir Putin within the framework of BRICS and the SCO and also on post-Soviet territory.

I never shy away from contacts, but I never impose myself on anyone. I meet regularly with the foreign ministers of Hungary and Slovakia. The Swiss Foreign Minister also requests a contact time and again. I never refuse them. In December 2024, former Austrian Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg requested a conversation during the OSCE Ministerial Meeting on Malta. He did not want to speak with me in front of the cameras, and asked me to go out for a smoke. We went out and talked to each other.

President Vladimir Putin never turns down offers and requests to meet and talk. Nor do I see any point in avoiding anyone. It is a different matter when they are avoiding you, boycotting and walking out when you are speaking. Let them do as they please. One fine day, they will do away with their follies. But things will never be the same when they are done with this, and when they express a desire to deal with us once again.

We now know what their words are really worth. “Thought expressed is a lie,” and anything they promised us is also a lie. This is what happened to the Minsk agreements, and a similar situation shaped up on the eve of the coup d’etat in Kiev in February 2014. At that time, then President Viktor Yanukovych and the opposition signed an agreement on calmly preparing for the early election. France, Germany and Poland signed this document and acted as its guarantors. The very next morning these signatures were tossed into the dustbin, and the opposition seized all government buildings.

In April 2022, bilateral talks were launched in Istanbul soon after the beginning of the special military operation. At that time, our negotiators agreed with principles for resolving the conflict that were suggested by the Ukrainian delegation. Later, they were told that they have not achieved much so far and therefore should continue fighting and weakening Russia.

When they (I am confident, not if but when) they come to their senses and suggest that we resume relations, our approach to building these relations in the future will be more rigorous.

Question: Following the global shifts of the past, we are witnessing a crisis of global international security, communication and law and order infrastructure. They no longer inspire confidence. Many countries have withdrawn from these structures. It appears that we are taking a step back. What do you think on this score? Do we need new structures? If so, what should they be like?

Sergey Lavrov: I have spoken on this issue in my statement. Of course, the UN has been put to test, primarily because of the West’s actions, which has actually taken over the governing elements of the UN Secretariat. The positions of the UN Secretary-General, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief and the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security are held by citizens of NATO countries.

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has initiated a reform. He has published a UN80 Initiative. I will not cite from that document, but it essentially stipulates restricting the ability of UN member states to influence the activities of the Organisation and its Secretariat and expanding the powers of the Secretariat in the spheres that have always been matters of intergovernmental coordination.

This is being done under the pretext that coordination takes too long, whereas such matters call for immediate action. This is yet another example of how the West is using its “proteges” in the secretariats of international organisations to promote solutions that benefit the West.

The Council of Europe, from which we have withdrawn, is in a deep crisis. Instead of developing a universal legal framework for humanitarian cooperation, it has thrown its energy into illegal efforts to establish “tribunals” against Russia, and commissions to assess the damage inflicted on Ukraine. This is regrettable. It used to be a good organisation.

The OSCE is in a deep crisis as well. Its current secretary general, a citizen of Türkiye and a former diplomat, has been trying to act within his powers in strict compliance with the principles of neutrality and impartiality. His predecessors grossly violated their powers and neglected the requirements of the OSCE’s statutory documents. The countries that held the rotating OSCE Chairpersonship acted in the same manner.

This position is currently held by Finland. The Helsinki Final Act, signed 50 years ago in 1975, led to the establishment of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was later renamed the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It was not a simple process either.

I have already mentioned organisations that are based on the principle of equality -- BRICS, the SCO, the CIS, the CSTO and the EAEU, including in relations with African colleagues. Incidentally, we will hold a second Ministerial Conference of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum and the first Russia-Arab World summit this autumn. We and our partners are comfortable with these formats.

Another place where we sit down at the same table with the West, apart from the UN, is the Group of Twenty (G20). It includes the G7 and the expanded BRICS and like-minded countries. A look at the balance in the G20 shows that it is equally divided between the G7 and their allies and BRICS and its allies – ten countries each. The G20 operates on the principle of consensus, which cannot be violated, and it is therefore a platform which can be used to bring the West to its senses. We have been trying to do this.

The West’s attempt to “Ukrainise” the G20 agenda fell through three years ago. Everyone supported our view that the G20 was not created to deal with political matters, which is the prerogative of the UN Security Council.

We still regard the UN as a crucial structure. If you look at the UN Charter, there is nothing that should be changed in it, including to suit the concept of multipolarity. The Charter includes the principle of sovereign equality of states, and the principle of equality and self-determination of nations. There is also the principle of territorial integrity.

The UN General Assembly later elaborated that the principle of territorial integrity applies to states whose governments respect the right of nations to self-determination and therefore represent all people residing in its territory. Did those who seized power as a result of the state coup in Kiev represent the people of Crimea, Donbass and Novorossiya? Definitely not.

All this has been set out in the fundamental documents. The West has recognised the independence of Kosovo even though no referendum was held there, explaining this by the right of nations to self-determination. However, when a referendum was held six years later in Crimea, where people wanted protection from the Nazis who had sent armed militants to seize the building of the Supreme Council of Crimea in Simferopol, the West did not regard this as their right to self-determination but insisted on respect for the principle of territorial integrity. According to a saying, the law is like an axle – you can turn it whichever way you please, if you give it plenty of grease. That is exactly what they are doing with international law.

The requirements of the UN Charter must also be respected at the UN. Choosing to respect one principle today and another tomorrow is unacceptable. All principles must be respected in their entirety and as a whole. We will continue working towards this end, even though resistance is strong.

Question: How do you estimate Russia’s role in shaping new global security architecture? What can be done to compel others to respect our country’s interests?

Sergey Lavrov:  I thought I tried to answer this question earlier.

First, it is necessary to defend the constituent principles at organisations that we regard as still viable.

I have just mentioned the UN and the strong assault on the rules of procedure and principles of the Charter. We have many allies in this area and their number is growing. In 2021, Venezuela came up with the initiative to establish the Group of Friends in Defence of the UN Charter. This 20-country Group regularly approves statements. There are other states willing to join this process. It regularly adopts statements (several statements on vital issues per year).

A statement was made not so long ago, and later we had it accepted as a UN General Assembly resolution. It has become a UN document on curtailing the modern practices of colonialism. This is a most important issue because seemingly these things happened so long ago. The decolonisation of Africa took place in the 1960s and the 1970s. Africa gained political independence but inherited borders that the colonial powers had drawn using a rule and cutting in two areas inhabited by one and the same ethnic group. This gives rise to periodic clashes, like the Burundi-Rwanda confrontation 30 years ago and the current stand-off between Mali and Algeria. One and the same ethnic group, the Tuareg, live on both sides of the border. This breeds contradictions and differences. But the most important thing is that the African Union is unwilling to change the lay of the borders, even though it has gained political independence along with these territorial problems. And this is the right thing to do. Consensus is the word.

But Africa failed to gain economic independence. I was on many business tours. For example, I visited South Africa. When the special military operation began, fuelling my plane emerged as a problem, because companies in charge of the fuelling business were either UK or US. We had much difficulty to come to terms with someone at an air force base. In any case, our South African friends would have done anything that was needed. This is an important sign. While hosting international events, sovereign states cannot guarantee to the association members they have invited that all technical and logistical hurdles will be properly addressed.

The current “second Africa revival wave” is about the economy. Our relations with the African Union have made much headway in recent years. In 2019, there was the first Russia-Africa Summit, followed by the second one in 2023. Right now, we are preparing a third summit. It will take place in Africa. In 2024, meanwhile, we held the First Ministerial Conference of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum. The second one is being planned later this year. 

We should keep universal structures like the UN in tone and urge everyone to respect the principles it has been founded on. In parallel, we ought to develop the centres of the upcoming multipolar world. I am referring to the SCO, the EAEU, the CIS, the CSTO, and all other associations in Eurasia, plus BRICS at the global level. This is a strong movement. 

The West will end up nowhere if it fails to become a major and strong centre of power and rather seeks to retain its full hegemony.

Question: You are a diplomat with a “human face.” Weaknesses are not alien to you and occasionally you can swear, using “strong words.” We love you for that as we do this “real thing” in you. My question in this connection is: How do you manage to remain human, considering your hermetic, conservative surroundings? 

Sergey Lavrov: I did not know that a “strong word” was a sign of weakness. Perceived this way, it is a touch of nature, not weakness. 

Any profession, if it lacks humour, cannot really thrill you. This refers to diplomacy more than to many other occupations. It often plays a positive role, if you have a chance to quip during a conversation or egg on a partner (provided you know him or her well and can predict their reactions).

President of Russia Vladimir Putin has a strong intuition which he displays while talking to his counterparts. This is one of the key things in diplomacy. You can gain much knowledge but the art of being on the same wave length with other people is largely inborn. Nevertheless, all of us should practice it under all circumstances.

For example, I used to mess around with other children in the yard when a boy. There was also an overage bully three or four years older than the rest, who would come and start ordering smaller boys around. This is roughly the same the West is doing now with regard to all others. People have just come for air to the yard, so leave them alone. But no, it’s in them to come and distort 15 kopecks or something else from everyone. Therefore, I like humour being present everywhere.

Question: Please tell us in confidence what you said at the BRICS Summit in Kazan, when someone stepped on your toes.

Sergey Lavrov: There are many different inventions. A beautiful girl passed by. She stepped on my foot. I decided that she was making passes at me and said that I would soon go out for a smoke.

Russia
Source: eng.globalaffairs.ru

At the recent meeting of the SCO Council of Foreign Ministers, the long-dormant Russia–India–China (RIC) format received a new impetus as Moscow confirmed efforts to revive the trilateral dialogue and Beijing expressed open support. Amid the current easing of tensions between India and China, RIC’s revival comes as a critical step towards reinforcing the strategic core of the BRICS+ framework and bolstering stability across Eurasia.

This shift in strategic thinking among RIC countries comes at a pivotal moment. Earlier this month, at the 17th BRICS Summit held in Rio de Janeiro under Brazil’s 2025 Chairmanship, with the stated theme “Strengthening Global South Cooperation for More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance”, the leaders reiterated their commitment to multilateralism, international law, and equitable development, and vowed commitment to build a more inclusive and representative global order that would be in the best of the Global South’s interests.

The leaders’ common vision is that emerging powers must enjoy a greater role in global governance, with the UN remaining its center and cooperation, not coercion guiding international affairs. Importantly, the leaders emphasized the need to abide by the Purposes and Principles enshrined in the UN Charter in their entirety. They also voiced the need to build deeper interconnectedness, advance sustainable development, and ensure the protection of human rights for all—not in the Western format, but in a manner that respects cultural diversity, national sovereignty, and the unique developmental contexts of the Global South nations.

The 2025 Rio de Janeiro summit marked a turning point in BRICS’s history. Welcoming new members, including Indonesia, and 12 partner nations such as Belarus, Cuba, Nigeria, and Uzbekistan, it demonstrated its ambition to serve as a collective voice for the Global South and represent a broad spectrum of developing economies. The Summit’s key initiatives include the Climate Finance Framework and SME Plan (2025–2030), and the Submarine Cable Proposal—a feasibility study for a high-speed BRICS internet cable. With over 40% of the global population, 37.3% of global GDP, and 18% of world trade, BRICS alone (even more if expanded as BRICS+) now wields significant global influence.

As BRICS+ forges mutually beneficial partnerships across the Global South, there is a growing need to ensure internal cohesion and effective coordination among its core members. Without a stable foundation, it risks fragmentation or a functional paralysis under the West’s pressure, divide-and-rule tactics, and opportunistic concessions.

RIC’s revival can provide the necessary anchor to help BRICS+ mature into a more coordinated and credible geopolitical force.

Since its inception in 2006 as a loose association of emerging economies, BRICS has evolved from an investment acronym into a multilateral institution with growing global clout. Institutions such as the New Development Bank (NDB) were created as alternatives to West-led financial bodies like the IMF and World Bank, offering more equitable support to developing nations. However, for BRICS to fully realize its potential, further institutional development is needed—especially in enhancing intra-BRICS trade, investment, and technological cooperation.

The RIC trio, which together made 36.7% of global GDP in 2024, forms the backbone of BRICS. Yet longstanding political tensions remain a stumbling block. The diplomatic progress made in 2024 by India and China through an agreement to restore mutual patrolling rights in Depsang Plains and Demchok in Ladakh—the first significant breakthrough since the 2020 border crisis—is limited as it does not resolve the broader boundary dispute. Nonetheless, China remains India’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade reaching $127.7 billion in FY 2024-25, albeit heavily tilted in China’s favor. Meanwhile, Russia—facing Western severe sanctions due to the war in Ukraine—has grown more dependent on China, with bilateral trade reaching record high $245 billion the same year. This growing Russia–China alignment has raised concerns in New Delhi about the potential imbalance within RIC, and the risk of India being sidelined.

Beyond geopolitics, RIC faces significant structural hurdles to deeper cooperation. Disparate trade policies, customs procedures, and intellectual property regimes hinder intra-RIC trade, which remains modest relative to BRICS’s total trade volumes. In 2024, India’s trade with China accounted only for 7-8% of its total, and trade with Russia was even less. Cooperation is further complicated by divergent digital governance frameworks. India’s data localization mandates under its Digital Personal Data Protection Act clash with China’s tightly state-controlled internet regulations, limiting the scope of cross-border digital trade. Technological gaps also persist: while China leads in areas like 5G, AI, and quantum computing, India faces challenges in bridging its rural-urban digital divide, and Russia struggles for access to advanced technologies amid sanctions.

To turn BRICS+ into a credible counterbalance to Western institutions, RIC member states must urgently harmonize their trade policies.

A shared legal and regulatory framework could unlock smoother trade and investment flows across member states. A BRICS Customs Union could help reduce tariffs and streamline customs procedures, potentially elevating intra-BRICS trade to that of more integrated associations such as the EU or ASEAN.

Digital interoperability should also be a top priority. India’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI), which is gaining global traction, and China’s Alipay offer platforms that could facilitate cross-border transactions within BRICS+ economies. The 2025 submarine cable project presents another promising avenue for integrating digital infrastructure and enhancing collective cybersecurity.
Bridging the technology gap requires standardized agreements on innovation and intellectual property. The BRICS Action Plan for Innovation (2025–2030) must prioritize joint research in green energy, quantum computing, and other emerging fields, while also deepening cooperation in traditional industries such as oil and gas, manufacturing, and agriculture. Institutions like the BRICS Space Council, which facilitates the sharing of satellite data for disaster response and climate monitoring, should be further leveraged to enhance cross-border technological collaboration.

Equally vital are people-to-people linkages. Simplifying visa regimes for professionals, students, and researchers can foster deeper societal ties and serve as a soft-power asset. Expanded academic exchange programs, cultural initiatives, and youth empowerment—especially for women and underrepresented communities—are essential for building long-term cohesion within the BRICS+ framework. While initiatives like the 2025 Memorandum of Understanding on Youth Cooperation are welcome, they require sustained funding and political backing to achieve a meaningful impact.


Climate cooperation is another area where RIC must lead by example. The BRICS Climate Finance Framework, launched in 2025, aims to pool resources and expertise to help BRICS member states adapt to climate change. Here, the strengths of each RIC nation are complementary: China’s green technology leadership, India’s solar power initiatives through the International Solar Alliance, and Russia’s vast natural resource base provide a solid foundation for collaborative environmental action.
Ultimately, the future of BRICS+ hinges on Russia, India, and China’s capacity to overcome their divisions and remain committed to collective progress.

As the BRICS+ expands its reach, the importance of a stable and aligned core becomes ever more critical.

The challenges are significant, but so are the opportunities. If the RIC nations harmonize trade policies, digital systems, and innovation agendas, they can solidify their role as the nucleus of a more inclusive, multipolar world order—one that reflects the true aspirations of the Global South

Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

Head of the Youth Association for International Cooperation Development (ANO YAIC), Lecturer at the Center for the Study of Foreign Languages of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Expert on Food Security Issues in the MENA Region

U.S. President Donald Trump issued a stern ultimatum to Russia, BRICS member states, and their economic partners. He warned that unless a peace agreement with Ukraine is signed within 50 days—by September 3, 2025—Washington will impose a 100% import tariff on goods from Russia, as well as “secondary” tariffs on countries that would continue buying Russian oil and gas. Speaking in the Oval Office alongside NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Trump emphasized that he is “discontented” with Moscow’s unwillingness to compromise and is ready for “extremely tough” measures.

In the meantime, he threatened to increase sanctions pressure on any country “sympathizing with the anti-American course of BRICS,” by introducing an additional 10% tariff on top of the base rates. According to Trump, “there will be no exceptions” for those who support BRICS plans for de-dollarization or the creation of alternative global governance institutions.

Economic and Financial Repercussions

The statement by the President of the United States regarding the introduction of a universal 10-percent tariff on BRICS member states is not merely guided by populism or a trade measure, but rather the beginning of a new phase in the economic conflict targeting both the redistribution of trade flows and fundamental rethinking of the U.S. role in the global economy.

The reason is quite obvious—BRICS countries are visibly stepping up their efforts to create a parallel financial, economic and institutional architecture, thereby undermining the status quo in which the dollar and the U.S. have been the uncontested centers of power.

Washington’s response in the form of tariff pressure is aimed at destabilizing this alternative BRICS model. The tariffs announced by Donald Trump are not only an economic measure but also a kind of political weapon meant to dismantle alternative centers of power.

However, in this case, the result can be quite the opposite. The U.S. risks losing its role as an arbiter in global trade, while the reaction of BRICS nations will likely be not only symmetrical but also strategic, and range from accelerating de-dollarization to moving towards a new architecture of global settlements. This could betoken the end of Washington’s dominance in the global economy and trade, fueling the formation of a new multipolar trade architecture. Thus, the world is entering an era of new turbulence, where non-economic factors will increasingly determine the economic future.

Speaking generally about the impact of the announced tariffs on the global economy, a number of BRICS nations, as well as key economies of the Global South and the global majority, have already reacted in one way or another. For instance, China condemned the actions of the U.S. and the announced tariff policy, viewing them as economic blackmail. As is well known, China is currently activating the CIPS platform for settlements with Brazil, South Africa, Russia, and other BRICS member states.

Tariffs are not only about trade but also—as U.S. experts point out—control. Trump is trying to contain the rise of new alternative globalization, which is forming around BRICS and even broader, around BRICS+. However, the paradox of this situation is that such measures do not restrain the development of trade and financial directions within BRICS but rather accelerate it.

A new wave of protectionist trade policies in the U.S, which surged after the announced plans to raise the “basic mutual” tariff rate to 15–20% and extend it to partners importing Russian or Iranian oil on July 10, 2025, has once again called into question the sustainability of global agri-food supply chains. Negotiations between the finance ministers of the “Group of Twenty” in Durban on July 17, were effectively under the threat of a new tariff escalation, with European and Asian countries warning of a possible mirror response, increasing the risk of further global trade fragmentation.

Impact of Trump’s Tariff Policy on Food Security in BRICS Countries

The final declaration of the XVII BRICS Summit, adopted in Rio de Janeiro, includes several substantial and comprehensive provisions dedicated to food security in the member states.
First, the document emphasizes the key role of BRICS member states in global food production and in assuring global food and nutritional security. The parties condemn unilateral coercive measures, primarily referring to economic sanctions, whose imposition negatively affects the realization of human rights, including the right of access to food resources. Furthermore, the declaration once again highlights the relevance of the initiative to establish a BRICS grain exchange and its development.

The emerging food sovereignty of the alliance, as well as the idea of creating a grain exchange, inevitably raises concerns in Washington regarding the preservation of its role as a regulator of prices, demand, and supply, even though the process of implementing the grain exchange initiative is rather gradual and unhurried.

The economic protectionism policy pursued by the Trump administration since 2017, including the introduction of tariff restrictions against China, Brazil, India, and other trading partners, has had significant repercussions for global agri-food chains. For BRICS nations, which play a key role as producers and importers of food, these measures have exacerbated food instability risks, increased external trade costs, and have stimulated the development of their own agrarian strategies that respond to current realities.

BRICS Nations: Food Vulnerability and Adaptation in a Turbulent Trade Environment

Washington’s decision to impose a universal 10% tariff on all imports to the U.S., along with the threat of additional charges for countries that “have joined the anti-American policies of BRICS,” has actually marked a new milestone in the escalation of trade conflicts. Formally, this concerns tariffs, but in reality, such measures are nothing else than a tool of geopolitical pressure called to restrain the growing influence of BRICS and to hamper its de-dollarization initiatives. A wide circle of states is affected, however a key question remains: how capable are these measures of undermining BRICS food security and economic stability?

Below is a chart of the current and upcoming tariffs to be imposed on all BRICS member states starting August 1, 2025. Another 10% tariff for BRICS ideological solidarity should be imposed in addition to the existing ones.

Russia and Iran will most likely be indirectly affected by the potential tariffs. Formally, Washington has imposed a 10% “basic” duty on all imports, but for Iranian food products, it is purely theoretical: food shipments from Iran to the U.S. have been banned since September 29, 2010, by OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury) and their sanctions.

Considering that fertilizers are an important element of food security, in 2024, about 7% of Russia’s fertilizer export revenues came from U.S supplies. (approximately 2.5 million tons of urea, ammonium nitrate, and potassium salts). Of course, there is no threat to food security; the measures taken by the U.S. will mainly affect producers and tax revenues flowing to the national treasury. A decrease in fertilizer supplies to the U.S. will push domestic producers to diversify their exports. For example, in the first half of 2025, exports of Russian fertilizers to Brazil increased by almost 30%.

A different situation is observed for BRICS member states located in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The fact is that the existing 10% basic tariff and the deprivation of Ethiopia’s AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act) benefits affect the supply of a key food product—coffee—while the impact of tariffs on non-food products (clothing) reduces the availability of hard currency in the country, with grain, fertilizers and bread prices steeply rising and the national currency being destabilized as a result. Egypt and the UAE, on the contrary, find themselves in relatively benign circumstances: their food chains are diversified, and the costs are currently limited to rising transactional expenses.

South Africa has not gone unnoticed either. For South Africa, the U.S. market accounts for only about 8% of its exports, but the share in citrus fruits reaches up to 16%, making the 30% customs hit (which may be accompanied by additional measures) surgical but strong and painful. Undoubtedly, South Africa has numerous markets, including those in BRICS, to reorient to. Moreover, the country remains a major producer of maize and fruits. However, the tripling of tariffs will severely impact the incomes of countless farming families, increasing pressure on the local currency. As a result, access to and stability of food for low-income groups will deteriorate, while the prices for imported bread and sunflower oil will rise. The key question is whether Pretoria can negotiate partial exemptions or expedite the reorientation of its exports before the tariffs begin to take a heavy toll, in order to prevent hunger and maintain the availability of existing products for the local population.

In Southeast Asia, Indonesia—also a member of BRICS since this January—has become the main target of Washington D.C. In addition to the base tariff, the U.S. has imposed a separate 32% duty on palm oil, with Jakarta covering 85% of U.S. imports required for this product.

In terms of seafood (mainly shrimp), only a 10% tariff was imposed in 2024. For Indonesia, U.S. tariffs are not a threat to food availability per se, but rather a blow to exporter revenues, and through them, to the financial access to food for people residing in coastal and palm regions. Additional tariffs on top of the existing ones will have a more destructive effect, which is why Indonesia is currently combining “tough bargaining” with Washington (for example, a guarantee for the purchase of 2 million tons of wheat, reorientation of export flows, and targeted fiscal measures domestically) with subsidies to Indonesian farmers.

Overall, this gives a chance to limit the macroeconomic damage done by tariffs (reaching around 0.05% of GDP) and prevent the further deterioration of food security for vulnerable population groups.
It is not that easy for U.S. customs duties to “bend” the Celestial Empire.

The United States accounts for about 5% of China’s total agricultural exports. Washington’s tariffs of 10% and 55% would eliminate a significant portion of these sales, but will affect only a small portion of the entire sector’s foreign exchange earnings. The introduction of effective supportive domestic measures by Beijing—including an increase in the budget for domestic grain reserves, subsidizing agricultural insurance, and loans for fish processors—will neutralize the potential systemic threat to China’s food security considering the existing and potential tariff measures taken by the United States.

As for India, U.S. tariffs will undoubtedly take a heavy toll on the export revenues of certain sectors (shrimp, spices, basmati), but they will not undermine the overall food security of this nation. The U.S. imports about 12% of India’s total agricultural exports. In turn, Delhi adheres to the diplomatic principle of “removing the surcharge” and has already proposed to the U.S. the reduction of its own tariffs on several U.S. goods, as well as guaranteed wheat purchases in exchange for exempting shrimp and rice from excessive customs duties. Simultaneously, the government is already launching market reorientation and targeted subsidies to soften the impact on farmer incomes.

The tariff policy unfolding around Brazil may well be the most notorious “tariff case.” Trump, accusing Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of a “witch hunt” against former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, intends to impose a record 50% tariff (the highest since China) on imports from Brazil starting August 1.
Brazil is quite unusual among Trump’s recent tariff targets, as it has a trade deficit with the U.S., while nearly all other countries have significant surpluses. In 2024, this country imported goods worth about 44 billion USD from the U.S., while exports from Brazil to the U.S. amounted to around 42 billion USD.

China’s De-dollarization Mechanisms within the Yuan Internationalization Strategy. RIAC Report

Brazil is a net exporter of grains, sugar, and meat. The surplus supply in a closed U.S. market lowers domestic prices; however, the incomes of 2 million coffee producers, 60,000 citrus growers, and 120,000 people employed in meat processing are declining.

Currently, the United States is the largest buyer of Brazilian coffee. If a tariff is implemented, U.S. roasters will have to seek alternative sources of coffee from other countries, while Brazilian coffee exporters are likely to redirect their supplies to markets in Europe and Asia, as well as BRICS member states, to make up for the U.S. market. U.S. coffee roasters will not be able to absorb a 50% increase in prices for Brazilian beans, while Brazilian exporters do not have sufficient margin flexibility to lower prices, to offset such a significant tariff. Again, Brazil’s food supply system will not be affected, even though without targeted government support, the incomes of coffee producers, citrus farmers, and meat processors are vulnerable.

Thus, U.S. tariff pressure does not lead BRICS nations to a direct food deficit, but it increases currency volatility and impacts the incomes of millions of households. The reciprocal strategies used by BRICS economies are similar: market diversification, subsidies for key exporters, increasing domestic reserves, and in some cases, negotiations with Washington on regulating mutual tariffs, or bargaining.

However, national measures are already insufficient. Washington is accelerating what it is actually trying to avoid: the rapprochement of BRICS member states, the rapid formation of alternative financial institutions and integration mechanisms, including the launch of a payment system based on national currencies, the reorientation of food sale and import markets, as well as the development of a consolidated geopolitical strategy for BRICS. The declarative nature of the initiatives gives way to joint practical steps.

Washington is shifting away from “targeted” sanctions to tough tariff diplomacy, where trade duties serve as the main tool of coercion. For the United States, the outcome of the confrontation will depend on how willing it is to endure real economic losses for the sake of achieving geopolitical objectives. As for BRICS states, the burdensome consequences of the U.S. tariff policy will directly depend on their ability to develop a unified position and not to allow tariff aggression to disrupt their cohesion. It is extremely important to strengthen unity in views and perspectives, strive for the further expansion of BRICS economies and markets, providing each state with mutual trade preferences and financial support.

Russia
Source: mid.ru

South Africa’s Presidency in the G20 is of great importance for quite a number of reasons. It is the first time that an African country has assumed leadership of this key international economic forum. And this is exactly one of the manifestations of the emergence of a new world order.

In 2025 the G20 rounds off its first full cycle of presidencies, which offers a good opportunity to review our past efforts and discuss the goals ahead.

On top of that, several anniversary dates create an exceptional historical context for the G20 this year. Namely the 80th anniversary of our Victory in the World War II and the founding of the United Nations; as well as the 65th anniversary of the adoption of the UN Declaration on Decolonization.
South Africa is steadily setting the tone for G20 endeavors with a focus on urgent issues of economic growth, food security, artificial intelligence, debt burden, and critical minerals. We support Pretoria’s priorities and strive to contribute to tangible practical results.

On July 24-25, the G20 Development Ministerial Meeting convened in Mpumalanga Province, opening a number of high-level G20 events this year. It provided for successful adoption of documents on sensitive matters for Africa, such as illicit financial flows and social protection. Now we embark on the final stretch towards the November G20 Summit.

Against the backdrop of rising geo-economic fragmentation, G20’s activities attract increasing attention. The Forum adopted its present form in 2008 – at a challenging time for the world economy – and since then proved itself an effective “crisis manager” on numerous occasions. G20 has remained resilient and efficient even at the peak of Western anti-Russian hysteria in 2022-2023. Today it continues to develop very much-needed consensus solutions on pressing economic and global issues.

The successive chairmanships of BRICS countries in 2022-2025 made a significant input to the productive work of the G20. Thanks to the well-balanced and independent stance of recent Chairs (Indonesia, India, Brazil and now South Africa), we could advance a unifying agenda at the Forum and transform it into a major channel to enable equitable communication among the largest economies.

The cycle of the BRICS leaderships in the G20 coincided with the steady strengthening of its positions in economic affairs. Today, BRICS and G7’ shares in the global GDP are measured as 40 and 29 percent respectively.

The mounting influence of BRICS asserts it as a center for growth, innovation and one of the main pillars of a new and more just world order. Its principles of consensus, equality, mutual consideration of each other’s interests resonate with a growing number of countries in the Global South, which enhances the role of BRICS as a sort of “spokesperson” for the World Majority.

In the G20, increasing weight and consolidation of a new pole of power enabled to rectify the long-standing pro-Western bias, and to focus discussions on the needs of developing nations. Finally, what we have at the top of our agenda is the long overdue issues of how to make economic governance more democratic and eliminate the digital and technological divides between the Global North and South. Such problems as illegitimate sanctions and other methods of unfair competition alongside the failure of developed countries to deliver on their ODA commitments were accorded the attention they rightly deserved.

South African Presidency has predictably placed G20 emphasis on the African agenda – a step that we fully support. Amidst the alarming developments in the global economy, situation in African countries looks particularly precarious. They routinely have to deal with the aftermaths of colonialism, thriving neocolonial practices, and inequitable division of labor. Their takes at development and industrialization get hindered by proliferating protectionist barriers, unbearable borrowing costs, and draining of resources.

Together with like-minded partners, we take efforts to consolidate the achievements of the BRICS presidencies in the G20 and give a strong political impetus to overcoming the challenges faced by developing countries, especially in Africa. We suggest our colleagues consider providing a “permanent seat” for BRICS in the G20.

Africa will only benefit from boosting cooperation with BRICS as a conduit for the priorities of the Global South, including at major multilateral fora such as G20. BRICS membership now comprises South Africa, Egypt and Ethiopia, who seek to promote both national objectives and pan-African agenda. Since 2025, Nigeria and Uganda have joined in as partner states. In addition, further enlargement of the New Development Bank through African shareholders seems rather promising.

The status of BRICS as a leading international format was vividly stressed at the Summits in Kazan in 2024 and in Rio de Janeiro this year. The key results of Russian and recent Brazilian chairmanships keep evolving. That includes initiatives for interbank cooperation and elaboration of independent settlement and insurance instruments. Also, broad support was given to our proposals on the new mechanisms of exchange trading, strengthening the resilience of supply chains and resistance to protectionism.

Both in Kazan and Rio de Janeiro, member states committed to building a more just, resilient, polycentric world order and putting an end to the Western dominance in the Bretton Woods institutions. We will continue to advance this common ground within the G20.

Russia is a responsible contributor to the development agenda, both bilaterally and at international venues. Our focus is on maximizing the potential of Russian-African partnership. Every year the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) serves as an acclaimed platform for promoting Africa’s interests. And again we would like to express our heartfelt gratitude to Deputy President of the Republic of South Africa Paul Mashatile for his participation in the event this year.

SPIEF’s distinguished stance is largely based on our competitive advantages in energy, digitalization and infrastructure, as well as extensive experience in terms of import substitution. We look forward to further fruitful cooperation and offer our African friends effective tools to enhance their economic sovereignty. In current difficult geopolitical situation sovereignty is the key to the true economic and political independence.